



*Asia: Less Continuity, More Change*

By Richard L. Armitage

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## Pacific Forum CSIS

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## Lane Lecture in Diplomacy

The Ambassador L.W. 'Bill' and Jean Lane Lecture in Diplomacy honors the contributions and accomplishments of long-time Pacific Forum CSIS supporter and Board of Governors member Ambassador Bill Lane and his lovely wife, Jean. Bill Lane is former U.S. Ambassador to Australia and Nauru (1985-1989) and former Ambassador at Large and Commissioner General, Japan (1975-1976). A member of the *TIME Magazine* Board of Directors, he served for many years as publisher and chairman of *SUNSET Magazine*. His association with Asia dates back to World War II, when he served in and around the Philippines as a U.S. Navy gunnery officer aboard a troop ship. His interest in East Asia continues to this day. He founded the Pacific Area Travel Association and is a Pacific Basin Economic Council Trustee.



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## **Asia: Less Continuity, More Change**

By Richard L. Armitage

It's an honor and a pleasure to be with you tonight, and to give this year's "L.W. 'Bill' and Jean Lane Lecture in Diplomacy." Bill Lane certainly needs no introduction to this group; we have been delighted to have him at past sessions of the Japan-U.S. San Francisco Security Seminar and his presence this year is surely missed. He has a good excuse, however; an important family gathering in honor of his lovely wife Jean, to whom we all wish a Happy Birthday.

Years ago I gave a speech about the U.S.-Japan alliance and Asia security called "continuity and change." And if you look at Asia now, there's an awful lot of change and I don't think there's so much of the continuity. Look at Australia, we've got new leadership with Kevin Rudd, who met with our president today in Washington. And this is going to have implications for us. We talked about China today, but we ought to talk about our trilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and the U.S. I think that Mr. Rudd, who is a very fine guy and has a great affection for the U.S.-Australia Alliance, probably won't have the same affection for our trilateral talks as his predecessor. He may engage in them, but I don't think there will be the same amount of cooperation.

Another change is Thailand today; there's new leadership in Thailand with a real nasty and nagging insurgency in the south. It doesn't seem to be getting much better. How about Malaysia, where UMNO was dealt a stunning setback in recent elections, and where you're seeing more and more dissatisfaction by the Chinese and India population? This will affect our mutual friend in Singapore.

We talked about the change in the Russian Federation and I think we've been lazy in Asia regarding the Russian Federation. We have been allowed to be lazy. Here is a nation that spans the Eurasian continent, but has always spent much more attention on Europe than on Asia. Well, they are not immune to understanding that the whole center of gravity of the world is shifted to

Asia. So I predict we will see a much more active Russian Federation in Asia. That's not necessarily a bad thing, but it's going to be a thing of change we're going to have to deal with.

We talked about Taiwan today. This is an interesting case. President-elect Ma Ying-jeou campaigned on his three no's – no independence, no reunification, and no change in the status quo, but he also campaigned on economic improvement. And the only way Ma Ying-jeou is going to be able to improve his economy is by improving his relationship with the Mainland. He must deal with investment caps and tourism and direct trade and direct flights – all those things. As someone suggested today, is China going to be able to respond? They already have about 1,000 missiles across the Taiwan Strait. Do you think that the PLA could afford to pull back 80 or 100 just as a gesture? They probably won't, but they probably should!

South Korea has also changed leaders. President Lee Myung-bak will likely be much more congenial toward Japan, much more congenial to the United States, and maybe we can get some meaningful trilateral cooperation going. I certainly hope so, but I don't know. Looks to me like President Lee got a little quick off the mark in the last couple days announcing how strongly he was going to condemn human rights in North Korea, which I think is the right thing. But, you need to think about this and indicate to the North Koreans what you are going to do. Don't surprise; don't do these things all of a sudden. It may be a sign of immaturity; it may be a sign of some rough sledding ahead. You saw how North Koreans responded by throwing some South Korean managers out of the Kaesong Industrial Zone and by firing off their short range missiles this morning.

So there is plenty of change, and there is more on the way. After the G-8 meeting, there may be elections in Japan, and then we've got our own coming in the U.S.

So there's going to be a lot of changes in Asia. But there's other change beyond that. There's a change in India and its "look East" policy. I agree with Ambassador Ryozo Kato and with Yukio Okimoto, that India is not going to be an ally of Japan or necessarily an ally of the United States. Certainly it can be a friend, however; we share a lot of common interests. But for Japan in particular, the relationship between India and Japan is one that is actually much better than

people realize. And it's rooted in the fact that many Indians note that during the war Japan only occupied a small part of India and in a very real way unpried the colonial hand from around the throat of India. And Japan gets credit for this. And of course it was an Indian judge at the Tokyo tribunals who didn't want to apply the death sentence to those who were ultimately convicted of war crimes. These things are well understood both in India and in Japan. This is why Prime Minister Abe was so well greeted when he went to India.

But beyond that, there is still more change. Notwithstanding our present recession or the present stagnation in Japan, we are in a period of the greatest wealth creation the world has ever seen. *Forbes* magazine had 83 billionaires in Russia (in 2007) and I don't think the number is known for China. But the question is whether that wealth is getting distributed in a timely enough fashion. If 300 million people today comprise the middle-class of China – and that's our whole population in the United States – there are still at least 600 million who live below the poverty line (\$2 dollars a day). So although we are in a period of great wealth creation, are we going to be in a period where, if this wealth is not spread out in a timely enough fashion, the expectations of the populace could lead to turmoil? Beyond that, there are changes in the consumption of oil as well as the thirst for oil and for raw materials. Finally the changes in the environment which you can read about, frankly you can sometimes taste on any summer day in Tokyo coming from China – the damage to the environment, the problems of global warming and climate change.

So there's an agenda of change out there that is enormous by anybody's standards. Let me talk about a couple of the countries who are major actors. First of all about China. I just returned from China. I must say that my personal impression is there's a great deal of buyer's remorse in China. Zhu Rongji famously said in the year 2000, "it's a good thing we didn't try in 2000, or we didn't get the Olympics, because we weren't ready." Well, I think privately some of the Chinese will tell you today they'd question whether they are ready now. Can they organize for the games? Sure! But there are so many things that get out of their control. The myth of ethnic harmony flew out the window on March 14. Chinese are coming to grips with the fact that this phenomenon of Tibet will probably bedevil them right up to the Olympics. I would suggest, though I'm not an expert in the ways and customs and culture of San Francisco, that when the Olympic torch runs through San Francisco you're going to see a few demonstrators out here who

have a few things to say about Tibet and what the Dalai Lama would call the genocide on the Tibetan culture that the Chinese are putting into effect. In a way I almost feel sorry for our Chinese friends because they put themselves in a cul-de-sac. On the one hand they vilify the Dalai Lama; he's the devil incarnate and they vilify him. But on the other hand today the Dalai Lama is the moderate one. Apparently many in Tibet, or at least some are frustrated with his message of peaceful persuasions and peaceful demonstrations. Many protesters are a little intemperate and impatient. So after having vilified the Dalai Lama, China finds it very difficult to talk to him. Meanwhile, what are Chinese leaders going to do when the Falun Gong unfold a banner on the Fifth Ring Road? Are the People's Armed Police going to come in and smash people on their heads, because that will certainly distract attention from diving and track and field, etc. Well, their initial desire would be to go and crack a few heads on this matter and to snuff it out quickly. But they're not ready for 2 or 3 or 4 simultaneous problems, and it appears to me that any country, be it Japan, the United States or elsewhere, would have difficulty handling 2, 3, or 4 problems at once.

But China has even more difficulty because of the structure of its leadership. But it goes beyond that and beyond Falun Gong and beyond Tibet. There are some things that they absolutely can do nothing about, like the environment. They can do absolutely nothing about it. They can stop their industrial plants, they can keep their cars off the road, but they can't shut off their coal-fired plants. The environment and degradation coming from China is so great that Lake Tahoe finds it in its filters now. With an economy 1/5 the size of the United States, China has surpassed the United States as an emitter of CO<sup>2</sup> gases. That's pretty phenomenal. So they are facing real problems. But wait, there's more. They forgot to handle inflation. I don't know if it's the case, I was told that in Beijing, in some commodities inflation in the countryside can go as high as 28 percent. So how the People's Republic of China deals with these issues, whether they come out of this in a very grumpy mood, is going to have a big effect on all of us in Asia for some time to come.

And then finally there's a question of Chinese decision making. Earlier at dinner I was reminded of Secretary Perry's and General Shalikashvili's decision to send the carriers into the Taiwan Straits in 1996. Of course it was the *Kitty Hawk*. So to some extent the Chinese not allowing the



*Kitty Hawk* to go into Hong Kong even though naval courtesy during a storm should have allowed it, is understandable because there is a history with China and the *Kitty Hawk* – not the least of which is that the *Kitty Hawk* stationed in Japan is a constant reminder of our alliance and our relationship with Japan. So on the one hand I can see a lot of reasons why the Chinese might want to make an example of the *Kitty Hawk*. I can see no reason why earlier they would've denied access during a storm to a couple of minesweepers, however; this is not in keeping with naval courtesy.

Likewise the anti-satellite test. Beijing is now trying to make the point that there's no difference between the PLA shooting down its satellite and the United States recently taking out an out-of-control satellite tumbling toward earth. I have tried to point out that we were public, transparent, gave two weeks notice, did all the safety checks, and then destroyed the whole target. They did it in secret and left 41,000 pieces of debris that others can run into at their own leisure in space. So there are miles and miles of differences.

Now the question that then comes to mind is did the leadership of China know? Probably there are as many opinions about this as there are belly buttons here tonight. I think that, without a doubt, the leadership knew; they probably had to sign off. But the real question is did the leadership understand what they were doing? Did they understand the implications? I don't think they did. And this gives me great concern, I would prefer they understood it, and did it, than they not understood it but did it anyway. And I think it's the latter, but I can offer you no empirical data.

As you might have gotten from the tenured tone of some of my comments today, I'm a little skeptical about what's going on in North Korea. I think to some extent the North Koreans have again saved us from ourselves. I was very worried, I'll be frank with you, that we were about to do something that great powers don't do, namely trade-off our relationship with a great power to develop a relationship with a small power. Now if there are any Japanese in this room who will stand up and tell me there is not a great deal of distrust surrounding the Six-Party Talks and our participation in them, I'll buy you breakfast in the morning. I don't think it's going to happen. But we have to understand this. This was deliberate on the part of the North Koreans to some

extent. They are going to have a harder time now driving a wedge between South Korea and Japan than they had earlier, but this was deliberate. Part of it was the way we negotiated it. Part of it is the way the North Koreans negotiate and part of it is the expectations of the People's Republic of China.

I think my purpose here tonight is to lay out some possible agenda points and also to be somewhat provocative. So I'll make the following statement. As I'm leaving town tomorrow, I can get out of town before you can pin me to the wall on it. I've come to the conclusion that regarding North Korea, although the People's Republic of China hates the idea of a nuclear armed North Korea, they would be willing to settle for it if that's the price of stability. Now that's just a personal view; the thing to debate tomorrow is whether or not U.S. policy is morphing in front of your eyes. Are you seeing a policy that's slowly, not rhetorically, but actually is morphing from one of denuclearization of the Peninsula to a program of capping the nuclear program and turning into counter proliferation? I think the jury is out on that. I'd be interested in our Japanese friends' views.

And finally just a question about the abductees issue. Jim Kelly and I put North Korea on the terrorists list because of the issue of abductees. This was not done thoughtlessly; it was not done wildly; it wasn't done on the spur of the moment. It was done with the feeling, first of all, there was a great deal of political interest in Japan; there's no question about that. But it was done with a feeling that this would be an excellent way to test North Korea. Nobody expected North Koreans to be able to come up with the living abductees. But we certainly had a right to expect that they'd come up with some truthful answers. And the test case was whether or not North Korea could be expected to accord the basic consideration to human rights, and I'd say abductees' families deserve a basic consideration of human rights. If they could not find it in themselves to live up as much as possible to their responsibilities on the abductees issue, how could we trust them to live up to an international agreement particularly given the previous agreements we had in 1994 that they didn't live up to? So for Jim Kelly and for me, this was not a hard thing to do. It was a good basis on which to test the intentions of the North Koreans. But I agree with what was generally said here today, that if they were the Washington Redskins, they

have gone to the ground game; they are running out the clock, and they're going to try to get a better deal from the next administration.

A word on South Korea, I have spoken a little bit about it. President Lee is coming to Washington. I don't understand why he wanted to have this visit so soon with a president who's at 30 percent popularity and is going out the door. I would have preferred, if I were President Lee, to have waited until the new U.S. president (he or she or whomever) is in office and then made my first call then. But he wants it, and he represents a very favored ally and so he will be coming to Washington later this month, and we need to make sure the visit goes well.

Finally, let me turn to our alliance. There are some good possibilities, I think, for the U.S. and Japan. Well, no secret here, at a minimum, Japan is in a period of stagnation politically. Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Bush enjoy about the same favorable ratings of 30/31 percent, which for us is quite low but for some former Japanese prime ministers is actually pretty good. It's not good enough for the present day, however. And I think this whole political weakness was shown in two ways. Obviously the recent difficulties surrounding the governor of the Central Bank. But the decision on the Indian Ocean is one that really showed a great deal of political weakness and it showed an opposition who felt that the duty of the opposition was solely to oppose, no other duties or responsibilities. I must say that the day I saw the final delivery of the Maritime Self Defense Force to the Pakistani naval vessel in the Indian Ocean, I cried out of anger and frustration and humiliation for the Maritime Self Defense Force sailors, who had to stand on their ship while Pakistani sailors in dress uniform stood and offered a *banzai sanjo* to the Maritime Self Defense Force. So they had to scuttle back to Japan after that.

How would you feel if you were a member of the naval services under such conditions. So I was one of those who was thrilled when Prime Minister Fukuda did finally prevail in the Lower House and passed the Indian Ocean deployment legislation. But immediately after that, Japanese mass media was immediately calling all around Washington to anyone who could spell "Japan," asking "does the United State appreciate this IO deployment?" Does the United States appreciate? Of course we appreciate it. But that's not the question. The question is not whether we appreciate it, it's how Japan feels about what it's doing, and how others in the international

community who are recipients feel about it. How Pakistan feels about it, how Afghanistan feels about it, and what this says about Japan's place in the world. That's the question to be asked. Of course we appreciate it, but you shouldn't do it because we appreciate it, you do it because of what it says about Japan in the world.

Let's move on to the United States. You're watching what I think is a very regrettable and not very uplifting political campaign right now, particularly on the Democratic side. Issues find it very difficult to intrude their way into the debate, it's all personal and I'm not smart enough to know in the long run what it will auger. Senator McCain offered a couple days ago his vision of foreign policy which, as regards Asia, was quite good I think – at least pretty good, I would say it's quite good, because I was involved in it. But I'll let the rest of you decide if you think it's good or not. He said something that was particularly noteworthy. He said that Joe Nye and I found out when we did our "Smart Power" report that public diplomacy is not a matter of being louder than others or saying the same thing over and over till someone gets it. Everyone knows what the United States thinks on almost every issue. The question is whether we know what they think. And this is why Senator McCain said something and I think frankly Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Obama would embrace this same statement. They'll put it in their own words, but it would be the same sentiment. We do believe in the power of our ideals and our ideas. We will try to persuade friends and allies around the world. But, if we are going to try to persuade them, we must in turn be prepared to be persuaded by them. This has been missing for the last seven years. And this alone is a very important development in the political campaign.

But beyond that there's not much out there, it's just so personal and unfun. The good news is I think that our recession will be relatively short. Although it used to be said when we sneeze the world catches a cold, a lot of those places that used to catch a cold when the U.S. economy went down are now not so export dependent. They developed their own internal consumption. So although they can't decouple from the U.S. economy, they are less severely hurt by a moderate to mild recession and that's very good news. But I expect to see out of this election, whoever wins, a United States, which is a somewhat more humble player on the world stage, but still intent on being an absolute player.

So what about the U.S. and Japan? Where are we? I listened carefully to Ryozo Kato's keynote address today. I had heard a similar comment, but he was a little more earthy. He talked about the Alliance being something that needed watering and gardening and constant care, but also said that from his observation some of the leaves in this garden were turning a little brown. I completely agree with him. I've been saying that we're adrift. I like his characterization better. There are folks in this audience, both in State/MOFA and Defense/MOD, in uniform and civilian, working like crazy to try to keep this relationship going the right way, valuing it the way it should be valued. But what are they missing? They're missing political guidance and leadership and they're missing perhaps strategic vision. It is not a secret that, because of myopia over Iraq and Afghanistan, we haven't been tending this garden of Asia, not just U.S.-Japan, but Asia in general. When the secretary of state misses the ASEAN Regional Forum 2 out of 3 times, what does it say? I'll tell you what they say in Singapore, they told me that it's not that we miss Dr. Rice at the ARF, it's that we didn't miss her. What bigger warning could one have about not paying attention to Asia?

Now this question of strategic vision. If I asked each of you what is a strategy I'm sure I'd get many different answers and I've got a different one of my own. A strategy is what you follow to reach a goal. So the first question I have is, what is our goal in the U.S.-Japan Alliance? Do we share the same goals? It might surprise you maybe we don't. Maybe on some issue we do, and maybe some others we have a slight difference of opinion. If I were in Tokyo I think I might have a question on whether the reunification of Korea is an absolutely good idea. It's just something to discuss, given historical neuralgia, etc. But I think the first thing that we ought to do, starting in this session and beyond, is to use that strategic dialogue to figure out first of all what is our goal.

Then something that will please my colleague and friend Joe Nye no end, is what we have in common: we are the two greatest soft powers of the world. No question about it. We've got arrows in our quivers or, if our Japanese friends like it better, we've got tools in our tool kit. Let's figure out what they are. Let's figure where we should use them in concert and where we should use them, perhaps the Americans on one side and the Japanese somewhere else. These are things that we ought to be doing now. We've got hard power, that's a different question. But

we ought to be thinking about this soft power and applying it now where it meets our interest. And beyond that, it seems to me there are some discussions that ought to be had. We hear a lot about Japan becoming a normal nation. But what does that mean? Does anyone want to define what it means? Does that mean being like the United States?

I'd say the U.S. is about the most abnormal nation. How many other nations would put troops in harm's way when their vital interests aren't always at risk? How many other nations don't desire more than the six feet necessary to bury their dead after engaging in some of these activities? This is very abnormal. But I'd ask, what is a normal nation? And how does a normal nation behave? Does it mean always working under UN auspices?. I don't particularly like that personally. I think we ought to give ourselves a little bit of flexibility. But these are things that we ought to debate.

How about defense reform? How about the nuclear posture of the United States? How about Japan? Japan is number 134<sup>th</sup> as regards the percentage of GDP spent toward defense. These are things we ought to be talking about and working out. I'm very sympathetic with what's going on with my friends in the Defense Ministry now. They've had 6 defense ministers in a year, scandals, the Aegis leakage problem, now a collision at sea. Every time you think that the defense agency or defense ministry is getting back on its feet and moving forward, there's another problem. So I hope those are behind us; I hope we can start concentrating on the big issues and get away from (if you'll pardon my French) pole vaulting over mouse turds; and it seems to me that we shouldn't pole vault over mouse turds.

Now finally I don't think that Dr. Perry or Ralph Cossa or Joe Nye, Jim Kelly, Sak Sakoda, or others here, have spent the majority of their lives to support the notion that the United States belongs in Asia without good cause or logic. I think we've spent the majority of our adult lives in the notion that we want to prolong and preserve our preeminence as a force for good as long as humanly possible. And I suspect that's a statement that, when slightly changed, could be applied to Japanese patriots here who spent the majority of their lives working hard to prolong and preserve their country's ability to be a factor in the world.

Now there was a headline that Ryozo Kato called me about not long ago; somebody was saying that the demise of the Japanese economy was inevitable. I suggested that about 15 years ago it was “Japan Inc.” that was inevitable and none of us could compete and you can’t get there from here, and oh my God, they’re invincible. Well, those who used to talk about Japan Inc. were as wrong, I trust, as those who talk about the inevitability of decline in Japan. So our task seems to me quite easy in one way. We’ve got to renew our own faith in this alliance, get the basics to answer these questions about what is our goal, what tools do we have, and how do we get there? It seems to me going back to basics right now is probably a pretty good idea.

Questions and Answers:

Question: Could you discuss U.S. policy toward Burma?

Armitage: I believe we had some misguided individuals in our National Security Council who wanted to handle the situation by blacklisting and boycotting ASEAN until it threw Burma out. Now that’s foolish for a lot of reasons: 600 million people, trillion dollar GDP, 2 treaty allies. But fortunately good sense prevailed. I think the first thing I would do if I were secretary of state is to do what our secretary of defense would do, namely engage in some pretty rigorous diplomacy with ASEAN. These are not inconsequential states; each one is unique and different and it’s not so hard. It used to be said, I think still is, that if the price of having a fair relationship with ASEAN is going to the ASEAN Regional Forum and singing a song or playing the piano, that’s not too heavy a price to pay. Even when you can’t carry a tune or play a note, you fake it. Or somebody in the delegation will be able to do it. So it’s simply a matter of demonstrating that you care a bit. Second, like what I said earlier about Sen. McCain, and I think Dr. Nye would probably agree with me, that the best thing we could do is hush up a little bit and listen to others. We don’t have to agree with them. They’ve got to know that we understand where they’re coming from.

As regards Burma, I would have said that the U.S. and Japan might have been able to play good cop, bad cop before the recent crackdown. I don’t think it’s right for Japan to go in now and throw further good money after all that you’ve done over the past 15 years to no avail there.

We're going to have to depend more and more (and they're getting tired of it) on China and India to try to influence things, and that's where we ought to spend our influence, particularly now that Japan at least temporarily has a somewhat better relationship with China than was the case a year and half ago.

Question: What's your view of the East Asia Summit? You have been quoted as being negative toward it.

Actually I have changed my opinion. I thought it was just another summit that duplicates so many multilateral groupings that already exist and was unnecessarily duplicative. Second, I realize that we would never get a treaty through the Hill under previous circumstances, so I was very negative about the whole thing. I've been heartened by two things. First of all Japan and Australia's participation. They are not carrying water for us; I would not use that term. But, should something untoward happen, we certainly are aware of it. I'm not inclined to have less U.S. presence in Asia. I don't want to be where I'm not wanted. There are some out there who suggest that China actually wants to draw a line and they are on one side of it, and we're on the other side, and I don't buy that. I feel that we're a Pacific nation, the entire ocean is open to everyone, and we have commerce and relationships with people on all sides of it. So I'm not inclined to go along the way the present administration has. I'd defer to Ralph, who ran conferences in 8 different countries last year, but if he's hearing something different, he can certainly let people know. But I think the comment I made about not missing Dr. Rice is a serious one, and it's one that I heard in Singapore and it really shook me.

Question: How do you assess the Chinese naval build-up?

The Chinese put a tremendous emphasis on their naval blue water capability for obvious reasons. They don't want to subcontract sealane security to the U.S. Seventh Fleet. It used to be that they'd say that they were doing their blue water enhancers for the Taiwan scenario, which would require just about the same number of ships and aircraft as a Japan scenario would. But given the energy needs of China, it seems to me reasonable that they'd be able to justify their blue water capabilities and acquisitions in terms of wanting to be able to guarantee their access to the



sealanes. Less but perhaps still understandable for a Chinese perspective is their development of stand-off weapons, cruise missiles, etc. which are directly aimed at keeping the U.S. and Japan from being able to conduct operations in the proximity of the Chinese mainland. This is why before China can meaningfully take part in mil-mil cooperation with us, they are going to have to become more transparent, as Secretary Gates and others have been urging them to do for so long with mixed results. There's still so much hidden and so much we don't know. So I think that they have interests and we have to recognize this. The downside is that we're not sure what their ultimate destination is, and until we are sure of their ultimate destination, their military build-up will raise concerns.

Question: What are your views about nuclear weapons and Japan?

Some Japanese pundits and commentators have already started talking about it. But I noticed that in the conversation Minister Ishiba had with Secretary Gates, he never uttered the word nuclear. But he made it very clear that if North Korea's nuclear weapons program was not terminated, then Japan would have to think about what to do. Well to me it rang clear as a bell. I don't think the message got through to all on the U.S. side. I think it's starting to sink in. My own view is if Japan were to be serious about the acquisition of a nuclear weapons program, this would be such a negative statement about the trust issue with the United States and our ability and willingness to provide the nuclear umbrella, that it would indicate we have had a split in the Alliance. Not separation, a split. In that case it would accelerate what would be going on in Japan and it would force the United States to totally reevaluate our standard in the Alliance. That's a pretty stark answer but that's where I stand.

## About the Author

**Richard L. Armitage** is President of Armitage International, and a former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State. Prior to assuming that post, he was President of Armitage Associates L.C. from May 1993. He has been engaged in a range of worldwide business and public policy endeavors as well as frequent public speaking and writing. Previously, he held senior troubleshooting and negotiating positions in the Departments of State and Defense, and the Congress, including as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy.