Editor’s Note: This issue is dedicated to the memory of Sheldon Simon, noted scholar and long-time contributor to Comparative Connections who passed away on Jan. 2. Our condolences to his family, friends, and colleagues.

To outside observers South Korea’s negative attitude toward China appears to be growing apace, but it is nothing new to locals. Since an annual poll by the Institute of Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University began in 2007, China has consistently ranked fourth on Korea’s favorability list, behind the US, North Korea, and even Japan (but ahead of Russia). It only surpassed the North to reach second place on two occasions: in 2014 and 2015, due to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s visit and at the conclusion of a free trade agreement.

The comprehensive 2020 index includes each PacNet commentary below.  Pacific Forum will continue to publish timely insight and analysis in 2021.

The following is an excerpt from Making Hong Kong China: The Rollback of Human Rights and the Rule of Law, published by Columbia University Press.

The following is the sixth and final part of a post-election series on the impact of the Biden administration on US relations in the Indo-Pacific. Visit here for part one, here for part two, here for part three, here for part four, and here for part five.

Though less than a year old, the second administration of Tsai Ing-wen has reaped many foreign policy successes for Taiwan. For example, successful management of Covid-19, visits by high-level American officials, the visit of the Czech Republic Senate president, and President Tsai being named as one of the 100 most influential people in the world by Time.

The following is part of a post-election series on the impact of the Biden administration on US relations in the Indo-Pacific. Visit here for part one, here for part two, here for part three, and here for part four.

The following is part of a post-election series on the impact of the Biden administration on US relations in the Indo-Pacific. Visit here for part one, here for part two, and here for part three.

The following is an extract from the introduction to the Regional Security Outlook 2021, prepared by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

An earlier version of this article was published in The National Interest.