ATTAINING ALL-DOMAIN CONTROL: CHINA’S ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL (A2/AD) CAPABILITIES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has developed a formidable anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capability designed to deter and repel the United States’ intervention in China’s near seas in times of conflict.

The hotly contested South China Sea is one of the PLA’s main operational directions and a theatre of potential military clash between China, the U.S., and South East Asian claimant states. This report takes stock of the PLA’s A2/AD capabilities, assessing the PLA Southern Theatre Command’s (STC) early-warning, target acquisition and strike systems, as well as the potential, however unlikely, for the employment of weapons of mass-destruction (WMD) in a South China Sea conflict.

It discusses South East Asian states and the U.S.’s efforts to counter the growing capability asymmetry in the South China Sea to erect minimum deterrence and ensure continued military access to the semi-enclosed sea.

The report concludes with practical policy recommendations to improve U.S. forces’ survivability and resilience in the face of conventional (and WMD) attack against its bases in the region and proposes a cooperative model for ally and partner capacity building.

Introduction

The topic of China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities is a complex one and involves a host of different capabilities and operating domains.

The PLA is rapidly attaining an all-domain control of the South China Sea. The PLA’s three-decade long modernization is bearing fruit in both quantity and quality of new hardware and pose a formidable A2/AD challenge to both the United States and the South East Asian claimant states to the South China Sea.

This article tries to provide a holistic overview of China’s contemporary A2/AD capabilities, which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can employ in a conflict in the South China Sea. To achieve this goal, the author divides the PLA’s A2/AD capabilities into two familiar categories: sensors and shooters, the PLA’s ability to find and fix surface and air targets and engage them with a growing panoply of ground-, sea-, and airbased long-range fires.

This study takes a stock of the PLA’s A2/AD capabilities, including the sensors and shooters available for the PLA STC, responsible for military operations in the South China Sea theatre of operations. It discusses the potential, however unlikely, use of weapons of mass destruction in a conflict. It then turns to a brief assessment of military balance across the South China Sea with a look at South East Asian South China Sea claimant states and the U.S.’s military capabilities in the region.

The study concludes with four practical policy recommendations to deal with PLA’s conventional (and WMD attacks), including accelerated adaption of dispersed operational footprint, strengthened active and passive defenses, return of a serious CBRN protection mindset and training, and a collaborative framework for ally and partner capacity building.

The report begins with a look at the China’s contemporary A2/AD capabilities in the South China Sea theatre of operations.

Table of Contents

Report

Introduction

China’s A2/AD capabilities in the South China Sea

Feasibility of PLA’s use of WMDs in the South China Sea

Growing regional military (im)balance

Policy recommendations

Conclusion: China’s all-domain control in the South China Sea

Bibliography

About the author

About the Authors

Dr. Olli Pekka SUORSA is an Assistant Professor at Rabdan Academy. Before joining Rabdan, he was a Research Fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore. His research focuses on European and Asian security and defence matters, airpower, the defence industry and technology. Olli has consulted several Southeast Asian air forces. He is currently working on a book on airpower and strategy in Southeast Asia. Before embarking on his academic career, Olli worked in the defence and aerospace industry in Finland.