CHINA’S UNDERWHELMING EFFORT TO UNDERMINE NATO’S NUCLEAR DETERRENT

China relies on selective narratives and arguments that have long been debunked to attack the legality of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements in the context of the NPT. The evidence shows that NATO’s arrangements were well known and extensively debated in the public sphere throughout the negotiations of the NPT—in fact, the treaty itself was worded specifically to allow these arrangements to exist. The arrangements continue to this day and continue to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and support the NPT.

China has increased its efforts to undermine NATO’s nuclear deterrent as part of a broader campaign to undermine US security guarantees in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) review process. China’s efforts include publicizing a report titled, “Analysis of the Incompatibility of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” in July 2024, accusing the United States and NATO of violating the NPT. The China Institute of Nuclear Industry Strategy published the report on its website in July 2024 alongside an abridged version of the larger report for a Chinese journal in November 2024.

Russia initiated its own campaign to denounce NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements in the NPT review process in 2015, breaking with its longstanding policy to refrain from such criticisms. However, Russia abandoned this campaign after re-establishing its own nuclear sharing arrangements in 2023 with Belarus.

The principal problem with these attacks is that they are based on incorrect information and assumptions to deny the fact that NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements are compliant with the NPT. In 2017, the French Institute of International Relations published a report, “The NPT and the Origins of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements,” that shows that NATO’s arrangements were not prohibited by the Treaty based on extensive documentation from United Nations transcripts of the negotiations, national and NATO archival records, and contemporaneous press reporting. The Chinese report, however, repeats debunked arguments from a 2000 anti-nuclear report by the Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PENN), “Questions of Command and Control: NATO, Nuclear Sharing, and the NPT,” as well as its fears of US intentions to replicate these arrangements in the Indo-Pacific.

This paper addresses the specific claims made in the Chinese report and argues in favor of the ongoing value in US extended deterrence guarantees as a strategy to prevent further nuclear proliferation.

Introduction

On Friday, July 26, 2024, the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and China Institute of Nuclear Industry Strategy convened a side meeting in Geneva during the NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), with the Chinese Delegation to the PrepCom in attendance, to present a report: “Analysis of the Incompatibility of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

The Chinese report sets out arguments to delegitimize NATO nuclear sharing arrangements by making inaccurate and previously debunked arguments, especially regarding the history of the negotiation and interpretation of the NPT. The Chinese report misinterprets the purpose and enduring value of NATO’s nuclear arrangements, while raising concern about its effects on the Treaty and security in East Asia.

The Chinese report is divided into seven sections, describing the history of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements in Section I, before attempting to make its case against the legality of these arrangements in Sections II-V, criticizing Japan and South Korea in Section VI before concluding with recommendations in Section VII.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Introduction

The Chinese Report

The Arguments

On the ongoing contributions of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements to global security

Conclusion

About the author

About the Authors

WILLIAM ALBERQUE is a Senior Adjunct Fellow at the Pacific Forum. He previously served as Director of NATO’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation Centre and the Director of Strategy, Technology, and Arms Control at the IISS, focusing on nuclear deterrence, outer space security, and risk reduction. He has also been a Senior Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center and the James Martin Center. Previously, he served as and worked for the US Government for more than two decades on nuclear security and safeguards, WMD non-proliferation, arms control, CSBMs, SALW, CBRN defense, pandemic response, and nuclear accident response.