Understanding JI Resilience and Australia's Counterterrorism Efforts in Indonesia

BY

TOM CONNOLLY
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Acronyms

ASG — Abu Sayyaf Group
ASIO — Australian Security Intelligence Organization
ATL — Anti-terrorism Law
AUSTRAÇ — Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
BNPT — Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme
DI — Darul Islam
FKPP — Forum Komunikasi Pondok Pesantren
FPI — Front Pembela Islam
HASI — Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia
JAS — Jemaah Ansyarul Syariah
JAT — Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid
JCLEC — Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation
JI — Jemaah Islamiyah
KOMPAK — Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis
MDUI — Majelis Dakwah Umat Islam
MILF — Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF — Moro National Liberation Front
MMI — Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
NAP CVE — National Action Plan on Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism
NGO — Non-government Organization
Pro-AQ — Pro-al Qaeda
PUPJI — Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah
P/CVE — Preventing and countering violent extremism
RRG — Religious Rehabilitation Group
TASTOS — Total Amniah Sistem Total Solution
WPS — Women, Peace, and Security
Executive Summary

Tom Connolly

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains one of Indonesia’s longest standing state security threats. It has survived major organizational transformations, state security crackdowns, and international military operations in its pursuit of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia that could extend to incorporate Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah rose to prominence for its role in orchestrating the 2002 Bali Bombings, which prompted the United States and Australia to engage Jakarta with the shared goal of destroying the organization and its links to al-Qaeda. Security pressures from Indonesian security services and international forces led to the dismantling of much of Jemaah Islamiyah’s leadership by 2007, which pushed it into a state of hibernation, where members focused on consolidating numbers and religious outreach. The emergence of the Islamic State and its Southeast Asian affiliates in 2014 occupied much of the Indonesian security services’ resources, which gave space to Jemaah Islamiyah to regenerate its strength with renewed vigor. The 2017 discovery of a JI military training program in Syria re-alerted Indonesian counterterrorism authorities to the risk posed by the group, and successive waves of arrests and crackdowns ensued. Although the COVID-19 pandemic meant that many terrorist groups ceased offensive operations and maintained a low profile, Jemaah Islamiyah began to infiltrate Jakarta’s state apparatus, civil society, and academia to promote its political objectives. Jemaah Islamiyah’s long history in Indonesia has proven it to be adaptable, patient, and persistent in pursuit of its objectives. Although it is not currently engaged in military operations, JI’s long history in Indonesia has shown the group is adaptable, patient, and long-term in its thinking. Observers suspect that leaders in Jemaah Islamiyah are biding their time and seeking gaps in state authority that they can exploit to pursue their organizational goals.

Introduction

Jemaah Islamiyah remains one of Indonesia's oldest and most prominent Islamist extremist groups. Jakarta considers the group to be an active threat, and the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) consistently reiterates JI as a concern. In a recent setback for JI, leader Para Wijayanto was arrested in June 2019 and the group's members have been recently targeted by a wave of arrests carried out by lead Indonesian counter-terrorism agency Densus 88. Upon Wijayanto's arrest, authorities uncovered evidence of JI's significant regrowth since its 2007–2008 dismantling, which included salary payments, palm oil plantations on Sumatra and Kalimantan, networks of mosques and preachers, and a sophisticated regional hierarchy of seven heads of section spread across Indonesia. Despite these setbacks, JI remains an active threat and boasts greater amounts of loyal, experienced, and better trained members than other jihadist groups in Indonesia. Although it is unclear who has assumed the role of leader since Wijayanto's arrest, a shura (council) still governs JI. This group is beholden to a constitution and operates on well-defined organizational structures. Prior to his arrest, Wijayanto stipulated that the undertaking of amaliyah (acts of terrorism) should only be used as a prelude to the seizure of state power. Wijayanto knew this was some time away, and opined that JI would need to pass through two stages to achieve this goal: nugthah inhilāq, the preparation of forces, and tامكین risalah, the “victory of concepts.”

JI has been successful in co-opting the socio-economic grievances induced by the COVID-19 pandemic to supplement its recruitment. In a 2021 recent interview, Indonesia's National Counter Terrorism Agency’s (BNPT) director for enforcement, Eddy Hartono noted that JI was continuing its long history of exploiting humanitarian crises to gain legitimacy, expand their support base, and boost recruitment. JI has consistently demonstrated its ability to utilize the cover provided by humanitarian organizations. For example, it has used Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (KOMPAK) or Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI; during the Syrian conflict) to cultivate grassroots support through the provision of social services. The COVID-19 pandemic is no exception, and extremist groups like JI are able to spread their ideology alongside the much-needed medical and economic assistance.

Al-Qaeda contributed significantly to JI’s seed money in the early 1990s, and it maintains strong international ties to the pro-al-Qaeda (pro-AQ) Jabhat al-Nusra, and its successors, the Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and Tahrir al-Sham. Regionally, JI has strong links to militant groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and many of JI’s top officials were trained in weaponry and military strategy in Mindanao. Additionally, given its long domestic history, JI has facilitated close links with other Indonesian extremist groups, including Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and Jemaah Ansharut Tausif (JAT), which was founded by key JI leader Abu Bakar

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8 Ibid., 2.
Ba’asyir. Throughout its existence, Jemaah Islamiyah has utilised its social, economic, and political networks to weather concerted counter-terrorism efforts conducted by Jakarta and its allies, including Australia.

**JII History**

Although JII was only formally founded in 1993, it has deep ideological roots in the Darul Islam (House of Islam) movement of the 1940s. The Darul Islam (DI) movement emerged in the newly independent Republic of Indonesia, in which insurgents predominantly of West Javanese descent executed a military campaign seeking to establish an Islamic state. Although the movement is largely remembered through the prism of religion, the DI insurgency was originally sparked by local militias helping the indigenous authorities fight off colonial occupiers. Osman notes that Islam became a common cause for mobilization amongst DI leadership. The lifespan of JII can be crudely broken into three stages: the inception of the group and its mantiqi structure between the late 1980s and early 1990s until 2001; its post-9/11 stage until around 2007; and, so-called “neo-JII” from 2007 onwards.

**Creation**

JI was formed in 1993 by Yemeni-born clerics Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who fled to Malaysia in 1985 to avoid prison sentences in Indonesia amid the Suharto administration’s New Order crackdown on radical groups. In exile, Sungkar and Ba’asyir began dispatching Southeast Asian fighters to assist the Afghan Mujahideen in their armed struggle against the Soviet Union. Sungkar and Ba’asyir developed strong organizational ties with individuals who would later become key al-Qaeda members and affiliates, and up to one thousand Southeast Asians fought in Afghanistan in this period. Also during this time, Southeast Asian militants gained experience with explosives, battle, and weaponry. Additionally, they were exposed to new ideologies through prominent Mujahideen fighters, like Osama bin Laden, commander Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and influential al-Qaeda theologian Abdullah Azzam. Importantly, linkages formed between Southeast Asian militants as Indonesian cadres trained and fought alongside Thais, Malaysians, and Filipinos in a camp run by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. The considerable number of battle-trained “Afghan Alumni” returning to Southeast Asia formed much of the early core of JII leadership and fighters in the early 1990s. In addition to training and battle experience in Afghanistan, JII received much of its seed money and resources from al-Qaeda.

**Mantiqi Structure**

Conceived from its outset as a highly centralized and well-structured military outfit—as outlined in its so-called manifesto *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah* (General Guide for the Struggle of al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah; PUPJI)—a hierarchy soon emerged that was divided into four operational or

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16 Ibid., 160.  
18 Ibid., 160.  
19 Ibid., 160.  
23 Ibid., 3.

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structural units known as *mantiqis*. These were overseen by Afghan War veteran Riduan Isamuddin, aka. Hambali, who was then JI Operations Chief. In the late 1990s, *Mantiqi I* constituted JI’s central insurgency group. Based in Malaysia, it was essential for JI’s international connections and established the infrastructure for the transfer of capital from al-Qaeda and the coordination of JI members in Afghanistan. *Mantiqi II* was JI’s principal operational and attack division, and under Amir Ba’asyir’s direction it significantly ratcheted up its operational tempo, conducting high profile operations, such as the 2000 Christmas Eve Church bombings and the 2002 Bali Bombings. *Mantiqi III* covered Mindanao, Sabah, and Sulawesi, and its cells were responsible for maintaining strong operational cooperation with the MILF and ASG in the Philippines, which enabled cross-training, support, and logistics. *Mantiqi IV* covered Papua and Australia, and fundraising was its main operational priority. *Mantiqi IV* never established significant military capability, and members of *Mantiqi III* noted that it would not ultimately be considered a proper *Mantiqi* until it developed military capacity. When President Suharto resigned in May 1998, Ba’asyir and Sungkar returned to Indonesia and Sungkar died of natural causes in November 1999. His death left JI in the hands of Ba’asyir, who was perceived to be a weak leader. Soon after Ba’asyir took control, internal schisms emerged. *Mantiqi II* leaders questioned the use of violence in Indonesia and wanted to focus on building the resources necessary to establish an Islamic State, setting a date of 2025. Alternatively, *Mantiqi I* leaders embraced Bin Laden’s 1996 and 1998 *fatwas* that authorized violence against the US and its enemies. By 2001, a group of JI members who had expressed support for Bin Laden’s *fatwas* began to pursue mass-casualty terrorism as advocated by the core circles of al-Qaeda leadership. Western targets quickly became the focal point of JI operatives after a December 2001 plan to attack British, US, Israeli, Australian, and Singaporean targets was disrupted.

**The Bali Bombings**

On October 12, 2002, JI militants carried out their most infamous attack on the Sari Club and Paddy’s Bar, which were popular night spots for Westerners in Kuta, Bali. This attack propelled JI into international notoriety and prompted a coordinated response from prominent Western powers to decapitate its leadership. Following the 2002 attack, Jakarta and the international community could no longer ignore the insurgent group. The Sukarnoputri administration in Jakarta was pushed by international forces, including the US and Australia, to take the threat of militant Islamist groups

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seriously. Indonesia’s lead counter-terrorism squad, Densus 88 (Detachment 88), was created in June 2003, and with the assistance of countries like the US and Australia, it relentlessly pursued JI’s leadership. The arrests and killing of prominent members of JI’s leadership following the first Bali bombing, which included Hambali and bomb expert Azahair Husin, decimated the mantiqi structure and severed many of its direct links to al-Qaeda. Despite such heavy setbacks, elements of JI continued plotting high profile attacks, which included the J.W. Marriott bombing (2003), the Australian Embassy in Jakarta (2004), and the second Bali Bombing in 2005. However, with international pressure mounting, JI found itself in dire financial straits by 2005, and was soon reduced to a single Java-based unit led by Abu Dujana, with ishoba (squads) in Solo, Surabaya, Jakarta, and Semarang. The beheading of three schoolgirls from Poso in October 2005 by the local JI branch generated such public outrage that the police sent their top investigators, led by national police chief Tito Karnavian to rein in the insurgents. After identifying the perpetrators and failing to persuade them to surrender, the police mounted an operation in the neighbourhood of Tanah Runtuh, moving against the militants. By the end of the day on January 22, 2007, one police officer had been killed along with fourteen JI militants. The Tanah Runtuh operation reduced JI’s credibility to a new low, especially after its leaders ruled out the idea of a retaliatory attack. The operation took place against the backdrop of ongoing raids and armed clashes in Poso, Central Sulawesi, which led to the arrest of over forty JI members, including prominent leaders. The successive police operations pushed JI out of the open, and away from violence to the use of dakwah (religious outreach) and education.

Neo-JI

Following the 2007 crackdown, JI leadership made an active decision to lie low, recuperate, and focus on dakwah. Bombings were deemed to be counterproductive, because they led to the death of innocent Muslims and loss of public support for their Islamist cause. This signalled the creation of so-called “Neo-JI,” which Indonesian authorities initially presumed to be benign, but have recently begun to contend with as a very real threat to Indonesian society. In a 2008 meeting in Surabaya, JI’s remaining senior leaders chose Kudus-based Para Wijayanto as the group’s new amir. Analysts suggest that following the degradation of JI’s leadership and capabilities in the wake of the Tanah Runtuh operation, Neo-JI refocussed its efforts on three fronts: dakwah and education campaigns, developing a clandestine network structure to develop its legal above-ground economic and social organizations, and a redesign of its military structure to emphasize training.

References:

47 Ibid., 3.
The new-found focus on *dakwah* and *taklim* (public lectures) was an acknowledgement of JI’s current weakness and desire to establish a broader base. In 2009, JI created its first above-ground *dakwah*, Majelis Dakwah Umum Islam (MDU), which communicated the centrality of Islamic law and reportedly sent its preachers to sixty-five places outside of Java, including Papua, East Nusa Tenggara, Maumere, and Bontang. By the end of 2013, it was estimated the Neo-JI had established an active education division network of 24 coordinators reporting to seven heads of section that were spread across Western Indonesia (five heads of section) and Eastern Indonesia (two heads of section). Neo-JI also began to establish legal, public-facing economic and social organizations to help support their programs and officers. The group enjoyed a good degree of success in this domain, accruing considerable profits through projects such as palm oil plantations on Sumatra and Kalimantan and clove and cacao fields in Southeast Sulawesi. Indonesian police later reported that JI was able to pay its “officers” a monthly salary between ten to fifteen million rupiah (USD $666–1000). Neo-JI was also reasonably successful in setting up above-ground humanitarian organizations. HASI was one these, which distributed aid to victims of the civil war. Set up in 2011, JI leadership used HASI to raise and distribute funds to support the recruitment and travel of JI foreign fighters to Syria. It regularly supported the travel of JI officials, including senior leader Bambang Sukirno and operative Angga Dimas Pershada, to join Syrian fighters. Between 2012–2013, HASI conducted 60 public discussions and collected 130 million rupiah for Syria, part of which was sent to JI-linked jihadist groups, such as *Jabah al-Nusroh* and *Ahrar Al Syam*. In 2015, the United Nations Security Council added HASI to its Sanctions List, and the US has designated it as linked to al-Qaeda and IS. Other humanitarian organizations associated with Neo-JI, including *Lembaga Kemanusiaan One Care*, continue to operate.

Para Wijayanto also oversaw a redesign of JI’s military structure. In 2011, JI’s central command agreed to a new structure with two wings: one for above-ground *dakwah* and the other for clandestine military operations. JI’s founding manual, PUPJ, informed the new military wing, however Wijayanto reformulated this guideline to create *Strategi Tamkin* (*tamkin* strategy). The *tamkin* strategy related to JI’s need to methodically acquire and consolidate influence over territory to eventually realize the proclamation of an Islamic state founded on the principles of Islamic jurisprudence.

While JI previously had four *mantiqis*, it now had one unified *bithonah* spanning from Sumatra to Nusa
Tenggara Barat. Wijayanto also put in place a two-tiered structure of disconnected cells that permitted coordination between groups, with strict limits on communication. All JI members used an elaborate set of pseudonyms, and trusted couriers were used for important communication, rather than cell phones that could easily be tapped by authorities. Additionally, Wijayanto instituted a system of planting cell phones to mislead and misinform police. JI’s official rationale for the construction of its military wing was that its cadres were necessary for self-defense, assistance to oppressed Muslims overseas, and the preparation of an army for an eventual Islamic state. JI’s revamped military training program involved screening recruits selected from JI pesantrens and then putting those who passed through a close quarter combat training program lasting twelve months. Recruits were sent to foreign groups such as al-Nusra, the Free Syrian Army, and Ahrar al-Sham between 2012 and 2018. Two four-man teams were also sent to ISIS in 2013 on a reconnaissance mission to observe ISIS tactics and better understand its doctrine. In both cases, the JI members were detained for refusing to swear bai’at to al-Baghdadi. Further, upon return to Indonesia, they declared there would be no official contact with ISIS and that its takfirism was unacceptable. In 2014, JI began to actively campaign against ISIS, claiming that it too quickly condemned people as a kafir. Groups associated with JI, including Jemaah Ansarul Syariah (JAS), even began circulating anti-ISIS propaganda. The Syrian training program ended in 2018 due to a shift in local dynamics, whereby insurgent groups consistently found themselves in-fighting due to Russian and Iranian aid being delivered to the Syrian regime. Indonesian counter-terrorism authorities took a relatively relaxed view of Neo-JI given its preoccupation with ISIS. However, the discovery in late 2017 of JI’s Syrian military training program brought the group back into the sights of Indonesian counter-terrorism authorities and a volley of arrests of male Syrian deportees soon followed. In May 2019, senior leaders of JI began to be arrested, which included Joko Priyono, who had created the training program in 2012. Information from these arrests led to the arrest of Para Wijayanto in July 2019. A new amir is usually chosen by a committee of JI elders who convene for that power, however a successor to Wijayanto is yet to emerge.

JI Resilience

Jemaah Islamiyah’s prolonged presence in Southeast Asia attests to its resilience. Some of the factors crucial to JI’s success include its use of kinship and marriage ties, its flexibility, its interaction and relations with foreign militant groups, its network of pesantrens (or Islamic boarding schools), sophisticated financial planning, successful vertical narrative integration, and contemporary counterintelligence strategy.

Familial Networks

Close, familial relations help to keep clandestine operations safe from infiltration by forming a bond that many other structures cannot equal. There is a strong and powerful legacy of family and insurgency in JI, which can be traced back to the Darul Islam (DI) movement. Although the secular Indonesian government killed some 25,000 people involved in DI, familial insurgent networks across Indonesia absorbed many remaining fighters, enabling them to avoid capture and then resurface after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1985. The idealism espoused by DI persisted through multiple generations in Indonesia, and provided a “deep socio-ideological

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67 Ibid., 4.
69 Ibid., 4.
70 Ibid., 2.
71 Ibid., 2.
74 Ibid., 2.
75 Ibid., 8.
77 Ibid., 1.
78 Ibid., 1.
While JI was establishing itself in Southeast Asia in the 1990s, a close friend of Hambali, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, who was brother in law of Osama bin Laden, acted as the major financing conduit between JI and al-Qaeda. After the collapse of the mantiqi structure following the Bali Bombings and the military powers targeting the group’s leadership, JI remodeled itself away from an apex leadership into a flatter structure that maintained strategic and tactical governance through familial groupings. Andrew Henshaw, the author of an authoritative study on insurgent resilience, contends that the shift to a more decentralized, holacratic structure following the decapitation of JI’s leadership in the wake of the Bali Bombings diffused decision-making by pushing it to the lower, tactical level. In this stage of JI’s life cycle, its familial structure enhanced security and efficiency by restricting information flows outside of security groups and enabled familial cells to operate with increased autonomy. Strong familial connections also help to insulate organizations from infiltration by law enforcement, because turning against the group necessarily entails turning against family members. However, under interrogation, these ties have been shown to become a liability, and law enforcement are able to uncover these links and quickly map JI networks. Henshaw explains that, especially in the period between the Bali bombings and the emergence of Neo-JI, many of the losses that JI suffered were due to those kinship ties that authorities were quickly able to know about upon interrogation.

Marriages are also a common method used by JI to extend kinship networks and bring new recruits. JI elders often adopt the role of matchmaker, and arrange marriages between new recruits and sisters, daughters, other female relatives, or those of their peers. Consistent with JI’s recruitment and radicalization strategy, maintaining kinship and marital ties between members helps to protect from infiltration and ensure allegiances among members.

**Counterintelligence Strategy**

JI’s operations are undergirded by a sophisticated counterintelligence strategy named Total Amniah Sistem Total Solution (total security system and total solution; TASTOS). TASTOS was approved following the dismantling of JI’s leadership in the years following the 2002 Bali Bombings by then leader Zarkasih, who was amir from 2005 to 2007. Para Wilayanto, who would assume the position of amir in 2008, wrote the handbook of TASTOS, identifying eight security problems and their solutions. One of the solutions implemented was a system of disconnected cells (or seller), wherein personnel at different hierarchical levels and divisions were unable to contact one another directly, but rather through a system of couriers. The institutionalization of TASTOS arguably prevented the complete destruction of JI networks, as its members were obliged to study and practice the doctrine, thus increasing resilience.

**Vertical Narrative Integration and Flexibility**

Leadership within JI has also maintained appeal to its recruits by successfully co-opting global narratives to sustain enthusiasm for its cause amongst members. This has been a long-standing skill of JI, dating back to the period following Darul Islam’s “golden years.” To avoid disengagement from the narrative of resistance and Islamism espoused by the DI movement, JI leadership has consistently reframed new conflicts in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria as relevant to the cause of Southeast Asian

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83 Ibid., 135.  
84 Ibid., 130.  
85 Ibid., 145-156.  
86 Ibid., 145-146.  
87 Ibid., 145-146.  
89 Andrew Henshaw, “Jemaah Islamiyah,” in *Understanding Insurgent Resilience: Organizational Structures and the Implications for Insurgency* (Sydney: Routledge, 2020), 140.  
90 Ibid., 140.  
93 Ibid., 17.  
94 Ibid., 17.  
95 Ibid., 17; Sidney Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Uncertain Short-Term Future” (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, January 31, 2021), 4.  
militancy. This successful vertical narrative integration, the linking of JI’s activities to al-Qaeda’s master narrative of a “war on Islam,” helps create a shared sense of grievance, purpose, and motivation for JI operatives. This has proven to be extremely persuasive within JI networks, and, when paired with kinship and marriage, has forged generational bonds between familial units of insurgents, increasing social capital and trust. Many of these narratives are promoted through pro-JI publishing houses and media outlets. Risalah Mijahiddeen (Jogjakarta), Symina (Kudus), and Ar-Ramah.com (online) are three outlets that regularly produce al-Qaeda- and JI-oriented articles.

A high degree of flexibility has proven to be another core facet enabling JI’s protracted presence throughout the region. This was especially evident during the early 2000s, when JI’s presence arguably peaked in Southeast Asia. Between 2000 and 2005, there were five different amirs in JI. In spite of the turbulence induced by the constant turnover of its leadership, JI was able to recover swiftly and resume operations.

“A high degree of flexibility has proven to be another core facet enabling JI’s protracted presence throughout the

Network of Pesantrens

JI leadership has cultivated a deep network of Indonesian Islamic boarding schools, or pesantrens, which they utilize to inculcate future militants with their extreme interpretation of Islam. Pesantrens are particularly known for delivering education to those from low income families and they are a deeply historic component of Indonesia’s education system, pre-dating independence in 1945. However, upon return from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, many Southeast Asian jihadists established pesantrens emulating the networks of Islamic madrasahs that they encountered in Pakistan, which were set up to train and recruit young refugees and Pakistanis. During the 1980s, up to one-hundred thousand foreigners travelled to Pakistani madrasahs where they received training, ideological indoctrination, and established access to transnational jihadist networks. These madrasahs served as the ideological front-line against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the extremist interpretation of Islam espoused by these schools, as well as the international networks provided, were formulative experiences for the global jihad. The pesantrens set up by returning Southeast Asian jihadists are a consistent source of recruits and indoctrination that still bolster JI’s rank-and-file. A 2003 International Crisis Group report found that there were 14,000 rural pesantrens registered with the Ministry of Religion in Indonesia; 8,900 of these taught hard-line Salafi Islamic principles, and a handful were associated with JI and radical jihadism. Al-Mukmin school in Ngruki, Solo is one such school, which has been described as an “ivy league” for JI recruitment, and its teaching staff have included notable extremists, including Hambali.

The political inaction to dismantle pesantrens, such as al-Mukmin, left JI with a critical component of its structure, which still acts as a conduit for financial resources, indoctrination, and multi-generational social networks that are sympathetic to JI. Jamaluddin admitted to nineteen schools being part of JI’s pesantren network, which was named Forum Komunikasi Pondok Pesantren (FKPP), however that number is likely higher given that satellite schools started by alumni and under the dakwah program

97 Ibid., 136.
98 Ibid., 136–137.
99 Ibid., 136–137.
102 Andrew Henshaw, “Jemaah Islamiyah,” in Understanding Insurgent Resilience: Organizational Structures and the Implications for Insurgency (Sydney: Routledge, 2020), 146.
103 “Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)” (Canberra: Attorney-General’s Department, n.d.).
105 Ibid., 136.
106 Ibid., 136–137.
109 Ibid., 432.
111 Ibid., 26.
112 Andrew Henshaw, “Jemaah Islamiyah,” in Understanding Insurgent Resilience: Organizational Structures and the Implications for Insurgency (Sydney: Routledge, 2020), 150.
encouraged the establishment of more.\textsuperscript{110} JI also has an elaborate teaching program, where several pesantrens are specifically set up for advanced training that will enable graduates to set up their own satellite schools.\textsuperscript{111}

JI-affiliated schools are generally run by a charitable foundation, or yayasan, however they also receive donations from private and public sources. Some, such as Pesantren Ulul Albab in Lampung, have received government aid.\textsuperscript{112} Many of these schools remain open to this day and, in addition to being a key source of recruits and funding, act as a conduit connecting JI with the surrounding community through religious celebrations and humanitarian activities.\textsuperscript{113} It is notable that al-Mukin in Solo was not on the list of JI-affiliated pesantrens described by Muhammad Jamaluddin, however it remains an important part of FKPP due to its historical role and vast alumni links.\textsuperscript{114}

**Sophisticated Financial Planning**

Jemaah Islamiyah has always boasted a sophisticated financial network, which has enabled it to survive in the face of significant exogenous pressure. In its early mantiqi period, al-Qaeda provided JI much of its seed money.\textsuperscript{115} In one instance, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, one of the operational planners of the September 11 World Trade Center attacks, provided Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a Canadian–Kuwaiti al-Qaeda operative with US$30,000 over three equal instalments for the purpose of JI operations against US targets across Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{116} Some of the al-Qaeda funding came from cash brought into the country by individuals; funds skimmed from Islamic charities; proceeds from hawala shops and gold sales; contributions (zakat and infaq) from its own members; contributions from outsiders; al-Qaeda investments and accounts that had already been established in the region, especially in Islamic banks; and, petty crime, racketeering, extortion, gun-running, and kidnapping.\textsuperscript{117} After the dismantling of JI’s mantiqi structure and under Para Wijayanto’s guidance, Neo-JI focused on dakwah, consolidation, and accruing capital.\textsuperscript{118}

Under Wijayanto, Neo-JI revamped its financing: it decentralized and regularized the collection of infaq; provided members training in entrepreneurship; increased fundraising efforts from wealthy donors; and, invested in large economic projects, such as palm oil plantations, food processing factories, and electronic manufacturing.\textsuperscript{119} Each division of JI had its own fund-raising efforts and treasurer, and from funds that were raised, 70 per cent went to divisional requirements and 30 per cent went to JI’s central treasury.\textsuperscript{120} Neo-JI’s income was sufficient to pay salaries of up to RP 10 million (approx. $700USD) per month to its senior staff, provide modest payments to unemployed members, contribute to weddings and funerals, fund humanitarian activities, and provide cars for senior staff.\textsuperscript{121} Neo-JI also allocated a generous amount of funding to its Syria training program, which was assigned RP 400 million (approx. $28,000USD) when it was originally created in 2013.\textsuperscript{122}

Charities and humanitarian organizations have historically been a strong source of income for Jemaah Islamiyah. Like al-Qaeda, JI’s coffers are often lined with revenue derived from Islamic charities.\textsuperscript{123} In 2003, Indonesian authorities estimated that around 15–20\% of Islamic charity funds in the country were being diverted to politically motivated groups and extremists.\textsuperscript{124} Even after the dismantling of its formal mantiqi structure, charitable organizations have remained critical of JI. Under Wijayanto’s leadership, JI became increasingly astute in eliciting charitable income. One such method was the placement of seemingly innocuous charity collection boxes (kotak amal) in thousands of Indonesian minimarkets.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{110} Sidney Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Uncertain Short-Term Future” (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, January 31, 2021), 3.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{113} Sidney Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Uncertain Short-Term Future” (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, January 31, 2021), 3.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 3.


\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 173.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 171.

\textsuperscript{118} Sidney Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Uncertain Short-Term Future” (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, January 31, 2021), 5.


\textsuperscript{120} Sidney Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Uncertain Short-Term Future” (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, January 31, 2021), 5.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{122} Sidney Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Uncertain Short-Term Future” (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, January 31, 2021), 6.

\textsuperscript{123} Zachary Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 (2003): 173.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 173.

\textsuperscript{125} Sidney Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Uncertain Short-Term Future” (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, January 31, 2021), 5.
National Police Spokesperson Inspector General Argo Yuwono said in December 2020 that authorities had uncovered over 20,000 donation boxes across twelve regions in Indonesia, including Jakarta, Lampung, North Sumatra, Yogyakarta, East Java, and Maluku. In an interview with al-Jazeera, former JI operative Arif Budi Setawan noted his astonishment at the “distinct escalation” of fundraising efforts these *katak amal* represented, as opposed to simply eliciting capital from wealthy donors. As noted above, humanitarian organizations, such as the Hilal Almr Society Indonesia and Lembaga Kemanusian One Care, are also utilized by JI to raise funds and provide cover to support the logistical requirements of its terrorist activities.

**Alliance Building**

Jemaah Islamiyah’s interaction with other regional and international militant groups has allowed it to better withstand pressures brought by the Indonesian and international community by facilitating the sharing of expertise, ideology, and training. Interaction with the Afghan mujahideen was central to almost every militant Islamic group in Southeast Asia. Significant operational links with al-Qaeda provided JI with much of its early seed money, and AQ’s leadership recognized the potential to exploit Indonesian security gaps early in the relationship.

In June 2000, top lieutenants to Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atif, travelled to Indonesia and saw the potential for a new base of operations. With the intention of shifting the base of terrorist operations from the subcontinent to Southeast Asia, al-Qaeda utilized its relationships with affiliated militants like Hambali to recruit and cultivate rich networks of Islamic militants across Southeast Asia. Members of the so-called Afghan alumni were pivotal in the early formation of JI, and were also critical in the combat training of Neo-JI’s militants.

The Syria training program that lasted from 2012 to 2018 involved sending specially selected recruits from *pesantrens* to al-Nusra Front, the Free Syrian Army, Ahrarul Sham, and IS. Although the reconnaissance trips to IS were unsuccessful, with a number of the recruits being detained for not pledging *ba’at* to then leader al-Baghdadi, the training with other AQ-affiliated groups provided arms, combat, and ideological training to JI militants.

JI also retains strong ties with regional extremist groups, in particular the ASG and MILF in the Philippines. Some of these connections date back to the Afghan Alumni. In the mid-1990s, as the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, Abdullah Sungkar organized with the MILF to establish training facilities in Mindanao, southern Philippines. Many of JI’s top officials were trained in Mindanao, including Para Wijayanto. JI militants trained regional affiliates, such as the ASG, MILF, and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), in advanced bomb-making, conducted joint training exercises, and assisted one another in weapons and explosives procurement. JI’s links in the Philippines have also helped its operatives escape from crackdowns carried out by Indonesian counter-terrorism authorities despite the MILF and Manila signing a peace framework agreement in October 2012.

**Leadership of Wijayanto**

Upon becoming the *amir* of JI, Para Wijayanto instituted several changes that have contributed to

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128 Ibid.
130 Zachary Abuza, “Tenets of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 3 (2002): 446.
131 Ibid., 446.
134 Ibid., 2.
137 Sidney Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Uncertain Short-Term Future” (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, January 31, 2021), 5.
JI’s continued success and presence in the region. His *tamkin* (settled) strategy revamped the JI’s founding ideological manual PUPJI, increased its hierarchical structure, and instituted an effective counterintelligence strategy.

All Neo-JI’s activities were focused on what Wijayanto termed the *Tamkin* strategy; that is the creation of an Islamic state idolizing and recreating the caliphate of the prophet. This clearly articulated strategy reinvigorated the ideological manual of JI and helped Neo-JI to reconsolidate its ranks through dakwah. Wijayanto realized the importance of local support in rebuilding JI and stressed the need to build relations with international mujahideen networks. Under Wijayanto, JI members were also forbidden from taking part in amaliyah (acts of terrorism) in Indonesia.

Neo-JI’s more hierarchical structure facilitated accountability and specialization. Prior to his arrest, Wijayanto, the JI treasurer, his secretary, and his deputies commanded the leaders of divisions and units. Wijayanto held regular direct meetings with divisional leaders and permitted them to add subdivisions or staff to carry out specific functions or improve the ideological, mental, or physical well-being of personnel.

Under this hierarchy, loss was minimized by Neo-JI’s centralized enforcement and its ability to identify and punish unfaithful or ineffective members taking negligent actions. Here, Neo-JI created a central enforcement unit, called hisbah (accountability), whose leader, Abu Fatih, was directly responsible to Wijayanto. An instance of the functioning of the hisbah was seen in May 2019, where Neo-JI leadership discussed punishment for a member named Jamal who had disobeyed instructions to meet Wijayanto. Here, leaders deliberated over the consequences of removing Jamal from Neo-JI’s ranks if he did not repent according to Islamic law, after being reprimanded with the first warning. Salaries and facilities were also awarded for the successful execution of duties. The accountability brought about by Wijayanto’s hierarchical structure contributed to JI’s unity throughout his tenure.

In addition to violence, some of the areas of expertise in Neo-JI included political campaigns and providing community services. Neo-JI’s practice of specialization is advanced to the extent that talents are encouraged to pursue their studies or enhance their skills in line with the needs of various JI divisions. For example, members of Neo-JI’s dakwah division were sent to continue studies in psychology or Islamic studies in Yemen or Sudan. However, one of the most troubling areas of Neo-JI has been the rebuilding of its military wing. Here, recruits underwent arguably the most rigorous admission processes in JI-linked pesantrens and undertook leadership training with the idea of becoming the trainers for the next generation of cadres. Although the Syria military training program was eventually disbanded in 2018 following the arrest of several JI cadres, the training many of the recruits had received up to that point was directly useful in the development of JI’s domestic military and security training.

**Indonesia’s Response**

Since the 2002 Bali Bombings, when Jakarta was forced to acknowledge the threat posed by JI, Indonesian authorities have tended to favor counter-terrorism and military operations against JI, which have incorporated mass arrests, imprisonment, and killings.

**Acknowledging the Threat**

Prior to the Bali Bombings, while JI’s mantiqi structure was firmly developed throughout Southeast Asia, governments in Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines actively pursued its members. Indonesia, on the other hand, was reticent to acknowledge the...
group was a threat and resisted pressure from the US and other governments in the region to crack down on it. Concerns regarding then-President Megawati’s credibility amongst Indonesia’s Muslim community difficulties convincing Indonesians of the existence of a nation-wide terror cell partially informed Jakarta’s reluctance to act against JI.

However, following the Bali Bombings in 2002, the Megawati administration was forced to acknowledge the existence and threat of the group, and immediately set up a significant legislative and policing apparatus to pursue JI and its leaders. Against the backdrop of President Megawati’s announcement that Indonesia lacked a legal basis to act swiftly and decisively against terrorism, Indonesia’s 2002 Anti-Terrorism Law (ATL) was ratified just six days after the Bali Bombings took place. The ATL supplanted existing criminal law, and was broadly designed to make the investigation, prosecution, and conviction of terrorists easier through the introduction of definitions of terrorism and the conferral of powers to law enforcers not usually permitted in cases governed by Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (Code of Criminal Procedure).

Alongside the legislative levers codified into law, Jakarta assembled an elite CT force, Densus 88 (Detachment 88), which is tasked with the detection, surveillance, and arrest of terror suspects. Despite the wealth of success Densus 88 has accrued in the dismantling of JI’s leadership and pursuit of its rank-and-file, it has been accused of fueling militancy in Indonesia through suspected human rights abuses and extrajudicial killings. After JI carried out the Jakarta Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Bombings in 2009, Indonesia’s national agency for combating terrorism, BNPT, was established, which combined forces from the police, military, and intelligence agencies in the hope of ensuring a more coordinated national CT strategy.

### Kinetic Operations

Between 2002–2009, Jakarta pursued an intense campaign of arrests and killings of JI’s leadership. They utilized Densus 88, local police, and international partners such as the US—which was eager to see the destruction of al-Qaeda networks following the 9/11 attacks—and Australia to arrest 466 JI members, assassinate and jail its key leaders, and generally reduce its capacity to conduct lethal attacks. JI’s direct links to al-Qaeda were severed by late 2003 with the arrest of one of JI’s key leaders, Riduan Isamuddin, aka. Hambali, as well as the deportation of a number of Indonesians and Malaysians from a cell in Karachi that he facilitated. That being said, sporadic communication between the two groups continued and policymakers in Indonesia soon found that military victories over the group were transient as leaders and fighters were quickly able to replenish the ranks of JI.

After the near destruction of JI in 2007 following successive police operations, authorities took a more relaxed view of the organization, especially given its publicly anti-ISIS stance. Densus 88 maintained some level of surveillance over JI, however given its focus on Islamic State affiliates and the cooperation of top JI leaders (including Zarkasih, the Amir, and Abu Dujana, head of military affairs), it missed Neo-JI’s steady reconstruction of economic and military capacity. However, the discovery of Neo-JI’s intricate military training program in Syria prompted successive waves of arrests and a reinvigorated crackdown on the group. Information gathered from these arrests led to the arrest of Para Wijayantra.

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155 Ibid., 2.


160 Ibid., 2; Andrew Henshaw, “Jemaah Islamiyah,” in *Understanding Insurgent Resilience: Organizational Structures and the Implications for Insurgency* (Sydney: Routledge, 2020), 149–150.


162 Ibid., 1.
in July 2019, and it is yet to be seen who a successor to amir will be. 163

Soft-Power Approaches

Indonesia has also implemented several soft-power counterterrorism measures, including programs aimed at the rehabilitation and reintegration of former JI militants, although these remain underutilized when compared to law-enforcement operations. While some countries in the region, such as Malaysia and Singapore, have developed comprehensive and structured rehabilitation programs, Indonesia’s measures remain largely ad hoc and lack structure. 164 Measures geared towards rehabilitation and reintegration exist, however these have not been proliferated enough to significantly stem the tide of radicalization.

The BNPT is mandated to undertake preventative CT measures and implement deradicalization initiatives. 165 The four pillars of prevention, deradicalization, law enforcement, and partnership inform the agency’s mission and it hosts discussions on the topics of peaceful Islam and nationalism in Indonesia’s prisons as part of its initiatives. 166 Besides the BNPT, Densus 88, as well as NGOs, including The Division for Social Applied Psychology Research Universitas Indonesia, Search for Common Ground, Aliansi Indonesia Damai, and Civil Society Against Violent Extremism, all recognize the profound dangers of radicalization in the prison system and work with detainees to deprogram the process. 167 In recognition of the economic necessities of life outside prison, the BNPT and NGOs, such as Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian and the Mutual Aid Society, work with convicts to help develop economic and entrepreneurial skills. 168 One such initiative undertaken by the BNPT is to provide funds to inmates upon their release to help them to start projects to sustain their livelihoods, such as entrepreneurship. 169 Although the BNPT developed plans to build a deradicalization center in Sentul, West Java in 2014 to help the reintegration of ex-convicts, the facility is far from Jakarta, where relevant government agencies and civil society establishments are located. 170 The BNPT has brought less ideologically committed terrorists from prisons to the facility for three-month rehabilitation programs to be undertaken in conjunction with other NGOs, such as Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian. 171 However, with nearly 1,000 terror convicts being released into Indonesia in 2018, there is no government mechanism to monitor individuals and their reintegration into the community. Further, these projects must contend with opposing programs by jihadi fundraising initiatives, such as Gerakan Sehari Seribu (One Thousand Rupiah-a-Day), which was a financial aid program directly challenging Jakarta’s deradicalization program. 172

Legislation

Jakarta has also evolved its legislative framework to meet the increasingly dynamic demands of countering extremist groups. This has included a 2018 amendment to its Anti-Terror Law, which underwent greater consultation with women’s groups, academics, religious groups, and civil society organizations that its 2003 iteration. 173 The Widodo Administration also signed the National Action Plan on Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism (NAP CVE) on 6 January 2021. The NAP CVE received important contributions from academics, think-tanks, female activists, and political party members in an effort to advance a “whole society” approach to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). 174 Although the NAP

166 Ibid., 315.
167 Ibid., 317.
CVE signaled the Widodo administration’s receptivity to alternate legislative models, observers suggest Jakarta could apply more gender-sensitive measures and explicitly link the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda with CVE.\(^{175}\)

**Australian Engagement**

As an immediate neighbor, tourist destination, and security partner, counter-terrorism engagement with Jakarta has been a strong feature of Australian bilateral relations. Australia’s 2017 *Foreign Policy White Paper* notes that Southeast Asia frames Australia’s northern approaches and is of “profound significance” to Canberra.\(^{176}\) In this domain, the Indonesian bilateral relationship is described as of being of “first order importance” and emphasis is given to “defense, counter-terrorism, law enforcement, and intelligence cooperation.”\(^{177}\) A former Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, in a 2019 speech acting in his official capacity as Ambassador, articulated some vital contemporary intersections between Australia and Indonesia that drive bilateral engagement.\(^{178}\) Education and interfaith exchanges are important examples of cross-cultural engagement, which help drive bilateral engagement outside of the domain of security. Further, with 1.3 million Australians visiting Indonesia in 2018 and increasing amounts of Australians—around 215,000 in 2018—visiting Australia, tourism constitutes a significant nexus between Jakarta and Canberra.\(^{179}\)

The importance of Indonesia to Australian security has long been acknowledged by policymakers. Consistent reports, including in 2020–21, from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation have noted the threat to Australians posed by terrorist cells operating in Southeast Asia.\(^{180}\) The 2002 Bali Bombings were the most devastating attack against Australians in Southeast Asia. The bombings came to define Australia’s counter-terrorism approach in Indonesia, as well as Southeast Asia more broadly, for the proceeding two decades.\(^{181}\)

**Counterterrorism Assistance**

Canberra has molded its CT policies in Southeast Asia along four key principles since 2015: disrupting terrorist activity; ensuring an effective response to and recovery from any terrorist attack; reducing the appeal of violent extremist ideologies; stopping individuals from resorting to violence to express their views; and contributing the global counterterrorism effort and architecture. When engaging Southeast Asian partners, Australian policymakers have deployed both provision of direct military assistance for the purposes of counterterrorism, like that seen in the 2017 Siege of Marawi, and less forceful approaches, which include deradicalization support, prevention of terrorist recruitment, and counter-financing.\(^{182}\)

Military and police support for countering terrorism in Indonesia has yielded mixed results for Canberra. Although military operations carried out by domestic anti-terror agencies have seen success against JI, they have not prevented it from regrouping and adapting to survive. In this domain, Australian intelligence agencies have reportedly been of great assistance to

“No matter how many military forces you send to suppress terrorism, the perpetrators will keep regrouping. The only option is preventative efforts and effective intelligence gathering.”


\(^{176}\) Ibid.


\(^{178}\) Ibid., 40, 41.


\(^{182}\) Ibid.


Indonesian CT agencies with signals intelligence. For example, it was allegedly telephone intercepts of Dr. Azahari Husin, a key logistician and planner of the Bali Bombings, provided by Australian agencies that eventually led Densus 88 to his villa in Batu, East Java, where he was subsequently killed. More broadly, Canberra contributed greatly to Indonesian law enforcement through its joint establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in 2004. Created in conjunction with Jakarta, the JCLEC acts as a national and regional law enforcement and CT training environment, and helps to foster collaboration between the Australian Federal Police and Indonesian National Police. Canberra and Washington were also instrumental providers of capital in the creation of Densus 88, following the Bali Bombings. The unit is an essential tool in Jakarta’s CVE efforts, however it has also been accused of fueling militancy through the alleged extra-judicial killings of terror suspects.

The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), Canberra’s chief financial intelligence agency, has also been a critical element of counterterrorism in Indonesia. Following the Bali Bombings, AUSTRAC helped Jakarta to monitor cash movements to help identify some of the perpetrators. AUSTRAC’s engagement in Indonesia remains a pillar of Australia–Indonesia collaboration on security efforts in the region, and it recently launched its 2020 Analyst Exchange Program with its Indonesian counterpart, PPATK. In 2015, the two agencies also co-hosted the first Southeast Asia Counter-Terrorism Financing Summit in Sydney where participants agreed to conduct annual risk assessments of terrorism financing in Southeast Asia to improve the intelligence picture of extremist groups operating in the region.

Conclusion

183 Andrew Henshaw, “Jemaah Islamiyah,” in Understanding Insurgent Resilience: Organizational Structures and the Implications for Insurgency (Sydney: Routledge, 2020), 139.
185 “Indonesia’s ‘Ghost Birds’ Tackle Islamist Terrorists: A Profile of Densus 88,” Jamestown Foundation 9, no. 32 (August 12, 2011).
pesantrens; sophisticated financial planning; national and regional alliances; and, Wijayanto’s transformational leadership. Although JI’s military activities are currently reduced, it has proven itself to be more than capable of executing long-term goals and will almost certainly remain a threat to Indonesia’s security into the future.

Policy recommendations

Improved Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs

Given the power of prisons to act as incubators of radical ideologies, engaging convicted individuals during their incarceration is wise. There is considerable room for improvement in prison-run rehabilitation programs administered by BNPT and selected NGOs. The BNPT undertakes religious deradicalization programs in prison, however they are unlikely to alter the hard-line religious zeal of fundamentalists. Indonesian police often send Ali Imron, a model inmate who is currently incarcerated for his role in helping organize the Bali Bombings, to convince other violent extremists that attacking civilians is forbidden in Islam. Rather than being administered and run by Indonesian police, altering the organizing programs to be closer to Singapore’s Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) could prove productive. The RRG engages credible religious leaders and professional counselling services to offer an alternative religious interpretation to clients. Adopting a similar model would help optimize the BNPT’s efforts to engage in religious deradicalization.

Better “after care” support will help to prevent inmates from returning to extremist circles upon release. The BNPT currently offers seed grants to prisoners upon release that are intended to go towards the establishment of a small business. Although the project is well intentioned and generally rushed and has very little follow-up. Without any training or advice to accompany the one-off payment, ex-inmates often just purchase goods to sell until the initial investment runs out. This initiative could be improved through more comprehensive financial training as part of rehabilitation, which would help prisoners attain a stable income upon release. This would have the dual benefit of greater economic investment in local communities while pulling individuals away from the financial incentives offered by extremist groups.

Further, better collaboration between the Indonesian police and local governments will ease the transition of ex-inmates back into communities. The West Java regency of Purwakarta, for example, established its own outreach program aimed at reintegration and the prevention of extremism, which has been broadly successful in reintegrating former terrorists. If reintegration programs that more closely emulate the Purwakarta model can be established, ex-inmates could enjoy better access to financial assistance, local communities would be able to shape the contributions of individuals, and BNPT resources could be freed up and re-allocated elsewhere.

**Stronger investment in Women, Peace, and Security**

The Indonesian government should build on its 2021 National Action Plan for Countering Violent Extremism (NAP CVE) and incorporate P/CVE measures aligned with the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. Research conducted by True & Eddyono (2017) highlights the wide variety of ways in which women are individually and collectively contributing to the reduction of violent extremism. Initiatives championing religious messaging from women ulama (learned ones) and female leadership within state as well as religious and youth networks will help to reduce opportunities for extremism. A broader understanding of gender-specific warning signs, including changes in social norms relating to veiling, mobility, and religious practices, will help the BNPT interpret when communities are moving towards the adoption of more extreme religious interpretations. Seeking broader engagement and contribution from women-led institutions would

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192 Rininta Anindya.
help to improve the overall effectiveness of government P/CVE policies.\(^{195}\)

Fortunately, there is appetite in Jakarta for a move towards P/CVE, as shown through the NAP CVE. At the December 2021 Australia–Indonesia Ministerial Council on Law and Security, Australian Minister for Home Affairs, Karen Andrews, agreed to continue “practical cooperation at the national and local level to implement Indonesia’s NAP CVE.” \(^{196}\) For Australia, this is a step in the right direction, and Canberra should look to engage security forces, in particular in the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, where it can exchange expertise and build better relations with CT officials from Indonesia, and Southeast Asia more broadly.

**Continued Monitoring and Arrest of Returning Foreign Fighters**

Over the past two years, Densus 88 has been especially active in arresting Indonesians suspected of fighting with terrorist cells in Syria, including al-Nusra, the Free Syrian Army, Ahrarul Sham, and IS (although JI would later disavow the IS). Maintaining vigilant of individuals returning from foreign conflict theatres is critical for Indonesian authorities, as these individuals tend to return with combat experience, international terror networks, and more extreme religious interpretations. Further, if Densus 88 remains in the headlines for high profile arrests of returning foreign fighters, as it has since 2019, this could encourage those already at home to halt attack plans for fear of arrest.

**Continue to Expand Opportunities for Collaboration**

Australia should continue to expand collaboration with Indonesia in the domain of financial and regulatory mechanisms. Australian institutions, such as AUSTRAC, already host regional summits and intelligence sharing operations to encourage skills sharing. In the case of AUSTRAC, it also co-hosts an Australia–Indonesia Analyst Exchange Program with its partner body PPATK, which focuses on targeting terrorism financing through not-for-profit organizations and charities. Programs like this should be expanded to more comprehensively prosecute and target ‘public-face’ charities that facilitate the travel and training of JI members to Syria to undertake military training. Although the ongoing recruitment of JI can be attributed to a complex socio-political process, depriving it of funding would be useful for stymieing the group’s access to foreign training theatres and jihadist networks.

\(^{195}\) Ibid.

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