PacNet #41 – ASEAN unity and the Russia-Ukraine crisis

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Dato Lim, ASEAN’s former secretary general, recently admitted that ASEAN’s ability to function effectively depends on the capability of its members to align their national interests with regional imperatives. Given the diversity within and between its member states, preserving unity has been a core objective since the organization’s inception.

For example, the 1967 Bangkok declaration—the organization’s founding document—emphasized regional cooperation and strengthening existing bonds of regional solidarity. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation reiterated these sentiments. In the aftermath of the 2012 Bali Concords II, however, ASEAN set out to create a “cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN community” with a “common regional identity.” This drive toward unity was accentuated through the ASEAN Regional Community Vision of 2025, with its target of “one identity and one community” adhering to “shared values and norms.”

Even so, disunity persists. The crisis of Myanmar, for example: In April 2021, two months after the junta took power in a coup, ASEAN forwarded a five-point consensus on the crisis. Violence continues to escalate, however, generating vocal international criticism toward ASEAN’s slow response. While Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have been largely more critical of the junta’s actions, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos have remained taciturn.

Global issues have similarly failed to engender regional consensus. The Russia-Ukraine war is a notable example. ASEAN responses, in terms of policy documents and statements, to the events since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 have been relatively muted. A 2014 joint EU-ASEAN statement following the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, condemned the act and called on all parties to stop the violence. The organization also addressed the situation in Ukraine at the foreign ministers’ level, but interestingly, only after 2022.

On Feb. 26, 2022, March 3, 2022, and April 8, 2022, ASEAN foreign ministers issued statements on the conflict. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was referred to as “hostilities” taking place in Ukraine. Instead of calling on Russia to withdraw from its occupation of Ukrainian territory in contravention to international law, the statements only called for “an immediate ceasefire or armistice” followed by “political dialogues that would lead to sustainable peace in Ukraine.”

Singapore and Laos represent contrasting perspectives. A 2023 survey conducted by Singapore’s Yusof Ishak Institute shows that only 14% of respondents from Laos are “very concerned” about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, compared to over 50% of respondents from Singapore. A 2020 survey asking “Who would you consider your country’s preferred strategic partner if the United States was unreliable” found that 33% of respondents in Laos considered Russia a suitable partner, while less than 1% felt the same way in Singapore. Differing sentiments toward Russia and, more importantly, how each nation frames the conflict, weakens efforts at unity.

ASEAN unity in praxis—voting in the UNGA

From 2014 to February 2023 there were 11 General Assembly resolutions on the Ukrainian crisis. In each, barring one (A/RES/68/262), all 10 ASEAN nations expressed their vote. The trajectories of voting patterns demonstrates the absence of a united position in the organization.

Source: Author’s data, based on United Nations General Assembly Voting Records.

As this graph makes evident, most of ASEAN abstained on resolutions concerning the Ukraine War. Brunei and Vietnam, for example, have consistently abstained on UNGA resolutions. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, initially in favor, shifted to abstaining in each subsequent resolution. Singapore is the only ASEAN country that has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions on the subject on more than one occasion. Even so, it has not consistently voted in favor of resolutions. Laos, in contrast, has either abstained or voted against resolutions on the Ukrainian crisis.

Laos and Singapore on the Ukrainian Crisis

To delve deeper, let’s explore the voting patterns of Laos and Singapore, the two countries that show the greatest divergence among ASEAN nations. While Singapore has proven most willing among all ASEAN nations to support UNGA resolutions on the Ukraine war, Laos (except for A/RES/68/262, where it did not vote) has consistently voted against.

A/RES/73/194, a resolution adopted on Dec. 17, 2018, is the point where this divergence begins. The resolution directly addressed hostilities taking place in the region and condemned Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory. It also urged the Russian federation “as the occupying power” to withdraw its forces without delay. Examining the resolution reveals three recurring points of contention between Singapore and Laos. This relates to Article 1, Article 5, and Article 8. Each of these articles are repeated in the resolutions of the next General Assembly session (not the next resolution) and in each case Singapore and Laos adopted starkly differing positions, with one voting in favor and the other voting against. Article 1 focuses on Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty by launching an attack on Ukraine.

Article 5 points out the unjustified nature of Russian action in Ukraine, i.e., that it is in violation of international law. Article 8, meanwhile, classifies Russia as an “occupying power” and directs our attention to the importance of it ending its “occupation of Ukraine’s territory.” As a result of these three clauses, and more specifically, the framing of Russia’s actions in these clauses, we see a significant divergence in the positions of Singapore and Laos.

A/RES/73/263, a UNGA resolution adopted five days later, does not include these three articles. Consequently, Laos and Singapore abstained. In A/RES/74/17 we witness the divergence once more, as it contains the three articles noted in A/RES/73/194. A/RES/74/17 was passed in 2019, a year after A/RES/73/194. By then the two nations had begun disengaging forces in Zolote and Petrovske (in Eastern Ukraine) and conducted Normandy Format Meetings – an informal meeting between French, German, Russian and Ukrainian diplomats.

Even so, the positions of Singapore and Laos remained unchanged as reflected by their voting pattern. Whenever UNGA resolutions discuss Russia’s actions as a violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity, note that Russia’s actions are unjustified (and therefore contravene international law), and classify Russia as an occupying power which should withdraw from Ukrainian territory, Laos votes against it while Singapore votes in favor.

This pattern between Singapore and Laos shows the latter’s disregard for the gravity of Russia’s actions. Moreover, it also explains why ASEAN foreign minister meetings did not classify Russia as an “occupying power” in violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity or even mention Russia in any statements.

Laos’ position may have a direct correlation with its economic crisis. According to its statistics bureau inflation hit a 22-year high in 2022 which eroded the population’s purchasing power. The nation also struggles to acquire sufficient foreign currency for its imports which has caused fuel shortages. In May 2022, the government stated that it would look for cheaper fuel sources instead of relying solely on China, Thailand, Vietnam and other nearby nations. Russian gas, meanwhile, is 70% cheaper than other international suppliers which will most likely draw Laos towards Moscow. Laos’ economic dependence on China might also induce it to welcome stronger ties with Russia; thereby diversifying its foreign relations and enhancing its strategic position through “mutual checks and balances among its partners.” At the outbreak of hostilities between Ukraine and Russia, Laos’ Foreign Ministry only stated that it will follow the “evolving, complex and sensitive” situation in the region and called upon all parties to “exercise utmost restraint.” Vientiane also conducted joint bilateral military drills with Moscow as recently as November 2022.

Accordingly, the fact that ASEAN members cannot agree on who violated international law in the Ukraine conflict casts doubt on the organization’s commitment to a “rules-based” international order. Moreover, if members cannot agree on violations taking place in Eastern Europe, thousands of miles from Southeast Asia, its inability to deal with contentious issues closer to home should be expected.

Conclusion

This is a problem because ASEAN Centrality presupposes unity. If ASEAN hopes to be at the center of the region’s security and economic architecture, the organization must not only adopt a proactive role on regional issues, but also maintain unity and a sense of cohesion on framing regional and global issues. That ASEAN members cannot adopt a common position on a conflict in Eastern Europe casts doubt on its ability to guarantee centrality. The absence of “ASEAN Centrality” could also further enable the establishment of new minilateral initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and AUKUS to exert a greater role in shaping security developments in Southeast Asia and the wider Indian Ocean region.

A first step to greater unity would be enhancing cooperation among ASEAN states. Wealthier ASEAN countries should seek to help those, like Laos, in a more precarious financial position reduce its dependence on external actors such as Russia.. Given Laos’ financial position other ASEAN nations should provide economic assistance to Vientiane and thereby reduce its dependence on external actors such as Russia. Regular bilateral meetings alone are insufficient to promote unity—one nation’s difficulties must be viewed as the entire region’s problem. If the ASEAN nations perceived challenges from this perspective the probability that disunity persists on international issues such as the Ukraine-Russia conflict would decline significantly.

Shakthi De Silva ([email protected]) serves as a Visiting Lecturer in International Relations for tertiary-level institutes in Sri Lanka. His most recent publications include a chapter on the securitization policies adopted by Gulf States and South Asia in the book ‘Regional Security in South Asia and the Gulf’ (2023) published by the Taylor and Francis Group (Routledge).

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: ASEAN Summit 2023 May 10, 2023 in Indonesia by CNN Philippines Staff/Southeast Asia News today/Sekretariat Presiden YouTube.

PacNet #40 – Decoding the Infrastructure Development on Myanmar’s Coco Islands

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Satellite imagery released by Maxar Technologies in January 2023, revealing new construction on Myanmar’s Great Coco Island, has raised concerns and questions. The imagery discloses an extended airport runway and two new widened hangars next to it. A report from Chatham House Policy Institute says that the runway seems freshly lengthened to 2,300 meters (7,500 feet) from 1,300 meters 10 years ago, and the new hangars enlarged by approximately 40 meters. The extensive nature of this development provokes suspicions as to whether the infrastructure under construction is a Chinese espionage base for its military expansion into the Indian Ocean.

Why China?

China has been a friend to the Myanmar military since the late 1980s. Even when Myanmar was isolated during the junta’s rule in the 1990s and 2000s, China remained a supportive partner of the regime. Despite the harmonious relations with the civilian government during the democratic transition of 2011-2020, China has always wanted to keep closer ties with the Myanmar military for economic and security reasons. The 2021 coup has strengthened the Myanmar military’s relationship with China and increased Beijing’s sway over the country. The presence of a Chinese intelligence base on the Coco Islands, long rumored among the international security community, had little to no evidence before the satellite imagery’s release.

Given the prevailing instability across the country, the Myanmar military cannot carry out the ongoing construction on the Great Coco Island without China; only the latter has both the willingness and capability to develop an airport on the remote island.

Why would China secretly—not publicly—develop such infrastructure? What is the project’s goal, in the short or long term?

While not part of the Belt and Road Initiative, the infrastructure development taking place on the Coco Islands reminds of other projects under the BRI in other parts of the world, as these projects often generate controversy and criticism. Specifically, rumors have swirled that these projects serve China’s regional military and security objectives, rather than the needs of the communities they take place in.

For instance, in 2018 and 2019, Koh Kong province in Cambodia underwent the Dara Sakor Airport Development project funded by China’s Union Development Group. The extreme difficulty of attracting visitors to Koh Kong Beachside resort makes the development of an international airport an illogical decision. Dara Sakor, deviating from the initial plan to develop an international airport for commercial airliners, developed a long runway (10,500 feet) with a “tight turning bay” favored by jet fighters. The Dara Sakor investment zone covers 20% of Cambodia’s coastline and lies close to the Ream Naval Base, granted to China for 30 years in return for the funding required to renovate the naval base. Although the developer insisted that the airport will be for civilian use, international observers immediately criticized the project as benefitting Beijing’s military strategy.

Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, another China-sponsored infrastructure project, also raised security concerns. In 2017, Sri Lanka leased a 70% stake in the port to China Merchants Ports Holding Company Limited (CM Port) for 99 years under a concession agreement signed by Colombo’s cabinet of ministers, keeping the remaining 30% under Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA). Although the CM Port and SLPA ostensibly jointly manage the port’s commercial operations, observers still consider the port a Chinese debt trap. As with Dara Sakor, the Hambantota port is poorly connected to the rest of the country, prompting questions as to its purpose. Some analysts believe China could potentially use the Hambantota Port as a pretext to establish a security base due to its strategic location for the import of energy from the Middle East.

Why Coco Islands?

As with the projects above, the Coco Islands’ remote location, poorly connected to the rest of the country, prompts questions as to whether its airport construction will eventually provide critical infrastructure for China, facilitating future military expansion. The Islands are remote from and poorly connected to the rest of the country. This seems consistent, however, with the PLA’s naval base expansion in Djibouti and China’s current aspiration to set up a permanent military base in Equatorial Guinea.

China considers the Atlantic Ocean important for its exports and the Indian Ocean crucial for its energy and raw material requirements. China has and will continue to undertake infrastructure projects along the maritime route as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. The suspicion and concerns over the China-developed infrastructure mainly arise from the lack of transparency and mysterious nature of the relationship, given the previously mentioned cases of BRI construction in corrupt states.

The Coco Islands’ undisclosed construction, along with other infrastructure ventures in its vicinity, has revived the “String of Pearls” Theory, with the Coco Islands as “beads” in China’s strategy to expand its military presence. According to this theory, China will persist in establishing its economic and military footholds in or around the Indian Ocean by investing in dual-use infrastructure development projects. The Maldives, Seychelles, and Madagascar can expect similar projects sooner or later. However, it will remain crucial to observe how China handles tensions in Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, key BRI infrastructure on China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

All in all, the ongoing construction of an airport on the Great Coco Island suggests China’s unwavering determination to broaden its sphere of influence. As Myanmar faces isolation, China sees an opportunity. If it wishes to ease such doubts and suspicions, China should establish a mechanism for sustainable transparency to demonstrate its sincere and responsible economic cooperation. Without transparency, China will find it hard to justify the development of infrastructure of such questionable use.

Furthermore, other major powers, namely the United States, European Union, and possibly India, should enhance their active engagement in the Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean subregions through political discussion and/or security cooperation with ASEAN member states to appropriately respond to the expanding influence of China. It is crucial to explore constructive measures with Myanmar’s neighbors that promote a balanced regional environment, foster ASEAN’s centrality, and ensure collective stability and prosperity.

Shwe Yee Oo ([email protected]) is Resident Nonproliferation Fellow at Pacific Forum.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Chinese President Xi Jinping in front of PRC and Myanmar’s flags in 2019 by Fred Dufour of Reuters.

Belt and Road Initiative China Economics Maritime Security Myanmar South Asia Southeast Asia

PacNet #39 – AUKUS: Enhancing Undersea Deterrence

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Driven by the CCP’s imperative to oversee “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049, US intelligence sources indicate that Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered the PLA to become capable of countering American military power in the Indo-Pacific and ready for a takeover of Taiwan by 2027. This is an alarming prospect lent credence by recent Chinese military exercises around the island nation. According to Adm. John Aquilino, Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), in his March Congressional testimony, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is on track to deliver 440 battle force ships by 2030, including significant increases in aircraft carriers and major surface combatants. As it grows in strength, the PLAN is likely to use its large naval forces to further uphold, even enforce, illegitimate Chinese claims over areas of the East and South China seas, areas through which foreign vessels of all kinds have rights to move under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the PRC ratified in 1996.

In this worsening geopolitical environment Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have created the AUKUS submarine and technology-sharing agreement, which has been called a “trilateral, security partnership based on defense capabilities that support [the three countries’] mutual national defense objectives.” According to Mara Karlin, US Assistant Secretary of Defence for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, the agreement will “lift all three nations’ submarine industrial bases and undersea capabilities, enhancing deterrence and promoting stability in the Indo-Pacific.”

Deterring indirectly

Before explaining how AUKUS facilitates “direct deterrence” from the perspective of capabilities, capacity, and force posture, it is important to identify forms of “indirect deterrence,” namely by promoting deterrence through a constellation of security alignments and the strengthening of the defense industrial base (DIB). In the case of these latter two forms of “indirect deterrence,” AUKUS—as with the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral and the Quad—is a minilateral. These minilaterals are not strictly alliances, but provide their members with a shared pool of military capabilities or what has also been dubbed a “federated model of defense.” Within the United States, these alignments gel with the administration’s organizing principle of “integrated deterrence,” which was laid out in the 2022 National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Nuclear Posture Review. In addition to accelerating efforts to promote planning, coordination, and operations between various US government agencies and US allies, AUKUS also provides integrated deterrence at the level of the defense industrial base for all three cooperating nations. While it would be a stretch to call this “undersea deterrence,” it would also be remiss not to mention the bolstering effect AUKUS will have on naval shipyards, the nuclear enterprise, and undersea sensor and weapons systems industries, which all contribute to national strength.

Directly deterring from beneath the sea

Defining deterrence as the “building of combat credible forces across all domains and across the full spectrum of conflict to deter aggression,” Karlin also noted that AUKUS is about more than just pillars I and II, but also includes a focus on undersea deterrence throughout the Indo-Pacific across a range of areas. At the simplest level, the agreement adds to undersea deterrence by delivering new advanced warfighting capabilities to its members, particularly Australia: it provides two types of nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) platforms—the Virginia class and “AUKUS class”—to replace Australia’s aging Collins class of conventionally powered submarines. While it is a crude measure, more vessels with long-range capabilities, amplified by the advanced weapons capacity and kinetic effects that they can deliver at greater range, more effectively may deter an adversary in the event that it contemplates aggression.

AUKUS thus provides all three countries with a wider distributed force posture closer to likely areas of operations, vis-à-vis the PLAN in the Western Pacific. As shown in Map 1, nuclear-propelled submarines greatly complicate the PRC’s calculus. They can be sent north of Australia to stalking grounds surrounding the South and East China seas, which are critical to Chinese maritime communication lines across the Pacific and to the Middle East and East Africa. By making these routes more vulnerable to interdiction, AUKUS forces the PLAN into a more defensive posture, which may direct resources away from large warships and logistics vessels designed for expeditionary operations.

It does this through the 2-part pathway framework agreed upon in March 2023. The first part of the pathway consists of increased port visits by US and UK SSNs from 2023, which adds to the ability of INDOPACOM and the Royal Navy to regularly position forces east of the Strait of Malacca and west of the International Date Line (IDL)—a helpful softening of the tyranny of distance confronting US and UK naval forces. The second part of the framework includes a rotational element in Australia under the Submarine Rotational Force West intended to begin by 2027. According to the Australian Department of Defence, this will be composed of “a rotational presence…of one UK and up to four US, nuclear-powered submarines” at Fleet Base West. This is likely to draw In Astute- and Virginia-class submarines. Again, this adds to a joint and combined campaign, allowing the three allies to synchronize joint capabilities through increased exercises and further cementing persistent forces in between the Strait of Malacca and the IDL.

Forms of deterrence provided by AUKUS

AUKUS, therefore, provides deterrence at multiple levels. The first two are forms of “indirect deterrence,” or factors which strengthen general deterrence at the state level.

AUKUS provides a signal of intent—through that of political alignment—potentially muddying the calculations of a potential aggressor. This is AUKUS as a minilateral grouping, and as architecture rather than as a defense industrial deal.
AUKUS provides indirect deterrence by adding to national strength by adding to the DIB of each member by providing opportunities for industrial cooperation and production. It releases national resources towards shipping industries that may have previously been in decline.

AUKUS has several effects in terms of direct deterrence, too. It is helpful to use the four-point “Seize the Initiative” INDOPACOM approach to divide them:

In its simplest and most direct form, AUKUS contributes to undersea deterrence by providing its members, notably Australia, with new advanced warfighting platforms (the SSNs and their systems).
That these are superior systems, with longer ranges provided by their nuclear propulsion, adds to their impact on potential adversaries’ logistics and planning. As submarines can hide underwater, they are an asymmetrical weapons system, designed to threaten sea lanes and surface shipping, both commercial and military.
Then there are the agreements made in March of this year, such as the two-part pathway that allows for a second direct form of undersea deterrence: that of providing those platforms in a distributed posture across the region. Whether through port visits or a more sustained presence through Submarine Rotational Force West, AUKUS brings more allied forces into the Western Pacific.
Then, finally, there is the deterrent effect produced by Submarine Rotational Force West itself: that of an integrated allied operational force that ideally will operate under a combined command structure.

Conclusion

As American, Australian, and British submariners train, exercise, and deploy, so will their operational capability and efficacy increase. They will become an integrated force capable of great strategic effect—deterrence—in the Indo-Pacific, a valuable asset for any war planner. The question as to whether these six forms of deterrence will deter Xi from ordering PLAN forces to lunge across the Taiwan Strait or from undertaking coercive activity across the First Island Chain is unclear. While they might not sufficient—given the time it takes for these systems and structures to come on line—these nascent capabilities will complicate PLAN planning and logistics. In the future, in any actual kinetic contingency, they will also provide a potent instrument to contain Chinese regional ambitions and military coercion.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

AUKUS Australia defense Deterrence Maritime Security Strategic Relations United Kingdom United States

PacNet #38 – EU holds the key to US-China rivalry

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An earlier version of this article appeared with The Hinrich Foundation.

President Biden came into office vowing to confront China more forcefully and professing a desire to work closely with US partners to form a “united front” on shared China concerns. This was a key point of differentiation with the previous Trump administration, which sometimes seemed intent on taking a wrecking ball to longstanding US alliances. Trump had gone so far as to refer to EU trade practices as “worse than China.”

Repairing bruised relations with the European Union and enlisting its support on common policies to push back more vigorously against China has been a top priority for the Biden administration. Results thus far have been mixed and the ultimate success of the policy remains in question.

Focusing on the European Union is a sensible recognition of the critical balancing position Europe occupies. EU policies that align more tightly with US measures to counter China would substantially strengthen the punch they pack. A European Union that sits on the fence—let alone one that leans towards China—would sap effectiveness from almost any US strategy. Ironically, the most significant rivalry in the Indo-Pacific might hinge on decisions taken in Brussels.

While the United States and the European Union have had a close working partnership for three-quarters of a century, their interests and viewpoints are far from identical, especially on China policy

Both sides largely share concerns over China’s alleged human rights abuses and its drive to obtain technological capacities that have potentially game-changing military applications. They also share broad discomfort over China’s authoritarian system, its geopolitical worldview, and its growing propensity to flex its military muscle in the South China Sea.

But sharper distinctions between the United States and the European Union arise over how best to “manage” China’s rise. The EU has been more inclined to try to thread the needle: challenge China on human rights and geopolitics when needed but strive to maintain robust commercial ties and emphasize cooperation on global issues such as climate change.

US-China policy assumes a greater disruption to the trade and investment relationship, especially in technology, and anticipates a relationship increasingly defined by clashes rather than cooperation.

Divergent voices within Europe

The key question is whether the policy common ground currently shared by the United States and the European Union will expand or contract. There are important voices within the European Union pulling in different directions.

French President Emmanuel Macron has been an emphatic voice within the European Union arguing against following the more aggressive US lead, warning that such a course would reduce Europeans to American “vassals.” Macron argues for a middle path that avoids picking sides between the US and China. During a recent visit to China, Macron plainly stated: “We mustn’t decouple with China.”

Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, has articulated a vision more in line with the US perspective. In her estimation, the EU-China relationship has grown “more distant and more difficult” as a result of “a very deliberate hardening of China’s overall strategic posture” and “increasingly assertive actions.”

For now, the EU approach appears to “de-risking”—reducing dependence on China in strategic sectors—rather than the partial decoupling suggested by US policy.

The direction the European Union ultimately leans will be key. Almost across the board, on issues ranging from export controls to investment reviews or the usage of Chinese telecommunications equipment in critical infrastructure, greater policy coherence between the European Union and the United States will enhance the effectiveness of the measures.

China’s triangulation

The critical role played by the European Union has certainly not been lost on officials in Beijing. Attempting to split the European Union from the United States to the maximum extent possible—triangulation—is the most sensible course for China to pursue.

China has made substantial efforts to cultivate strong bonds with Europe. Arguably, the high water market for these efforts occurred during the waning days of the Trump administration. The European Union and China appeared to have reached an agreement on a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment despite urgent pleas from incoming Biden administration officials to wait until the new US administration assumed office and official input from team Biden could be provided. The US entreaties were ignored by the European Union.

Achievement of the long-sought investment deal with the European Union was perceived as a major coup for China and a devastating setback for the United States, especially given its unsuccessful last-minute efforts to slow the train. The wheels would come off the CAI in 2021 however. Acrimonious disputes over EU sanctions in response to alleged human rights abuses in China caused Europe to pause its implementation process and the agreement remains in limbo today, presumed dead.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has presented a far greater impediment to China’s efforts to court EU sympathies. China has professed neutrality and has avoided condemning Russia, let alone applying sanctions. Moreover, China has indirectly helped Russia fund the war by substantially increasing imports of oil and gas, a move which has been widely interpreted in the West as a not-so-subtle tilt towards Russia.

From the EU perspective, the invasion is nothing short of cataclysmic—a direct challenge to the very founding principles upon which the European experiment is based. The prevailing view in Brussels is that unconditional condemnation and material support to help Ukraine repel Russian advances are required.

China’s position is causing the EU to fundamentally reconsider its relationship. According to European Commission President von der Leyen: “How China continues to interact with Putin’s war will be a determining factor for EU-China relations going forward.”

US shortcomings

If China has not played its EU cards flawlessly, neither has Washington. The Biden administration has frequently proceeded in a manner that makes it less likely that the hoped-for common front with the European Union can be achieved. The European Union has been rankled by what it sees as a lack of consultation and coordination from the United States and an insufficient appreciation for collateral damage being inflicted on EU interests as the United States conducts its strategic rivalry with China.

A case in point is the recently passed Inflation Reduction Act, which takes aim at China’s dominance in the electric vehicles sector through the provision of massive subsidies for EVs produced in the United States, or in countries that have a trade agreement with it. There is no trade agreement between the European Union and the United States. EU producers in this critical sector would therefore not be eligible for IRA subsidies and would find themselves competitively disadvantaged vis-a-vis not only US producers, but also Korean, Mexican, or Canadian producers.

It should have been blindingly obvious to US officials that the EV subsidies contained in the IRA would significantly sideswipe EU producers and precipitate a firestorm of protests from Brussels. Yet, both the White House and Congress either missed the point or deemed it to be insufficiently important. Predictably, EU officials were apoplectic upon being apprised of the IRA provisions.

In the aftermath of intense diplomatic fallout, the US is now scrambling to do damage control that could have been more effectively accomplished on a preemptive basis. An inelegant band-aid solution seems at hand, in the form of a limited agreement on critical minerals that will be generously interpreted as a “trade agreement” for the purposes of the IRA. This would largely address the European concerns by making EU producers eligible for US subsidies.

Despite the likelihood of a resolution on the horizon, the entire episode is unlikely to have increased European confidence in their working relationship with the United States.

Can they get their act together?

A seamless US-EU policy on China will never happen. But the divergences in viewpoint should be manageable. Both sides recognize that we are in a new strategic era that will require a new and more guarded approach to China. Differences arise over how aggressively and to what extent China guardrails need to be put into place.

The key question moving forward is whether we’re headed towards a greater convergence or divergence in outlook. In either case, the logic in favor of working together more constructively on China policy—if for no other reason than to limit collateral damage—is overwhelming. It’s time for both sides to conduct themselves accordingly. Avoid presenting the other side with any fait accompli. More robust consultation and transparency as policies are being developed and negotiations are being conducted will go a long way. Above all, drop the internecine squabbles and stay clear of the unforced errors that are setting the relationship back.

Stephen Olson ([email protected]) is a Senior Research Fellow at the Hinrich Foundation with over 30 years of international trade experience. Previously, he was an international trade negotiator in Washington DC and served on the US negotiating team for NAFTA negotiations.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Flags raised during EP President Martin Schulz’s welcoming of PRC President Xi Jinping to the European Parliament in Brussels by European Union 2014 – European Parliament.

China European Union Geopolitics Strategic Relations

PacNet #37 – Comparative Connections Summary: May 2023

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Comparative Connections Summary:
January-April 2023

REGIONAL OVERVIEW

“Like-Minded Minilateralism” Coming of Age

BY RALPH COSSA, PACIFIC FORUM & BRAD GLOSSERMAN, TAMA UNIVERSITY CRS/PACIFIC FORUM

As broad-based multilateral organizations seem to be increasingly unable (or unwilling) to tackle the major security challenges of the day—Russia-Ukraine, China-Taiwan, North Korea, and Myanmar, to list but a few—more focused “minilateral” efforts involving “like-minded” allies and partners are coming to the fore. Foremost among the dysfunctional are the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and broader UN mechanisms, thanks to Russian and Chinese intransigence. Sadly, ASEAN-led mechanisms like the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, not to mention ASEAN itself, also fall into this category, as does the G20, whose foreign ministers failed to reach any meaningful conclusions at their early March 2023 meeting, their first with India at the helm. Enter the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or “Quad,” involving Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-US technical cooperation agreement), various minilateral cooperative efforts (including US-Japan-Philippines and US-Japan-Korea), and a resurgent like-minded G7, now that its (failed) experiment of drawing Russia and China into its process has come to an inglorious end. But not all new efforts are succeeding. President Biden hosted his second “Summit of Democracies” which drew little fanfare or attention.

US-JAPAN RELATIONS

The US and Japan Build Multilateral Momentum

BY SHEILA A. SMITH, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & CHARLES MCCLEAN, YALE MACMILLAN CENTER

2023 brings a renewed focus on the US-Japan partnership as a fulcrum of global and regional diplomacy. With an eye to the G7 Summit in Hiroshima in mid-May, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio began the year with visits to G7 counterparts in Europe and North America. Later in the spring, he toured Africa in an effort to gain understanding from countries of the Global South. The Joe Biden administration looks ahead to a lively economic agenda, as it hosts the APEC Summit in November on the heels of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan laid out in detail the economic ambitions of the Biden national strategy on April 27, giving further clarity to how the administration’s foreign policy will meet the needs of the American middle class. Regional collaboration continues to expand. Both leaders will gather in Australia on May 24 as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hosts the third in-person meeting of the leaders of the Quad. Also noteworthy in this first quarter of 2023 is the progress in ties between Japan and South Korea.

US-CHINA RELATIONS

US-China Effort Set “Guardrails” Fizzles with Balloon Incident

BY SOURABH GUPTA, INSTITUTE FOR CHINA-AMERICA STUDIES

The proposed “guardrail” that Joe Biden and Xi Jinping sought to erect last fall in Bali failed to emerge in the bitter aftermath of a wayward Chinese surveillance balloon that overflew the United States and violated its sovereignty. Though Antony Blinken and Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference afterward, aspersions cast by each side against the other, including a series of disparaging Chinese government reports, fed the chill in ties. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during the return leg of her US transit added to bilateral and cross-strait tensions and were met with Chinese sanctions. Issues pertaining to Taiwan, be it arms sales or a speculated Chinese invasion date of the island, remained contentious. The administration’s attempt to restart constructive economic reengagement with China, including via an important speech by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, appears to have fallen on deaf ears in Beijing.

US-KOREA RELATIONS

Nuclear New Year

BY MASON RICHEY, HANKUK UNIVERSITY

South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol has tried to make a priority of transforming the traditional US-South Korea military alliance into a “global, comprehensive strategic alliance” with increasing ambitions beyond hard security issues on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in general. Yoon and his foreign policy team get an “A” for vision and effort—joining the NATO Asia-Pacific Four (AP4) and releasing an Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 are evidence. But, like Michael Corleone trying to go legit in The Godfather III, every time they make progress getting out, they get pulled back into the Peninsula. To wit, during the first trimester of 2023 Korean Peninsula security issues again commanded disproportionate attention from Seoul and Washington. The proximate cause for this dynamic is North Korea’s mafioso-in-chief, Kim Jong Un, who started 2023 with a January 1 missile launch and kept at it throughout the winter. This, of course, followed record-breaking 2022 North Korean missile tests and demonstrations, which totaled approximately 70 launches of around 100 projectiles. Given the near-zero prospects for North Korean denuclearization and the growing arsenal at Pyongyang’s disposal, it is understandable that any South Korean president would be distracted from interests further afield.

US-INDIA RELATIONS

An Even Larger Role in Everything

BY AKHIL RAMESH, PACIFIC FORUM

On May 24, 2022, President Joe Biden met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the Quad summit in Tokyo. According to the White House readout of the meeting, “The leaders reviewed the progress made in the US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership. They committed to deepen the Major Defense Partnership, encourage economic engagement that benefits both countries, and expand partnership on global health, pandemic preparedness, and critical and emerging technologies.” While such statements are often aspirational and lag in implementation, the first four months of 2023 show the renaissance in US-India ties to be real.

US-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS

Washington Zeroes in on Manila

BY CATHARIN DALPINO, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

With an apparent renaissance in the US-Philippine alliance, spurred by rising tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, the Biden administration ramped up diplomatic activity with Manila as the two countries moved toward an official visit from President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., in May. At the same time, the 42nd iteration of Cobra Gold, which returned to full strength for the first time since the 2014 coup in Bangkok, suggested momentum in the US-Thailand alliance, albeit with a lower profile. While the international environment continued to be roiled by US-China rivalry, the Russian war in Ukraine, and high food and commodity prices, Southeast Asia’s own internal turmoil was evident. The junta in Myanmar extended the state of emergency and stepped up aerial bombing of areas held by the opposition and armed ethnic groups. As Indonesia takes up the ASEAN chair, prospects for implementing the Five-Point Consensus Plan are dim, if not dead. Vietnam and Thailand began leadership transitions—Hanoi with an anti-corruption purge and Bangkok with the launch of general elections—while Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen continued to eviscerate the opposition ahead of his near-certain re-election in July.

CHINA-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS

China Strengthens Regional Leadership Countering US Challenges

BY ROBERT SUTTER, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY & CHIN-HAO HUANG, YALE-NUS COLLEGE

Southeast Asia featured prominently in Beijing’s increasingly strong international efforts to portray Chi-na as a source of strategic stability and economic growth with comprehensive global governance plans supportive of interests of developing countries and opposing the United States. These efforts intensified after the landmark 20th Party Congress in October and the 14th National People’s Congress in March. They were reinforced as Xi Jinping emerged from COVID restrictions and preoccupation with domestic matters to engage actively in summitry with leaders of Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, Cambodia, Malay-sia, and Singapore. China’s economic importance for regional countries grew as did its dominance over the contested South China Sea. Its show of force against Taiwan in April had little discernible impact on China-Southeast Asia relations, while notable US advances in military cooperation with the Philippines warranted Chinese warnings that escalated during the reporting period.

CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

Confrontation Muted, Tensions Growing

BY DAVID KEEGAN, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES & KYLE CHURCHMAN, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

As 2023 began, cross-Strait confrontation was muted. Travel began returning to pre-COVID levels across the Strait and between the mainland and Taiwan’s offshore islands. At China’s annual National People’s Congress, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang and reanointed President Xi Jinping eschewed inflammatory rhetoric about reunification with Taiwan. Taiwan and the US kept Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the US low-key. Tsai met House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, deflecting the speaker’s ex-pressed interest in visiting Taiwan and avoiding the destabilizing Chinese military exercises around Tai-wan that followed Speaker Pelosi’s visit last August. Despite this calm, seeds of confrontation proliferated. China cut a communications cable to Taiwan’s off-shore islands and announced a coast guard drill to inspect commercial shipping in the Taiwan Strait, both interpreted as practice for gray-zone coercion. China persuaded Honduras to sever its longstanding diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Taiwan increased its military budget and expanded training with US forces. Former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou visited China and met Chinese officials, endorsing the 1992 Consensus and signaling that the upcoming election campaign for Taiwan’s president will again offer two very different visions of Taiwan’s future relationship with mainland China.

NORTH KOREA-SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS

North Cranks up Nukes— and Slams Down the Phone

BY AIDAN FOSTER-CARTER, LEEDS UNIVERSITY, UK

The first four months of 2023 brought no progress or respite in inter-Korean relations. Pyongyang sent no further drones into Southern airspace as it had in December, but continued to rattle Seoul with tests of advance weaponry and ever more lurid nuclear rhetoric. South Korea hardened its language and stance, with a restored emphasis on human rights in the North—now officially defined as an enemy once more. ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol also found enemies within: leftists who made contact with the DPRK in third countries were no longer ignored but prosecuted. More ominously, so were four top officials who served the previous president, Moon Jae-in, over how they handled two difficult inter-Korean incidents in 2019-20. Elsewhere, Seoul complained in vain about Pyongyang’s abuse of its assets in two defunct joint ventures: stealing some, destroying others. Soon after, the North stopped answering the phone. It is hard to see how North-South relations will improve, but all too easy to imagine them getting even worse.

CHINA-KOREA RELATIONS

Deepening Suspicions and Limited Diplomacy

BY SCOTT SNYDER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & SEE-WON BYUN, SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITYChina and South Korea began 2023 with the temporary imposition of tit-for-tat restrictions by both governments on travel to the other country after China lifted its zero-COVID policy. Although the restrictions proved temporary, they pointed to the reality of a sustained downward spiral in China-South Korea relations accompanied by increasingly strident public objections in Chinese media to the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s steps to redouble South Korean alignment with the United States regarding Indo-Pacific strategy, supply chain resiliency, and shared values. South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin’s congratulatory call to newly appointed Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang on Jan. 9 was one of the few positive senior-level inter-action between the two countries in early 2023; by the end of April, the main diplomatic interactions between China and South Korea had devolved into a dueling exchange of private demarches and public assertions that the other side had committed a “diplomatic gaffe.”

JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS

Talking—But Talking Past Each Other

BY JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

The 17th China-Japan Security Dialogue resumed in late February after a four-year pause but produced no resolution to outstanding problems. In early April, Chinese and Japanese foreign ministers also met for the first time since 2019, with the four-hour meeting similarly unproductive. The Chinese side expressed annoyance with Tokyo for its cooperation with the United States, its support of Taiwan, the release of Fukushima nuclear-contaminated wastewater into the ocean, and Tokyo’s recent restrictions on semiconductor equipment exports. The Japanese foreign minister sought, but did not obtain, information on a Japanese national who had been arrested on spying charges, complained about Chinese intrusions into the territorial waters around the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and stressed the importance of stability in the Taiwan Strait. There was no mention of the long-postponed state visit of Xi Jinping to Tokyo as a matter of reciprocity for former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s visit to Beijing.

JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONS

The Return of Shuttle Diplomacy

BY JI-YOUNG LEE, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY & ANDY LIM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

In March 2023, Japan and South Korea had a long-awaited breakthrough in their bilateral relations, which many viewed as being at the lowest point since the 1965 normalization. On March 16, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio held a summit in Tokyo and agreed to resume “shuttle diplomacy,” a crucial mechanism of bilateral cooperation that had been halted for about a decade. Behind the positive developments was President Yoon’s political decision on the issue of compensating wartime forced laborers. The two leaders took steps to bring ties back to the level that existed prior to actions in 2018 and 2019, which precipitated the downward spiral in their relationship. Japan decided to lift the export controls it placed on its neighbor following the South Korean Supreme Court ruling on forced labor in 2018. South Korea withdrew its complaint with the World Trade Organization on Japan’s export controls. Less than a week after the summit, Seoul officially fully restored the information sharing agreement (GSOMIA) that it had with Tokyo. They also resumed high-level bilateral foreign and security dialogues to discuss ways to navigate the changing international environment together as partners.

CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONS

War and Peace for Moscow and Beijing

BY YU BIN, WITTENBERG UNIVERSITY

Perhaps more than any other time in their respective histories, the trajectories of China and Russia were separated by choices in national strategy. A year in-to Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, the war bogged down into a stalemate. Meanwhile, China embarked upon a major peace offensive aimed at Europe and beyond. It was precisely during these abnormal times that the two strategic part-ners deepened and broadened relations as top Chinese leaders traveled to Moscow in the first few months of the year (China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, President Xi Jinping, and newly appointed Defense Minister Li Shangfu). Meanwhile, Beijing’s peace initiative became both promising and perilous as it reached out to warring sides and elsewhere (Europe and the Middle East). It remains to be seen how this new round of “Western civil war” (Samuel Hunting-ton’s depiction of the 1648-1991 period in his pro-vocative “The Clash of Civilizations?” treatise) could be lessened by a non-Western power, particularly after drone attacks on the Kremlin in early May.

JAPAN-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS

Great Power Politics: The Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Global South

BY KEI KOGA, NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY

2023 marks the 50^th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, and there are expectations that their relationship will be upgraded to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Given the good diplomatic, security, and economic relations between Japan and Southeast Asian states, ties are likely to be strengthened. However, Japan is now taking a more competitive strategy toward China, as indicated in the three security documents issued in December 2022, while Southeast Asian states generally continued the same strategic posture by which they have good relations with all great powers in the Indo-Pacific region. Also, while Japan issued the “New Plan for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific” that emphasizes the “Global South,” it remained silent about ASEAN centrality and unity in the Indo-Pacific, and it was unclear what roles Japan expects ASEAN to play. Although both Japan and Southeast Asian states need to adjust their roles in the Indo-Pacific region, it remains to be seen whether the 50^th anniversary becomes an opportunity for clarification.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors.

ASEAN China Free and Open Indo-Pacific India Japan North Korea South Korea Southeast Asia Strategic Relations

PacNet #36 – How Biden can make the most of his Pacific Islands trip

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An earlier version of this article was published in The Pacific Island Times.

Later this month, President Biden is scheduled to make an official visit to Papua New Guinea while en route to the Quad Leaders’ Summit from the G7 Leaders’ Summit. The visit is being hailed as the first time that a sitting American president has ever visited a Pacific island country. It also builds on three prior events attended by senior leadership figures.

In 2018, former Vice President Mike Pence visited Papua New Guinea to attend the APEC CEO Summit. At that event, he highlighted the value of multi-billion dollar investments made in Papua New Guinea by ExxonMobil. He declared that the United States would partner with Australia and Papua New Guinea on Lombrum Naval Base. And he promised that the US government would protect the sovereignty and maritime rights of Pacific island countries.

Last July, incumbent Vice President Kamala Harris addressed the 51st Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting. In her remarks, she acknowledged that the Pacific Island Countries have not received the diplomatic spotlight that they deserve from the US government. She also delivered a commitment to strengthen the partnership between the United States and the Pacific island countries.

Last September, Biden hosted the US-Pacific Island Country Summit, where participants jointly issued a Declaration on the US-Pacific Partnership. Separately, the Biden administration published a formal roadmap for how to implement the commitments made on the American side. This coincided with the release of a Pacific Partnership Strategy as an addendum to the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States.

During the upcoming visit, the Biden administration will seek to further strengthen the partnership between the United States and the Pacific island countries. This will start by putting Papua New Guinea on the list of Presidential Travels Abroad. But, it will not end there. This trip will need to be about much more than a touch and go on a runway in Port Moresby.

The Biden administration will need to make this trip worth the risks. That will require President Biden to deliver on multiple commitments in the space of only a few hours. That will present its own challenges.

There are a lot of upstream dependencies and downstream uncertainties. The Biden administration will therefore need to be prudent in their selection of deliverables.

Here are four options they are likely to consider:

First, Biden should have a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Marape of Papua New Guinea. Assuming the negotiations will be concluded, that meeting would provide an opportunity to sign new defense and surveillance cooperation agreements between the United States and Papua New Guinea. That would mark an important bilateral win.

Second, Biden should have a joint meeting with Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr, Marshall Islands President David Kabua, and Micronesian President David Panuelo. Assuming the negotiations will be concluded, that meeting would provide an opportunity to announce the Compact of Free Association agreements between the United States and the freely associated states. That would enable the next phase in the renewal process to kick-off prior to the debt limit X-date and the summer recess for the United States Congress.

Third, Biden should have a multilateral meeting with the member states of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). That meeting would not only provide an opportunity for all parties to attest to the broadening and deepening of regional cooperation on priority issues such as climate change, economic recovery, maritime security, environmental protection, and international security. It also would present a platform for the PIF member states to independently observe that the US government is making progress against the Roadmap for a 21st-Century US-Pacific Island Partnership.

Of course, not all commitments can be fulfilled through bilateral and multilateral meetings. The American public tends to exhibit limited knowledge about geography, foreign policy, and the world. It also appears to be uncertain about the economy and impatient with the ongoing war in Ukraine. There is a risk that such sentiments could endanger the billions of dollars that the United States government intends to spend on a revised diplomatic and military posture in the Pacific islands region. The Biden administration will need to mitigate that risk.

This presents the fourth option. The Biden administration should try to use the setting to their advantage. The American public may have severe gaps in their knowledge about Papua New Guinea, but many Americans know about the region through war stories about places like Bismarck Sea and Guadalcanal.

Some even have personal memories involving family members. President Biden is one of them. He reportedly had two uncles who were based in Papua New Guinea during World War II. The Biden administration could try to leverage these historic battles and personal memories to persuade a wider audience of the myth that America is a Pacific nation.

Michael Walsh ([email protected]) is a senior adjunct fellow at Pacific Forum. He also is an affiliate of the Center for Australian, New Zealand, and Pacific Islands Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Flags of countries in the Pacific Islands Forum as featured in an article by The Fiji Times.

Diplomacy Pacific Island Region United States

PacNet #35 – Mekong water usage tests China’s claimed good-neighborliness

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China claims to be a uniquely benevolent international actor—a great power that, unlike other great powers past and present, does not practice “power politics” (self-interested bullying of smaller states) and is not “selfish” or warlike. The PRC government styles itself as the custodian of principles that, if implemented, would excise international relations of conflict and injustice.

Smaller neighbors to China’s south particularly fear domination by a strong China. To assuage their concerns, Beijing proclaims that it “opposes the strong bullying the weak” and supports “building a world of shared prosperity and promoting common development of all countries through every country’s development.”

The issue of managing fresh water resources provides a rigorous practical test of these sweet-sounding PRC assurances. Three major Southeast Asian rivers—the Mekong, the Salween, and the Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy)—originate in the PRC-controlled Tibetan plateau. Even with this geographic advantage, China has insufficient water. Chinese make up 20% of the world’s population, but their country contains only 6 or 7% of the world’s fresh water supply. The good-neighborliness promised by Beijing’s official diplomatic rhetoric collides with the permanent scarcity of a vital resource. Not surprisingly, the latter wins out in actual PRC policy practice. But while unswervingly serving its own self-interest, Beijing also employs familiar methods to limit damage to the PRC’s desired international image.

Underneath the ceremonial public statements, the actual Chinese belief is that China owns the Lancang and that Chinese people have the right to take or use the water as they wish. They don’t think of it as a regional resource to be shared equitably with their neighbors.

China’s official position, repeated by PRC officials such as Ke Yousheng, China’s permanent representative to the United Nations’ Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, is that “we should also respect the legitimate rights and interests of riparian countries in the rational development and utilization of water resources, and take care of each others’ interests and concerns.” The reality is that Beijing prioritizes taking care of Beijing’s interests, with little “respect” for the interests and concerns of downstream neighbors.

Before arriving in Southeast Asia as the Mekong, the river flows through PRC territory as the Lancang. China operates 11 hydropower dams along the Lancang, with another 95 dams on tributaries that feed into the river. The Chinese dams harm the livelihoods of millions of people in the downstream Southeast Asian countries in two ways. First, the dams remove sediment, which includes nutrients that helps plants grow, from the waters flowing through them. As a consequence, rice fields that use Mekong water for irrigation are becoming less productive. Second, by impounding or releasing large amounts of water, the dams can cause or worsen droughts or floods downstream. In 2019, Chinese dams held back such an immense amount of water that downstream countries suffered a severe drought while the Lancang section of the river enjoyed unusually large water levels. Conversely, the Chinese dam operators sometimes open the floodgates during dry seasons without warning, making the river level downstream rise by several meters overnight and causing massively damaging floods. China is also compounding these negative effects by building dams in the downstream countries that will supply electricity to China.

Chulalongkorn University Prof. Thitinan Pongsudhirak argued in 2021 that Chinese officials adjust the flow of water into the Mekong as a diplomatic tactic—for example, releasing more water as a gift before an important meeting between Chinese and Southeast Asian officials. “It’s very clear that the Chinese are using the dams for political leverage,” he said.

Reminiscent of its engagement with ASEAN to advance Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, Beijing uses its influence over a regional organization to manage the political problem of Chinese dams disrupting the Mekong.

In 1995, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos signed an Agreement on the Cooperation and Sustainable Development of the Mekong River and founded the Mekong River Commission (MRC). China declined to join, thus avoiding the agreement’s obligations. Since then the MRC has criticized Chinese dam-building and demanded more information about the operations of dams in China that affect the flow of the river.

Beijing countered by establishing an alternative organization, the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) forum, in 2016. As Hoang Thi Ha, an analyst at Singapore’s ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, notes, “The LMC is a prime example of Sino-centric multilateralism, in which China is the one who sets the rules and frameworks.” For instance, the LMC sponsors research projects that highlight the negative impacts of climate change, but not the problems caused by dams, helping Beijing divert criticism away from its own behavior.

The other important aspect of PRC damage control is the creation of alternative narratives that fight back against accusations that the PRC has acted dishonorably. The issue of the Lancang dams has given rise to several examples.

Beijing offers up the typical colonialist argument that its increased influence and economic penetration result in blessings for the region rather than exploitation: “China is solidly promoting Chinese-style modernization, which will bring new benefits to the development of the countries along Mekong River.”

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, China faced outside criticism for its reluctance to share key data, presumably out of fear it would make the PRC government look bad. Beijing has responded by insisting that China has been extraordinarily transparent. Similarly, answering complaints that China does not publicize information about Lancang River water storage and release by Chinese dams (which the Chinese government considers a national security secret), government functionaries have retorted that China “provided hydrological data of Lancang River free of charge during flood season to MRC for 15 consecutive years [since 2002].” That data was wholly inadequate; it included only rainfall and water level information from two Chinese-operated hydrological stations, and only for part of the year. China agreed to release additional information starting in 2020 only under outside pressure. PRC media opportunistically called it “a major step taken by China that fully demonstrates the country’s goodwill and sincerity as a responsible upstream neighbor.” Outside analysts continue to question the accuracy and timeliness of the data provided by the PRC government.

The “major step” of releasing additional data resulted from an April 2020 report in which a US-based environmental watchdog organization used satellite data to expose the extent of downstream damage caused by China’s dams.

The PRC government responded to this embarrassing revelation with a three-headed alternative narrative. The first point of this narrative was that the study defaming Chinese dams was scientifically flawed. Secondly, PRC commentators argued that Chinese dams actually help the downstream countries by evening out the flow of water. In particular, these commentators said, the dams made the drought of 2018-2019 less severe for Southeast Asia. Finally, Chinese media and officials attributed criticism of the dams to a US anti-China agenda. A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson called the 2020 report a “malicious move to drive a wedge between” China and its neighbors. Chinese vice foreign minister Luo Zhaohui claimed that “For political purposes, some countries outside the region have repeatedly used the Mekong water resources issue to spread rumors and stir up trouble, alienating all parties and undermining sub-regional cooperation.”

This allegation is consistent with PRC strategic communication about the South China Sea dispute. In that case, Beijing argues there would be no disharmony between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors if the United States was not “stirring up trouble.”

Beijing might be able to have it both ways with the Chinese domestic audience, persuading them that their government can provide water and electricity while simultaneously being a “good neighbor.” But for China’s actual neighbors, this is increasingly non-credible, as is the notion of PRC exceptionalism.

Denny Roy ([email protected])is a senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu. He specializes in strategic and international security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

China Diplomacy Energy and Resource Security Geopolitics Southeast Asia

PacNet #34 – The rise of ISKP in South Asia: A threat to regional stability

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The rise of ISKP (Islamic State – Khorasan Province) in South Asia, particularly India, is a cause for concern. The group’s use of propaganda and recruitment tactics targeting vulnerable individuals leads to the radicalization of youth and the perpetration of violent acts. ISKP’s acknowledgement of responsibility for the Coimbatore and Mangalore blasts, even though they failed to cause the intended harm, may represent an attempt by the group to demonstrate its expanding presence and operational capabilities in India. This is consistent with the group’s propaganda and recruitment efforts, portraying ISKP as a powerful and effective organization capable of carrying out attacks in multiple countries.

Indian security agencies should take this threat seriously and work proactively to prevent further attacks by ISKP and other extremist groups—and seek help from Delhi’s partners in addressing these threats. This may include measures such as improving intelligence-gathering capabilities, strengthening border security, and enhancing cooperation with international partners in countering terrorism. Addressing the underlying grievances and socio-economic factors contributing to the radicalization of individuals also matters for preventing the spread of extremist ideologies.

ISKP in South Asia

Founded in 2014, the ISKP goal was to establish an Islamic caliphate in Afghanistan. The return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in 2021 created a complex security situation in the region, emboldening groups like ISKP to push their agenda and attract recruits. The Taliban and ISKP have different ideologies and objectives, and their competing interests could lead to violent clashes in Afghanistan and neighboring countries.

ISKP’s establishment of a “Khorasan Province” in Central and South Asia demonstrates its aspirations to expand its reach beyond Afghanistan and establish a broader caliphate.

One of the ways ISKP has succeeded in recruiting members is by taking advantage of minority plight and sectarianism across the region. By portraying itself as a defender of minority rights and a champion of the oppressed, ISKP has succeeded in attracting individuals who feel marginalized or disenfranchised by their governments.

Propaganda tactics carried out by the ISKP have also succeeded in garnering widespread sympathy for its cause: overthrowing governments in the region. The organization has capitalized on public dissatisfaction with corruption, inequality, and violence among Central and South Asian countries by portraying itself as a more extreme, uncompromising alternative to these other parties.

ISKP’s use of online propaganda and targeted messaging has helped it recruit members and build support for its agenda. In particular, the objective of ISKP’s propaganda campaign in India is to condemn the emergence of Hindu nationalism and defend dissatisfied Muslim minorities.

The ISKP has also issued a book in Malayalam, the indigenous language of southwest India, detailing how to engage in jihad. The organization has, furthermore, produced books with comparable content in Hindi and Urdu. These publications are intended to radicalize susceptible individuals and persuade them to join the group’s cause.

The vast majority of Muslims in India reject the extremist ideology and violent tactics of ISKP, and the Indian government has taken steps to counter the group’s propaganda and recruitment efforts. Nonetheless, efforts to counter such propaganda must continue.

Conclusion: A Comprehensive Response

ISKP has demonstrated its resiliency by adapting to the ever-changing situations in Central and South Asia and shifting its focus to an increasingly number of countries. Its rise requires a comprehensive and coordinated response by all stakeholders, including international partners such as the United States and East Asia, who can play an important role in countering the ISKP threat.

For starters, the United States has a strong interest in countering this threat given the groups links to the broader ISIS network and has the potential to destabilize the region. The United States can provide significant support in intelligence-sharing, capacity-building, and diplomatic engagement, as well as in countering terrorist financing and promoting countering extremist ideology.

Partners such as Japan and South Korea can also play a role, including through financial assistance and technical support. As part of broader efforts to promote regional stability and security, these countries can work with Indian authorities and other stakeholders to build a comprehensive and coordinated response.

Additionally, cooperation and coordination among South Asian countries and their international partners is essential. This could include joint military exercises, sharing of best practices, and joint operations against the group. A united front against ISKP would send a strong message that their violent extremist activities will not be tolerated.

South Asian countries should also work together to address the underlying issues contributing to the growth of extremist groups, such as poverty, inequality, and political instability. By addressing root causes, South Asian countries can create a more stable and secure environment for their citizens and reduce the appeal of violent extremism. A multi-faceted approach that involves improved intelligence gathering, counter-radicalization efforts, and international support, as well as cooperation and coordination among South Asian countries, is crucial to effectively addressing ISKP’s threat.

Neeraj Singh Manhas ([email protected]) is the Director of Research in the Indo-Pacific Consortium at Raisina House, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: ISKP Flag on abandoned shipping container by Stimson Center’s South Asian Voices.

Defense Cooperation India South Asia Terrorism

PacNet #33 – Myanmar’s Coco Islands: A concern not to be ignored

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The India-Myanmar relationship is rooted in shared history, culture, and religious values. India and Myanmar share a 1,600-kilometer (1,000-mile) land and maritime border in the Bay of Bengal, adding more significance to the bilateral relations. Furthermore, towns by the Myanmar-India border and cities such as Yangon and Naypyidaw house a large Indian diaspora of roughly 2.5 million.

With India’s active outreach to neighbouring countries with its “Neighbourhood First’ and “Act East” policies, India’s northeastern states are connected to Southeast Asia through Myanmar. As the only ASEAN country sharing a land border with India, Myanmar is a bridge between India and ASEAN.

The strategic importance of Myanmar—with over 1,200 miles of coastline along the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, proximity to the western entrance of the Malacca Strait, and a direct linkage to the Indian Ocean—in maintaining security and stability in the wider Indo-Pacific region is clear to more than just India. In the colonial era, the Japanese imperial forces and the army of the British Empire repeatedly clashed over the control of Burma for the same strategic reasons. Fast forward to 2023 and the “Malacca Dilemma” persists. The People’s Republic of China considers Myanmar a strategically important country in Southeast Asia for hegemonic ambitions in the region.

In January 2023, Maxar Technologies released satellite imagery revealing renewed levels of infrastructure and construction activities on the Great Coco Island. The Coco Islands archipelago lies less than 50 miles north of Andaman and Nicobar Islands—home to India’s first tri-service command. While there has been speculation of Chinese activity in the region since the 1990s, Maxar’s satellite imagery lends credence to this suspicion, and Chatham House in March 2023 showed satellite images of two new hangars, a new causeway, and an accommodation bloc. This has caused much concern, as it showed a newly expanded 7,500-foot runway and a radar station on the island.

Beijing, in its effort to establish an alternative route to the Indian Ocean, is leveraging the global isolation/ostracization of the Burmese junta in Myanmar by Western nations. Since the February 2021 Coup, Myanmar has returned to an era of isolation—ASEAN has drafted a Five-Point Consensus to navigate the return of normalcy in Myanmar, though to not much benefit. The United States and Europe have imposed sanctions on Myanmar, which increases Naypyitaw’s dependence on Beijing.

However, Beijing’s influence in Myanmar is not new. Even under democratic rule, Myanmar was one of the early recipients of Chinese aid under the Belt and Road Initiative. China-Myanmar cooperation was not limited to civilian infrastructure development. Military and strategic installations such the construction of the SIGINT station had begun in the 1990s with the placing of an antenna tower, radar sites, and other electronic facilities forming a comprehensive SIGINT collection facility. Beijing has slowly and steadily established more facilities, not just on the Great Coco Island, but also SIGINT listening stations in the Andaman Sea at Manaung, Hainggyi, and Zadetkyi in Myanmar. Through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), part of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has invested in infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and railway lines, providing it access to the Indian Ocean without having to go through the Malacca Strait.

Cognizant of the strategic significance of these developments, the Indian government has raised the issue bilaterally with Myanmar. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs official spokesperson, Arindam Bagchi, said that “India will take all necessary steps to safeguard its interests” and that the government “keeps a constant watch on all developments having a bearing on India’s security.”

New construction activities on the island, not limited to naval ports and the possibility of a new airbase, pose challenges to India. Military leaders have long warned the possibility of Chinese infrastructure development on the island. As far back as 2005, junta leaders invited Indian defense officials to tour the island and lay to rest any concerns of Chinese involvement. Upon the visit, the then-Chief of Indian Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash categorically dismissed concerns of military infrastructure development on the island.

Recent developments refute this and, importantly, this coastline provides direct access to the Indian Ocean, giving China an enormous advantage over major competitors, including India. If this comes to fruition, Beijing will be able to control both the eastern part of Malacca Strait via its artificial islands in the South China Sea and the western part through CMEC and Coco Islands in Myanmar. For nations that seek to maintain a safe and secure Indo-Pacific, China’s infrastructure development on the Coco Islands adds a new dimension to this challenge.

Despite US and European sanctions, New Delhi has joined Tokyo, Moscow and Beijing in maintaining diplomatic relations with the military government in Myanmar. The Chinese activities on the Coco Islands raise questions about the benefits of that engagement for New Delhi. The military leadership in Naypyidaw has counted primarily on neighbouring states—India, China, and Japan and Russia—to keep its economy afloat. It may be time for the military leadership to rethink its support for Chinese infrastructure development on the islands, given that it cannot afford to lose more partners.

Shristi Pukhrem ([email protected]) is a Senior Research Fellow at India Foundation. The views expressed are personal.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Myanmar’s military chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and Prime Minister Narendra Modi by PIB.

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PacNet #32 – Europe’s China confusion does the world a disservice

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An earlier version of this article appeared in The Japan Times.

Talk about mixed messages! Days after European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made one of the toughest speeches ever on China by an EU official, French President Emmanuel Macron visited that country with a delegation of business leaders.

Macron’s visit saw him meeting with supreme leader Xi Jinping, emphasizing points of convergence with Chinese proposals to end the Ukraine war and touting Europe’s “strategic autonomy”—diplomatic speak for creating distance from the United States on important policy matters.

It’s music to Chinese ears. Beijing is eager to exploit those differences to dilute any consensus on China policy within Europe and widen gaps between it and Washington to prevent the emergence of a unified position toward China.

European incoherence is worrying and not for just obvious reasons. Internal differences deprive the world of a credible alternative to the hard line toward China that dominates thinking in the United States. This is especially troubling for Japan, whose logic in many ways mirrors that of Europe.

In a speech the week before Macron’s visit, von der Leyen said that Xi “essentially wants China to become the world’s most powerful nation,” and that had been accompanied by a “deliberate hardening” of China’s strategic stance, with the country becoming “more repressive at home and more assertive abroad.” She pulled no punches, noting that “Just as China has been ramping up its military posture, it has also ramped up its policies of disinformation and economic and trade coercion. This is a deliberate policy targeting other countries to ensure they comply and conform.”

The EU identified China as a “systemic rival” in its 2019 strategic outlook. That label takes on special significance given von der Leyen’s pledge “to ensure that our companies’ capital, expertise and knowledge are not used to enhance the military and intelligence capabilities of those who are also systemic rivals.”

For her, however, and in distinction from US policy, the preferred policy is to de-risk trade with China, not to decouple. “We do not want to cut economic, societal, political or scientific ties. … But our relationship is unbalanced and increasingly affected by distortions created by China’s state capitalist system. So we need to rebalance this relationship on the basis of transparency, predictability and reciprocity.”

That means recognizing Chinese ambitions for what they truly are, rather than what some might want them to be—or as they may be presented—and promoting competitiveness and resilience within EU economies and businesses. That means reducing vulnerabilities created by reliance on single suppliers for critical or essential materials. That means employing defensive measures, like the trade controls mentioned above.

Her tough words contrasted with Macron’s message. He and Xi issued a joint communique in which they agreed to “improve market access” for each other’s businesses and designated 2024 as a “China-France Year of Culture and Tourism,” a move intended to get Chinese tourists to visit France as pandemic travel restrictions are eased. They also closed a deal to open a second production line for Airbus in China, another boost to the company’s ambitions in that market.

Macron emphasized the need to promote Europe’s “strategic autonomy,” or as he explained in an interview during his visit, reducing dependence on the United States and preventing Europe from getting “caught up in crises that are not ours.” Addressing the Taiwan situation, he added that “the worst thing” would be for Europeans to “become followers on this topic and take our cue from the US agenda and a Chinese overreaction.” Those comments generated considerable pushback in Europe; the Biden administration focused instead on cooperation with France.

China welcomed Macron; von der Leyen, a member of Macron’s group, not so much. Politico contrasted the treatment given the two. Macron was met on the airport tarmac by the foreign minister; von der Leyen got the ecology minister at the regular passenger exit. Macron’s schedule was overflowing, von der Leyen’s was bare-bones. Macron had a glittery state banquet with Xi while von der Leyen held a news conference at EU delegation headquarters. As Politico summarized the atmosphere, “While state media trumpeted the Sino-French relationship, Chinese social media demonized von der Leyen as an American puppet.”

If all that was too subtle, Fu Cong, China’s ambassador to the EU, was blunt in remarks to the Financial Times the day of von der Leyen’s speech. “We do hope that the European governments and the European politicians can see where their interests lie and then resist the unwarranted pressure from the US,” adding “it will only be at their own peril.” After all, he noted, “Who in their right mind would abandon such a thriving market as big as China?”

The easy explanation for EU schizophrenia is “good cop, bad cop.” That assumes a level of foresight and coherence in European diplomacy that seems unduly optimistic. Most observers concede that there are, as Mikko Huotari, director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies explained, substantive differences between von der Leyen and the major EU governments on how to handle EU-China relations.

There is also a self-serving element to Macron’s statements: In this and similar formulations, European strategic autonomy would be led by France. In his typically incisive and caustic analysis, Tufts University professor Dan Drezner writes that “Macron is playing his part of the French president and trying to call attention to himself.” According to Drezner, the appropriate “considered response is a polite shrug.”

Still, there is a real cost to Europe’s incoherence but it isn’t the one that typically comes to mind. A European position that is both clear-eyed about China while acknowledging the need for engagement would provide an important counterweight to the narrow-minded consensus that dominates thinking in the United States.

Writing in The National Interest last month, Paul Heer, a former American national intelligence officer for Northeast Asia, worried about the “bipartisan consensus on the nature and scope of the threat from China,” challenging the validity of the premises upon which those judgments are based and warning of groupthink that could lead US policy dangerously astray.

Heer agrees that China is a formidable and ruthless opponent and one that requires a comprehensive, whole-of-government competitive US response. Still, he rejects — citing the Annual Threat Assessment of the US intelligence community — that it is “an ‘existential’ winner-take-all threat to US global power and influence or to the American way of life, requiring a wholly adversarial cold war US response.”

His conclusion matches that of Harry Hannah, another former American intelligence official, who argues in a Stimson Center Red Cell report that a fixation on China risks repeating Cold War mistakes, especially that of ignoring or underplaying other developments that could be equally if not more important to US national security. Hannah is especially keen to empower other actors whose interests and values align with that of the United States, even though they may not be identical. Ignoring them or forcing them to toe the US line, he argues, plays to Beijing’s preference for a great power “Group of Two” that marginalizes other countries—many of which are US allies or partners.

A united Europe, one with a coherent and consistent policy toward China, could, in this conception of global order, balance China without going to the US extreme. While Europe alone can’t check China, its approach approximates that of Japan and together they offer a more inviting alternative to those skeptical of the all-or-nothing US policy. It is a credible option for those in Washington uncomfortable with the prevailing hard line, too.

Europe can’t replace the United States on issues of Indo-Pacific security. Forging a framework for constructively engaging one of the world’s superpowers is just as vital, however. Brussels can’t do that alone. Only by working with Tokyo and other like-minded countries can Europe succeed.

Japan has been reaching out to Europe for some time now, a process that began two decades ago and accelerated under the Trump administration as Tokyo and Brussels sought allies to gird an international order weakened by Beijing, Moscow and, sadly, Washington. Japan and the EU signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement, the Economic Partnership Agreement and the Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure to strengthen their cooperation and counter the forces of revisionism.

The United States needs to adopt a more flexible approach to its allies and partners, giving them the space to maneuver as they see fit—as long as they work toward the same goals. But this demands that those allies step up as well. Recent events show that Brussels understands the challenge; meeting it remains beyond its grasp.

Brad Glosserman ([email protected]) is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University as well as senior adviser (nonresident) at Pacific Forum. He is the author of Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions (Georgetown University Press, 2019). This article is drawn from a forthcoming book on the new national security economy.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: President Xi Jinping and President Emmanuel Macron at an official ceremony at the Great Hall of the People (6 April 2023, CNN) by Gonzalo Fuentes via Reuters.

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