



Editors Note: The following DPRK, ROK, and Chinese perspectives were offered at a recent meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and illustrate the wide differences that exist regarding Korean Peninsula denuclearization. These views are solely those of the individual authors.

Situation in the Korean Peninsula – A North Korean Perspective by So Ki-sok

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The Six-Party Talks for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula were entirely broken down by the racket for sanctions and pressure by antagonistic forces, including the U.S. As a result, an unpredictable tense situation was created on the Korean peninsula.

The escalated tension was caused by the unchanged hostile policy of the U.S. against the DPRK. The Six-Party Talks ended and the tension was escalated by the U.S. and its followers who entirely denied the spirit of respect for sovereignty and sovereign equality, the basis and life of the talks which was clarified in the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement. The essence of the U.S. hostile policy against the DPRK, which continues to be maintained, is to obliterate the idea and system of the DPRK.

The current U.S. Administration has repeated the denunciations of Bush who used to say that the DPRK was a “tyranny” and a “rogue regime.” It also brought up the issue of our satellite launch for peaceful purposes to the UN Security Council saying it was “the challenge” to international society. The use of outer space for peaceful purposes is the legitimate right of a sovereign state stipulated by international law. The DPRK launched the satellite in accordance with international procedures after joining the necessary international conventions, including the Outer Space Treaty.

But the UNSC, which, until now, had not taken issue with and dealt with the satellite launch of individual countries, adopted the “President’s Statement” under the incitement of the U.S., saying that the satellite launch of the DPRK was a violation of UNSCR 1718 and denounced it. Urged by the U.S., the UNSC adopted “Resolution 1874” on sanctions against the DPRK on June 12, taking issue with the second nuclear test of the DPRK, which was taken as a self-defensive measure. The “President’s Statement” and “UN Resolution,” instigated by the U.S. and finding fault with the peaceful satellite launch and nuclear test, are just wanton violations of and insults to the sovereignty of the DPRK and part of the international pressure to disarm and bring down the DPRK. The adoption of the resolution to condemn the DPRK and support for the hard policy of the U.S. Administration against

the DPRK in the U.S. Congress on June 15 showed that the U.S. hostile policy against the DPRK never changed.

Analysts have expressed concern that there is the possibility that the present U.S. Administration would enforce a stronger policy against the DPRK in the future than did the Bush administration. The acute phase of confrontation between the DPRK and U.S. was created by the racket for sanctions and pressure on the DPRK by the present U.S. Administration, which continued the Bush Administration’s hostile policy against the DPRK.

Second, tensions are the result of all kinds of military exercises and arms reinforcement conducted by the U.S. on the Korean peninsula. No sooner had the U.S. Administration taken power than it conducted the unprecedented large-scale joint military exercises “Key Resolve” and “Foal Eagle” in and around south Korea in March and thus severely threatened the security of the DPRK. These were nuclear war exercises for the preemptive attack on the DPRK entirely in its scale as well as its contents. This is well known through the fact that a larger number of U.S. forces than in the past and attackable military equipment including two aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines were thrown in the joint military exercises and the period of exercises was doubled.

The U.S. made “OPlan 5027” and “OPlan 5029” to attack the DPRK and has conducted large-scale strike exercises continuously in the sea and air, mobilizing a group of combat warships and “F-15K” fighters including nuclear submarines around south Korea in recent days. The situation has also been extremely aggravated by all kinds of scouting actions on the ground, sea and air.

The insistence to solve the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula with military means, which appeared at the beginning of Bush administration, has been strengthened. The U.S. and south Korean troops escalated the second stage of “watch condition” to the third stage and the U.S. let its air forces move urgently into the Korean peninsula and put U.S. ground forces in south Korea on alert.

The U.S. made the decision to introduce 84 pieces of “SM-2,” ship-to-air guided missiles which are expected to be installed on south Korean destroyers and also announced that it would deploy “Global Hawk,” an unmanned air scout for the improvement of capability to collect information on the DPRK. The U.S. also made the decision to sell to south Korea in the period of the “the military mid term plan of 2010-2014” tens of “OBU-2s,” laser-guided bombs (so-called “Bunker Busters”), whose export was banned because it is one of the strategic weapons, to destroy underground military facilities.

Such facts show that tension on the Korean peninsula has been aggravated by military exercises and arms reinforcement made by the U.S. in and around the peninsula.

The way to prevent aggravated tension

First, the U.S. and antagonistic forces should cease the racket for sanctions and pressure on the DPRK. The DPRK made nuclear weapons and has strengthened its self-defensive war deterrent to maintain the sovereignty and the right to existence of the nation in the face of the increased aggressive threat by the U.S. The retaliatory measures have been followed by sanctions and pressure and the situation has been aggravated by them.

In recent days, some people say that the DPRK's measures to strengthen the self-defensive military power in the face of unfair measures by the UNSC is to seek "direct talks between the DPRK and U.S." and to gain "more political and economic benefits" through dialogue in the future. These are the words of those who don't know about the essence of the matter. The DPRK has strengthened its military power to maintain the security of the country and the sovereignty of the nation and it is not aimed at drawing anyone's attention and taking anything through dialogue. The DPRK can live under even stronger sanctions than in the past because it has already lived under sanctions imposed by the antagonistic forces for tens of years. The DPRK has already built a firm self-reliant national economy and strong defensive capability and has accelerated economic construction depending on them.

Under such conditions, the DPRK cannot but go along the road to strengthen its self-defensive nuclear deterrent in every way because there would be no fruits from talks with the U.S., which tries to pursue its hostile policy against the DPRK. The DPRK said that it should counter "the sanctions" with retaliation and "confrontation" with all-out confrontation as the DPRK has put the announced strong measures into practice. This shows that the escalation of tensions is inevitable as long as the U.S. hostile policy exists.

Second, the U.S. should put an end to the unfair double-standard policy it has applied to its international relations. If the unfair double-standard of the U.S. is allowed, the world will be divided into dominating countries and dominated countries and international relations would be inequitable and complicated. The double-standard policy of the U.S. has heavily appeared in several international issues such as nuclear, human rights, and terrorism, and it has made the solution of problems worse and more complicated. The racket for sanctions and pressure by the U.S. abusing the UN is a typical product of the double-standard policy.

Only a principle that is applied to all countries equally is the life and fundamental principle of international organizations. The double-standard of the U.S. demands yes or no to the alliance with the U.S. and following the U.S. would only result in preventing the solution of international problems, to say nothing of the Korean issue. Therefore, the unfair double-standard policy of the U.S., denied by history, should be ended as soon as possible.

Third, the U.S. should give up its supremacy and move toward the universal dismantlement of nuclear weapons. The U.S. president said that if he was elected, he would show "the new figure of the changed U.S.," saying that he would show "the sincere attitude of the U.S." to cooperate with the world and withdraw from the high-handed act, arbitrariness, and

unilateralism pursued by the former Administration. Now he is trying to show "the changed figure," speaking about "the world without nuclear weapons," or "establishment of a nuclear fuel bank." But there is so far no tangible fundamental change in U.S. policy though several months have passed since the appearance of the new U.S. Administration.

Sometime ago, the U.S. president said that the U.S. would maintain its military supremacy. The announced U.S. military budget in 2010 is \$534 billion or 4 percent more than 2009. This is more than the total military capabilities of 25 countries. The U.S. conducted the first nuclear test and used the first nuclear bombs in war in the world. The U.S. has about 9,400 nuclear weapons and deployed 1,702 nuclear warheads. Such facts show that the U.S. has pursued supremacy continuously and depended on that power.

Now world opinion says that the U.S. has shouted the slogan of "a world without nuclear weapons" but it is devoid of action. The period that pursued the supremacy and blackmail of small countries has passed. If the U.S. Administration wants "the world without nuclear weapons," it should give up its supremacy and move toward the entire dismantlement of nuclear weapons.

The root cause of the danger of WMD proliferation

It is important to find the root cause of the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to prevent it. It can be said that the danger of proliferation of WMD is generated by the ambition based on nuclear superiority and the double-standard policy of the U.S. to realize dominance. The U.S. produced and used nuclear weapons first in the world and has pursued supremacy, threatening other countries and interfering in internal affairs with many nuclear weapons. The U.S. has infringed heavily on the sovereignty of independent countries that have different ideas and systems under the pretext of "the threat of proliferation of WMD" while it does not say even a word about the fact that its alliances possess and proliferate WMD and it even supports them secretly.

To end the threat and proliferation of nuclear weapons, first of all the U.S. should join in the world trends that demand the entire dismantlement of nuclear weapons, removing the threat of nuclear preemptive attack on designated states, and the double-standard policy related to the nuclear issue.

View of PSI

Now the U.S. is trying to expand the dangerous "proliferation security initiative" aimed at anti-U.S. countries including the DPRK with UNSC Resolution 1540. PSI is a high-handed policy based on unilateralism and the product of unfair double-standard policy. PSI would cause military conflict and world instability as the tool to ignore international laws such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to say nothing of the UN Charter that stipulates respect for sovereignty and the rules or mutual relations between countries, and legalize undisguised piracy to infringe on the sovereignty and right of existence of other countries.

The U.S. is trying to legalize the dangerous PSI system and expand it under the pretext of the nuclear test made by the DPRK in recent days. The Korean peninsula is under a touch-

and-go situation because of the south Korean decision to fully participate in PSI. Originally, the Bush Administration had ceaselessly tried to drag south Korea into PSI and the present U.S. Administration urged south Korea to take part in PSI at last. This is wanton violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement that does not allow any kind of embargo by one side, to say nothing of international law.

The DPRK already clarified that it would regard the encroachment on its sovereignty by PSI as a declaration of war. It means that if the DPRK's sovereignty is violated by PSI then the U.S. denied the Armistice Agreement itself and threw away its responsibility as a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, and the DPRK should respond with immediate and strong military means because the DPRK is no longer bound by the Armistice Agreement.

Developments on the Korean Peninsula: A South Korean Perspective by Kyudok Hong

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It is unfortunate that the DPRK violated relevant resolutions and statements of the UNSC and defied repeated warnings of the international community. Pyongyang's nuclear test on May 25, 2009 and its nuclear and ballistic missile programs seriously threaten peace and stability. Furthermore, the DPRK overtly declared its intention to reprocess its spent fuel rods to make an additional nuclear bomb. It also threatened to test an ICBM, build light-water reactors, and will no longer hide its intention to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) for making additional bombs. Pyongyang's provocations not only destabilize the power balance among the states in Northeast Asia but also increase the level of tensions by creating a regional arms race.

In conducting the second test, the North clearly demonstrated a complete disregard for its commitments under the Sept. 19, 2005 Joint Statement and subsequent agreements reached at the Six-Party Talks. I believe that Pyongyang made a series of strategic blunders and failed to take advantage of the leadership change in the United States.

There are many who are still concerned by the possibility that the Obama administration will compromise with Pyongyang due to its inability to force Pyongyang to give up its nuclear option. There are at least four reasons why the Obama administration will not use force against Pyongyang. First, North Korea's sudden collapse would create a dangerous power vacuum and would give rise to fierce rivalries among regional great powers. Second, uncontrolled stockpiles of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in North Korea might become available to other states or rogue groups and would threaten to undermine global nonproliferation efforts. Third, a surge in cross-border refugees would force enormous socioeconomic strains on neighbors including China. Fourth, stabilization and reconstruction of North Korea would require a large investment of resources from international society. Therefore military strikes or an invasion would jeopardize potential economic cooperation among concerned parties.

It seems that North Korea will keep testing the Obama administration by escalating further with the possibility of another nuclear test and the firing of a long-range missile. It remains to be seen how long the U.S. can be persistent and patient enough to maintain its principles.

People in South Korea generally believe that Pyongyang's violations should be met with a strong response. South Korea welcomed the adoption of UNSCR 1874 in which the Council acted unanimously to condemn those activities in the strongest possible terms and imposed very strong sanctions to limit North Korea from advancing its banned programs by blocking funds, extending the embargo to products which help them, adopting sanctions against persons and entities involved, and requiring states to inspect and destroy banned cargo.

South Korea stressed the need to ensure that all provisions of Resolution 1874 are strictly implemented by all UN member states. Seoul also welcomed the expanded mandate of the monitoring committee and the establishment of an expert panel to assist the Turkish presidency of the Security Council and accelerate assistance to member states that needed it.

There exists a consensus shared by both Seoul and Washington that the pattern of paying in advance should not be repeated. The good news is that North Korea's tendency to keep using brinkmanship against the Obama administration and the Lee government made people turn their back on the pro-North Korean liberals' usual rhetoric and criticism of the Lee government's balanced approach toward Pyongyang.

At this critical juncture, Seoul would like a warning that if nuclear weapons or materials are used against the South that there will be a commensurate and credible response to include the possible use of force. And this firm willingness was clearly expressed during the summit meeting between the President Lee and President Obama when they announced the Joint Vision for the United States and South Korea. To reinforce the assurance, President Obama committed himself to provide "extended deterrence," including the nuclear umbrella.

However, South Korea welcomed the fact that sanctions had excluded humanitarian assistance and development programs as the Security Council remained concerned about North Korea's population. Seoul made it very clear that it would open the window wide for North Korea if it decides to return to the table to discuss the matter.

Can the Six-Party Talks be resumed?

President Lee will definitely support nuclear negotiations within the context of the Six-Party Talks if Pyongyang truly honors prior commitments. As President Lee pointed out at the press conference after the summit meeting on June 16 at the White House, the prior pattern of rewarding bad behavior by opening another round of negotiation should not be repeated. Seoul finds that it is very important that the five parties speak with one voice in dealing with backsliding by North Korea when it threatened to reverse the denuclearization process.

At the time of the first test, the common liberal lament was that North Korea was belligerent only because President Bush eschewed diplomacy in favor of tough rhetoric. Led by Christopher Hill, however, the U.S. announced the resumption of Six-Party Talks only three weeks after the first North Korea

test. He did everything to earn Kim Kye-Kwan's confidence by providing rewards that North Korea had long sought, such as bilateral talks with Washington, lifting financial sanctions, and removing it from the list of states sponsors of terrorism before North Korea fulfilled its obligations.

The frank acknowledgement of failure raises a question for all of us: how do we do the job better this time? How can we convince Pyongyang to make a strategic choice to reject, once and for all, its nuclear game? A proposal for five-party talks should not be misunderstood. What President Lee was suggesting is that we need to discuss the best possible options based on the lessons learned during previous years. The fact that North Korea quadrupled its nuclear capability and doubled its delivery power of long-range missile systems during the process of denuclearization requires sound strategy and skills to deal with the North.

What actions could be taken to move the process forward?

What would we do if Pyongyang demands we drop everything before it returns to the Six-Party Talks? The five partners will need to consult seriously how we are going to deal with the North once it decides to return to the process. The Obama administration should not repeat the mistake made by the Bush administration. We must remember how North Korea raised the ante by launching a ballistic missile, expelling U.N. inspectors, boycotting talks, and detonating a second nuclear bomb once they return to the table. Therefore, a thorough review of the ways we were dealing with Pyongyang since the first nuclear test is very much needed before we can resume the next round of Six-Party Talks.

President Lee wishes to strengthen Korea's strategic networks with other partners and is determined to take a leadership role in creating a focal point of discussion, debate, and action on the future of the Korean Peninsula, including nonproliferation issues. He announced Korea's full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative on the day after North Korea tested a second bomb on May 25, 2009. Yet, he learned a hard lesson from the beef incident that gaining support from the people at home is a necessary condition for conducting a successful foreign policy. The question is how he can transform people's passion and energy into a driving force for solving regional and global challenges. He believes that there is much room for strategic cooperation among key partners and well-coordinated skills and strategies are very much needed.

What is its impact on the global nonproliferation regime?

Pyongyang violated agreements in the past and is likely to test them again. People are concerned that the U.S. would be prohibited from testing its nuclear weapons to ensure their safety and reliability and to strengthen deterrence. Some wonder if the U.S. nuclear umbrella, already thin, will become increasingly tattered as the North hones its weapons and delivery systems. Paula DeSutter, for instance, argues that North Korea's nuclear test makes people in the U.S. more hesitant to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

At the same time, Seoul worries that the only interest of the U.S. is warning Pyongyang against the potential transfer of strategic materials and nuclear weapons to other states or

nonstate actors who might use them against the U.S. This would send the wrong signal to Pyongyang. North Korea may misunderstand that it would be okay as long as nuclear capability stayed in its territory.

Critics fear that if North Korea would be recognized as nuclear weapon state, it will be seen as a model for others. If the five parties do not maintain a united front pressuring Pyongyang, there is no way to penalize potential nuclear aspirants. Critics also wonder whether the State Department's verification professionals should be revived. In the Bush administration, Assistant Secretary Paula DeSutter and her deputy Patricia McNerney were never fully utilized.

Developments on the Korean Peninsula – A Chinese Perspective by Yang Yi

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The DPRK conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009 in disregard of the international community's opposition. It seriously affects the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the credibility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and the peace and stability of Northeast Asia. The UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1874 condemning "in the strongest terms" the test and imposing new sanctions on June 12, 2009. Regional tensions have been steadily rising. In spite of this, all concerned parties should remain calm, show restraint, refrain from actions that may further aggravate the situation, and persist in seeking a peaceful solution. That is the only way out of the crisis.

New developments on the Korean Peninsula

This current crisis began with the satellite launch by the DPRK in April. Countries including the U.S. and Japan strongly urged the UNSC to adopt a President's Statement accusing the DPRK of violating UNSCR 1718. The DPRK immediately responded that it would withdraw from the Six-Party Talks and restore its nuclear facilities to strengthen its nuclear deterrence. Thereafter, the DPRK stopped all its cooperation with IAEA, removed the seals from its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, dismantled monitoring equipment, and expelled IAEA inspectors and the U.S. nuclear disablement inspection group. On April 25, the DPRK Foreign Ministry said that it had resumed reprocessing spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor. On April 29, it claimed that the hope of the Six-Party Talks and the denuclearization of Northeast Asia had vanished forever, and that it would conduct another nuclear test and fire a ballistic missile. On May 25, the DPRK announced that it had succeeded in its underground nuclear test and fired several-short range missiles. Two days later, the DPRK announced that it would no longer abide by the Korean Armistice Agreement. The whole world is astounded and shocked by these actions of the DPRK.

Condemning the DPRK's behavior immediately, U.S. President Obama noted that the DPRK's actions posed a "direct and reckless challenge" to the international community. Secretary of State Clinton asked to adopt a tough and unified policy toward the DPRK. Japanese Prime Minister Aso Taro described that the DPRK behavior as unacceptable.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry also expressed its firm opposition to the DPRK nuclear test and “strongly urges the DPRK to honor its commitment to denuclearization, stop relevant moves that may further worsen the situation and return to the Six-Party Talks.” The ROK not only prohibited its citizens from visiting the DPRK except for the Kaesong Industrial Complex, but also announced that it would fully join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) so as to “counter serious threats posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.” The DPRK then repeatedly warned that South Korea’s participation in the PSI would be equivalent to a declaration of war.

On June 13, 2009, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1874 to convey strong displeasure and strengthen sanctions on the DPRK. The DPRK responded by claiming that it would never give up nuclear weapons and announced that it would take three retaliatory measures to safeguard its national dignity and autonomy, including weaponizing newly extracted plutonium, resuming uranium enrichment, and, since the blockade imposed by the U.S. and its allies was an act of war, “unswerving military countermeasures.”

China’s attitude

The resumption of the nuclear test by the DPRK inevitably cast a shadow on the Korean Peninsula. The international community appealed to all parties to tackle the DPRK’s provocation calmly and tried to persuade the DPRK to come back to the talks. It is the unchanging foreign policy of China to safeguard peace and stability in Northeast Asia. From their inception in 2003, China has committed itself to safeguarding the progress of the Six-Party Talks. Though the talks have deadlocked several times, China has spared no efforts in active mediation to sustain progress. China has made immense contributions to the talks and obtained outstanding achievements, recognized and appreciated unanimously by the international community. The biggest accomplishment of the talks is that peace has been preserved in Northeast Asia and the relevant countries have a forum to communicate and build trust to help establish an enduring peace and security regime.

It is proper to reiterate that China is firmly opposed to the DPRK’s nuclear test as it violated the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, impaired the effectiveness of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and affected regional peace and stability. China supports an appropriate and balanced reaction by the UNSC and has taken part in relevant discussions with a responsible and constructive attitude.

Meanwhile, the sovereignty, territorial integrity, legitimate security concerns, and development interest of the DPRK as a sovereign country and UN member should be respected. UNSCR 1874 is not just about sanctions. Political and diplomatic means are the only way to resolving the relevant issues on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK should enjoy the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy after its returns to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Resolution 1874 also leaves room for parties to solve the DPRK nuclear issue peacefully through dialogue.

To bring about denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, opposing nuclear proliferation and safeguarding peace and stability are the common interest of all parties. Under current

circumstances, all parties concerned should remain calm, show restraint, refrain from actions that may aggravate the situation, and persist in seeking a peaceful solution. China is ready to continue to play a constructive role and keep close communication with countries concerned including the DPRK.

The Prospects

The second nuclear test of the DPRK has led the U.S. to reassess the DPRK’s sincerity on the issue of denuclearization, which will have a grave impact on the DPRK nuclear issue and the situation on the peninsula. First, the test will lead to an even more negative judgment of the DPRK and, in view of the failures of the last two U.S. administrations in confronting the brinkmanship policy, even more opposition to what it sees as the DPRK’s nuclear blackmail. This will have a direct influence on the reevaluation of the DPRK policy of the Obama administration, and cause it to harden its stance.

Second, the tense situation will continue and possibly escalate. The confrontation between the U.S., Japan, and the ROK and the DPRK will be aggravated and the possibilities of U.S.-DPRK dialogue will be remote in the near future. After the nuclear test, Obama claimed immediately that the provocation could only deepen the DPRK’s isolation and that the DPRK would pay price for its actions. After the UNSC adopted Resolution 1874, there were strong reactions from the DPRK and the risks of the military confrontations increased.

Third, with the tense circumstances on the Korean Peninsula, the DPRK will persist in having nuclear weapons to defend its safety. It is difficult for the DPRK to give up its tough stance. On the other hand, the resumption of the nuclear test puts the DPRK into unprecedented isolation, which not only further irritates the conservative factions within the U.S., Japan, and the ROK, but also dealt a heavy blow to the diplomatic efforts of China and Russia to promote détente.

Conclusions

The DPRK has to make a choice under unanimous opposition from the international community. Resolution 1874 supports peaceful dialogue with the DPRK and calls on the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks unconditionally and fulfill the Joint Statements of Sept. 19, 2005, Feb. 13, 2007, and Oct. 3, 2007. The Resolution also appeals to the members of the Security Council and the other members of the UN to make joint efforts to tackle the current situation through peaceful and diplomatic means and develop comprehensive resolutions through dialogue while avoiding further aggravating the situation. It will be a huge challenge to their political wisdom for the DPRK, U.S., and the international community to seize the opportunity to open talks and make negotiations fruitful.