

Eighth U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue
“Common Strategic Interests & Building Strategic Stability”
Co-hosted by NPS; Pacific Forum CSIS; and
China Arms Control and Disarmament Association
June 8-10, 2014; JW Marriott Ihilani Ko Olina Resort & Spa, Oahu Hawaii

Agenda

Main Dialogue Session Location: Ocean 1 Ballroom

June 8

1730 *Reception, Lurline Room Lanai*

1800 *Welcome Dinner, Lurline Room*

June 9

0730-0815 *Continental Breakfast, Ocean 1 Ballroom Pre-function Lanai*

0815-0845 **Welcome Remarks: Outlining Common Strategic Interests**

US: NPS and PF

PRC: CACDA

0845-1015 **Common Challenges and the Evolving Nuclear Strategic Environment**

What are the main strategic issues on which the U.S. and China share common interests and face common challenges (with “strategic” centering on nuclear issues, but also extending beyond)? What are American and Chinese perceptions of recent developments in the regional and global strategic environment? What role do strategic nuclear issues play in the “new type of great power relations” framework? What are the chances for further nuclear arms reductions and what role could both sides play in improving these prospects?

Chair: Michael Glosny

US Presenter: Karl Eikenberry

PRC Presenter: Qian Lihua

1015-1030 *Break*

1030-1230 **Developments in Nuclear Modernization and Strategic Postures**

What are the major developments in each side’s nuclear capabilities and strategic posture over the last five years? What continuities and changes do recent government and military reports (such as the QDR, Chinese *Defense White Paper* and 2013 edition of *战略学/Science of Strategy*) contain on each side’s nuclear policy? What concerns and questions does each side have about the other’s nuclear posture and ongoing modernization? How does each side plan to incorporate non-nuclear strategic weapons, such as conventional hypersonic missiles, into their strategic posture? How does each side view SSBNs as serving strategic stability?

Chair: Chen Kai

1st PRC Presenter: Yao Yunzhu

US Presenter: Brad Roberts

2nd PRC Presenter: Zhu Chenghu

1230-1400 *Lunch, Ocean 2 Ballroom*

1400-1600 **Managing Crises and Avoiding Escalation**

If a serious crisis erupts, what factors in the U.S.-China context might challenge/undermine stability and increase the risk of escalation? How might the asymmetry of conventional and nuclear capabilities affect the likelihood of escalation? Are there actions that either side might take (especially in the nuclear domain) that could inadvertently make the other side fearful and increase the chances of strategic escalation? Are there aspects of both sides' ongoing modernizations, both land and sea based, that might have a (positive or negative) effect on crisis stability? What actions can both sides take to prevent and limit escalation in a crisis?

Chair: Phillip Saunders

1st PRC Presenter: Xiang Ganghua US Presenter: Avery Goldstein

2nd PRC Presenter: Wu Riqiang

1730 *Reception, Lurline Room Lanai*

1800 *Dinner, Lurline Room*

June 10

0745-0830 *Continental Breakfast, Ocean 1 Ballroom pre-function Lanai*

0830-1000 **Evolving Views on Missile Defense**

What effect does each side believe its BMD will have on strategic stability? What does each side view the main drivers for and recent changes in America's BMD system? Does the deployment of BMD systems signal anything about broader intentions? How much of a challenge do current or anticipated BMD capabilities pose for China's strategic deterrence? Which current or future systems would pose the strongest threat to China's deterrent capability? What actions could either side take to address the other's concerns over BMD? What future developments are likely to lead each side to improve BMD capabilities?

Chair: Hu Yumin

1st PRC Presenter: Wu Riqiang

US Presenter: Dean Wilkening

2nd PRC Presenter: Wu Chunsi

1000-1015 *Break*

1015-1215 **Breakout Sessions: Confidence and Security Building Measures**
Matsonia Room, Mariposa Room, and Ocean 1 Ballroom

US: Lew Dunn, Chris Ford, Phillip Saunders
PRC: Wu Chunsi, Fan Jishe, Han Hua

We will divide into three different small groups for a discussion of a few specific CSBMs that have been proposed during earlier dialogue meetings. The discussion will be facilitated by American and Chinese group leaders. The aim will be to summarize the discussion with a brief power point presentation made by the group leaders in the afternoon plenary session.

1215-1400 *Lunch, Ocean 1 Ballroom Pre-function Lanai*

1400-1530 **Plenary Session: Confidence and Security Building Measures**

Chair: Christopher Twomey
Presentations led by the breakout session co-chairs

In the plenary session, each breakout group will present the key points of agreement, disagreement, and new questions that emerged in their group's discussion of specific CSBMs. We hope to be able to make recommendations to our governments on the feasibility, importance, and order of priority for these CSBMs.

1530-1600 **Implications and Ways Forward**

NPS, Pacific Forum, CACDA, and Heads of Delegation

CSBM Topics for Break-out Sessions
8th U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue (June 2014)
“Common Strategic Interests & Building Strategic Stability”

We will divide into three different small groups for a discussion of a few specific CSBMs that have been proposed during earlier dialogue meetings by the two sides. American and Chinese group leaders will facilitate the discussion. The aim will be to summarize the discussion with a brief power point presentation made by the group leaders in the afternoon plenary session. Each group has been assigned a total of 3 (but groups may add an additional one if they so choose).

Group 1 (Lew Dunn/Wu Chunsi)

1. Development of a “Joint Statement on Strategic Stability”
2. Bilateral Technical Exchanges on Verification Technologies and Procedures
3. Joint Studies on Capabilities and Threat of DPRK Ballistic Missiles

Group 2 (Chris Ford/Fan Jishe)

4. Both Countries Declare That They:
 - a. Acknowledge that conventional attacks (to include space and cyber) on components of their nuclear systems could provide justification for nuclear retaliation,
 - b. Understand the escalation danger of conventional attacks on all components of the others' nuclear retaliatory systems, and
 - c. Thus intend to refrain from conducting such attacks, based on their mutual understanding of the potential consequences.
5. Chinese Participation in New START Mock Inspections
6. Reciprocal Visits to BMD Sites

Group 3 (Phil Saunders/Han Hua)

7. Pledges of No First Attacks in Nuclear, Space, and Cyber (Three NFA/Us)
8. Reciprocal Visits to Nuclear Test Sites (Assuming resumption of lab-to-lab exchanges)
9. Reciprocal Notification of BMD and CPGS (or similar system) Test Launches

For each concrete CSBM, the teams would be encouraged to discuss the following questions and fill in a PPT template along the following lines.

Slide 1: What do participants think the purpose of this measure would be? What problem do they think it is helping to address or solve? Is it an "important" problem worth such attention?

Slide 2 “Pros” & Slide 3 “Cons”; both from US and Chinese perspectives

Slide 4: Are there other ways to help address the same problem or achieve the same purpose that might be more acceptable to both?

Slide 5: Implementation/Next Steps: Who would be involved on each side?