KEEPING ONE AT ARM’S LENGTH: THE MISSILE & NUCLEAR DIMENSION OF CHINA’S COUNTER-INTERVENTION STRATEGY IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

Drawing on insights from Chinese writings, this paper argues that Beijing’s military strategists would aim to incapacitate the United States’ command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities through a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means. Simultaneously, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would seek to neutralize or destroy key American military assets, particularly in Guam, to hinder the deployment of reinforcements or to gain time to isolate the Western Pacific battlefield. This objective would be pursued through the PLA’s extensive arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles launched from multiple platforms. To counter potential American military reinforcements, the PLA may attempt to interdict westward approaches in the Philippine Sea. However, as this paper further contends, the PLA faces significant strategic and operational challenges in conducting military campaigns beyond the First Island Chain.

Introduction

Of the various geopolitical flashpoints in the Western Pacific region, the South China Sea and Taiwan are arguably fraught with the most uncertainty, and carry the highest risk of tensions escalating into a hot war scenario. Consider for example the spate of flareups surrounding the Second Thomas Shoal between China and the Philippines, and military tensions repeating around Taiwan with worrisome regularity over the past year. The SCS and Taiwan form a contiguous theater of military operations, seen from diverse scenarios.

However, the situation can be more nuanced. For example, any SCS disputes flaring up into a full-blown armed conflict are likely to remain limited to just that localized theater. Sure, that does not make any such eventualities any less bloody if push comes to shove, but armed action in the context of the SCS disputes is not likely to cause an existential challenge to any of the parties.

In other words, say, a Southeast Asian claimant may lose its hold on any of those terrestrial features in the SCS, but it does not threaten the country’s existence as a whole. At the same time, a SCS contingency may not necessarily threaten Taiwan’s existence.

The same could not be said about a contingency revolving around Taiwan. Any combat operation involving Taiwan is bound to include an SCS dimension, which may or not affect the other Southeast Asian parties.

The Philippines, being geographically proximate to Taiwan, and being a United States treaty ally, is more likely than not to be involved in a certain capacity. A Taiwan scenario, which is primarily tied to Beijing seeking forceful reunification with what it deems to be a renegade province, can pan out in ways that undermine the existential security of this island. It could be in the form of an outright full-scale armed invasion by the People’s Liberation Army.

Alternatively, it could be a sustained air and naval blockade designed to isolate the island from the outside world, starve it of trade to sustain its economy, and thereby compelling Taipei’s leadership to capitulate to Beijing’s wishes.

In all these scenarios, one would expect China to attempt to forestall, as best as possible, any potential American military intervention.

The considerable missile and nuclear weapons buildup of the PLA over the decades contributed significantly to the evolving Chinese counterintervention strategy, centered notionally around the operational assumption of at least neutralizing American combat power at the onset of hostilities, and keeping American reinforcements at bay outside the First Island Chain (FIC) [第⼀岛链], all while ensuring that Beijing sufficiently deters Washington from further escalatory moves using its more credible, second-strike nuclear capabilities – arguably in the shape of sea-based deterrent, in particular its expanding nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) capabilities.

To be sure, recent domestic upheavals in China might have put some questions to the veracity of the Chinese nuclear deterrent, as seen in the removal of the entire leadership of the PLA Rocket Force (formerly Second Artillery), which constitutes Beijing’s nuclear sword.1 But one does not take lightly the pronounced developments to date of the PLA missile and nuclear capabilities, especially hypersonic weapons developments.

Tapping insights from Chinese writings, this paper argues that Beijing’s military planners would seek to induce paralysis of the American command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities through both kinetic and non-kinetic means.

At the same time, the PLA would seek to neutralize or destroy the key American military assets in Guam at least, to forestall the deployment of reinforcements or simply to buy time for it to isolate the Western Pacific battlefield.

This would be accomplished by the PLA’s plethora of ballistic and cruise missiles fired from multiple platforms. To counter any incoming American military reinforcements, the PLA may seek to interdict those westward approaches in the Philippine Sea. However, as the paper also argues, there remain potential strategic and operational complications for the PLA to wage campaigns east of the FIC.

Table of Contents

Report

Introduction

China’s near-seas advantage

Nuclear dimension: ‘ssbn bastion’ In the South China Sea

Counter-intervention with Chinese characteristics

Hypothesizing a future counterintervention scenario

Conclusion

Notes

About the author

About the Authors

Collin KOH is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies which is a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has research interests on naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Southeast Asia. Collin has published several op-eds, policyand academic journal articles as well as chapters for edited volumes covering his research areas. He has also taught at Singapore Armed Forces professional military education and training courses. Besides research and teaching, Collin also contributes his perspectives to various local and international media outlets and participates in activities with geopolitical risks consultancies.