



U.S., Japan, and China Conference  
on Trilateral Security Cooperation

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Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS ([www.pacforum.org](http://www.pacforum.org)) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

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## Executive Summary

Relations among the United States, Japan, and China have experienced wide swings over the past decade. The various bilateral relationships are moving in the right direction and there is improved trilateral cooperation especially in the area of nontraditional security issues. Our project on “Strategic Goals in U.S., Japan, and China Relations” has sought to enhance the likelihood of success by focusing on the fundamental concerns of the three countries and exploring ways they could work together to realize shared interests. Most important, there are no major obstacles to building on this foundation, although lingering issues will continue to moderate the pace.

The most significant change over the last year is the warming of relations between China and Japan with prospects for continued high-level dialogue, and at the time of the meeting, the anticipation associated with the visit to Japan by Chinese President Hu Jintao. Although difficulties with historical animosity continue to plague the relationship, the extensive economic cooperation that has occurred between the two has helped improve relations. The inauguration of the more pragmatic Fukuda administration in Japan has helped improve the sense of cooperation. Ultimately, U.S. interests are best served by good relations between Japan and China.

Relations between the U.S. and Japan remain strong and both sides viewed the decision by Japan to resume supporting naval operations in the Indian Ocean as a positive sign. China recognizes the historical importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and understands that the two countries will strive to maintain close security ties over the mid-term. However, China also feels that the alliance will serve as a barrier to improving trilateral cooperation as some Chinese fear their country would become its “target.” Building confidence through cooperation on environmental security and other nontraditional security is a way to help develop a stronger basis for cooperation among the three countries.

U.S.-China relations remain strong with high-level dialogues proceeding and tentative cooperation continuing, especially in the area of economic coordination. The primary concern for Japan is the fear of being excluded from strategic dialogue between the U.S. and China. There remains a fairly significant degree of anxiety among Japanese over the growing relationship between the U.S. and China and its implication for U.S.-Japan relations. The best way to counter that fear is to establish a track-one trilateral dialogue mechanism.

In an effort to address issues that have a great influence on enhancing cooperation among the three countries, the group addressed recent developments on the Korean Peninsula. While the Six-Party Talks represents an important forum for security cooperation among the three countries, the difficulty with reaching an agreement on denuclearization has limited its potential as catalyst for improved cooperation beyond the issue of North Korea itself. There remains a great deal of skepticism that the talks can lead to a permanent security dialogue mechanism for the region. The series of bilateral talks that ensued following the stalemate reached when North Korea failed to make its nuclear materials declaration on Dec. 31, 2007 highlighted the difficulty with implementing security cooperation in the region.

Nevertheless, despite the generally pessimistic assessment, there does not appear to be a better solution to the problem.

The recent elections in Taiwan created a great deal of optimism, primarily because the election of President Ma Ying-jeou and the return to power of the Kuomintang (KMT) are seen as a shift to a more pragmatic approach by the leadership in Taiwan. The optimism centers on the idea that the election provides the opportunity to make significant strides in cross-Strait relations. However, the opportunity for improvement is not open-ended and if the people in Taiwan do not see improvements in their economic situation in the short term, it will become difficult for Ma to effect broader change in the society. China remains skeptical and has adopted a wait-and-see attitude. The irony is that while maintaining the status quo may be the path of least resistance, it will also contribute to the growing sense of separate identity in Taiwan, which ultimately makes unification more difficult.

Environmental security was a specific focus of discussion during the conference. There was general agreement that the technical nature of environmental security issues provides an excellent vehicle for enhanced regional cooperation. There is a great deal of functional cooperation that occurs in addressing environmental concerns, but policy coordination remains difficult. This was attributed to the fact that environmental issues tend to be long-term concerns that do not receive frequent and consistent attention from the security policy community. A key aspect of increasing awareness regarding environmental issues is to broaden the definition of security and take an ecological approach to environmental issues. Failure to take effective action on environmental issues could challenge national survival as ecological destruction threatens human settlement and limits economic potential. Specific areas that directly affect Northeast Asia and should be the basis for improved trilateral cooperation are climate change, yellow sand, acid rain, energy resources, nuclear waste, marine resources, and marine pollution. The need for an effective multilateral coordinating mechanism that includes multinational corporations, civil society, and local governments echoed throughout the session.

Effective trilateralism begins with mutual efforts to support each country's core strategic vision. China should back Japan's normalization process, the U.S. and Japan should support China's peaceful rise, and China should support a continuing role for the U.S. in the Asia Pacific. After embracing those general principles, there is a wide range of issues on which the three countries can pursue trilateralism, ranging from high-level strategic dialogues to search-and-rescue exercises. Ties between NGOs and the private sector should be encouraged. There should be a premium on creative thinking. Improving relations among the U.S., Japan, and China provides an opportunity to move bilateral relationships and trilateral relations to new levels. Politicians are sending the right signals and should move forward with initiatives to seize the moment. While there is a long list of shared concerns upon which governments can act, it is vital that the three countries push other elements of their societies to join in and thicken the web of contacts that can insulate relations from another downturn. The new emphasis on pragmatism among the leaders in these countries is a good starting point, but more work is needed.

## U.S., Japan, and China Conference on Trilateral Security Cooperation

Relations among the United States, Japan, and China have experienced profound swings throughout the decade of trilateral meetings that the Pacific Forum CSIS has hosted with partners from Japan and China. When we convened on March 31-April 2, 2008 for our 12<sup>th</sup> round of discussions, the various bilateral relationships were experiencing renewed hope of not just bilateral cooperation, but even improved trilateral cooperation, especially in the area of nontraditional security issues. Relations between Japan and China were still feeling the positive effects of the more pragmatic approach and prospects for ongoing high-level dialogue including a prospective visit to Japan by President Hu Jintao. Relations between the U.S. and Japan were strong and both sides viewed the decision by Japan to resume supporting naval operations in the Indian Ocean as a positive sign. U.S.-China relations remained strong, with high-level dialogues proceeding and cooperation continuing. Most important, there were no apparent obstacles to building on this foundation.

Despite positive bilateral relations, there remains a general reluctance among the three to pursue substantive trilateral cooperation. The triangle is still composed of three distinct sets of relationships and there has not been much in the way of three-way discussions or cooperation. Our conference sought to address that shortcoming by focusing on the fundamental concerns of the three countries and exploring ways they could work together to realize shared interests. Specifically, the conference included a session on the prospects for cooperation in the area of environmental security. Equally important, the conference participants wanted to ensure that conflicts among the three could be openly addressed and minimized to prevent them from jeopardizing that cooperation. To this end, the conference examined the state of the three bilateral relationships from the perspective of the third party. The group evaluated recent developments on the Korean Peninsula and assessed the implications of the recent presidential election in Taiwan for their combined impact on future cooperation in the region. The conference concluded with an assessment of the global strategic environment.

### **Chinese perceptions of U.S.-Japan relations**

In his presentation on Chinese perceptions of the U.S.-Japan relationship, Yang Mingje (China Institute of Contemporary International Relations) asserted that China recognizes the importance the U.S. and Japan attach to their bilateral relationship. While acknowledging the historical reasons for the security alliance, he expressed the hope that the alliance will adjust to and accommodate a changing world. Specifically, the alliance should not consider China a threat and must avoid any actions that interfere in China's internal affairs.

From a Chinese perspective, it is important to recognize that the regional security environment has changed dramatically over the past several years. Beijing sees the alliance through the prism of that changing environment. The fact that the four major powers in the region (Russia, Japan, China, and the U.S.) all want to take a larger role in the region creates

the potential for difficulties if their relationships are not managed carefully. Each of these states plays a crucial role in social transitions and the regional powers seek to play a more significant role in regional and global affairs. Japan wants to increase its role in security affairs, Russia wants to guarantee its role in the Asia Pacific, and China seeks to be a responsible stakeholder. These transitions create many uncertainties and introduce the possibility of conflict. Finally, China considers the U.S. to be part of the region and believes that it can play an important role in dealing with regional security issues and improving relationships among the other three countries.

China remains optimistic about the region's future and is adjusting its national security strategy accordingly. It has developed new conceptions for its peaceful development policies and its vision for a harmonious world. Since China wants to participate in the region, it recognizes the need to make adjustments to its foreign policy to improve cooperative efforts, especially in the areas of developing energy and natural resources and thinking about global concerns such as the environment.

Yang offered some thoughts about how the interest in improving trilateral relations dominates Chinese thinking about the U.S.-Japan alliance. The U.S. and China are major stakeholders in the region and should be seen as constructive partners. China and Japan are doing the preparatory work to establish a stronger relationship. Both relationships should focus on trilateral strategic relations.

Despite efforts to improve trilateral relations, China still has concerns about the U.S.-Japan alliance. The first significant shift in the alliance came in 1996 with the joint declaration that established the baseline for the future of the alliance, moving it away from its origins in the Cold War. The 2005 statement at the Security Consultative Committee meeting is seen as a second key point: the U.S. and Japan shifted the focus of the alliance from regional to global concerns. The three questions that these shifts raise in the minds of the Chinese are:

- 1) Who is the next target of the U.S. Japan alliance, North Korea or China?
- 2) Will the alliance try to interfere in the internal affairs of China?
- 3) What is the real purpose of the missile defense program? If the North Korea issue is resolved, then what is the purpose of the missile defense system? Is it China?

The presentation concluded with some suggestions on how to improve relations with both the U.S. and Japan and to avoid misperceptions. These included both bilateral and confidence-building measures as well as trilateral security cooperation, especially in the area of nontraditional security.

The discussion focused initially on the role of the alliance and the perceived need for trilateral security cooperation in the region. Several U.S. participants suggested that the U.S.-Japan alliance is changing to frame security more broadly than just military operations and is shifting its focus from common threats to common interests. The target is instability in the region and the two countries aim to give Tokyo confidence in its expanding role in dealing with these issues. Other participants suggested that the development of a U.S.-Japan-China



trilateral security cooperation mechanism at the Track-1 level would be useful, although some were skeptical given the lack cooperation between the three countries. Others argued that trilateral cooperation itself could be perceived as a threat by others, especially South Korea, and suggested a better approach would be a four- or five-power security cooperation mechanism in the region. The role of the alliance in providing a basis for stability in the region was also raised.

A Japanese participant suggested that the focus of the U.S.-Japan alliance was currently on North Korea, but it is expanding to address new threats. Essentially, the alliance should target whatever threatens Japan or the U.S. and should look at trilateral cooperation with China as a way to address nontraditional security issues.

Comments by Chinese participants centered on the need to shift from a threat-based alliance to a more cooperative approach. One asserted that there were three components to the security equation in Northeast Asia: the bilateral alliance between U.S. and its allies, major power relationships, and bilateral/multilateral forums. Although these forums are new, they are the most important because they hold the key to future security cooperation in the region. While several Chinese saw the need to expand the alliance to other areas such as nontraditional security, they expressed concern about an alliance based on “common values” and saw military-based alliances as “old thinking.” While reiterating the idea that trilateral cooperation did not need to replace existing mechanisms, one Chinese highlighted the importance of focusing on areas such as environmental issues as the best avenue for increasing security cooperation. Some Chinese expressed frustration with what they perceived as inconsistency in alliance policy in both the U.S. and Japan from one administration to the next. Some advocated trilateral security cooperation that extends beyond East Asia.

The session concluded with a U.S. participant suggesting that the U.S.-Japan alliance was likely to remain stable following the 2008 U.S. presidential elections. The only difference would be the policy issues that will be highlighted. Specifically, if the Democrats win the election, there is likely to be less enthusiasm for aggressively pursuing missile defense. He concluded by suggesting that we should not use the term “nontraditional security” to avoid raising difficult issues. Two important specific issues that fall in that category are haze in Southeast Asia and yellow dust in Northeast Asia.

### **U.S. views of Japan-China relations**

In his presentation on U.S. views of Japan-China relations, Robert Dujarric (Temple University) echoed a common perception that good relations with Japan is critical to U.S. interests in the region. Japan has the second largest economy in the world with an advanced technological base; it provides military bases with significant infrastructural support from the Japanese government; and the Japan Self-Defense Forces provides capabilities that reinforce U.S. military capabilities. The alliance makes it easier for the U.S. to deal with China because it limits the scope of Sino-Japanese tensions and reinforces the U.S.-dominated security architecture in the region. Nevertheless, it is in the interest of the U.S. to support

good relations between Japan and China. Historically, tensions between Japan and China have fueled Chinese nationalism, which ultimately gets focused on the U.S.

From the U.S. perspective, the two key variables in future relations are whether China's policy is compatible with U.S. interests and whether Japan or China is the leading Asian economic power. If China is pro-U.S. and economically dominant, then the U.S. will focus on China and Japan will be marginalized. If China is hostile to U.S. interests, then the U.S.-Japan alliance will become more important and the impact of China-Japan relations will be minimal. The U.S. does not want bad relations between China and Japan to drag the U.S. into a conflict between them. Therefore, the U.S. would like to see relations between them improve and move beyond the history issues that keep the relationship from growing. As an ally, a conflict between Japan and China will involve the U.S.

In the discussion, a U.S. participant remarked that it seems that it is only the U.S. that wants the relations between the other two parties to improve and remains concerned that the relationship is actually deteriorating. The Chinese response was that during the reform policies of the 1970s and 1980s, China had less anti-Japanese sentiment. In fact, China saw Japan as a model of capitalism and appreciated its role as investor and source of ODA. Chinese participants explained the shift to more antagonistic feelings among Chinese toward Japan in recent years as a result of the loss of a common enemy during the Cold War, the increased exposure to other economic development models, lingering concerns over Japan's role in the Taiwan issue, and the return of history issues, including disputed territory and Japan's lack of remorse for its actions during the war. Some Japanese participants felt that Chinese failed to understand Japan. They argued that young Chinese continue to be educated to hate Japanese and that Japan was a target of nationalism to support for the authoritarian regime in Beijing.

In looking at the residual difficulties associated with historical animosity, one U.S. participant suggested that China and Japan should look to Europe as an example where countries have been able to move beyond the past and work on common challenges through a range of multilateral institutions. This suggestion was dismissed by several participants as misleading. A Japanese participant argued the analogy was unfair because China remained an authoritarian regime with a monolithic policy approach, thus making it difficult to reconcile differences given Japan's pluralism. Another counter-argument was that Germany should be seen as the exception in dealing with its past, rather than a model.

Several participants emphasized promising aspects of the relationship by focusing on the extensive economic integration between the two and the opportunities for them to work together, especially in Africa and other areas where development assistance is needed and in the area of nontraditional security. There was also a sense that since the Abe visit in 2006, the election of the more practical Fukuda as prime minister, and the upcoming visit of President Hu Jintao, there is an opportunity to improve relations. However, interdependence helps, but does not solve, the underlying problems that continue to plague the relationship.

## **Japanese views of U.S.-China relations**

Takagi Seiichiro's (Aoyama Gakuin University) presentation on Japanese views of the U.S.-China relationship began by emphasizing that China was viewed by Japan primarily through the prism of U.S.-Japan relations. Recognizing that China is growing both militarily and economically, he suggested that both countries would remain important to Japan for the foreseeable future. While the relationship between the two might fluctuate, it is within a narrow range: Japan does not see it becoming a nuclear rivalry nor an alliance relationship that would threaten Japan. Confrontations between the two tend to be short-lived and the most important factors that influence relations are domestic politics in the respective countries and unexpected accidents. He went on to suggest that there are elements of both cooperation and conflict that will keep the relationship from threatening Japan.

Several long-term trends will continue to influence the relationship. First, Taiwan is a dilemma for China and tends to grow in importance when U.S.-China relations deteriorate. Second, domestic politics in both the U.S. and China are important because both sides have concerns about accommodation of the other. Third, nationalism in China remains a concern because it tends to be focused on Japan. Fourth, the power transition away from the central government in China, which is an outgrowth of its economic reform model, creates uncertainties for neighboring countries. The major concern is how long the transition will last and whether the outcome will be a more democratic country. This leads to uncertainties about the peaceful rise of China.

Takagi saw both countries acknowledging the other's importance. For the U.S., China is important primarily because of its size, but it wins U.S. attention for a variety of reasons. Accordingly the U.S. approach has been engagement and to avoid unnecessary confrontation. It has hedged the risk associated with engagement by maintaining its alliances in the region. China, on the other hand, has approached its relationship with the U.S. to avoid confrontation while trying to contain the American impact in the region. Because the U.S. can disrupt its economic and social development, conflict is not in China's interest. Instead, China has pursued a strategy of strategic partnership and soft balancing.

When asked about Japan's primary concerns regarding U.S.-China relations, a Japanese participant suggested that a survey of Japanese government officials revealed: first, concern about a secret deal between the U.S. and China on North Korea or Taiwan without Japanese participation; second, fear that the lack of specialists on Japan in the U.S. government would reinforce the tendency within the U.S. to focus on China policy and neglect the U.S.-Japan relationship; third, concern that Japan is left out of U.S.-China nuclear dialogues, which raises concerns about extended deterrence for Japan.

Other discussion addressed a variety of issues, including the difficulty of resolving the history issue, especially between Japan and China, although one Chinese participant suggested it was a regional issue, not just a bilateral one. Another participant pointed out that extensive youth exchanges between China and Japan were reducing differences between the two countries. A Chinese participant noted that the U.S.-China relationship had matured significantly since 2001 and looked forward to more cooperation with the U.S. and the

establishment of a stable and relatively balanced trilateral relationship between the U.S.-Japan alliance and China. A Japanese participant noted that the government of Japan is carefully studying a Chinese proposal for Track-1 trilateral dialogue. He felt that Japan's response should be positive as long as it was not the only mechanism for dialogue among the three countries. The primary concern was that the U.S. and China would dismiss Japan as irrelevant and see U.S.-Japan and U.S. relations in zero-sum terms. He concluded the U.S. should retain its alliance with Japan because it would be difficult for the U.S. to maintain an effective presence in the region without military bases in Japan.

### **Changing situation on the Korean Peninsula**

The situation on the Korean Peninsula is a source of concern for all three countries and has presented opportunities for trilateral cooperation to deal with the denuclearization of North Korea. While there remains a great deal of skepticism regarding North Korea's intentions to fulfill its obligations in the Six-Party Talks, Sakata Yasuyo (Kanda University of International Studies) argued that the six-party framework should be a more useful approach than the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework because it gives all six parties a voice in the process. The most important challenge will be for the five parties (Japan, U.S., China, Russia, and South Korea) to coordinate efforts in the areas of energy and economic aid/cooperation in exchange for North Korea's denuclearization. Sakata argued that the key to success would be coordinating efforts within the five working groups (Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Normalization of U.S.-DPRK Relations, Normalization of Japan-DPRK Relations, Economic and Energy Cooperation, and Northeast Asia Peace and Security). All parties would have to work out their own issues independently, but the working groups should move in parallel and must come together at the end of each phase.

Sakada outlined issues in the policy coordination process. First, the immediate challenge is completing phase 2 of the implementation agreement of February 2007. Specific sticking points are well known and are centered on the U.S.-DPRK talks seeking a "complete and correct" declaration of North Korea's nuclear programs. A second follow-on problem with North Korea's declaration is that the U.S. has promised to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in return for the declaration. This will require careful coordination with Japan because of the deadlock between Japan and North Korea regarding the abduction of Japanese nationals in the 1970s. The abductee issue has also spilled over into other areas such as energy and economic assistance since Japan has refused to provide assistance until the issue is satisfactorily resolved. This is an example of where coordination among the five working groups is essential. Sakata suggested that the Fukuda administration has made a commitment to pursue a more flexible approach with more emphasis on "dialogue" while using "pressure tactics" more judiciously. A third development that has begun to cloud the Six-Party Talks is the shift in inter-Korean relations since the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in South Korea and a more confrontational approach toward the North. It is too soon to determine the outcome of this shift.

Looking forward to the possibility of moving to Phase 3 of the implementation agreement, Sakata argued that the parties will face even tougher issues. She was skeptical that North Korea would be willing to abandon all its nuclear programs, return to the NPT and

IAEA safeguards, accept a verification regime, and implement the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula with South Korea. She felt that the U.S. and Japan held the key to a more graceful opening of international assistance to North Korea. Looking beyond the Six-Party Talks to the issue of economic and security cooperation in Northeast Asia, Sakata argued that Japan and Russia should be integrally involved in the process. If it proves difficult to proceed with six parties, the five parties (excluding North Korea) should explore ideas and plans for multilateral cooperation in the region. Specifically, China, Japan, and South Korea should take the initiative in the areas of non-nuclear energy and economic cooperation. Environmental cooperation should also be an important part of that cooperation. She concluded by suggested that nurturing an environment where North Korea or a unified Korea can be integrated into the regional economic and security architecture would be the most useful way to develop an enduring security mechanism.

In his presentation, Wei Ouyang (National Defense University) argued that the best chance for resolving the North Korea nuclear issue was within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. He felt that the incentives available to North Korea should encourage them to accept denuclearization. U.S.-China-Japan trilateral efforts should focus on ways to contribute to the success of the six-party framework. One challenge that he saw was the shift in policy by the Lee Myung-bak government toward North Korea.

Scott Snyder (Pacific Forum) argued in his presentation that the Six-Party Talks stalemate is due to a variety of obstacles that prevent further implementation of the Feb. 13 and Oct. 4, 2007 agreements. First, the priorities of the six parties are not fully aligned. North Korea recognizes that while U.S. demands full disclosure in the areas of enriched uranium as well as declaring the specific details of its past activities in its plutonium program, other participants are less concerned with past accounting. Second, the inauguration of the Lee government in the South has created new uncertainties in North-South relations. As a result, North Korea has tried to gain the upper hand in inter-Korean relations and has become wary and anxious about the new approach. Third, the “new issue” of North Korean proliferation activity with Syria was not concretely addressed in the implementation agreements. As a result, that it has become a political issue in the U.S. while North Korea has accused the U.S. of “moving the goal posts” by demanding “disclosure” on the issue. Fourth, the declaration itself is problematic. Since North Korea knows that its declaration will be the basis for expanded monitoring and verification regime, it fears that whatever it reveals will be used to further push North Korea into a corner. If it declares less than is known, the U.S. will find it politically unacceptable. If it declares more than is known, North Korea will raise new suspicions that will require further investigations. Fifth, there are conflicts within the North Korean government regarding benefits and sequencing of actions. From North Korea’s perspective, the “strategic decision” to forgo its nuclear programs is fraught with danger as it is crucial for the regime to maintain leverage *vis-a-vis* the U.S. and the other parties. Sixth, the tactical approach taken by the U.S. has created anxieties among other parties in the process. As U.S.-DPRK bilateral negotiations over the nuclear issue take center stage, the other four parties have become onlookers, engendering fears that their interests are not being considered in the final outcome or that the Six-Party Talks forum will be marginalized by a “secret” bilateral deal.

There are also longer-term anxieties among the six parties over the future of the Korean Peninsula. These anxieties tend to inhibit the capacity of the respective parties to deal effectively with the denuclearization issue. Questions regarding the relationship between denuclearization and “regime transformation” in the North remain unanswered. Also, the impact of denuclearization on the unification of the two Koreas remains difficult to assess. Ultimately, the process of denuclearization magnifies strategic anxieties regarding the feasibility of expanded cooperation in the region. At this point it is difficult to determine who can influence North Korea. China appears to have exhausted its ability to positively influence the North. The conservative turn in South Korea appears to be increasing anxieties in the North over inter-Korean relations. The U.S. seems to have exhausted its ability to provide incentives without making additional concessions that will be politically unsustainable at home and leave new problems that will require further negotiations in the future.

Given these obstacles, Snyder presented three equally unsatisfying scenarios to the current stalemate. First is the so-called Libyan model where North Korea would make the strategic decision to give up its nuclear programs in exchange for economic assistance and integration into the international system. This is unlikely due to mistrust of the new administration in South Korea and possible divisions within North Korea over the need for the nuclear programs to ensure regime survival. A more likely variant of this scenario is a North Korean willingness to make gestures to keep the negotiation process going while continuing to defer a strategic decision. The other six-party participants must then determine the price they would pay to prevent the Six-Party Talks from failing.

A second scenario was a U.S. concession on the “complete and correct” declaration by North Korea, whereby North Korea would be able to defer its declaration on the uranium and proliferation issues to a later date. While this approach would prevent a reversal or deterioration by reinforcing the status quo, it would also be difficult to sustain politically.

A third scenario, which Snyder viewed as the most likely, was for the Six-Party Talks to remain in suspension – to maintain the status quo until things become clearer with a new administration in the U.S. and time for the North to better judge the approach by South Korea. This “muddling through” approach allows North Korea to remain a de facto nuclear state, which several neighbors and especially Japan, find unacceptable. Also, it is questionable whether the North Korean leadership will be able to maintain stability for that long and has other parties world response to a severe food shortage (as predicted by some) or some other humanitarian crisis.

Each of the above scenarios has drawbacks and pitfalls. There are serious difficulties with finding a solution that provides minimal satisfaction to all parties. It is almost certain that as the issue has become politicized in the U.S., Japan, and to some extent South Korea, the challenge will be to find a compromise that can be sustained politically by all sides.

Snyder concluded with a discussion of “minilateral” and multilateral efforts that might help improve the chances of finding a cooperative solution to the North Korean nuclear issue and the likelihood of extending that cooperation beyond that specific issue. He pointed out that the difficulty with various trilateral combinations (U.S.-Japan-China/Japan-

China-South Korea/U.S.-South Korea-China/U.S.-Japan-South Korea) is that they all fail to address the North Korea nuclear issue in a meaningful way. Paradoxically, North Korea is simultaneously the catalyst for multilateralism among the other parties of the Six-Party Talks and yet holds deeper forms of multi-party cooperation “hostage” to the singular issue of denuclearization. So, the eventual challenge may be finding the issues that would ultimately drive multilateral cooperation beyond the common concern with North Korea. Thus far, it has proven difficult to find functional issues that equally engage all parties, especially given bilateral issues that act as stumbling blocks to improving multilateral cooperation.

During the discussion, participants from Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. stated that a de facto nuclear North Korea was unacceptable and expressed concern that the U.S. was in the process of making a “secret deal” with North Korea. Others expressed concern that it was difficult to determine what ‘red lines,’ if any, the U.S. had with respect to North Korean nuclear activities. A Japanese participant suggested that a U.S. concession to North Korea was Japan’s worst nightmare. A Chinese participant responded by saying that China was not as concerned about U.S.-North Korea bilateral discussions as the U.S. and North Korea are the main players and that China would work hard to find a “win-win” solution. A common theme throughout the discussion was that while almost everyone was dissatisfied with some aspect of the six-party process, it would be difficult to find a better mechanism. Along those lines, a Japanese participant suggested it was in everyone’s interest to complete Phase 2 of the implementation agreement. By moving to Phase 3, the group would be able to better test North Korea’s intentions and move to a solution. In the meantime, transparency and creating a durable security mechanism remains the goal of all parties.

### **The Taiwan question**

The recent elections in Taiwan have created a great deal of optimism among analysts, primarily because most believe the election of Ma Ying-jeou and the return to power of the Kuomintang (KMT) represent a strategic opportunity to transform cross-Strait relations and help bring an enduring peace and stability to East Asia. The three presenters provided unique perspectives on the implications of the election, the critical policy issues it has raised, and the prospects for sustainable progress in cross-Strait relations.

Bonnie Glaser (Pacific Forum) began by focusing on the concrete measures China could take in the near-term to create goodwill with the Ma and the people of Taiwan. Ma will need to show the benefits of a better relationship with the mainland to the Taiwan people to solidify his credibility as the leader who can find the right balance between reconciliation in the face of a growing Taiwanese identity. Specific measures that would demonstrate the PRC’s goodwill include allowing Taiwan membership in the World Health Assembly, avoiding “stealing” any more of Taiwan’s allies, stop denying Taiwan international space in organizations that do not require sovereignty to join, avoiding interference with the proposed Singapore-Taiwan free trade agreement, and moderating China’s military posture by pulling missiles deployed across the Strait from Taiwan and freezing the deployment of short range ballistic missiles. In return, Ma must follow through with his campaign promises, especially the commitment to return to the so-called 1992 consensus, oppose Taiwan independence, and pursue peace and stability across the Strait.

The U.S. role is very important and Washington should work to repair relations with Taiwan without undermining cross-Strait relations. The U.S. must recognize that China is concerned about losing U.S. support in opposing the independence movement. The U.S. should give China to proceed in improving cross-Strait relations at a deliberate pace. Other moves that could upset the delicate balance at this point would be U.S. sales to Taiwan of *F-16* fighters and moves toward more official contacts with Taiwan. Nevertheless, Glaser felt that the U.S. should help Taiwan in its effort to gain international space.

Glaser suggested economic cooperation will continue to be the area where both sides are most aggressive in seeking ways to engage. With both sides strongly committed to this objective, several initiatives such as regular cross-Strait charter flights and allowing mainland tourists to visit Taiwan will likely be implemented within the coming months. However, moving beyond economic issues will continue to pose difficulties with the greatest prospects for success being in areas such as military confidence-building measures and cooperation in the areas of science, health, education, and culture exchanges.

Glaser concluded by arguing that both the U.S. and Japan would benefit from a reversal in the recent adversarial trend in the relationship and increased cross-Strait economic exchanges. From a longer-term perspective, while reunification could present some concern in both the U.S. and Japan, it is not an immediate concern as Ma, in deference to domestic sentiment, pledged throughout his election campaign that he would not negotiate reunification during his term in office. However, the specific form unification takes and specific military arrangements will certainly shape U.S.-Japan evaluations of the situation when and if it does occur.

Zhang Tuosheng (China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies) focused his presentation on the anticipated impact of the recent presidential election and UN membership referendum in Taiwan. He considered Ma's wide margin of victory unexpected and characterized it as evidence that the people of Taiwan were seriously dissatisfied with the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) corruption, its inability to develop Taiwan's economy, and its attempts to create ethnic conflict. Despite the wide margin of victory, Zhang remained suspicious that Chen Shui-bian and the DPP might attempt to prevent a smooth transfer of power. Accordingly, China remains on high alert for the worst case; it would be premature to relax its guard until the transition in Taiwan was complete. Meanwhile, China would continue with its pragmatic and flexible policy of seeking peaceful cross-Strait relations.

Characterizing the election as a serious setback for the DPP and its move toward de facto independence, Zhang saw the election of Ma as an excellent opportunity to improve cross-Strait relations. Given the strong historical links between the KMT and mainland and the positive statements made by Ma during his election campaign, it will be much easier for the mainland to demonstrate its flexibility and make rapid responses to positive gestures from Taiwan. However, there are remaining difficulties. For example, Ma's policy of "three noes" (no reunification, no independence and no war) is only partly consistent with the mainland's policy of peaceful reunification, one country – two systems, anti-Taiwan independence, and establishment of a peaceful development framework. China is also concerned about Ma's



statements regarding revision of the constitution, removal of missiles, and increasing Taiwan's international space. Zhang also worried that Ma's desire to improve Taiwan-U.S. relations could dramatically increase arms procurements from the U.S., which would adversely affect the chances for improvement in cross-Strait relations. Looking to the future, he argued that improving relations between China and Taiwan is a common interest of the U.S., China, and Japan. Maintaining a strict adherence to the one China policy and reducing arms sales to Taiwan would provide China with the opportunity to build a framework for peaceful development that could serve as the basis for reducing tensions and increased confidence-building measures throughout the region.

Matsuda Yasuhiro's (University of Tokyo) presentation focused on the domestic implications of the Ma victory. He argued that a careful analysis of the election campaign showed the "Taiwanization" of Ma and the KMT. The fact that Ma did not talk about unification, did not identify himself as Chinese, and did not say anything about the Republic of China demonstrates his recognition that the KMT needs to create a local identity. In the end, there were more similarities than differences between the KMT and the DPP in terms of trying to appeal to voters' sense of a Taiwan identity. Matsuda argued the 1992 consensus and Ma's acceptance of the one-China principle is really only a tool for opening dialogue with the mainland. He anticipates that Ma's foreign policy will in some ways emulate the initial approach employed by Lee Teng-Hui in that he will pursue cross-Strait dialogue while working hard to improve relations with the U.S. and create additional international space for Taiwan. In relations with the mainland, Matsuda agreed with the other presenters that improving economic relations would be relatively easy, although Ma's campaign promise of "no equality, no negotiation" will quickly become a stumbling block to progress in diplomatic relations.

An interesting theme that emerged in the ensuing discussion was China's reaction to the elections. While several U.S. participants characterized Ma's election as an historic opportunity for China to take the initiative in improving cross-Strait relations, several Chinese participants felt that nothing had really changed and argued that China should take a wait and see approach. The U.S. arguments centered on the need for China to shape the situation and boost Ma's credibility by showing support for something symbolic like Taiwan's application for observer status with the World Health Assembly or a withdrawal of missiles from the area immediately across from Taiwan. Others warned that it was important for China to recognize Taiwan's need for additional international space. Chinese responses highlighted the need to test Ma's intentions and prepare for change with a focus on long-term policies rather than short-term gestures.

The session concluded with several participants stating that despite differences in how they view individual leaders in Taiwan, U.S. and Japanese intentions toward Taiwan were identical: both countries ultimately sought a peaceful resolution to Taiwan-China relations. Chinese respondents felt that both U.S. and Japan should remember that long-term unification would remain China's core interest. One participant pointed out this divergence creates a dilemma: while maintaining the status quo may be the path of least resistance, it also would contribute to the growth of a Taiwan identity that would make unification more difficult and require a great deal of creativity to resolve.

## **Cooperation for environmental security**

During this session, the focus shifted to trilateral cooperation in the area of environmental security. While it is generally recognized that environmental issues are becoming increasingly important, there has been a general reluctance by countries to engage in collective action to address them. The presentations given during the session highlight the reasons for this reluctance and point to areas where cooperative efforts have been successful.

Ouyang Wei (National Defense University) began with a presentation on the role of the military in environmental security. He suggested that the military should improve its capabilities to respond to these threats and pay a more active role in environmental protection. He went on to highlight environmental problems that can occur at the global, regional, and national level. Global problems include global warming, ozone depletion, deforestation and so forth. Regional pollution, deforestation and depleted water resources can have a direct impact on diplomatic relations and can create military tensions. At the national level, soil erosion, deforestation, and the lack of water resources can create social instability and result in large numbers of refugees. A fourth area that is often overlooked when considering environmental security is the dramatic impact military operations have on the environment. The widespread environmental damage created in the first Gulf War when Iraq burned large quantities of oil resources is an example of the long-term damage these kinds of operations can cause.

Therefore, environmental security requires a long-term perspective and requires careful multinational cooperation. This will require an effective international coordinating mechanism for activities including joint research, threat identification, crisis management supervision, development of laws and regulations, and promotion of dialogues and exchanges. Enhanced military-to-military cooperation, especially in the area of disaster response, would be greatly beneficial. Finally, to avoid conflicts arising from resource disputes, a peacekeeping force under the UN should be established.

The focus of Ota Hiroshi's (Waseda University) presentation was the need to broaden the definition of security beyond the narrowly defined state-centric thinking that has dominated international relations literature. He argued that an ecological approach to the issue of environmental security correctly emphasizes the need for a fundamental shift in attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions to ensure an environmentally secure world. While economic development is necessary to break cycles of poverty, population growth, and environmental destruction, developing sustainable approaches to that task become critical. He concluded with a description of how climate change could create dramatic changes and become an issue of national survival if we do not address environmental security issues in a systematic way.

Miranda Schreur (University of Maryland and Freie Universität Berlin) addressed the issue of environmental security in East Asia. She began by pointing to the fact that environmental scarcity and competition for resources can lead to political instability while environmental degradation can cause human health problems and long-term ecological destruction threatens human settlement and limits economic potential. Nevertheless,

environmental cooperation can also serve as a mechanism for peace and stability by promoting trust, the development of collaborative networks, and the promotion of dispute resolution through dialogue.

There are several transnational environmental security issues that directly affect Northeast Asia. They include climate change, yellow sand, acid rain, dispute over energy resources, nuclear waste, competition for marine resources, and marine pollution. While most people recognize these problems, countries in the region have been reluctant to deal with them cooperatively because of the reluctance to give up sovereignty, mutual suspicion, lack of leadership and effective enforcement mechanisms, and difficulty with finding a satisfactory way to share costs. Schreurs argued that there were increasingly positive signs of regional cooperation in this field. Over the past several years a variety of multilateral organizations have been established to deal specifically with environmental issues in the region. This represents a critical first step in creating momentum for increased cooperation and the establishment of norms that promote better transnational coordination in monitoring and responding to environmental security issues.

During the discussion, several participants recounted their difficulties in dealing with environmental security: their experiences echoed the comments of the presenters. There was a lengthy discussion regarding the crucial role that multinational corporations and civil society can play in improving how local governments respond to environmental challenges. The session concluded with a general recognition that it was important to move beyond technical cooperation and to create political will at the regional level to address environmental security in a systematic way.

### **Future global strategic environment**

Watanabe Akio (University of Tokyo and Aoyama Gakuin University) began the session with a presentation on the trend in security studies to expand beyond the state-centered model of security. The emergence of human security and the globalization of international relations are symptomatic of that shift and reflect the growing recognition that individuals must be protected. As we begin to think more globally, survival of the human race becomes paramount. While states have increasingly begun to define security relations in regional terms, there remains a reluctance to extend that to the global scale because the rise of China impacts the balance of power in the region and regional states are still groping for a well-defined role in the emerging security architecture. Given these uncertainties, Watanabe argued that we should focus on economic security and take a more comprehensive approach to shared security challenges.

In his presentation, David Brown (Johns Hopkins University) argued that the most dramatic shift that has occurred in the U.S.-Japan-China relationship is that for the first time in nearly two centuries the relationship is no longer shaped by external influences. Instead, the three countries have become great powers in their own right and can shape their own destinies. Over the past several years there have been several issues that have led them toward a shared sense of vulnerability. The events of September 11, 2001 led to a brief period of shared determination to respond to nonstate actors. In 2006 the threat of avian flu

raised the shared concern with public health. In 2007, climate change raised the fear of vulnerability to the effects of the natural environment. None of these issues appear to be a strong enough to sustain trilateral cooperation however.

Three questions that will shape the immediate future of trilateral relations are the role of strategic military forces, especially nuclear weapons; the capacity of the international economic system to deal with financial crisis; and the emergence of a “Beijing consensus” that is opposed to foreign interference in domestic political decisions that counters the “Washington consensus” based on liberal democracy and open markets. Brown concluded by arguing that each of these questions can create animosity within the trilateral relationship and all should be carefully managed. Clearly, there is a need to be pragmatic and avoid creation of an unproductive ideological divide.

The holistic nature of global policy requirements and the need to work together were the major themes of Lu Dehong’s (China Foundation for Strategic and International Studies) presentation on the future of the global strategic environment. Noting the gaps between globalization and state-centered distribution, between the haves and have-nots, and between the global nature of issues and state responses, he argued that it will become increasingly important for major powers to work together and to avoid seeing each other as enemies. Although increasing interdependence among states is not a guarantee of peace, it helps by creating familiarity and confidence in the desirability of peaceful resolution of conflicts. Therefore, tensions among major powers tend to be subjective. He proposed that the best way to deal with complex issues such as environmental security and other nontraditional security issues was to keep an open mind and be conscious of the fallibility of judgments and reasoning of other parties, to recognize the complexity and non-linear nature of the challenge, and continually reassess circumstances rather than rely on point assessments that may result in false impressions. Ultimately, building confidence in the response of other major powers is the key to effectively dealing with global security issues.

Given the future-oriented nature of the session topic, the chair then solicited comments from participants who attended the meeting as part of the Pacific Forum Young Leaders program. A U.S. young leader, recalling his experience in South Africa with the truth and reconciliation commission on apartheid, highlighted the importance for the younger generation to see the older generation remember and demonstrate forgiveness. The message for Northeast Asia was that reconciling disputed history cannot be left to future generations. He went on to argue that setting aside ideological differences and focusing on good governance and cooperative approaches to transform societies were the critical elements in dealing with future global security challenges. A Chinese Young Leader suggested that dealing with nontraditional security issues could be the driving force behind increased cooperation and emphasized the importance of improving understanding of these threats and to cultivate a culture of communication in pursuit of global solutions. He went on to suggest that China wanted to be a responsible stakeholder in regional and global affairs by fostering development and cooperation with other countries, but did not want to impose methods or ideologies on others. A Japanese Young Leader focused on the importance of good governance and the need to move beyond ideologies and conflicts like the two Koreas and China-Taiwan. While emphasizing the need to strengthen regional and global capacity to

improve cooperative approaches to nontraditional security issues, he also recognized the need to develop institutions for legitimizing collective actions.

Other issues raised in the discussion included the need for strategic nuclear discussions in the framework of a U.S.-China-Japan trilateral dialogue, the importance of nontraditional security issues as an organizing principle for security cooperation, and the need to find the right balance between resolving current problems and working to shape the contours of trilateral relations. Several Japanese participants expressed concern that strategic nuclear discussions between the U.S. and China could lead to increasing insecurity in Japan. Accordingly, they argued that Japan should be included in these discussions, with some arguing that the agenda should be broadened to include conventional weapons issues. Using cooperative approaches to deal with nontraditional issues and emphasizing sustaining development and good governance was seen by one participant as way to get at the root causes of insecurity in the region. Military action should be used only as a last resort as it tends to be reactive, whereas the most pressing need is to build better capacity at the local level. While lauding the optimism expressed by the Young Leaders in their comments, one participant reminded the group that it was important to deal with the “harsh realities” of the current trilateral security relationship. Without resolving these issues, it would impossible to build an effective institutional framework for long-term cooperation. The session concluded with a suggestion that one area where trilateral cooperation is currently being used successfully and could be further expanded is maritime security, especially in expanding capacity to improve sea lane protection in areas such as the Malacca Straits. Returning to a recurring theme of the conference one participant remarked that there was a tendency to turn opportunities for cooperation into a competition over which country could “cooperate” better than the others.

### **Final thoughts**

Discussion during the wrap-up session centered on prospects for engaging in trilateral cooperation beyond regional issues. Some suggestions included addressing nontraditional security issues such as UN peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and joint search and rescue operations. While recognizing the attractiveness of dealing with these types of issues because they are relatively noncontroversial, participants acknowledged that the deeper issues of promoting good governance and building institutional capacity of regional cooperation were essential. Also, it is important to limit the influence of ideology if the three countries are serious about developing a sustainable agenda for cooperation. Returning to a theme that resonated throughout the conference, several participants advocated the establishment of a Track-1 dialogue mechanism focused on institution building in the area of nontraditional security issues, especially in the area of environmental protection and maritime security.

Suggestions for future sessions of this trilateral forum ranged from examination of the relations with neighboring regions to more abstract issues such as the role of social change on security cooperation. Specific suggestions included an examination of the role Central Asia and its energy resources might have on trilateral relations; that Pakistan and India; and given the increasing involvement in development assistance to Africa by both China and

Japan, there was interest in examining lessons learned from that involvement. Finally, some participants advocated the use of simulations and negotiation scenarios to engage in problem-solving approaches to climate change and other environmental issues. In his concluding remarks, Zhang Tuosheng (China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies) noted that despite remaining differences among the three countries, it was clear that there was great sentiment to improve cooperation, especially in the area of nontraditional security. He also noted that the group had reached a consensus that the recent election in Taiwan represented an opportunity to reduce tensions and improve cooperation in the region. Ralph Cossa (Pacific Forum) noted in closing that it is important for all three countries to set aside ritualistic issues that attempt to fix blame for past grievances and stop making excuses for failing to make progress in trilateral cooperation.

With governments in the region placing new emphasis on practical cooperation, the general mood of the conference was more hopeful than in the past. Improving relations among the U.S., Japan, and China provide an opportunity to move bilateral relationships and trilateral relations to new levels. Politicians are sending the right signals and should move forward with new initiatives. While there is a long list of shared concerns upon which governments can act, it is vital that the three countries push elements of their societies to join and thicken the web of contacts that can insulate relations from another downturn among politicians. These relationships are far too important to leave to a small group of decision makers – politicians in particular.

## About the Author

Carl W. Baker is the director of programs and co-editor of *Comparative Connections* at Pacific Forum, CSIS. Previously he was on the faculty at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies where he lectured and conducted seminars on a variety of security-related topics. He has extensive experience in Asia, having served with the UN Military Armistice Commission and as a political and economic intelligence analyst in South Korea. He also served for seven years in a variety of military staff assignments in Japan and worked for extended periods in the Philippines and Guam. A graduate of the Air War College, he has an M.A. in public administration from the University of Oklahoma and a B.A. in anthropology from the University of Iowa.





# Appendix A

## The 12<sup>th</sup> Japan-U.S.-China Conference on Trilateral Security Cooperation

Organized by  
Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS),  
Pacific Forum CSIS, and  
China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies (CFISS)

### *Program*

#### **MONDAY, MARCH 31**

Participants arrive in Tokyo  
18:00 **Welcome Dinner** hosted by RIPS [Wolfgang Puck Cafe]  
Greetings by Masashi Nishihara, President, RIPS

#### **TUESDAY, APRIL 1**

9:30 Registration [Nippon Foundation Bldg., 2F]

10:00 **Opening Remarks:**  
Seiichiro Takagi, Professor, School of International Politics, Economics,  
and Business, Aoyama Gakuin University  
  
Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS  
  
Zhang Tuosheng, Director, Academic Assessment Committee and Center  
for Foreign Policy Studies, CFISS

10:10-12:30 **Session I: The Third Party's Views on Bilateral Relations**  
*Moderator: U.S.*

- 10:10-10:45 Chinese Views on U.S.-Japan Relations  
*Presenter:* Yang Mingjie, Assistant President, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
- 10:45-11:00 Coffee Break
- 11:45-12:30 Japanese Views on China-U.S. Relations  
*Presenter:* Seiichiro Takagi
- 11:00-11:45 U.S. Views on Japan-China Relations  
*Presenter:* Robert Dujarric, Director, Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies, Temple University, Tokyo
- 12:30-13:30 **“Bento” Lunch** [Nippon Foundation Bldg., 2F]
- 13:30-15:15 **Session II: The Changing Situation in the Korean Peninsula**  
*Moderator:* (China)  
*Presenters:*  
Yasuyo Sakata, Professor, Kanda University of International Studies  
  
Scott Snyder, Senior Associate, Pacific Forum  
  
Zhu Feng, Professor, School of International Studies and Deputy Director, Center for International & Strategic Studies, Peking University
- 15:15-15:30 Coffee Break
- 15:15-17:15 **Session III: The Taiwan Question**  
*Moderator:* (Japan)  
*Presenters:*  
Bonnie Glaser, Senior Associate, CSIS  
  
Zhan Tuosheng

Yasuhiro Matsuda, Professor, National Institute for Defense  
Studies

18:00 Evening free

**WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2**

9:30-11:00 **Session IV: Cooperation for Environmental Security**

*Moderator:* (Japan)

*Presenters:*

Ouyang Wei, Professor and Deputy Director of Research,  
Center for Crisis Management, National Defense  
University

Hiroshi Ota, Professor, School of International Liberal  
Studies, Waseda University

Miranda Schreurs, Director, Environmental Policy Research  
Centre, Freie Universität Berlin

11:00-11:15 Coffee Break

11:15-12:45 **Session V: Assessing Global Strategic Environment**

*Moderator:* (U.S.)

*Presenters:*

Akio Watanabe, Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo and  
Aoyama Gakuin University

David Brown, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced  
International Studies

Lu Dehong, Deputy Director, Research Department, CFISS

12:45-13:30 **“Bento” Lunch** [Nippon Foundation Bldg., 2F]

- 13:30-14:15    **Wrap Up**  
                  *Moderator:* Seiichiro Takagi
- 14:15-14:30    **Closing Remarks**  
                  Zhang Tuosheng  
                  Ralph Cossa  
                  Masashi Nishihara
- 16:00-1800    **Public Seminar**            [Nippon Foundation Bldg., 2F]  
                  (Please confer separate program)
- 19:00            **Farewell Dinner – Restaurant “Aux Bacchanales Akasaka”**  
                  Hosted by Pacific Forum

**LIST OF PARTICIPANTS**  
**for**  
**The 12th Japan-U.S.-China Conference**  
**on Trilateral Security Conference**  
**Tokyo, March 31-April 2, 2008**

***SENIOR PARTICIPANTS***

**The United States**

Carl <b>BAKER</b>	Director of Programs, Pacific Forum CSIS
David <b>BROWN</b>	Professor, Johns Hopkins University
Ralph <b>COSSA</b>	President, Pacific Forum CSIS
Robert <b>DUJARRIC</b>	Director, Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies, Temple University, Tokyo
Bonnie <b>GLASER</b>	Senior Associate, Pacific Forum CSIS
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Weston <b>KONISHI</b>	Council on Foreign Relations Hitachi Fellow, Tokyo
Miranda <b>SCHREURS</b>	Professor, University of Maryland; now Director, Environmental Policy Research Centre, Freie Universität Berlin
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### **The United States**

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Jiyon <b>SHIN</b>	Vasey Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS

## Observers

Hideaki <b>ASAHI</b>	Visiting Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs; former Ambassador to East Timor
Christophe <b>BOSQUILLON</b>	Managing Director, Dai Nippon Kali Kaisha, Ltd.