US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue
Responding to Increased Chinese Aggressiveness

BY
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By Ralph Cossa

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# Table of Contents

**Executive Summary**  

**Introduction**  

**Overview**  

**Potential for Conflict?**  

- China's Military Prepares for War  

**Taiwan Defense Priorities and Contingency Preparations**  

**United States Defense Preparedness and Priorities**  

- Arms Sales  
- Strategic Ambiguity  

**Increasing Domestic Awareness**  

- Implications Should Taiwan Fall  

**Enhancing Deterrence**  

- Deterring Gray Zone Attacks  
- Deterring an Invasion  
- Nuclear Deterrence  

**Countering Coercion**  

**Taking Stock: Where Do We Go From Here?**  

**Key Findings and Recommendations**  

- Responding to PRC Pressure  
- Helping Taiwan Defend Itself  
- Clarifying US Defense Policy  
- Enhancing Deterrence  
- Increasing Public/Allied Awareness  
- Other Recommendations  

**Attachments**  

- A: US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue Agenda  
- B: US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue Participants  

**About the Author**
US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue: Responding to Increased Chinese Aggressiveness

Executive Summary

Taiwan is already under attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) politically, economically, psychologically, and militarily—the latter through more aggressive Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gray zone military operations short of actual direct conflict. This multidimensional threat requires a multidimensional response in ways that complement and enhance military deterrence. PRC behavior represents a global problem that demands a global response.

PRC pressure on Taiwan has increased considerably over the past year, even before Beijing used the visit by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi as an excuse to further ramp up pressure. The August 2022 PLA military exercise around Taiwan appears aimed at further creating a “new normal” that could reduce warning times should Beijing invade. However, such PRC actions are not “normal.” They are unilateral, destabilizing, and, in some instances, illegal changes to the status quo. Such Chinese pressure tactics, combined with the “wake up call” provided by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have sensitized the citizens and governments of Taiwan, the United States, and the international community to the growing possibility—if not probability—of a PRC invasion and have increased public perceptions about the need and willingness to defend Taiwan democracy.

The PRC’s nuclear buildup is also a great cause of concern. This concern is driven not by the threat of nuclear war (given US nuclear superiority) but by the possibility of nuclear blackmail aimed at discouraging Washington from getting involved in a Taiwan confrontation. Taiwanese are concerned about crisis escalation (especially to the nuclear level) but worry more about the PRC deterring the United States.

The United States, working closely with allies and other like-minded states, should be more proactive and less reactive in responding to increased PRC aggressive behavior. With the US Department of Defense (DoD) in the lead, the US Government needs to better assess Chinese strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis Taiwan with an eye toward countering strengths and exploiting weaknesses, while also examining ways to broaden the
challenge along multiple fronts in cooperation with various allies and partners. Think tanks can and should supplement this analysis.

While continued strong support for Ukraine is important to demonstrate Western resolve and prevent more Russian territorial gains, the PRC remains the “pacing threat” and thus should remain the focus of US national security policy and defense procurement strategy.
Introduction

On Aug. 15–16, 2022, at a time when increased Chinese pressure, including aggressive gray zone tactics, was raising the threat of conflict across the Taiwan Strait, 70 US and Taiwan scholars, experts, and former and current government officials (the latter in their private capacities as observers) convened for the second Track 2 US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue. The Pacific Forum hosted the dialogue, with sponsorship by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and in partnership with Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR).

The dialogue addressed a range of key strategic issues pertinent to the bilateral security relationship, especially in the military realm. Its focus was on defense and deterrence measures both partners could take, together and separately to raise the costs and risks and thus lower the odds of Chinese military action. The objective was to produce actionable and operationally relevant recommendations aimed at improving and enhancing the security relationship.

The August 2022 dialogue built upon the recommendations resulting from the 2021 inaugural dialogue with a greater sense of urgency as a result of both Beijing’s increasingly aggressive actions toward Taiwan and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the latter of which demonstrated that naked aggression is no longer unthinkable.

Most of the participants convened in person in Honolulu with a small number of participants joining virtually. The dialogue addressed the following topics: current/looming cross-Strait challenges and increasing risks of conflict; Taiwanese defense goals and priorities and the extent of planning for worst-case contingencies; US defense policy goals, priorities, and motivations related to cross-Strait conflict; domestic attitudes in Taiwan and the United States and how they relate to cross-Strait defense preparations; current deterrence-related policy and capabilities and how best to enhance them to decrease the likelihood of Beijing taking military action against Taiwan; and options to counter coercion that would complement and enhance military deterrence.

Participants also reviewed the key findings and recommendations from the Pacific Forum’s 2021 US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue: Dealing with Increased Chinese Aggressiveness report and discussed the road ahead, with a focus on identifying priority solutions to near-term problems. The dialogue also continued to build a community of senior and rising officials and strategists well versed in these issues in the United States and Taiwan.

Senior officials from the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office in Honolulu, provided keynote addresses. To increase understanding of the potential consequences of a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan, participants also received a summary of the ongoing Pacific Forum study on “Understanding the Implications of a Successful Chinese Invasion of Taiwan,” which will be the subject of a companion Issues & Insights Report. To better understand the nature of the challenge posed by the PLA, participants also received a briefing on the National Defense University’s study, Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan.

Overview

Taiwan is under attack by the PRC, politically, economically, psychologically, and through more aggressive PLA gray zone military operations. Beijing’s pressure tactics against Taiwan have increased appreciably over the past year. The PLA’s aggressive behavior, especially when combined with the “wake up call” of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have sensitized the citizens and governments of Taiwan, the United States, and the international community to the growing possibility, if not probability, of a PRC invasion and have increased public perceptions about the need and willingness to...

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defend Taiwan. Both the United States and Taiwan have taken measures in the last year to deter or, at the very least, better prepare to respond to Chinese kinetic action against Taiwan. Many of these measures are consistent with the recommendations in the 2021 Dialogue Report, but the United States and Taiwan should do more to increase the risks or costs associated with any PLA military action against Taiwan. This report contains a list of key findings and new recommendations aimed at increasing deterrence and enhancing Taiwan and America’s defense capabilities as interpreted by the author, who is solely responsible for the content.

The PRC poses a multidimensional threat that requires a multidimensional response in ways that complement and enhance military deterrence while countering Chinese coercion. The PRC’s aggressive behavior represents a global—not a strictly US or Taiwan—problem, which demands a global response, in cooperation with friends and allies and other like-minded states. There was a great convergence of views among American and Taiwanese participants as to the urgency of the challenge and the need for effective countermeasures now to deter further PRC aggression and assist Taiwan in resisting current coercion tactics, even as both prepare for a possible direct conflict with the PRC.

Potential for Conflict?

The potential for conflict across the Taiwan Strait is growing more serious by the day as Xi Jinping’s government becomes more oppressive at home and more aggressive abroad. As one US official noted, “military escalation may not be unthinkable for the PRC leadership.” Even if Beijing does not intend to attack in the near term, its pressure tactics aimed at demoralizing Taiwan could easily spiral out of control and escalate in the event of an accident, given Beijing’s increased recklessness.

Over the past year, Beijing has become increasingly aggressive and assertive toward Taiwan, with almost daily incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, increased military training exercises, economic pressure tactics, and a declaration that the Taiwan Strait is not international waters. All this occurred before Beijing used the July 2022 visit by US Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi as an excuse to further ratchet up tensions through an unprecedented early August PLA military exercise around Taiwan, including missile launches over the island and into Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Participants saw the PLA actions as an attempt to establish a “new normal,” a terminology they rejected. Not only do exercises of this nature improve Chinese capabilities to attack or to impose a blockade, they can also reduce warning times should Beijing decide to invade.

Participants firmly urged both governments and the broader international community to reject the “new normal” concept and brand Chinese actions for what they are: unilateral, unacceptable, destabilizing, and, in some instances, illegal changes to the status quo. They represent a continuing challenge to the rules-based order that has preserved regional and global stability for decades. Beijing should be called upon to honor previous cross-Strait arrangements, including center line delineations, that have preserved stability and helped prevent naval and air accidents in the past. The US Navy and the navies of like-minded states (such as Japan and Australia) and commercial carriers should continue to regularly transit the Taiwan Strait to demonstrate the invalidity of Chinese claims that this broadly recognized international body of water is Chinese internal waters or its territorial sea.

PLA activities in general but especially during the August 2022 military exercise appear aimed, in part, at developing the capability to quarantine or blockade Taiwan either physically or through area denial techniques, such as announcing missile closure zones that would increase the risks of commercial activity in or around Taiwan ports. Any attempt to blockade, quarantine, or otherwise boycott or embargo Taiwan would not, and should not, be considered “gray zone” actions but acts of war. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) specifically states, “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, is considered a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the
United States.” As a result, any PRC announcement of an embargo or blockade will likely compel the United States to respond. One US analyst noted that US Navy ship visits to Taiwan would be a logical first reaction to any announced blockade or embargo of Taiwan ports.

While increased PRC aggressiveness, especially as regards its August 2022 military exercise around Taiwan and earlier crackdown on Hong Kong, have increased the sense of urgency in both Taiwan and the United States, differing opinions persist as to the PRC’s readiness to invade (this was the case in last year’s dialogue as well). China hands typically argue that Beijing is still several years away from successfully invading Taiwan, and that current pressure tactics are part of a “win without fighting” strategy aimed at demoralizing the people of Taiwan. Many of the assembled US and Taiwan military experts worried that PLA capabilities are being underestimated, however, and that PLA risk-taking tendencies could lead to an inadvertent or accidental incident that could escalate; even if the PRC is deemed unprepared to invade today, other events could prompt an earlier than anticipated invasion.

The good news is that the US intelligence success in accurately predicting Putin’s invasion sends a clear signal to Beijing about Washington’s ability to closely monitor its military activities. As one US analyst noted, “a Chinese invasion will not be a surprise; we will see the build-up and invasion preparations.” The United States and Taiwan will likely know if and when the PRC is preparing to attack and Beijing will know that we know. The remaining questions the United States and Taiwan must consider are: How prepared will either or both be to respond? How can the United States assist Taiwan in making its ports and airfields more survivable? Are plans in place to combat a PLA embargo or blockade or to respond to missile and air assaults or mining operations against Taiwan ports and airfields?"

PRC military activity throughout the year and especially during the August 2022 military exercise has demonstrated Xi Jinping’s and the PLA’s increased willingness to take risks. This increases the probability of accidents or confrontations that could lead to escalation. Beijing has also used the Taiwan issue to stir up nationalism at home. But, as one analyst noted, “China can manufacture nationalism but can’t totally control it.” While domestic pressure, especially by Chinese netizens, is not likely to be determinative, it can put increased pressure on Xi to act. Participants assumed (correctly) that Xi’s “president for life” (or at least the next five to ten years) status would be confirmed at the then-upcoming 20th Party Congress. Once Xi’s continued rule is secured, Xi is likely to be more, not less, aggressive, which again increases the possibility of accidents or miscalculations.

China’s Military Prepares for War

An independent assessment of PLA capabilities and limitations prepared at the National Defense University and reviewed at this dialogue argues that gray zone tactics short of using lethal force are the most likely PLA course of action in the near term. This assessment is based on the PLA’s insufficient lift and the difficulties involved in projecting power across the strait by a military lacking in both actual combat experience and joint military operations. While the United States (but not Taiwan alone) enjoys qualitative and some quantitative advantages over the PRC, Beijing is determined to close these gaps and is steadily improving and modernizing its forces and capabilities. The window of deterrence is closing for Washington and Taipei as the window of opportunity is opening for Beijing.

Participants were not prepared to predict with confidence that Xi would order an invasion of Taiwan in the next year or so, given the PRC’s still somewhat limited (but rapidly improving) military capabilities. However, few were willing to rule out the possibility and no one argued against the widely held belief that Beijing’s military (as well as economic and political) pressure against Taiwan will steadily increase. A failure by Taiwan and the United States to demonstrate their preparedness and willingness to respond will send the wrong signal to Beijing.

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Taiwan Defense Priorities and Contingency Preparations

Dialogue participants examined Taiwanese defense goals, priorities, and the extent to which Taiwan has prepared for worst case contingencies. Taiwan officials stressed that Taipei recognizes and accepts that responsibility for defending itself rests with Taiwan, and the Tsai Ing-wen government has taken significant steps in the past year to better prepare itself to do so, including the establishment of an All-out Defense Mobilization Agency. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was a sobering wake up call for Taiwan and its international supporters. As a result, Taiwan is placing increased emphasis on asymmetrical warfare and the development of homeland and territorial defense capabilities to improve Taiwan's ability to resist the invasion should PLA troops land on Taiwanese soil (as recommended in last year’s dialogue report and as the Ukrainian people were so heroically doing at the time of this writing).

Training of recruits is getting tougher and more realistic and there is growing public support for extending the length of mandatory military training to better prepare conscripts for homeland defense. Reserve reform is underway but still slow and questions remain regarding operational control over territorial defense efforts both in peacetime and in the event of war. The Russian invasion and the PRC crackdown on civil liberties in Hong Kong (which effectively ended the “one country, two systems” promise imbedded in the Hong Kong reversion agreement with the United Kingdom) has instilled a sense of urgency among the Taiwan public. This has resulted in the establishment of organizations like the Kuma Academy, which trains ordinary citizens (at their own expense) to prepare for and defend against foreign invasion. A strong domestic resistance force buys precious time to allow outside assistance to reach Taiwan.

Debate continues in Taiwan over the proper mix of hardware needed to defend against the PLA and what an asymmetric force would look like. While American officials stress the need for “large numbers of small things,” this does not mean that larger weapon systems should not be part of the mix. As one American noted, “asymmetric weapons are weapons that attack enemy weak points; for example, coastal defense cruise missiles are a major deterrent.” The United States is not against Taiwan possessing major weapon systems per se—F-16s are a vital element in the defense of Taiwan, for example—but remains concerned about weapon systems that have first strike implications or limited operational or deterrent value.

Taiwan defense experts are also concerned about the lack of a common operational picture to support joint warfighting. For example, each military service uses its own maps; there is no common view of the battlefield within the Taiwan military. Greater interoperability between the various Taiwan military services is a prerequisite to establishing interoperability with the United States and other countries that could potentially come to Taipei’s assistance in the event of hostilities. More broadly speaking, Taiwan needs to reshape its national defense strategy to “outthink” PRC strategy, which focuses on Taiwan vulnerabilities.

In short, while Taiwan has made major strides in improving its defense capabilities over the past year, and while both its willingness to fight and sense of urgency have increased, participants agreed that Taiwan is not capable of defending itself against an all-out PLA assault without outside assistance. Taiwan participants also credibly argued that a lack


5 These points are documented in the section dealing with “Increasing Domestic Awareness.”
of clarity regarding the nature and extent of outside support complicates Taiwan defense planning and acquisitions. A discussion of roles and missions between US and Taiwan defense planners would help Taiwan better understand the types of capabilities the United States could bring to bear in the event of a Chinese attack, should the political decision be made to intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf. Such action, while not providing a guarantee of US assistance, would nonetheless assist Taiwan defense planners in developing their own roles, missions, and defense acquisition plans. A case in point: uncertainty regarding the level and nature of outside support has continued to hamper Ukrainian defense efforts, underscoring the nature of this problem.

While recognizing that the war in Ukraine was still on-going and final lessons and outcomes are still to come, participants saw great value in a comprehensive analysis of the immediate lessons, focusing on the manner in which Ukraine has thus far successfully held its own against the Russian military. Identifying what has not worked and what could be improved would be useful as well. Other nations, like Lithuania and Switzerland, which have focused on territorial defense, could serve as useful models as Taiwan improves its overall homeland defense posture.

**United States Defense Preparedness and Priorities**

As underscored by a senior American participant, the United States has identified the PRC as “our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge” to US national security interests and the Indo-Pacific as “the center of gravity for US security.” This realization helped drive the discussion of US defense policy goals, priorities, and motivations related to cross-Strait conflict. One overarching question posed by a US former official set the tone: “Americans must ask themselves the question, do we want to live in a world where Beijing sets the standards and makes the rules?” It should come as no surprise that no one in the room thought such a world was acceptable, much less desirable. US and Taiwan participants largely agreed that the United States needs to invest more on defense and, in the face of Russian as well as PRC assertiveness and aggression, must be prepared to fight two wars simultaneously. That is neither current US strategy nor a capability America possesses today.

The continued US defense focus on the Indo-Pacific in general, and the PRC in particular, was encouraging to Taiwan participants from both government and academia, although some feared the Ukraine War and persistent Middle East tensions (especially but not exclusively related to Iran) could draw US focus and resources elsewhere. They welcomed the February 2022 White House release of the *Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States*[^6], which clearly identified the PRC as the primary challenge to US interests in the region: “The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power.” While repeating America’s consistent (through prior administrations) commitment to “a free and open Indo-Pacific,” the strategy report also directly criticized Beijing’s “coercion and aggression,” while further warning that “the PRC is also undermining human rights and international law, including freedom of navigation, as well as other principles that have brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific.”

Taiwan participants also applauded the US concept of “integrated deterrence” but sought clarity as to its contents, characteristics, and application to Taiwan. US participants provided some details, drawing from the National Defense Strategy’s unclassified Fact Sheet[^7], which states, “integrated deterrence entails developing and combining our strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of US national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships.” While the United States clearly envisions a role for allies and partners, it has not defined this role, especially for Taiwan. Meanwhile, the absence, at the time of our dialogue, of

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Arms Sales

US arms sales to Taiwan was another major topic of discussion. Arms sales have increased in recent years through both the Trump and Biden administrations, but participants agreed the United States must do more to help prepare Taiwan to defend itself. American officials agreed that procurement lag times remain a serious problem. As noted earlier, there is disagreement within both the Taiwan and US camps about how much time there is to prepare, but few disputed that both Washington and Taipei need to prepare now for worst-case scenarios. The United States should “fast track” arms sales to Taiwan and examine coproduction and prepositioning alternatives either on Taiwan or nearby (e.g., Okinawa or Guam) to be better prepared to respond should Beijing’s attack plans be accelerated or other events lead to a military confrontation. Last year’s recommendation that the United States consider giving selected weapons systems to Taiwan without charge was repeated again this year.

Strategic Ambiguity

As was the case during the 2021 conference, participants again debated the advisability of strategic ambiguity as a central feature in US Taiwan policy throughout the two-day meeting. All acknowledged that senior US officials (including President Biden himself on several occasions) have become increasingly clear in expressing America’s commitment to help Taiwan defend itself if the PRC attacks. While voices calling for strategic clarity have grown louder, a more nuanced view seems to have emerged, calling for strategic ambiguity at the policy level but strategic clarity at the operational level. If one assumes that any PRC invasion will have already factored in a US response, the United States should focus on how (and how much and how fast) to bring and demonstrate strategic clarity at the operational level through more focused and more visible joint and combined training and exercises.

Several participants noted that they shared the concerns expressed by a number of US allies (and by Japanese experts in particular), about the PRC’s reaction to any announced change in the long-standing practice of strategic ambiguity. To address these concerns, the United States should consult closely with allies and partners like Taiwan, Japan, and Australia, among others, before making any policy pronouncements and, in the event of official policy changes, give them advance warning to prepare.

Increasing Domestic Awareness

The resolve of the people of Taiwan to fight in the event of a PRC invasion of their homeland has steadily increased in the past year. As noted earlier, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has increased Taiwan public awareness of the similar threat posed by the PRC. So too has the earlier PRC crackdown on dissent in Hong Kong and increased PLA military activity in and around Taiwan, including but not limited to the August 2022 exercise. Participants examined how these events affected domestic attitudes in Taiwan and the United States and how they relate to cross-strait preparedness. Generally, the people of Taiwan have become more aware of the nature of the PRC threat and more determined to defend their democracy. However, the failure of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to commit troops to assist Ukraine has also negatively affected Taiwan public perceptions of US willingness to come to Taiwan’s aid. In contrast, the war in Ukraine has increased US public opinion about the need and willingness to help Taiwan defend itself.

Various public opinion polls cited by Taiwan participants show that more than 70% of Taiwan citizens are willing to fight; “If Ukraine can do it, so

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9 The Defense Department released an unclassified version of these three documents together on October 27, 2022 [https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-/1/1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF].
can we,” opined one Taiwanese. An equal number support restoring and lengthening compulsory military service. The number was smaller among 20-29 year-old respondents who would be most directly involved, but a strong majority (roughly 60%) still supported compulsory training. Meanwhile books on how to prepare for a Chinese attack have become best sellers in Taiwan, as has a book “debunking” Chinese misinformation. Taiwanese confidence in their military’s ability to defend against the PRC remains low, however, with a majority (ranging from 56-64% in various polls) believing that Taiwan is incapable of defending itself without US/outside support. While most (but not all) Taiwan polls show that a majority still believe the United States will come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of an invasion, the numbers are decreasing since the Russian invasion of Ukraine (from 60% to 54% in one poll). Taiwan participants speculated that Beijing’s disinformation campaign may have been a factor in the decline.

An extensive poll conducted by our partner organization, INDSR, in early March, 2022 (several weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine) reinforced many of the above findings. A strong majority (more than 70% overall and over 60% of 20-29 year-old respondents) thought four months of military service was too short, with a similar number voicing support for an extension to one year of service. Roughly 64% favored continued procurement of arms from the United States while an even greater number (roughly 85%) supported the “independent development of national defense weapons and equipment.” Two-thirds of respondents also supported the military’s possession of “weapons able to strike Chinese military installations along the coast.” More than 70% were committed to the defense of Taiwan in the event of a PRC attack, but only 40% thought the United States would likely send troops to help defend Taiwan (compared to 49% who thought it unlikely). Many of the earlier cited polls, which showed higher numbers, merely asked if the US would “help defend” Taiwan; this one specifically asked if America would send troops. 31% of respondents identified the PRC as Taiwan’s greatest threat, interestingly followed by declining birth rates (27%), which would have an impact on future numbers of available recruits. Finally, roughly 75% supported disaster prevention drills, even if they disrupted daily life.

US polling regarding Taiwan is much less frequent or precise but the Ukraine War has in fact focused more public and media attention on Taiwan amid concerns that Beijing might similarly invade its “lost territory.” A March 2022 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center showed that a large majority of Americans (78%) believe that tensions between the PRC and Taiwan are at least a somewhat serious problem for the United States. 35% described these tensions as very serious, up from 28% last year. Historically Taiwan has ranked very low on the scale of US-PRC issues of concerns, often ranking last. Of note, an even greater percentage of Americans expressed serious or somewhat serious concern about the Sino-Russia partnership (92%) and Beijing’s involvement in US politics (84%).

“The central question during this deterrence discussion, therefore, was how to raise the costs and risks to Beijing to prevent war in the first place by convincing Beijing that any military attack against Taiwan was bound to fail.”

Meanwhile, a more recent poll conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in late July 2022 (just before Rep. Pelosi’s visit and the PLA exercise)

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showed that most Americans would support sending arms and military equipment to Taiwan in the event of a PRC invasion (76%), but only 40% would favor sending US ground troops. In a similar poll in August 2021,15 52% of Americans favored sending troops to help defend Taiwan in the event of a PRC attack, the first time a majority has favored such an action since pollster first asked the question in 1982. In this year’s poll, three-quarters of Americans (76%) thought Beijing would see Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a precedent, encouraging it to invade Taiwan. Should this occur, a majority of Americans would also support imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions (76%) and, most significantly, using the US Navy to prevent the PLA from imposing a blockade against Taiwan (62%), in effect supporting direct US military involvement in the conflict despite increased caution about committing US ground troops.

Participants believed that Washington and Taipei should put greater emphasis on articulating the differences between Ukraine and Taiwan in the eyes of their respective publics and should take further steps to reinforce both growing awareness of the PRC threat and the need to respond to this challenge. Greater public awareness of the domestic, regional, and global implications and consequences should the PLA invade and occupy Taiwan could further strengthen the resolve among the United States and its regional and global allies and partners to deter such PRC actions. Washington and Taipei also need to better assess and understand the impact of Beijing’s disinformation campaigns on public opinion and develop information plans to counter these ongoing disinformation attacks. The United States could learn from Taiwan, which has already developed expertise in this area, at both the governmental and non-governmental levels, including through the establishment of a Taiwanese fact checking center and media literacy campaigns.14

**Implications Should Taiwan Fall**

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coordinate more closely to signal resolve and enhance their collective deterrence and defense.

Enhancing Deterrence

To fully understand deterrence, it is important to examine where it has failed. Despite accurate intelligence regarding Russian intentions and strong statements from the United States and its NATO allies about severe consequences (many subsequently implemented), Putin was not deterred from launching his invasion of Ukraine. A Russian “failure” (however defined) could act as a deterrent to others; likewise Russian success could embolden Xi Jinping (among others) to seek military solutions to disputes. The central question during this deterrence discussion, therefore, was how to raise the costs and risks to Beijing to prevent war in the first place by convincing Beijing that any military attack against Taiwan was bound to fail. One key question for defense planners in the United States and Taiwan was “how must current policies and capabilities be enhanced to decrease the likelihood of Beijing taking military action against Taiwan?”

The first question asked during this session was “what are we trying to deter?” The answer was three-fold: the PRC’s ongoing gray zone tactics, which are becoming increasingly aggressive; a PLA invasion of

“Most participants believe that Beijing will have already factored in a US response to any decision to attack Taiwan.”

Taiwan or other forms of kinetic action; and the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Deterring Gray Zone Attacks

The burden of responding to PLA gray zone tactics fall primarily, although not exclusively, on Taiwan. The PRC has the clear advantage over the United States, given its close proximity to Taiwan and the wide variety of options available to Beijing (many of which have already been explored but could be repeated or magnified in frequency or intensity). PRC harassment and encroachment at this level also reduces warning times for wider scale operations. The Ukraine conflict is just the latest example of an aggressor using the pretext of an “exercise” to launch an attack.

Deterring an Invasion

In the event of a PRC attack against Taiwan (note that this report considers actions such as an attack on offshore islands or an embargo or blockade acts of war, rather than gray zone activities), the United States has a larger role to play. As previously explained, Taiwan stands little chance of defeating a PRC attack without outside assistance; the belief that outside assistance would not be forthcoming would negatively impact Taiwan’s willingness and ability to respond. While subject to debate, most believed that the advantage here still resides with the United States but that the balance of power was rapidly eroding. Halting or reversing this slide will require action on both sides, including smarter procurement decisions. For example, the current portfolio of US precision guided munitions favors ground attack rather than anti-ship weapons that would be critical in a Taiwan scenario.

As one US defense expert opined, the US Air Force is buying a “shockingly low” number of long-range anti-ship missiles and none of the US services has effective mid-range anti-ship weapons that fifth-generation fighters could carry internally. Most of the ground attack weapons in the current US portfolio are not suited for striking mobile forces; they are optimized for large-scale attacks against fixed land-based targets. If the PRC is indeed the “pacing challenge” and Taiwan represents the issue where conflict is most likely to result, then the US needs to focus procurement efforts accordingly.

Taiwan should also better prepare for conventional conflict, focusing on those weapons systems that provide the greatest asymmetric advantage, including anti-ship missiles (both surface-to-surface and air-to-surface), drones, short-range air defense systems (including man-portable systems), and improved early warning. One Taiwan defense specialist argued that Washington needed to support a tougher Taiwan response to PLA gray zone
activities to increase deterrence since “a failure to respond increases Beijing’s tendency to do more.” The challenge of course is to do this in a way that does not encourage or even “justify” (in Beijing’s eyes) further escalation.

Participants debated the need for greater strategic clarity during this session, not just to deter PRC aggression, but also in terms of Taiwan acquisitions. As one Taiwan analyst argued, “If the United States wants to deny Taiwan certain capabilities, then it needs to provide clear and concrete assurances that it will fill the gap.” More visible US support would both help deter Beijing while increasing hope in Taiwan that it could win (or at least not lose) a conflict with the PRC. One suggestion was for US military trainers to deploy visibly to Taiwan in order to assist in the training of the Taiwan military, rather than the current “train the trainer” US approach. Another was for active-duty US military members to serve as observers at Taiwan exercises such as the annual Han Kuang computer-simulated war games (at present retired senior US military officers play this role). This was based on the belief, as expressed by one Taiwan expert that “for real deterrent value, China must be aware of what we are doing.”

While greater clarity may be more reassuring to Taiwan, most participants believe that Beijing will have already factored in a US response to any decision to attack Taiwan. As a result, the deterrence discussion in Washington and Taipei should focus not on “if the United States will assist” but on how both, individually and collectively, can increase the costs associated with a Chinese invasion, since the capability to respond is at least as important as the perceived willingness to do so. Clarity without capability has limited deterrent value.

**Nuclear Deterrence**

The greatest concern associated with the PRC nuclear build-up is not nuclear war per se (given US preponderance of nuclear weapons) but rather nuclear blackmail by the PRC aimed at discouraging the United States from getting involved in a Taiwan Strait confrontation. The balance of nuclear power clearly favors the United States. While some worry about an attempted “sprint to parity” by the PRC, especially if the US nuclear inventory is significantly reduced, this was not a major area of concern; the odds of strategic arms limitation talks, much less reductions, appear low today. More worrisome was the PRC expanding and modernizing its nuclear capabilities, not to achieve parity but to give Beijing options it never had before. In theory, as Beijing’s nuclear vulnerability decreases, this is supposed to promote stability. However, as the PRC feels less vulnerable, it may consider nuclear weapons as an “ultimate intervention tool” allowing it to become more aggressive conventionally (the “stability-instability” paradox).

The perception that Putin’s nuclear threats have been an effective deterrent against direct NATO involvement in the Ukraine War may lead Beijing to conclude that it could use its growing nuclear capability in a similar way during any cross-Strait contingency. As a result, a nuclear shadow hangs over everything, resulting in the increased likelihood of aggression at gray zone and conventional levels and potentially nuclear use as well. As has been the case in Ukraine, if Beijing attacks and the war is not going well, this could also prompt it to threaten (or even to exercise) the nuclear option; no one believes that Beijing’s “no first use” doctrine would prevent it from employing nuclear weapons if defeat was imminent.

As a result, the United States needs to think about escalatory options below the use of strategic nuclear systems in the Indo-Pacific to deter PRC nuclear use. Both the United States and Taiwan (as well as US regional allies) should identify ways to respond to the PRC’s nuclear build-up by looking at options at the conventional level as well as possibly through nuclear-sharing arrangements where Taipei (and other allies) would have a more direct role in nuclear deterrence. Such arrangements could help strengthen strategic deterrence and, as an important potential side benefit, could help reduce proliferation incentives, which are rising to unprecedented levels in several allied capitals.

The US government’s desire to strengthen extended deterrence while decreasing the role of nuclear weapons also appeared contradictory to several Taiwanese participants who openly worried about
how nuclear weapons fit in the new integrated deterrence concept. Taiwanese (and other US allies and partners) have expressed the concern that integrated deterrence may reduce the importance of extended deterrence, especially extended nuclear deterrence. These concerns have not been assuaged by the limited amount of information that has been made public thus far regarding the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review.

**Countering Coercion**

The PRC threat toward Taiwan is multidimensional and thus requires a multidimensional response. Taiwan is already under attack, not just through PLA gray zone tactics (which send their own political and psychological messages), but through Chinese political and economic coercion and an intense disinformation campaign aimed at creating domestic political divisions and demoralizing the Taiwanese population. The United States and like-minded allies and partners have a significant role to play in assisting Taiwan in countering these attacks. Non-military responses to these largely non-military actions are essential to Taiwan’s sense of well-being and security and are less likely to be escalatory.

Taiwan participants were especially concerned about internal political subversion, which has been ongoing for years and exploits Taiwan’s democratic political environment and belief in freedom of speech and expression. (Americans have similar concerns and are now belatedly responding to PRC-sponsored Confucius Institutes, which have been vehicles for spreading propaganda on American campuses.) Particularly troubling are Chinese propaganda and disinformation campaigns, especially through social media, and Beijing’s successful attempts to coerce statements from business leaders and Taiwanese celebrities who see endorsing or repeating Chinese messages as a cost of doing business on the mainland. Add to this PRC attempts to limit Taiwan’s international space, including by luring away some of Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic partners, and its cyber campaigns and economic warfare. Taiwanese anticipate and in fact are already experiencing a more persistent and aggressive economic punishment campaign in the wake of the Pelosi visit.

Combatting economic coercion in particular requires an international response, similar to the way many in the free world assisted Australia in combatting the Chinese boycott of selected Australian products issued in response to a simple request by Canberra for a fuller accounting of the origins of COVID-19. South Korean businesses experienced PRC strong-arm tactics in the wake of Seoul’s decision to allow the United States to deploy the defensive Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system to counter the North Korea missile threat. They reacted by shifting some PRC-based factories elsewhere. Some Taiwan businesses, with government encouragement, are also considering leaving the PRC but are reportedly having trouble getting out, given the magnitude of their earlier investments there.

Combatting economic coercion also requires a greater understanding of what Taiwan colleagues described as Taiwan’s “comprehensive vulnerabilities.” Taiwan security specialists expressed particular concern about Taiwan’s reliance on outside energy sources, which could increase Taiwan’s susceptibility to economic coercion in peacetime and especially during times of conflict. We are seeing this play out in Europe where European willingness to create a greater sense of economic interdependence with Russia (in the belief this would decrease the prospects of conflict, not to mention save money) has now resulted in many countries hurriedly searching for alternative energy suppliers.

The PRC’s economic boycott of Taiwan-produced goods has proven to be a double-edged sword, however, since it has undermined political sympathy in Taiwan from individuals and businesses that have been relying on the Chinese market. As Beijing increases domestic controls and clamps down on foreign businesses, lobbying organizations in Taiwan, the United States, and elsewhere that traditionally were the strongest proponents of cooperation with Beijing are now calling for tougher national stances and greater protection of intellectual property rights. This trend is likely to continue to Beijing’s detriment.

One of the lessons of the Ukraine conflict (at least thus far) is that the international community can make the aggressor pay a price without directly participating in the conventional conflict. As one
participant noted, “the vernacular of deterrence is changing; the United States’ greatest deterrent toward China is economic, not military.” The Chinese are also watching and learning. The United States should pay particular attention to the lessons Beijing is learning and what steps it is taking to reduce its own economic vulnerability.

Taiwan participants underscored the significance of, and their great appreciation for, official joint and multilateral statements such as the various “two plus two” and broader joint statements specifically referencing the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. All agreed that preserving and enhancing Taiwan’s international space was an important counter to PRC coercion. A number of participants encouraged the United States to be more proactive and less reactive in responding to PRC coercive behavior, including through increased political and diplomatic efforts to articulate the multidimensional nature of the threat and its implications for regional security. This included support for a more aggressive information campaign not only to counter PRC disinformation efforts but also to exploit the double-edged sword of increased Chinese nationalism. Both US and Taiwan information campaigns should also focus on what the Chinese people stand to lose if war breaks out across the Straits, since “internet nationalism” in the PRC part reflects Chinese peoples’ frustration with their own government, which should be exploited.

Taking Stock: Where Do We go from here?

In the final session, participants discussed the road ahead, with a focus on identifying priority solutions to near-term problems. They also reviewed the key findings and recommendations from the 2021 Dialogue Report. As indicated throughout this analysis, a number of recommendations from the first dialogue have already been acted upon or have been incorporated in the above discussion; a few have been overtaken by events. Others are consistent with the conclusions reported in the 2021 Dialogue Report and are repeated at the end of the final section of this report outlining other key findings and recommendations.

As previously noted, there was a great coincidence of views among American and Taiwanese participants as to the urgency of the challenge and the immediate need for effective countermeasures to deter further PRC aggression and assist Taiwan in resisting current coercion tactics, even as both prepare for the worst-case scenario of direct conflict with the PRC. The emphasis is on being more proactive in combatting the PLA’s current gray zone activities and coercive measures and strengthening deterrence and the ability to respond should deterrence fail. This includes testing old assumptions to see if they still apply. Both sides need to better identify and assess PRC strengths and weaknesses with an eye toward countering the strengths and exploiting the weaknesses. An information campaign aimed at attacking the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a good place to start. Beijing must believe that an invasion of Taiwan will be the beginning of a long struggle that it ultimately cannot win.

The US government should coordinate closely with allies and other like-minded states in responding to the global challenge posed by Chinese economic as well as military and political coercion and Chinese efforts to further isolate and marginalize Taiwan. Many argued that the time has come for Taiwan to participate in multilateral initiatives including military exercises. Taipei has applied for membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP); Washington should support this effort. The US administration also needs to better develop and articulate its own Indo-Pacific economic strategy and explain Taiwan’s role in it. Noting that Taiwan reporters are already invited to observe the Hawaii-based Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational naval exercise—the world’s largest international maritime training event, this year involving 26 nations—one Taiwan scholar asked why Taiwan military officers or civilian defense officials cannot also be invited as observers.

While US and Taiwan participants agreed that continued strong support for Ukraine is important to demonstrate Western resolve and prevent more Russian territorial gains, both sides agreed that the PRC remains the “pacing threat” and should
therefore remain the primary focus of US national security policy and drive DoD’s acquisition strategy.

As frequently noted in this report, the United States and Taiwan response must be multidimensional. Hard power matters most—capabilities matter more than words. However, the United States must integrate military hard power with political, economic, and other dimensions of national power to be most effective. This requires a whole of government approach. In addition, asymmetry must be about operational concepts, not just weapons. Today, the United States and Taiwan do not know one another’s plans. The United States and Taiwan need a common defense plan. As a senior Taiwan former official asked, “How can we work together if we don’t plan and train together?”

“Both sides need to better identify and assess PRC strengths and weaknesses with an eye toward countering the strengths and exploiting the weaknesses.”

At the end of the day, Taiwan needs to assure the United States that it has the will and ability to defend itself and the United States must assure Taiwan of its “rock solid” support. Both countries must develop effective measures to increase the risks to future PRC actions against Taiwan to fortify our integrated deterrence.

Key Findings and Recommendations

Responding to PRC Pressure

Finding: PRC pressure on Taiwan—economically, politically, and especially militarily—has increased considerably over the past year. The early August 2022 PLA military exercise around Taiwan appears aimed at further creating a “new normal” that will reduce warning times should Beijing decide to invade.

Finding: PLA activities appear aimed, in part, at developing the capability to quarantine or blockade Taiwan. Xi Jinping and the PLA have demonstrated increased willingness to take risks while both stirring up and responding to increased Chinese nationalism.

Recommendation: The United States should make clear that attempts to blockade, quarantine, or otherwise boycott or embargo Taiwan are not “gray zone” actions but acts of war that are likely to force a US response. US Navy ship visits to Taiwan would be a logical first reaction to any announced blockade or embargo of Taiwan ports.

Recommendation: The United States should assist Taiwan in making its ports and airfields more survivable.

Recommendation: DoD and the Taiwan Ministry of Defense (MoD), if they haven’t already done so, should develop plans, both individually and collectively, for how they would combat a Chinese embargo or blockade and how to respond to missile and air assaults or mining operations against Taiwan ports and airfields. Conducting visible training and exercises could help strengthen deterrence.

Finding: Beijing’s military (as well as economic and political) pressure against Taiwan will steadily increase. A failure by Taiwan and the United States to demonstrate their preparedness and willingness to respond will send the wrong signal to Beijing.
Recommendation: DoD and Taiwan’s MoD, if they haven’t already done so, should develop plans, both individually and collectively, for how to better respond to PLA gray zone activities.

**Helping Taiwan Defend Itself**

**Finding:** Participants from both sides agreed that Taiwan cannot overcome an all-out PLA assault without outside assistance. A lack of clarity regarding the nature and extent of outside support complicates Taiwan defense planning and acquisitions. So does the lack of a common view of the battlefield within the Taiwan military and a lack of awareness in Washington and Taipei of one another’s plans for the defense of Taiwan.

- **Recommendation:** DoD should hold private “roles and missions” discussions with Taiwan defense planners to help Taiwan better understand the types of capabilities the United States could bring to bear in the event of a Chinese attack. Such action, while not providing a guarantee of US assistance, would still assist Taiwan defense planners in developing their own roles and missions and defense acquisition plans.

- **Recommendation:** DoD and Taiwan’s MoD should develop a common defense plan or, at a minimum, share one another’s plans for the defense of Taiwan. To the extent politically possible, they should train and exercise together in order to more effectively implement these plans.

- **Recommendation:** US defense planners should assist Taiwan in developing a common operational picture of the battlefield, given admitted Taiwan shortcomings in developing and employing joint operations. As noted last year, the United States should also encourage Taiwan to produce its own National Security Strategy to better inform its public and to put its own defense strategy in broader perspective.

**Finding:** The Russian invasion of Ukraine has had a sobering “wake-up” effect on Taiwan and its international supporters. As a result, Taiwan is placing increased emphasis on asymmetrical warfare and the development of homeland/territorial defense capabilities (as recommended in last year’s dialogue report).

- **Recommendation:** The United States should assist Taiwan in the development of its homeland and territorial defense capabilities and, where they fit in the national defense structure, should assist Taiwan’s interaction with other nations that have extensive experience in this area. It should encourage Taipei to increase the length of compulsory military service and assist in making such training more realistic and relevant.

- **Recommendation:** While recognizing that the war is still on-going and final lessons and outcomes have yet to be learned, the United States and Taiwan should more comprehensively review, both together and individually, the immediate lessons. They should focus on the manner in which Ukraine has thus far successfully held its own against the Russian military. Identifying what has not worked or what could be improved would be useful as well; this could be the subject of supporting academic research.

**Finding:** US arms sales to Taiwan have increased but Washington should do more to help prepare Taiwan to defend itself. Procurement lag times remain a serious problem. Time to prepare remains but the window is closing. Many of the assembled US and Taiwan military experts worried that some PRC experts are underestimating PLA capabilities. These experts fear that PLA risk-taking tendencies could lead to an inadvertent or accidental incident that could escalate, or that other events could prompt an earlier invasion.

- **Recommendation:** The United States should “fast track” arms sales to Taiwan and examine coproduction and prepositioning alternatives either on Taiwan or nearby to be prepared to respond should Beijing attack plans be accelerated or other events lead to a military confrontation. Participants repeated last year’s recommendations that the United States consider giving selected weapons systems to Taiwan without charge and that Taiwan focus on “large numbers of small things.”
Clarifying US Defense Policy

Finding: Taiwan participants from both government and academia sought clarity as to the details of the otherwise well-received US concept of “integrated deterrence” and its application to Taiwan; few have been provided so far. The absence of unclassified versions of the US National Defense Strategy, the Nuclear Posture Review, and Missile Posture Review at the time of the 2022 Dialogue added to the uncertainty regarding US defense policies and priorities expressed by Taiwan participants.15

- **Recommendation:** As recommended last year, the US Department of Defense and/or State Department should consider sending a team to Taiwan, or at a minimum work closely with the AIT team in Taipei, to explain the concept of integrated deterrence and its implications for Taiwan.

Finding: Senior US officials have become increasingly clear in expressing America’s commitment to help Taiwan defend itself while still maintaining strategic ambiguity as to whether and how the US would come to the defense of Taiwan if the PRC attacks it. While voices calling for strategic clarity have grown louder, a more nuanced view seems to have emerged, calling for strategic ambiguity at the policy level but strategic clarity at the operational level. Some experts, domestically and especially among US allies, remain concerned about Chinese reaction to an announced US policy change in this regard.

- **Recommendation:** The United States should focus on how (and how much and how fast) to bring strategic clarity at the operational level, even as the academic community continues the debate regarding the benefits, costs, and risks associated with embracing strategic clarity as a matter of policy.

- **Recommendation:** The United States should consult closely with allies and partners like Taiwan, Japan, and Australia, among others, before making any policy pronouncements. The United States should also understand their concerns and to give them advance warning to prepare in the event of official policy changes. Finally, the United States should also keep its allies apprised of the White House’s evolving operational approach to this issue.

Enhancing Deterrence

Finding: Beijing will most likely have factored a US response into any decision to attack Taiwan.

- **Recommendation:** The deterrence discussion in Washington and Taipei should focus not on “if the United States will assist” but on how both, individually and collectively, can increase the costs associated with a PLA invasion. The capability to respond is at least as important as the perceived willingness to do so. Strategic clarity without capability has limited deterrent value.

- **Recommendation:** US Taiwan-related defense preparations should be more visible; as one Taiwan expert opined, “for real deterrence value, Beijing must be aware of what we are doing.”

- **Recommendation:** The United States should carefully assess, preferably through consultations with Taiwan officials, the impact of Taiwan-related actions and policy decisions on Taiwan security interests. They should understand that Taiwan scholars, like their US counterparts, have mixed views regarding the advisability of greater strategic clarity since (as the aftermath of Rep. Pelosi’s visit demonstrated) the PRC’s response to what they perceive as “hostile” US actions is often to Taiwan’s detriment.

Finding: The US desire to strengthen extended deterrence while decreasing the role of nuclear weapons appears contradictory to many Taiwanese participants. The role/impact of Russian nuclear threats on the US/NATO decision to avoid direct engagement with Russia in Ukraine is also troubling to them.

- **Recommendation:** The United States should more carefully explain the role of nuclear weapons within the broader, more inclusive concept of extended deterrence. The

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15 As noted in this report, the US Government did release unclassified versions of these key national security documents in October 2022. The unclassified National Defense Strategy still contains little or no explanation of Taiwan’s integrated deterrence role.
development of the nuclear employment strategy may provide such an opportunity.

- **Recommendation:** The United States should explain precisely how nuclear weapons fit in the new integrated deterrence concept. It should dispel the idea increasingly in vogue in Taiwan and some allied capitals that efforts to integrate deterrence may reduce the importance of extended deterrence, especially extended nuclear deterrence.

**Finding:** The greatest concern associated with Chinese nuclear build-up is not the threat of nuclear war (given US preponderance of nuclear weapons) but rather nuclear blackmail by the PRC aimed at discouraging Washington from getting involved in a Taiwan confrontation. Taiwanese are concerned about crisis escalation (especially to the nuclear level) but worry more about the PRC deterring the United States.

- **Recommendation:** The United States should conduct joint intelligence assessments with Taiwan government officials (and US allies) about the implications of the PRC’s nuclear build-up. Such assessments should focus on the implications now as well as in the future, based on possible and most likely developments.

- **Recommendation:** The United States and Taiwan (as well as US regional allies) should identify ways to respond to the PRC’s unprecedented build-up by looking at options at the conventional level as well as possibly through nuclear-sharing arrangements in the Indo-Pacific. Both should encourage, if not financially support, security-oriented think tanks to conduct research on the desirability and feasibility of such arrangements in the Indo-Pacific (and what can be learned from existing nuclear-sharing arrangements in the NATO context). Such arrangements could help strengthen strategic deterrence. An important potential benefit from a US perspective would be that they could help reduce proliferation incentives, which are rising to unprecedented levels in several allied capitals.

**Finding:** Ukrainian lessons learned have thus far focused on the war’s impact on Taiwan threat perceptions and defense preparations, less on lessons that the United States has learned, and even less on lessons Beijing has learned and how it is responding.

- **Recommendation:** While recognizing that the Ukraine war is far from over and its outcome still unclear, US Government officials, researchers, and independent scholars should carefully assess emerging lessons learned not just for Taiwan but for US defense strategy and preparedness.

- **Recommendation:** DoD should more deeply examine the prospects of, and the necessity of being prepared for, two simultaneous major conflicts, given both Russian and Chinese territorial ambitions. Since the PRC remains the “pacing challenge,” US defense acquisitions and border procurement strategy should focus on responding to Chinese contingencies.

- **Recommendation:** US government officials, researchers, and independent scholars should also carefully assess the lessons that the PRC appears to be learning from the Western response to the Russian invasion and any corrective actions Beijing is taking or preparing to take in response to those lessons.

- **Recommendation:** With the DoD in the lead, the US Government and think tanks should assess PLA strengths and weaknesses with an eye toward countering the strengths and exploiting the weaknesses in any Taiwan-related scenario. To be most effective, this data should be shared with Taiwan defense planners.

### Increasing Public/Allied Awareness

**Finding:** Ukrainian lessons learned have thus far focused on the war’s impact on Taiwan threat perceptions and defense preparations, less on lessons that the United States has learned, and even less on lessons Beijing has learned and how it is responding.

- **Recommendation:** Officials in Washington and Taipei should put greater emphasis on articulating the differences between Ukraine and Taiwan in the eyes of their respective publics. Both should publicize public opinion polling in the United States that reinforces both growing awareness of the Chinese threat and the need to respond to this challenge specifically but not exclusively in defense of Taiwan. Greater public awareness of the domestic, regional, and global
implications and consequences should the PLA invade and occupy Taiwan could further strengthen the resolve among the United States and its regional and global allies and partners to deter such Chinese actions.

**Recommendation:** Washington and Taipei should better assess and understand the impact of Chinese disinformation campaigns on public opinion and both individually and jointly develop information plans to counter these ongoing disinformation attacks.

**Finding:** US allies and partners have an important role to play in deterring a PRC invasion of Taiwan. Japanese and Australian officials in particular have become more outspoken in warning of the threats posed to regional stability (and more specifically to Japan’s national security interests) due to increased Chinese assertiveness and both the prospects and implications of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

**Recommendation:** The United States and its allies and partners should continue stressing the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait in official joint and multilateral statements such as the various “two plus two” and broader joint statements.

**Recommendation:** The United States needs to develop and/or sponsor public information campaigns that better articulate the implications and/or consequences of a successful Chinese invasion (including broad distribution and US Embassy-sponsored public information sessions for key allies and partners explaining the results of studies such as the soon-to-be-completed Pacific Forum assessment of the consequences should Taiwan fall).

**Recommendation:** DoD should develop joint contingency plans with affected allies such as Japan and Australia on how to best counter Chinese military action, specifically including a blockade or boycott of Taiwan, to be better prepared to respond if the political decision in their respective capitals is made to provide such assistance.

**Finding:** Taiwan is already under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through more aggressive gray zone operations. This multidimensional threat requires a multidimensional response in ways that complement and enhance military deterrence. Chinese behavior represents a global problem, which demands a global response by the United States, Taiwan, and like-minded states. **Recommendation:** The United States should be more proactive and less reactive in responding to Chinese aggressive behavior toward Taiwan, including through increased political and diplomatic efforts with allies and partners to clearly articulate the PRC threat and the implications for regional security should Taiwan be attacked by the PRC.

**Recommendation:** The US Government should coordinate closely with allies and other like-minded states in responding to the global challenge posed by Chinese economic as well as military and political coercion both vis-à-vis Taiwan and more generally. While continued strong support for Ukraine is important to demonstrate Western resolve and prevent more Russian territorial gains, the PRC remains the “pacing threat” and Taiwan is the greatest flashpoint. The PRC in general and the defense of Taiwan in particular should remain the focus of US national security policy and DoD’s acquisition planning.

**Recommendation:** Recognizing that Taiwan has “comprehensive vulnerabilities,” the US Government should sponsor research aimed at assisting Taiwan in identifying non-military security-related vulnerabilities, such as its reliance on outside energy sources, to reduce Taiwan’s susceptibility to economic coercion in peacetime and especially during times of conflict.

**Other Recommendations**

**Finding:** Washington and Taipei have already acted upon or incorporated many of the recommendations outlined in the 2021 Dialogue Report; a few others
have been overtaken by events. Other recommendations are consistent with the findings and recommendations outlined in this report and are worth repeating:

- **Recommendation:** The US and Taiwan governments and militaries must prepare for the worst-case all-out invasion scenario, even while identifying measures to combat Chinese gray zone activities. Both need to improve strategic communication. The United States should more clearly articulate not just the military but also the political and economic costs associated with any Chinese kinetic action against Taiwan.

- **Recommendation:** The United States needs to better prepare for military contingencies, with the aim of increasing the “risk” factor in any Chinese “risk-reward” calculus.

- **Recommendation:** The United States should continue its firm support for greater Taiwan involvement in international organizations and initiatives, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and other trade and economic entities, and carefully explore the prospects for Taiwan involvement in bilateral and multilateral military training and exercises. More pushback is needed against Chinese efforts to limit Taiwan’s international space.

- **Recommendation:** Taiwan needs to reassure the United States that it retains the will and ability to defend itself and the United States should continually reaffirm that its support of the Taiwanese is “rock solid.” Both must develop effective measures to fortify integrated deterrence.
U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence & Defense Dialogue
August 15-16, 2022, Honolulu, HI
Hyatt Place Waikiki Beach Hotel (Pua Melia Room, 2nd Floor)

Agenda

Monday, August 15, 2022

9:00 - 10:15 AM: Opening Session
Welcoming Remarks:
  Ralph COSSA, Pacific Forum
  Ming-Shih SHEN, Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR)
  Donald WENZLICK, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
U.S. Keynote Speaker: Amb. James MORIARTY, Chairman, American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)
Taiwan Keynote Speaker: Amb. Michael Y.K TSENG, Director-General, Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office in Honolulu (TECO)

10:15 - 10:30 AM: Break

10:30 AM - Noon: Session 1. U.S.-Taiwan Comparative Security Assessments: Potential for Conflict?
An examination of current/looming cross-Strait challenges and increasing risks of confrontation and conflict:
- Have PLA capabilities and PRC intentions changed over the past year? If so, how?
- What PLA actions and capabilities are the most troubling/threatening?
- How has the cross-Strait situation changed in the past year?
- How do you assess and categorize PRC actions? Has the likelihood of conflict increased, decreased, or stayed roughly the same? How likely is Beijing to use aggressive actions below the threshold of war to achieve its strategic goals?
- How have the actions of the United States and its allies and partners (i.e., Japan, Australia, the Quad, AUKUS, etc.) affected the security environment? Have they helped ease the pressure or accelerate the potential for conflict?
- Where do our assessments of PLA capabilities and PRC intentions coincide? How do they differ?
- How can Taipei or Washington assure Beijing they will not change the status quo without bending to further coercion? Will it make a difference?

U.S. Presenter: Bonny LIN, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Taiwan Presenter: ADM Richard Y.K. CHEN (ROCN, ret), Taiwan Center for Security Studies
U.S. Discussant: Bonnie GLASER, German Marshall Fund of the United States
Taiwan Discussant: Fu-Kuo LIU, Institute for International Relations, National Chengchi University (IIR/NCCU)

Noon - 1:30 PM: Working Lunch (attendance optional)
Summary of National Defense University (NDU) Press study on *Crossing the Strait: China's Military Prepares for War with Taiwan*, addressing China's military options, organizational reforms and new capabilities, the current cross-strait military balance, the challenges China would face in trying to resolve the Taiwan issue by force, and how Beijing weighs military, economic, and political factors in its evolving Taiwan policy calculus.

*Presenter:* Phil SAUNDERS, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, NDU

1:30 - 3:00 PM: Session 2. Current Taiwan Defense Priorities and Contingency Preparations

Examination of Taiwanese defense goals and priorities and the extent of planning to prepare for worst-case contingencies:

- What is Taiwan’s war-fighting posture? How has it changed since our last meeting? How is it likely to further evolve?
- How prepared is Taiwan to respond if hostilities were to break out today? What has changed since our last engagement? What is in progress and what has yet to be initiated?
- What changes to Taiwan’s defense policies and concepts are needed now to be better prepared for worst-case contingencies?
- Where are the shortfalls or areas where outside assistance is most immediately needed?
- What is the proper mix between improvements and reforms aimed at addressing gray zone challenges and those aimed at countering a direct invasion (understanding that some measures address both)?
- What is the status, roles, and missions of the newly-established (Jan 2022) All-out Defense Mobilization Agency and its impact on command and control and interagency integration?
- Has military training become more realistic and relevant to the growing challenge at hand? Is there a role and rationale for territorial defense forces? What is the status of reserve and mobilization reforms? How has it changed since our last meeting?
- What role does Taiwan expect the United States and other like-minded partners such as Japan and Australia to play? What formalized mechanisms are in place to enable or compel allies and partners to act? If they don’t currently exist, what steps should be taken to implement them?
- Is there a relationship between a U.S. decision to stick with “strategic ambiguity” or opt for “strategic clarity” and Taiwan’s defense policy, posture, and acquisition decisions?
- What “lessons learned” from the Ukraine War are relevant for Taiwan’s defense policy?

*Taiwan Presenter:* Alexander Chieh-cheng HUANG, Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University

*U.S. Presenter:* Ian EASTON, Project 2049 Institute

*Taiwan Discussant:* Domingo I-Kwei YANG, INDSR

*U.S. Discussant:* Denny ROY, East-West Center

3:00 - 3:15 PM: Break


Examination of U.S. defense policy goals, priorities, and motivations as they directly relate to cross-Strait conflict:
- If cross-Strait conflict were to break out today, how prepared is the United States to immediately respond? What has changed since our last engagement and how might it change in the future?
- How likely is it that Washington would respond? Would the circumstances make a difference; i.e., unprovoked PLA attack vs. response to a Taiwan “provocation” such as a declaration of independence, etc.?
- What would a U.S. response likely entail?
- What role is envisioned for U.S. allies and partners in defense preparedness and in the event of a conflict or lower-order military action (island seizure, naval/air skirmish, etc.)?
- How does the U.S. Integrated Deterrence Concept relate to cross-Strait hostilities and what role (if any) is envisioned for Taiwan?
- What is Taiwan’s reaction to these documents, and its role in and reaction to, the updated U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy?
- What "lessons learned" from the Ukraine War are relevant for the defense of Taiwan and broader defense policy of the United States and its partners in the Indo-Pacific?

U.S. Presenter: Heino KLINCK, Klinck Global, LLC
Taiwan Presenter: Chyungly LEE, National Chengchi University
U.S. Discussant: Brendan Rittenhouse GREEN, University of Cincinnati
Taiwan Discussant: Lucy CHENG, Prospect Foundation/Visiting Fellow at CSIS

4:45 - 5:00 PM: Day One Wrap-up Session
Remarks by Chen-wei LIN, INDSR

6:30 - 8:30 PM: Welcoming Dinner (Tikis Grill & Bar)

Tuesday, August 16, 2022 - Hyatt Place Waikiki Beach Hotel

9:00 - 10:30 AM: Session 4. Increasing Domestic Awareness
An examination of domestic attitudes in Taiwan and the United States and how they relate to cross-Strait defense preparations:
- Do Taiwan citizens believe a PLA invasion is likely in the near term? In the next 7-10 years? Eventually or inevitably? Has this changed in the last year? Or will it continue to change in the next year?
- Are Taiwanese ready and willing to fight? Is there a sense of urgency in Taiwan regarding the need for a stronger and better trained military force and greater military preparedness?
- Is the U.S. public ready and willing to help Taiwan defend itself? How has this changed in the last year? Last 5 years? How will it change in the next 1-2 years? What is driving that change?
- What is the Taiwan public’s perception of its own military?
- How does the perception of Taiwan’s willingness to defend itself impact the likelihood of U.S. assistance and vice-versa?
- How can the U.S. effectively communicate strategic ambiguity to the public without engendering dependency or demoralizing Taiwan?
- Is there a need to raise public awareness regarding the PRC threat among both publics?
- What are the perceptions of publics in likeminded partners, such as Australia and Japan?
- How effective is Beijing’s disinformation campaign and how can it best be countered?
- Can third-party regional actors play a role?

Taiwan Presenter: I-Chung LAI, Prospect Foundation
U.S. Presenter: Bill SHARP, University of Hawaii
Taiwan Discussant: Dee WU, Formosan Association for Public Affairs
U.S. Discussant: Eric LEE, Project 2049 Institute

10:30 - 10:45 AM: Break

10:45 AM - 12:15 PM: Session 5. Enhancing Deterrence
An examination of current policy and capabilities and how best to enhance them to decrease the likelihood of Beijing taking military action against Taiwan:
- Has Taiwan become more or less confident in the U.S. ability to deter the PRC from orchestrating military operations against Taiwan? Why?
- How do the United States and Taiwan, individually and collectively, increase the risks – economic, political and social as well as military – in Beijing’s risk-reward calculus in order to enhance deterrence?
- What role does strategic communications and declaratory policy play in enhancing deterrence?
- What role could crisis management and risk reduction mechanisms with the PRC play in enhancing deterrence?
- What PRC actions are eroding deterrence and how should they be countered to reinforce deterrence across the Taiwan Strait?
- What specific aspects of U.S. policy should be strengthened, and how? How can Taiwan assist?
- Conversely, what actions would be counterproductive?
- How does the PLA’s nuclear build-up impact deterrence across the Taiwan Strait and within a conflict? How should Washington and Taipei respond in the event of PRC nuclear blackmail?

U.S. Presenter: Stacie PETTYJOHN, Center for a New American Security
Taiwan Presenter: Fu-shin MEI, Taiwan Security Analysis Center
U.S. Discussant: Jacques DE LISLE, Foreign Policy Research Center
Taiwan Discussant: Charles Chong-Han WU, Stimson Center

12:15 - 1:45 PM: Working Lunch
Review of Pacific Forum study on “Understanding the Implications of a Successful Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.
Presenters: David SANTORO and Ralph COSSA, Pacific Forum
Commentator: Ian EASTON, 2049 Institute
1:45 - 3:15 PM: Session 6. Options for Countering Coercion Below the Level of Armed Attack

An examination of the options to counter coercion which would complement and enhance military deterrence:

- What is the PRC expected to do ‘non-militarily’? When? Where?
- What are the political pressure points in Taiwan domestic politics – and how would the PRC leverage these pressure points? (not to mention the pressure points for the United States, Australia, and Japan, among others)
- How much economic and political pain is the international community and Taiwan willing to take on if cross-Strait tensions increase?
- What are some short-term (2-3 year) non-military policy changes (cyber, law enforcement, disaster preparedness) that Taiwan can reasonably make to improve its defensive posture?
- Does PRC dependence on Taiwan for important parts of high-tech value chains - esp. the most advanced semi-conductors - serve as a deterrent or an incentive with respect to the possible use of the PLA against Taiwan?
- How do other non-military issues such as diplomacy/foreign policy/international space, economic and trade, information and cognitive warfare, and law enforcement and other non-traditional security issues impact Taiwan’s resiliency and deterrence across the Taiwan Strait?

Taiwan Presenter: Russell HSIAO, Global Taiwan Institute
U.S. Presenter: Shirley KAN, Global Taiwan Institute
Taiwan Discussant: Da-jung LI, Tamkang University
U.S. Discussant: Amb. Raymond BURGHARDT, Pacific Century Institute

3:15 - 3:30 PM: Break

3:30 - 5:00 PM: Session 7: Taking Stock/Where do we go from here?

A review of the key findings and recommendations from the 2021 Dialogue and a discussion of the road ahead, with focus on identifying priority solutions to near-term problems:

- Which recommendations from last year’s meeting have been implemented? Which are still relevant? What new have we concluded?
- How do we further enhance bilateral cooperation?
- How do we internationalize the Taiwan issue? Are multilateral military exercises feasible? What is the appetite/feasibility/challenge of a regional collective security organization to respond to aggression?
- How do we improve the ability of the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded states to compete with, and push back against, the PRC?
- How do we better exploit PLA/PRC weaknesses and vulnerabilities?
- How should the United States engage allies like Japan and Australia to get them to play an effective role in the defense of Taiwan?

U.S. Presenter: BGEN David STILWELL (USAF, ret), Former Assistant Secretary of State
Taiwan Presenter: SHEN Ming-Shih, INDSR
U.S. Presenter: LTGEN Wallace “Chip” GREGSON (USMC, ret), W.C. Gregson & Associates
Taiwan Presenter: Admiral (ROCN, ret) Hsi-min LEE, INDSR

5:00 - 5:30 PM: Closing Comments
   Donald WENZLICK, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
   Ming-Shih SHEN, INDSR
   Ralph COSSA, Pacific Forum

Evening open
U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue
Honolulu, HI - Aug 15-16, 2022
Attendee List

U.S.

1. Amb. Raymond BURGHARDT
   President, Pacific Century Institute
   Former American Institute in Taiwan Chairman and Director

2. Jake BURSACK
   Senior Representative to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
   U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency

3. Elizabeth CHAN (virtual)
   Chief Executive Officer
   Global Risk Mitigation Foundation

4. CDRE Dean COMMONS
   Vice Director for Intelligence
   U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

5. Ralph COSSA
   WSD-Handa Chair/President Emeritus
   Pacific Forum

6. Brian DAVIS
   Deputy Director, Political and Security Affairs
   American Institute in Taiwan – Washington

7. David DAY (virtual)
   Chairman
   Global Risk Mitigation Foundation

8. Jacques DELISLE
   Professor of Law & Political Science
   University of Pennsylvania and Foreign Policy Research Institute

9. Ian EASTON
   Senior Director
   Project 2049 Institute

10. Casey ELLIS
    Strategic Trends Research Manager
    U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency

11. Bonnie GLASER
    Director, Asia Program
    The German Marshall Fund of the United States

12. Brendan GREEN
    Associate Professor of Political Science
    University of Cincinnati

13. LTGEN Wallace GREGSON, USMC (ret.)
    President
    WC Gregson & Associates

    Airpower Strategist
    U.S. Treasury Department

15. George KA'ILIWI, SES (virtual)
    Director
    USINDOPACOM J8

16. Shirley KAN
    Advisor
    Global Taiwan Institute

17. James KELLY
    Pacific Forum Chairman
    Former Assistant Secretary of State East Asia Pacific
18. **Col. Matthew KENT**  
    Foreign Area Officer  
    U.S. Department of Defense

19. **Janet KILIAN**  
    Command Economist  
    U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

20. **Heino KLINCK**  
    Founder and Principal, Klinck Global LLC  
    Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia

21. **Ingrid LARSON**  
    Managing Director  
    American Institute in Taiwan – Washington

22. **Eric LEE**  
    Associate Director of Programs, Project 2049 Institute  
    Pacific Forum Young Leader

23. **Bonny LIN**  
    Director, China Power Project  
    Center for Strategic and International Studies

24. **Julia MARRA (virtual)**  
    Analyst  
    U.S. Treasury Department

25. **Amb. James MORIARTY**  
    Chairman  
    American Institute in Taiwan

26. **Chris PATTON (virtual)**  
    Military Exchange Program Manager, Security Cooperation Division, G3/5/7  
    U.S. Army Pacific

27. **Allen PLACK (virtual)**  
    Liaison Officer to National Capital Region  
    U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific

28. **Stacie PETTYJOHN**  
    Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program  
    Center for a New American Security

29. **Lt. Col. Derek PING**  
    Senior Country Director, China Defense Relations Team  
    Office of the Secretary of Defense, China Policy

30. **Erik QUAM**  
    Director, China Focus Group  
    U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

31. **Denny ROY**  
    Senior Fellow  
    East-West Center

32. **David SANTORO**  
    President  
    Pacific Forum

33. **Phillip SAUNDERS**  
    Director, China Center  
    National Defense University

34. **Bill SHARP**  
    Associate/Lecturer, Center for Chinese Studies & Department of Asian Studies  
    University of Hawaii at Mānoa
35. BGEN David STILWELL, USAF (ret.)
   Former Assistant Secretary of State
   East Asia Pacific

36. James TAYLOR
   Planner
   U.S. Special Operations Command
   Pacific

37. Michael TANG
   Targeting/Ops Integrator, U.S.
   Special Operations Command
   Pacific
   U.S. Defense Threat Reduction
   Agency

38. Capt. Herbert THOMPSON (virtual)
   Director of Intelligence
   U.S. Special Operations Command
   Pacific

39. Joshua WALKER
   Senior Sensitive Activities, U.S.
   Special Operations Command
   Pacific
   U.S. Defense Threat Reduction
   Agency

40. Donald WENZLICK
   Chief, Strategic Trends Division
   U.S. Defense Threat Reduction
   Agency

41. Lance WESTERBERG
   Intel Integrator, U.S. Special
   Operations Command Pacific
   U.S. Defense Threat Reduction
   Agency

42. CDR Christina WONG (virtual)
   Taiwan Director, J51
   U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

43. Rob YORK (virtual)
   Director for Regional Affairs
   Pacific Forum

44. Yitzu CHANG
   Consular Officer
   Taipei Economic & Cultural Office
   in Honolulu

45. Adm. Richard Y.K. CHEN (ret.)
   Advisor, Defense Technology
   Center, National Yang-Ming Chiao-
   Tung University
   Former Vice-Minister of the
   Ministry of National Defense

46. Lucy CHENG
   Visiting Fellow at the Center for
   Strategic and International Studies
   The Prospect Foundation

47. Russell HSIAO
   Executive Director
   Global Taiwan Institute

48. Alexander Chieh-cheng HUANG
   Professor
   Tamkang University

49. Mark HUANG
   Deputy Director
   Taipei Economic & Cultural Office
   in Honolulu

50. I-Chung LAI
   President
   Prospect Foundation

51. Chyungly LEE
   Professor
   National Chengchi University
52. Adm. Hsi-Min LEE (ret.)
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Institute for National Defense and
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53. Da-jung LI
Assistant Professor
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54. Chen-wei LIN (virtual)
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55. Fu-Kuo LIU (virtual)
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National Chengchi University

56. Fu-Shin MEI
Director
Taiwan Security Analysis Center

57. Ming-Shih SHEN
Acting Deputy Chief Executive Officer
Institute for National Defense and
Security Research

58. Amb. Michael Y. K. TSENG
Director General
Taipei Economic & Cultural Office in Honolulu

59. Jose TSOU (virtual)
Director
Taipei Economic & Cultural Office in Honolulu

60. Chih-Hung WAN
Director, MLD
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61. Charles Chong-Han WU
Visiting Fellow
Stimson Center

62. Dee WU
Policy Coordinator
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63. Domingo I-Kwei YANG
Assistant Research Fellow
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64. Jesslyn CHEONG
Senior Program Manager
Pacific Forum

65. Audrey HAPP
Program Manager
Pacific Forum

66. Emma HSU (virtual)
Research Intern
Pacific Forum

67. Carol LI
Program and Publications Manager
Pacific Forum

68. Jake STEINER (virtual)
Resident WSD-Handa Fellow
Pacific Forum

69. Claire TIUNN (CHANG)
Research Intern
Pacific Forum
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ralph COSSA is President Emeritus of Pacific Forum and WSD-Handa Chair in Peace Studies. He is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Experts and Eminent Persons Group and a founding member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific’s Steering Committee. Mr. Cossa is a political/military affairs and national security specialist with more than 50 years of experience in formulating, articulating, and implementing US security policy in the Asia-Pacific and Near East–South Asia regions. Mr. Cossa served in the U.S. Air Force from 1966 to 1993, achieving the rank of colonel and last serving as special assistant to the commander of the US Pacific Command. He previously served as Deputy Director for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies and earlier as a national security affairs fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

Mr. Cossa holds an MBA from Pepperdine University, an M.S. in strategic studies from the Defense Intelligence College, and a B.A. in international relations from Syracuse University. He also received an honorary PhD in international relations from the University of Cambodia.