



A New U.S.-Japan Agenda

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Executive Summary

The U.S.-Japan relationship remains central to regional and global security. Today, the key challenge for alliance managers is using their assets in new and creative ways. With a new approach, our nations can rejuvenate, sustain, and solidify the bilateral relationship, enhance regional and global security, and better the lives of millions of people around the world.

The two countries must deal with traditional security concerns, but military issues shouldn't be the single core of the relationship. There are new issues that are better suited to the capabilities of two of the world's richest and most technologically advanced countries. Cooperative policy approaches in several areas will enhance the strength of the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship while promoting a positive image to other states. Areas of opportunity include:

- expanding and increasing global prosperity through reforms that increase efficiency and open economies, as well as promote good governance and rule of law;
- coordinating development assistance, and creating more effective aid programs;
- increasing trade and transportation security;
- preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- promoting energy security and policies that protect the environment;
- cooperation for crisis management, disaster relief and mitigation, and humanitarian aid in response to major disasters;
- cyber security;
- counter-terrorism cooperation;
- developing a framework for the safe integration of science and technology, including controls on dual use technology and "soft know-how";
- global health, including building capacity in developing countries to fight infectious diseases and to improve the public health infrastructure;
- nation building and peace building.

A strategy that expands the focus of U.S.-Japan cooperation will pay many dividends. It will broaden bilateral engagement and extend areas of cooperation. It will bring new voices and new energy to the relationship. It will take pressure off the military component of the relationship, which has borne too high a burden for too long. It sidesteps traditional obstacles to security cooperation.

This agenda requires Japan to forge and present to the world a vision of its appropriate role in global affairs. The U.S. must learn to listen to its ally more carefully and to better consult and coordinate policy. A new and rejuvenated alliance requires a more balanced apportioning of roles and responsibilities and the sharing of burdens. A new agenda can rejuvenate a vital partnership, one that has grown more important – not less – in the 21st century.

A New U.S.-Japan Agenda

By Brad Glosserman and Katsu Furukuwa

After the halcyon days of the Bush-Koizumi era, friends and supporters of the U.S.-Japan alliance look at the future with trepidation. A retreat from the high-water mark set by those two leaders was inevitable, but few suspected alliance relations would become the focal point of domestic politics in Japan as has occurred in recent months. The prospect of a new U.S. president is always unnerving in Tokyo, especially given Japanese fears that a Democratic president would be less committed than a Republican to the alliance (which is not true, historically).

The U.S.-Japan relationship remains central to regional and global security. The bilateral alliance is a cornerstone of U.S. engagement with Asia. The extended nuclear deterrent provides stability and assurance for Japan. Most significantly, however, the coordinated application of the two countries' resources to international problems is a force multiplier: working together, Japan and the U.S. can do far more than they can by themselves. Indeed, the most important challenge for alliance managers is the use of those considerable assets in new and creative ways. We believe that with a fundamentally new approach, our two nations can rejuvenate, sustain and solidify our bilateral relationship, enhance regional and global security, and better the lives of our two countries' citizens and those of millions more around the world.

Of course, the two countries must deal with traditional security concerns, most critically the maintenance of peace and stability in a region that is increasingly important to world trade and the global economy. The projection of power remains vital, which means the U.S. must maintain its forward presence. The safety and security of the maritime domain is a key shared objective for two allies that rely on trade to survive. In short, the military dimension of the relationship remains critical.

Those points and the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan notwithstanding, we do not believe that military issues should be the single core of the relationship. Just about every discussion of the future of the alliance starts with Japan's contributions to international peacekeeping or multilateral security programs. Political and legal-constitutional constraints invariably overshadow Japanese debates over such policies. While some change is inevitable, its pace is uncertain; bringing the alliance into those discussions tends to sidetrack the debate, raising questions about U.S. involvement and heightening sensitivities about Japanese sovereignty. Those are unwanted distractions that can damage bilateral relations.

It is more efficient and more effective to focus elsewhere. There are new security concerns that are better suited to the capabilities of two of the world's richest and most technologically advanced countries. Cooperative policy approaches in several areas will enhance the strength of the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship while promoting a positive image to other states. This approach will seek to improve the material conditions in regions of greatest need while developing policies that advance the national interests of the U.S. and Japan.

The first area of opportunity should be attempts to *expand and increase global prosperity*. Our two governments should be doing more to create economic opportunities for our citizens and others around the world. That means implementing reforms that increase efficiency and open our economies as well as promoting good governance and rule of law around the world. We should be setting examples for other countries through unilateral action, joint efforts – such as a free trade or economic partnership agreement – and multilateral initiatives, such as providing real leadership in the Doha Round of international trade negotiations and trade liberalization in ASEAN and APEC.

Similarly, the U.S. and Japan should be coordinating development assistance, creating more aggressive and effective aid programs. Money is needed but equally important is building capacity in developing countries: developing infrastructure, providing help in meeting international standards, and ensuring good governance. A related effort would bring the U.S. and Japan together to promote the development of civil society. A robust civil sector, with active and independent nonprofit organizations, is vital to the health and ultimate stability of a society. Our two countries have experience, knowledge, and capital that can spur the growth of such organizations around the world. A preliminary test for the two countries is the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), which Japan will host in May 2008. TICAD should be closely coordinated with the G8 Summit that Japan will host in July. The United States and Japan should call for an international initiative to establish criteria for evaluating progress toward realization of the UN Millennium Development goals and press to see that they are met.

Second, the U.S. and Japan should be leading efforts to *increase trade security*. The globalization of international production has raised alarms about product quality and the safety and security of supply chains. Two of the world's largest trading and manufacturing countries can set standards in these areas. Their multinational corporations can disseminate knowledge, knowhow, and a mindset that ensures safety and security.

A related concern is transportation. Globalization has facilitated the mobilization (and movement) of people, which requires increased levels of safety and security of transportation. Our two governments can collaborate to strengthen international initiatives for trade and transportation security, such as those related to aviation, maritime, and port security.

Third, efforts to increase global trade need to proceed in tandem with measures to *prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)*. Export controls and interdiction measures are essential in this regard. The law enforcement authority's role is vital in shaping bilateral cooperation for WMD nonproliferation. In particular, East Asian countries need more investment to build capacity for effective nonproliferation measures. Priorities should include stringent national legislation to fight proliferation (pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540) and strengthening law enforcement capabilities.

A fourth area of opportunity is *energy security*. Asia's future (in fact, every region's) is dependent on assured supplies of energy. Our two countries should ensure those supplies at every link of the production and consumption process. Policies should address energy markets and pricing (including the development of alternatives to fossil fuels), transportation, storage,

and use (i.e., efficiency and conservation). Since the U.S. and Japan play a prominent role in every one of these sectors, coordinated efforts can pay huge dividends. Critical is the establishment of an international policy framework for energy conservation that includes all key stakeholder states, including China and India. Essential to this is a market for carbon dioxide transactions. Furthermore, new indicators are needed to evaluate national energy conservation programs in consumer electronics, transportation, and other industries.

Energy policies are intimately linked to *environmental policies*. That linkage is most evident when it comes to climate change: the unbridled use of fossil fuels threatens to create irreversible damage to our planet. Development itself has an environmental impact that has frequently been overlooked as countries try to become richer. The U.S. and Japan should be leaders in the battle against climate change, as well as in protecting the environment more generally. A cooperative and aggressive bilateral approach could rewrite the global environment agenda. This approach should generate vigorous bilateral cooperation for environmental monitoring, data collection and analysis, even using space assets, and the development of better simulation systems to guide global efforts against climate change. Initiatives should also explore new accounting models that better account for externalities (e.g., carbon emissions) as well as schemes that ensure the wider dissemination of clean technologies through new intellectual property regimes.

Energy policy is also closely linked to nuclear nonproliferation since many countries are currently planning to expand their use of nuclear power. Working with the international community, and Russia in particular, the U.S. and Japan should assist those countries to obtain or increase nuclear energy use in a proliferation-resistance manner consistent with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty's Additional Protocol.

The prospect of increasing intensity of natural disasters, which is believed by many experts to be driven by climate change and environmental degradation, means that bilateral cooperation for crisis management, disaster relief and mitigation, and humanitarian aid in response to major disasters should be another focal point of alliance cooperation. It is vital to help countries, especially developing states, prevent major damage from natural disasters or accidents, to mitigate the damage when such events occur, and to facilitate recovery as quickly and smoothly as possible.

A fifth opportunity is *cyber security*. The integration of information technologies into every dimension of a modern society is accelerating. Information technology is a fundamental component of national infrastructures – such as basic government functions, financial services, energy, transportation, telecommunications – and provides the very essence of networks between nations. While we do not yet understand all the ways these technologies will be used, it is abundantly clear that this process is creating new vulnerabilities. The U.S. and Japan should make cyber security a priority for cooperation and research. Critical infrastructure protection should be one part of this program.

Counter-terrorism (CT) cooperation is a sixth pillar of the bilateral relationship. Bilateral efforts for CT should go beyond intelligence cooperation. The two countries should better coordinate efforts to assist other countries as they try to build CT capacity, especially in

Southeast Asia, in such areas as aviation security, maritime security, border control, customs operation, law enforcement, port security, and terrorism financing.

Seventh, *science and technology policy* generally is another target. The U.S. and Japan are global leaders in these fields and should develop a framework to ensure that the results of research and development are safely integrated into societies. This is a huge endeavor, covering not only the registration and protection of such work (including patents and intellectual property rights) but its dissemination in the world. It is becoming clear that we have very little understanding of the potential use and implications of new technologies, particularly their security implications. Nanotechnology and biological research come immediately to mind, but the list of concerns is long.

A related issue is the misuse of technologies, the so-called “dual use problem.” Traditionally, international cooperation for nonproliferation focused primarily upon interdiction of “hardware.” Equally important is preventing the flow of dual-use technologies and expertise through scientists and engineers. Given East Asia’s growing industrial capabilities, which equates with growing dual-use potential capabilities, multilateral cooperation should be pursued to stop the flow of “soft know-how” to countries of WMD concern or nonstate actors. It should be emphasized that the interdiction of “hardware” is not the single salient issue. Tokyo and Washington are leading efforts to control the spread of technologies that can be used to make weapons of mass destruction. Coordination of that work will ensure consistency and the raising of national capacities that are essential to the ultimate success of nonproliferation efforts. In the end, these issues may not be managed solely by laws, and will require adoption of better governance of scientific research programs and close cooperation between academic/scientific communities and law enforcement/national security communities. This requires integration of scientific and academic communities in the bilateral alliance structure.

An eighth opportunity is *bilateral cooperation on global health, including coordination of assistance toward developing countries* to strengthen the latter’s capacity building efforts to fight infectious diseases and to improve the public health infrastructure. This should be a critical task for the alliance given the potential scale of casualties and damages in the event of human-to-human transmission of bird flu. The U.S. and Japan should strive to strengthen international cooperation with the Global Fund, and to assist developing countries to build capacity for the public health in a manner consistent with the International Health Regulation 2005.

A final target is *cooperating on nation building, and peace building*. In failed or fragile states, such as Afghanistan, the two countries should bring together their expertise in development and security to develop an integrated approach to stabilize these states.

It should be plain that our governments should be devising complementary and cooperative strategies within all international organizations. A coordinated approach – which does not mean the two governments should always take the same position, but should be working together – would maximize influence and advance the two countries’ concerns.

A strategy that expands the focus of U.S.-Japan cooperation from “hard” security to include other issues will pay many dividends. It will broaden bilateral engagement and extend

areas of cooperation. It will bring new voices and new energy to the relationship. We believe the two countries should focus on nurturing the next generation of thinkers and workers in these fields. While this is likely to be a natural outcome if this agenda is adopted, it should be stressed: habits of bilateral cooperation should be developed early.

A second advantage of this approach is that it sidesteps traditional obstacles to bilateral cooperation on security matters. It is hard to see how Article 9 applies to Japanese action on cyber security, trade security, infrastructure protection or other pressing national issues that can be applied outside Japan. Moving forward on these issues will strengthen Japan's contribution to regional and global security and increase its value to its ally and partner.

Finally, we should note that our approach is not unprecedented. In 1992, President George H.W. Bush and Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi set out a global agenda for the two countries by reaffirming the alliance as "a global partnership." Four years later, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro noted that "(the US-Japan) Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the core of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and underlies the mutual confidence that constitutes the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global issues."

The rhetoric of these declarations has been part of the boilerplate of subsequent bilateral meetings but more is needed. Washington and Tokyo should put this agenda forward as the substance of their relationship and embrace new partnerships with fervor and passion.

In doing so, the alliance needs more robust integration of new stakeholders, including those in charge of law enforcement, development, public health, transportation, border control, and science and technology, in addition to traditional alliance managers (primarily diplomats and defense officials). These new stakeholders have different organizational cultures and operational modalities from those held by traditional alliance managers. Effectively integrating new stakeholders in each country into the alliance structure will be difficult. It is critical that there be communication between new and traditional stakeholders and the nurturing of common understanding about the strategic objectives of the alliance. Domestic coordination of those stakeholders will shape the course of the alliance.

Alliance cooperation on global affairs obliges the United States and Japan to pay more attention to management of the "values" component of bilateral relations. The policy agenda outlined above cannot be implemented without the adoption of universal values such as democracy, respect for human dignity and the rule of law. An agenda that is global in both geographical scope and its contents requires the two countries to step beyond an alliance structure that has been primarily colored by a defense policy-oriented posture.

Japan aspires to enhance its diplomatic standing in the world. This is driven, in part, by a consideration to balance against and simultaneously engage with a rising China. Indeed, the changing geopolitical landscape in Asia is prompting Japan to embrace "value-oriented diplomacy," emphasizing the adoption of universal values and disciplines as major diplomatic instruments, such as democracy, freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy. The evolution of Japan's diplomatic posture, together with efforts by other allies and friendly states, such as Australia and Singapore, has contributed to a shift from an interest-based order to a

value-based one, especially in Asia, This new posture must be complemented by a steady and strong determination to play a global role.

Realization of this vision imposes specific obligations on the United States and Japan. For its part, Japan must forge and then present to the world a vision of its appropriate role in global affairs. This is a challenging assignment given the many changes taking place within Japan, in the region and beyond. The difficulties are compounded by the uncharted social and political terrain that is being created by a rapidly aging society. It is unclear to many if Japan will be able to create a national consensus. At the same time, the U.S. must learn to listen to its allies more carefully and to better consult and coordinate policy. Traditionally, the U.S. has led and insisted that its partners follow: this is not the stuff of real partnership. A new and rejuvenated alliance requires a more balanced apportioning of roles and responsibilities and the sharing of burdens. The U.S. must learn to follow better.

This new approach offers many advantages. It will take some pressure off the military component of the bilateral relationship, which has borne too high a burden for too long. This is especially desirable given the political controversies that swirl around military-oriented security issues in Japan. We believe that Japan can play a bigger role in such areas, but focusing on them unduly politicizes such debates. Additionally, extending the range of cooperation expands the alliance into new fields, broadening its appeal and bringing new constituencies and ideas into its ambit. These participants will bring new energy and creativity. This has the potential to rejuvenate a vital partnership, one that has grown more important – not less – in the 21st century.

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