GAME THEORY: NEGOTIATION REPUTATION, PAYOFFS AND IMPACT ON THE SEANWFZ

This paper seeks to evaluate the behavior of the United States and China concerning the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty through the framework of game theory.

Utilizing the sequential game model, it assumes that consultations between SEANWFZ state parties and nuclear-weapon states regarding the treaty protocol occur on a recurring basis. China’s approach in these consultations, including its expressed willingness to sign the SEANWFZ Treaty protocol, reflects its broader strategy to establish a favorable reputation in negotiations.

This strategy capitalizes on ASEAN’s aspiration to shield the region from the strategic, economic, and humanitarian consequences of a potential nuclear conflict. By signaling readiness to accede to SEANWFZ, China enhances its perception management, fostering expectations within ASEAN that engagement with China could yield beneficial outcomes.

In contrast, the United States is perceived as adopting a maximalist and inflexible stance regarding its criteria and position on negative security assurances. This perception risks undermining the United States’ long-term credibility in non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control.

Moreover, it raises concerns about U.S. commitment to regional peace and security, further exacerbating uncertainties for Southeast Asian countries. Despite their security challenges vis-à-vis China, these states remain reluctant to become entangled in unrestrained great-power competition. Unless the United States presents a viable alternative to SEANWFZ, China’s apparent willingness to take the lead in signing the protocol may incentivize Southeast Asian nations to accommodate China, provided such engagement contributes to regional security and neutrality.

As U.S.-China strategic competition intensifies, the imperative for Southeast Asian states to assert their own interests will become increasingly pressing. With nine out of ten Southeast Asian countries having ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the normative opposition to nuclear weapons has been further reinforced. Consequently, opportunities for constructive dialogue and diplomatic bridge-building are diminishing.

Introduction

In September 2023, Indonesian President Joko Widodo handed over the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ceremonial gavel to Laos’ Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandon, marking the turnover of Indonesia’s one-year chairmanship of the regional grouping.

While it was an eventful year, 2023 ended with one particular goal of ASEAN not being met: securing the accession of nuclear-weapon states (NWS) to the protocol of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. This is an unfortunate outcome, given the urgent need for guardrails in the increasingly tense and volatile Indo-Pacific security environment.

Despite ASEAN’s efforts, why have the NWS, particularly the United States and the People’s Republic of China, continued to refrain from signing the protocol of the SEANWFZ Treaty? Furthermore, despite the NWS’s stated commitment and expressed willingness to advance discussions with ASEAN on the protocol, as articulated in the Joint Communiqué of the P5 in December 2021, why has no substantive progress been achieved? Does this stalemate stem from the intransigence of the NWS, or does it reflect ASEAN’s limitations in effectively negotiating the issue?

This paper examines the behaviors of the United States and China vis-à-vis the SEANWFZ, through the lens of game theory. While there are challenges in modeling complex security environments in game theoretical terms, game theory is a useful tool in evaluating interstate behavior.

The utility of game theory as a descriptive, analytical, and normative framework is manifested in its extensive application in political science, economics, and strategic studies.

This paper hopes to generate discussions on the complexities of China-United States interactions concerning confidence-building and arms control initiatives in Southeast Asia.

Table of Contents

Report

Introduction

Changing and uncertain regional order

The visionary aspirations of SEANWFZ

Illustrating the game theory model

Game 1: ASEAN-China

Game 2: ASEAN-United States

Next moves for ASEAN

Conclusion: A light at the end of the tunnel?

Bibliography

About the author

About the Authors

Karla Mae G. PABELINA is an Associate Fellow at Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) and Chief Research Officer at the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies (CIRSS) of the Philippine Foreign Service Institute (FSI). She has been actively involved in Track II dialogues on Nonproliferation and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific through the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). Karla is an alumnus of the US State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Programme (IVLP); a recipient of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Women Scholarship for Peace (Global South: Asia-Pacific); as well as the 2017 United Nations Fellowships on Disarmament. She obtained her Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of the Philippines, Diliman in 2007. She received her Masters in Strategic and Arms Control Studies with Красный диплом or red diploma from SaintPetersburg State University, Russian Federation. Prior to her work at the FSI, she was a Research Officer for the Presidential Commission on the Visiting Forces Agreement (PCVF). She also worked as a Research Assistant for the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS Philippines), an independent policy research and advocacy institution affiliated with the UP Department of Political Science.