Introduction
David Santoro and Rob York
Announced just over a year ago on Sept. 15, 2021, the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security partnership promised work on two interrelated lines of effort between the three allies. One entailed providing Australia with a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability. The other involved cooperation on developing and providing joint advanced military capabilities to promote security and stability in the region, including in cyber, artificial intelligence and autonomy, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic systems, electronic warfare, and information sharing.
AUKUS sent shockwaves across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Some praised the new partnership, explaining that it would tighten the US hub-and-spokes alliance system and stand as a powerful deterrent to China’s new assertiveness in the region. Others¾with the People’s Republic of China in the lead¾were much less enthusiastic, even outright critical, insisting that it would create unnecessary tensions, possibly leading to arms races or crises, and undermine nonproliferation norms and rules. France was also deeply upset because AUKUS immediately led to Australia’s cancellation of a French-Australian submarine deal, without notice.
In the days, weeks, and months that followed the AUKUS announcement, the Pacific Forum published, via its PacNet Commentary series, several preliminary analyses on the trilateral partnership, each reflecting a specific national perspective from throughout the Indo-Pacific and beyond. One year later, and as implementation of the AUKUS partnership remains ongoing, we have compiled these analyses into a Pacific Forum Issues & Insights volume.
It is our hope that these publications will provide a basis for further study and additional recommendations.
Table of Contents
PacNet 41, 09/20/2021. After the shock: France, America, and the Indo-Pacific by Bruno Tertais
PacNet 44, 09/29/2021. How AUKUS advances Australia’s commitment to collective defense by Ashley Townshend
PacNet 46, 10/05/2021. After AUKUS, “present at the creation” in the 21st century by Brad Glosserman
PacNet 48, 10/19/2021. New Zealand and AUKUS: Affected without being included by Robert Ayson
PacNet 50, 10/26/2021. Fold, call, or raise? China’s potential reactions to AUKUS by Yun Sun
PacNet 51, 11/03/2021. What AUKUS means for European security by Marie Jourdain
PacNet 54, 11/22/2021. What AUKUS means for Malaysia’s technological future by Elina Noor
PacNet 57, 12/10/2021. Building on AUKUS to forge a PAX Pacifica by Henry Sokolski
PacNet 58, 12/14/2021. Why the UK was the big winner of AUKUS by David Camroux
PacNet 59, 12/21/2021. “JAUKUS” and the emerging clash of alliances in the Pacific by Artyom Lukin
PacNet 60, 12/28/2021. AUKUS’ short- and long-term implications for Taiwan by Fu Mei
PacNet 05, 01/21/2022. AUKUS’ opportunities and risks for Indi by Manpreet Sethi
PacNet 11, 02/24/2022. Nuclear submarines for our Pacific Allies: When to say yes by Henry Sokolski