

Taiwan and U.S. Taiwan Relations

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Welcome everybody. This is a special discussion, that we're having today, focused on Taiwan, U. S. Taiwan relations. It is a discussion that is part of a series of three, similar discussions. One, that is, focused on the findings and recommendations. On, the U. S. Taiwan deterrence and defense dialogue that the Pacific Forum has run, running in 2022.

, 2021 and 2023, sorry, 2021 and 2022. We had another discussion also based on a study that the Pacific Forum ran. On, the consequences and implications should there be, a, PRC takeover of, Taiwan, military takeover. And here, today we are having a three way discussion, on, broader Taiwan and U.

S. Taiwan relations. So my name is David Santoro, and I'm a president and CEO of the Pacific Forum, which is a Honolulu based think tank focused on Indo Pacific security and strategy. So, as I said, we are a think tank. We are a non partisan think tank. A lot of the work that, we do focuses on dialogues, Track 2, Track 1.

5 processes. Throughout the region. We are also conducting research on these issues. And, we have been doing, Indo Pacific work since 1975. So I like to say that, We have the pulse of the region. We feel the pulse quite, quite well. So that's, that's a little bit of, of, who we are. Today's focus, as I said, is on Taiwan, on US Taiwan relations, and, some of it, although not just, not all of it is going to be, inspired by the work that the Pacific Forum has done over the years, on, on, on Taiwan with Taiwan, on US Taiwan relations.

, particularly though, not just on deterrence and defense issues and over in recent years, we have done some work, that is relevant to this discussion. Today's, discussion is, happening with the support of, TECO, Taiwan's, economic and cultural office here in Honolulu. And, so we have 2 speakers today.

, the 1st speaker is, Mr. Richard Lynn, who is Director General of TICO Honolulu, and, Dr. Daniel Roy, who is Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the Postdoctoral Fellowship Program at the East West Center. So, welcome to you both, looking forward to discussing, those important and timely issues with you.

, what I think I'll do is I'll just begin by maybe just letting you know a little bit about my own assessment of, of, today's focus, from a U. S. perspective. So, obviously we in the United States have been talking about Taiwan a lot more in recent years. There's, raising concerns, about, well, about.

The deterioration of the regional security environment, in the Indo Pacific, rising tensions, throughout the region, but particularly in the cross strait. And that's why at Pacific Forum we just started, this, dialogue on U. S. Taiwan relations, and did that study, and I've been doing

more work in this area just to try and unpack what the problems are, what the potential solutions are.

, could be, , and how we can address those, those questions. , 1, , 1 thing I'll say as well is that a lot of the work that, , the for has been doing and a lot of work that I have, I have been doing particularly has been on, , hard security questions, nuclear nuclear issues in particular. And, , when we talk about US Taiwan relations, , In recent years, we have talked about, , China essentially building up its nuclear arsenal and a lot of the discussions that we've been having is how that, , , that's what many have described that as as a breathtaking development.

Is going to change the equation, , on, , in cross cross trade relations, and I think, , for many Americans, at least, , this is a primary worry, the potential of military, , invasion by the PRC. , , off to Taiwan. So, , this is certainly one way the United States is, is thinking about this, these issues.

But we are often reminded, , by a time when his colleagues that, , there's a lot more that, , China, , the PRC is already engaged in. , with, with Taiwan and, , maybe we can, we can start the discussion here is even though we in the United States and me personally are looking at the high end, , danger, , you know, full on military invasion, there's a n ber of things that are, that are already happening and, and frankly concerning, , on the island.

And so. You know, maybe we can start the discussion here. , let, let me begin by giving the floor to, , DG Lynn for his remarks on those issues or, , any other issue that you want to talk with. Okay, thank you. President Santoro and aloha and good morning. , thanks for inviting me to join in this dialogue, , so that I can give my, , Taiwan perspective on the issues that, , president had just mentioned.

But 1st of all, I would like to start with a little background. And, , and also background on the US and Taiwan relations, , actually, , Republic of China, as we, , call ourselves, , , , based on our constitution, we are better known as Taiwan. And Taiwan is a self-governing democracy. Of 23.5 million people located across Taiwan strait from mainland China in the West Pacific.

The United States terminated diplomatic relations with Taiwan on January 1st, 1979 in order to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. At that time, the U. S. government also agreed to withdraw U. S. military personnel from Taiwan and terminate a U. S. Taiwan mutual defense treaty and stated that it would Henceforth, maintain cultural, commercial, and other official relations with the people and government of Taiwan.

However, with the support from bicameral and bipartisan in the Congress, , the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act was passed and is safeguarding and it provides The legal basis for unofficial relations between Taiwan and US. And now this year we are celebrating the 45th years of this TIA. And over the past four and a half decades, the TIA has stood as a As a backbone of US.

Taiwan relations, founded on shared values and unwavering commitment to freedom and democracy, human rights and rule of law, which also foster peace and stability in the Indo Pacific. Today, we reflect on the myriads of achievements that have defined our collective journey from fostering economic cooperation to nurturing cultural exchanges, our bilateral tie has flourished and strengthened.

But, all in all, the TRA, it has become, since 1979, the U. S. government policy has followed a U. S. one China policy, which regarded Taiwan and, and followed by the various administrations. And the Biden administration described this policy as guided by, first of all, DIA. Secondly, the three joint communiques, between U.

S. and PRC. And third, and the sixth assurance is that President Ronald Reagan communicated to Taiwan's government in 1982. All those, key documents, provide Taiwan, first of all, The U. S. relation with Taiwan should be carried out through the American Institute in Taiwan. And secondly, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient Self defense capabilities.

And first of all, and the most important is that it is U. S. policy to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any result of forces or other forms of coercions that would jeopardize the security of the U. S. or the social economic system of the people on Taiwan. So as I emphasize that those TRA are the backbone of our bilateral relations and it still becomes a very Vital deterrent against any future expansion from the PRC.

So I would like to take this opportunity to mention this and we are commemorating these meaningful documents. We are hoping that this will continue to play its key role in bilateral relations.

Very good. Thank you so much for these opening remarks. Yes, absolutely. This is a landmark year for that, for that purpose. Denny, did you want to, maybe take on some of the, or bounce back on some of the questions that I asked at the beginning or, build on, D. J. Lynn's opening remarks. Well, to, thanks for, the historical background provided by Director General Lynn, and in the same vein, maybe it's useful to ask ourselves how we got in this situation.

Well, the three parties involved the United States, China and Taiwan, each of them has, has been pursuing its own path going back to a deep history that brought us to the situation. Starting with the United States, the United States, dominating its own region of the Western Hemisphere, found itself in a position to have a great deal of influence in Asia by virtue of the United States being having such a lead in national power.

Over the other potential great powers at the end of the Second World War and determined that it was in the U. S. Interest to preserve both U. S. Security and opportunities for prosperity to play a shaping role in Asia in the post war period and did it largely because because it

could because because the relative power gap was so large United States did what most other countries in that situation would do.

For China's part, China was weak at that time, had a minimal role in determining the rules of the international system and further isolated itself by its immediate aftermath of the communist revolution. So China had to sit back and watch the United States take on this role in Asia. But, but, , as we know, China historically has itself played a major role as, as, , as, as, , itself the shaper of its own region and had set itself the goal of, of, , making it building itself back into the great power that was once was in antiquity.

And being able to res e what it sees as its birthright of having a great deal of influence over the region. And we've seen, since that time that the United States established itself in the post war era, as the strategically most influential country in the region, China has gradually been building itself back to a position where China could claim what it sees as its rightful role, which brings the United States and China into conflict.

Which is, which of these countries? Is going to have that, that, , preeminent shaping role in the region. , and then finally, , last but certainly not least, , Taiwan's part, , Taiwan, going from, from, , , a country that ran itself on a model that was pretty similar to, to, , the Lenni model that the Chinese have always used, , to, , a thriving and mature democracy.

Gaining the admiration of the world and particularly of Americans. The United States is always promoting the idea of democratization worldwide. And China's sorry, Taiwan is a shining example. And not only that, but one of the top around 20 or so economies in the world. And of course, a major supplier of, Some, some, , parts of the global economy that are extremely important to everyone's prosperity.

, so we have this seemingly irreconcilable flash between China and the United States over which will play this role in the region. And for Americans, it requires a constant reevaluation of this question. Is it worth it to the United States to continue to try to play this role? Of the strategic shape in Asia when it's getting increasing opposition from a country with the region that itself wants to play that role, raising the costs and risks to the United States of continually opposing China's own aspirations, and Taiwan is, of course, caught in the middle.

Thank you, Danny for this background. I guess the full on question to this is, , I mean, it's always. Useful to, to understand why we are where we are and how it came about. , I guess the, the full on question to that is given that the situation, , has changed considerably in, in just a few years.

I'm not, not, not, not a lot of time. , the balance of power has shifted and is shifting. In a manner that, , from a U. S. perspective is, , not in our favor. And so we do have to ask ourselves very serious questions. And Taiwan also has to do the same thing. And what I'm wondering is, , well, n ber 1, how is it?

I think there's an agreement in Washington in Taipei that there is a need to strengthen. It runs and you hear that you read that everywhere actually. Do more than what we have been doing. So the question for you is: Are we doing what we need to be doing? , and if not, , what more should we be doing?

from the u. s and from a from taipei's, perspective. If you have to reflect on Taiwan's defense choices and priorities Did you say they are fit for purpose and in sync with some of the priorities that, , , that we see, , as, as, as, as important. And then how would you change them?

Question for you. Director general yes. Yeah, the question for you. Okay, the question is the question is essentially, how do we strengthen deterrence? How do we make it more effective and what is Taipei's perspective on how we can make that work? Bearing in mind that one way to strengthen deterrence is to keep deterrence visible.

There needs to be a visible element. , to, to, to, to, to that process. So what is it that we can do, , to improve the current situation that you have both described as deteriorating from both the U. S. and that one's perspective. Yes, thank you, president Santoro. , I think that in retaining how to, , enhance the, , deterrence,

, against the, , the, the, the, the China, I think Satar, , since the, , inauguration of the, , president Light, , William Lie, , , I think said that they have reiterated that, .

That, , there's a continuity of policy, , on the, , cross Taiwan's cross the Taiwan Strait. That means that, , we emphasize that, , the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are not subordinate to each other. And all the people of Taiwan must come together to safeguard our nation. And our political party ought to oppose annexation and protect sovereignty, and no one should entertain the idea of giving up our national sovereignty in exchange for political power.

That means that domestically, , we will like to reconcile between parties and have the equal goals that, , those, , we cannot, , succeed. succ b, , to the pressure of PRC to give up the sovereignty that we have been fighting for. And internationally, , we have, , joined the, , , we have the support from the, , Congress, , through the, , National, , National Defense Authorization Act that, , the U.S. government will, , help Taiwan, . , enhance its capacity and capability against any potential invasions from China. And then, , but we would not, , take for granted that, , the U. S. commitment to defend, , Taiwan. And, , so, , in the years of, . 2021, we have 22, and we have, , realignment of our policy that, , , we have, ,

we have, , realignments of our policy and we, and increased our national budgets, , now to 2025. In the year 2025. That will be, , 2.45% of our GDP. And, , at the same time, we have extended our compulsory, , , , constriction time from four months to one year. That showcases that, , our people do, , know how to defend, , the, , the nation against invasion.

And what's most important is that, we will still, looking forward to U. S. leadership in, in the future. Forging the strong joint deterrence on the first side and chain. That means Japan, South Korea and the Philippines will join the, deter any, Gray Zone tactics or any disinformation warfares that impose strongly on Taiwan.

Thank you, Jinjie Lin. , well, it's interesting because we have seen in the Pacific For Dialogue, that we ran, a, a, a difference between the findings of our 2021 process and 2022 process. , clearly in the 2 years that we ran this dialogue, we realized that it was a clear change of mood in Taiwan.

, and, and it was an, rising interest in, in strengthening deterrence and, obviously this was driven by what happened in Europe, in Ukraine. , Taiwanese seem to have taken into account that, invasion was a real possibility and we have seen progress in strengthening deterrence. , between those 2 years and then in the years that followed, what I worry about personally is, yes, we have seen progress.

, and frankly, I would extend that to the entire region. Most, U. S. U. S. allies. , have been progressing in, in, in strengthening deterrence. I worry, though, that progress might not be enough. Essentially, despite the fact that there's all these good things that are taking place in strengthening deterrence, try and regain the initiative, and ultimately respond to the shifting balance of power that that specific progress may not be enough.

Or not sufficient to keep up with that changing balance of power. So I take your point that Taiwan has been doing a lot. I worry though that it might not be enough. And frankly, I worry that we in the United States also might not be doing enough. And, with that response, let me turn to, to, to, Dr. Roy, Denny, , please give us your sense of where we are on that particular point.

Yeah, to reinforce the point you just made, David, I think that neither the United States nor Taiwan are doing enough to sufficiently deter China, given China's demonstrated commitment, both both ideologically and and, in terms of putting resources behind that commitment to eventually annex Taiwan.

Looking a little bit more deeply, we should recognize the question of deterring China from attempting to force unification upon Taiwan. It is primarily a political question, not a military question. There's a huge military component, of course. What that means is that China could have a military advantage, that the balance of forces could be in China's favor, and that that alone wouldn't necessarily move China to take the step of military attack.

Or conversely, the configuration of military forces may not be in China's favor, but China may decide to attack because ultimately it's a political decision. But let's talk about the military aspect first. How does the prospect of moving militarily against Taiwan look from China's standpoint?

What would happen? And I think, a good resource is the series of war games that the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D. C. ran in 2022. They ran 24 iterations of a Chinese military attack against Taiwan. And their conclusion was that in most cases, China would not succeed in militarily subduing Taiwan.

But the, the losses on the U. S. side. The Taiwan side, along with the Chinese side, would, would be horrific. , in effect everyone would lose, even though Taiwan would emerge still, a de facto independent from China. We have to also recognize that, that, the Chinese would likely react if it was the same government in China to, to a, a, a defeat like that, , with, , a rededication of itself to try again within a few years.

So how do we deter China against making that kind of a decision? There's a, there's a political part of it. And, and this would involve the way I would put it is avoiding high cost and low benefit actions. So what I mean by that is, , actions that the United States or Taiwan might take that have a high cost in terms of, of, , being extremely noticeable and, and generating the maximum amount of hysteria in China.

But the low benefit is that they do very little to actually help Taiwan defend itself better. What we really want is the opposite. We want low cost but high benefit. So there has to be a lot of political savvy in what we do and how we present what we do to minimize the counter effect on the Chinese side.

On the military side, of course, we do need to reduce the PRC's expectation of success. By improving our ability to defeat an attempted Chinese evasion or even blockade, we'll talk more about that later. To me, the principles ought to be, particularly on the Taiwan side, , that, that, , the defense should be built around the philosophy of having a large number of small independently operating military units that are survivable and highly dispersed rather than the opposite.

Thank you. It should involve lots and lots of missiles and drones. And Taiwan should be making serious preparations. I'm sorry to say more serious preparations than Taiwan is now making. It's encouraging to see defense spending raised to two and a half percent of GDP, but that's still quite low for a country in the Taiwan situation.

, there's been lots of attention to the need to improve military training in Taiwan and make it more meaningful. More resources behind it. So the guys actually have enough bullets to practice shooting. The reserve force could be stronger. The preparation there needs to be better. And there needs to be more hardening on Taiwan.

Hardening not only of military structure, but civilian infrastructure, counter disinformation operations, counter fifth column operations. And we have to acknowledge that, unfortunately, there's a political obstacle in Taiwan to making some of these preparations. On the one hand, the ruling DPP doesn't necessarily want to scare the public by appearing to be a poor manager of interstate relations.

Therefore, there's an incentive for them to downplay the tensions between Taiwan and the mainland. And on the other hand, the Kuomintang often thinks that it's unnecessary to put a lot of effort into these kinds of preparations. Because it itself has no intention to seek independence. There are some weaknesses in the U.S. side. The United States is dangerously weak in numbers and in defense manufacturing. And I worry that the United States is, is, is, if it's a hegemon, it's a hegemon that's running on fumes. That it doesn't have the wherewithal, doesn't have the commitment to maintaining the wherewithal to continue that traditional role of being a shaper in Asia.

I'll stop there.

Thank you, Danny. Yes, I, you know, that echoes the point that I was making that, the sense my own sense and seems to be your sense as well that there has been good progress in both Taiwan and the U. S. But progress is not enough and we are still behind. I also like the point you made about, it would that it would be better for Taiwan to have, Many, many small things, military, military wise, instead of having, a few big things.

And that's also a key finding that that we've had, being more fit for purpose, would, would, would, would go a long way in, in enhancing the trans. maybe let me turn to the DG Lin, you might want to. If you want to respond to some of the points that Denny has made, and then Denny, I have a follow on question on your, point regarding the political dimension of, of deterrent, deterrence.

Yes, thank you. Dr Roy and President Santoro. I think that, our government has, actually, realized that, that, time is not on our side and, we still need to put more resources, on our national defense and what's, what's more, the asymmetrical, asymmetrical, warfare is the, key, to our future success.

So, we have, encouraged our defense industry, sectors to have a joint venture with the U. S. counterpart, to, make use, full use of the, our manufacturing capacities and to make strong or un I mean, that's also one of our, future defense, resort. So that's one of the key issues.

And what's more, we have already put resources into building our own submarine. So that, we'll, I mean. step by step, we will put, in novel resources to actually build out our own, defense. even though that, we can foresee that the, China's, military buildup will be a quarter of trouble or 10 times larger than that, we can, put into our national defense budget.

And the other side is that, the, President Lai, He has to face, opposition no party dominate parliament. That means that some of their policy has to win through a heated debate in the parliament in order to make it a, a, a, a, a, a policy that can be, Implemented by the current governments, so we have on our domestic issue

that we will also like to share with the international like mighty nations that they are still obstacle, but we are positive that we will set aside differences.

, among our political bodies and make, , the Chinese, , deterrence, , against Chinese, , invasion is our, , as one of our top priority because it involves, , the, , very existence of our country.

Thank you. , Dr. Roy, let me ask you, , you mentioned the political aspects of deterrence. I wonder, as you well know, There is a discussion as to whether the United States should maintain its policy of so-called strategic ambiguity regarding, , intervention. I guess this is, this falls from my perspective under the, , category of political deterrence.

, what is your position? Do you see value in us keeping that particular approach or as some have advocated changing it? Yeah, I'm a supporter of maintaining strategic ambiguity. The argument for going to strategic clarity is that China would then have to take seriously the possibility of the U. S.

Intervention in a cross strait war. I think the Chinese already do not only take it seriously, but expect the United States to intervene. So we would gain nothing by making that change. On the other hand, there would be a huge cost in, , it gets back to the concept I mentioned earlier, you know, high cost actions, , the cost here would be to convince the Chinese that war with the United States is inevitable.

What we should be striving for, , is a form of political deterrence against China that would involve some part of the United States. Persuading the Chinese that the United States actually doesn't necessarily have a strong interest in Taiwan independence per se. Now, independence advocates in Taiwan won't be happy to hear this, but the United States, I believe, as far as our interests are concerned, would be perfectly satisfied with how the United States now characterizes the status quo, understanding that there are different versions of the status quo.

The U. S. View is that Taiwan is de facto, not de jure, but de facto independent and China isn't trying to force Taiwan. Into joining the PRC, whereas the Chinese side, certainly a lot of Chinese analysts, and I'm sure David, you've heard this from some of your interlocutors.

Believe that the United States actually has the goal of creating an officially de jure, independent Taiwan Republic of Taiwan. So there's scope there for the United States. To U. S. officials to persuade the Chinese that the United States is willing to kick that can further down the road. And we think the Chinese are as well.

That could be the beginning of some common ground.

Yes, I mean, and from, , from a deterrence perspective, you know, I, I would, I would argue that we can do better at the operational level, , without having to change our policy. And so

convincing. Can be done at the operational level without having to change anything at the policy level. This has been my position as well.

, and and frankly, I think the position that works best for the United States. So I, personally, would agree with your characterization. , that that the United States should stick with strategic ambiguity, , follow at the policy level again, that more can be done, , militarily or operationally, if you will, , let me now, , ask you both, , you know, I guess the question of, , the invade the so called full scale invasion is this do you consider that to be the primary danger?

, are there others? And what are the top line recommendations, , in terms of how we can deal with that threat. So, again, he's, as everyone is talking about for a full, full scale invasion, the danger that we should be worried about and if not, what are the others and and frankly, what are the other dangers, even if they are not the top dangers.

, did you, then maybe you want to go first. Yes, I think that the Taiwan government has been, , will not be naive to think that, , the invasion is not possible because that, , Taiwanese people are peaceful, , and peace loving people and, , but we are political. But practical in the sense that, , we will, , prepare for the war in order to avoid the war.

And then, , , I think that, , even though that, , the, , the PRC has been literary trying to change the state of course, and create a pretext for their, , future invasions, but, , my government, , we have been, . Practical not to, I mean, , go for the, , , de jure independence, de facto independence.

But, , we, we, , have, , exercise self constraint, self restraint in the events of any, , , Contingency or or any gray zone tactics imposed by the other side. Take the example of the Kimoi vessel collision, for example, which happened in the, , in January this year, and we have downgraded into a law enforcement incident so that no further escalation of tension and confrontation will lead to the eventual, , , a real war.

So this, this, , will showcase that, , , we must, , exercise self restraint before, , any real danger of any change of state of course, might, , trigger a real war in the future.

, thank you, D. G. Lin. , Dr. Roy, did you want to j p in? Yeah, if, , if I'm a planner for the Chinese side. Wondering how to accomplish a military takeover of Taiwan. I would think of an attempted evasion as putting my weakness against the American strength, you know, which is which is immediate involvement of all the top line military equipment.

I think the United States is still stronger than China. Although it is again in keeping with the war games run recently by CSIS and others, there was certainly a horrendous loss on both sides. On the other hand, , guessing what the, you know, the typical Chinese elites view of the United States is, I would probably tend to think that the Chinese strength is staying power, and the American weakness is a lack of staying power.

It is, you know, the typical Chinese elite would be very causative of the social turmoil going on in the United States and r ors of US decline and so on. And recent examples of how the United States will, will commit somewhere, but after a few months, we'll, we'll, that commitment will begin to waver.

The cost of war will weigh on the American people and, and, and, they'll lose patience, they'll lose attention, and eventually they won't be able to keep up the fight. So if you look at it that way, then, then a blockade, a long blockade looks like a lot better option than an all out evasion, an attempt to quickly seize Taiwan from the Chinese point of view.

An evasion could be calibrated so that the US forces are put in an awkward position. And they probably have. pretty pretty high bar for your rules of engagement. Don't shoot unless this happens. And the Chinese would figure out what is the level just below there that they can play in?

Because the gray zone is, such a Chinese specialty. These days, it would soon figure out where the gray zone they could operate and then just keep it up for months and months and months and hope that the Americans would eventually tire and begin to ask Why are we running down our military forces with no conclusion here?

Why is this still going on? And then eventually they might, they might win that way. Of course, there's still lots of problems with a blockade from the Chinese point of view. The biggest probably is that it would develop so slowly that it would give the rest of the world full opportunity to, to gear up, to fight it both, both in terms of amassing military force in the area and also economic sanctions that would weigh in against China.

This also raises the issue, by the way, of what should Taiwan prepare for an evasion or a blockade? And we have to recognize that there's kind of a contradiction here. The invasion would get back to what I mentioned earlier, and David also referred to those principles of having a lot of small, survivable, but lethal units.

Thank you very much. But on the other hand, those who argue, for blockade preparation, would say that what we need are the opposite. We need a lot of big units because blockade involves not, not shooting, but, but, b ping, b ping of shifts. So we need lots of, lots of big, platforms, the, the, the, the kind that are sort of disparaged under an asymmetric strategy.

So there is a basic conflict and difficulty there is Taiwan. , it's hard to ask Taiwan to prepare adequately for both given the strain on the resources that are available. Thank you. , did you Lynn, did you want to j p in? Yes. In this regards, I think that, I think in terms of the, the, , the, , total invasions on the other side, I think that, we are under, we are the undergo and we are the weaker size that, what we do is that, we will, our government is, putting resources and, extended the, support on the other, like-minded nations.

, especially the U. S. and, , and Japan and Philippine, so that, , we, , make sure that, , in case of any mobilization or military process or, , or any, , any, , war, , mobilization, we will, they will be indicators showing up. , , to Taiwan, and we will be, , in the position to, , make ready all the necessary to counter the attack, , in a timely fashion.

But, , as, , Dr. Roy just mentioned that the first strike will inevitably, , destroy most of our defense, , , preparedness. But, , we will still, , , , leaning to, , more, , asymmetrical, asymmetrical Warfare. So any mobile, , defense units so that our defense will continue to survive after the first strike.

Oh, let me follow up on this because you mentioned the Chilean internationalizing the, the, the problem. And, , I mean, I guess, , you know, one question is what does that specifically mean? And you mentioned Japan and the Philippines, but I think There's beyond that as well, , you know, a lot of it also involves, , I mean, I guess increasing Taiwan involvement in bilateral and multilateral processes.

And I wonder, you know, if we can, if you both could talk a little bit more about this. The other thing as well that relatedly is the role of our respective, , respective publics. , is the United States, the U. S. public. , would the U. S. public be supportive of responding to, , a, , blockade scenario on invasion?

And what about the time when he's public? How do you see that play out in the decision making process that both, , Washington and Taiwan would have to deal with. , so maybe, maybe Danny, go ahead. And then, , did you leave. Yeah, for the U. S. Public. , it has always been sort of either marginally not supportive or marginally supportive of the idea of the United States, , intervening militarily to help defend Taiwan.

I think that the percentage of folks who are willing to support that kind of effort has gone over 50 percent in recent years. So there seems to be a correlation between the sense of China as a threat and willingness to pay that kind of a cost. But you've got to think that Americans would very quickly be asking themselves, Is this worth the cost here?

How is this a vital U. S. interest? And particularly when the United States would start taking losses as it certainly would. there's another question you wanted me to address, David, , yes. Regarding internationalizing, the question. Yeah. So, the big question here to get right down to the essence of it is what countries do you think are going to send military forces to help defend Taiwan?

So there'd be a very long list of countries that would, , release statements rhetorically supporting Taiwan. , there would be a somewhat shorter list of countries that would go along with some kind of economic sanctions regime against China, probably temporarily, but what countries would send military forces into a hot war in the Taiwan Strait, , and then maybe get a few more.

That might occasionally contribute a couple of ships to helping to break a blockade, although that would involve a lot of risk. And I can imagine a lot of European countries, maybe Australia, looking at that also. So, but actually sending forces to help defend Taiwan and in the event of a hot war in the Taiwan Strait.

You're going to have most probably the United States and I would say probably Japan, and that's all.

Thank you. Did you Lynn? Yes. I think that the, the, , the least scenario we would like to see is that that is a war actually happening in, on, on the island of Taiwan. That means that it will destroy, , the, , AC companies we have achieved, , for the past four decades. , , but, , , any incident happens.

The, on the, , across the Taiwan Strait, that will be an incident of global significance, actually, , for the blockade or any, any, , military icing, , of the island. , I think the PRC's intention is trying to undermine the competence of the people, but it has proven unsuccessful, , I mean, , through, .

, on the previous, , presidential election happening in Taiwan. So what, what they are now is trying to, I mean, taking, , , applying a result to the military force as one of the last option before, , actually, , Taiwan is when, when out of control to China, as they are still claiming that, , China, Taiwan is part of China.

And Taiwan Strait is the internal water of China. So that will justify that they will want to, creates such a claim that, , , helping them to, , make, , to justify, , their, , military use of, of taking over Taiwan is their options. So as, , Dr. Roy just mentioned that, , even though we foresee that, , they will be limited.

limited helping him from the like mighty nation in the event of a real war happening and in China on Taiwan, but I think that, , we are still, , strive to make, , the peace and prosperity of Taiwan street, , one of our top priority in, in, in order to avoid any, , Any war that the PRC might plan, I mean, plan the plan on us.

I think that, , what, what our government does is that we will still, , , exercise self restraint before any, , inevitable warfare will happen. Thank you. , and to wrap up as we come close to, , the end of our session, let me ask you both one final question. And essentially, I'm after one recommendation.

One thing that you, , would want to see if you had a magic wand, , and you could, you could do something or change something, what would it be? Just, just one thing, and please remain realistic. But if you could change something, what, what would that be? , maybe Danny first? On the U. S. side, rebuild our defense industrial capacity.

Fair enough. Did you, Lynn? Yes. I think that, , we would like to overturn the, , mis , I mean distorted, , misinterpretation of the, , UNGA resolution two, seven by eight. That has created a force, , pretext, , for China to claim that, , Taiwan is part of China and it represents, , , the 23. million people on Taiwan, and if that can be overturned, then Taiwan can gain more exposure internationally and, and, I mean, , return our favor and make it beneficial to the international community in case of the, , reliable supply chain, as well as the, , combat against the, , climate change.

All right, well, thank you so much. , thank you both for a very engaging discussion. We could have probably spent several hours, , fleshing out all these topics. But, , I think we've had a good discussion. , thank you again. And with that, let me call this discussion to close. Thank you.

Thank you.