Executive Summary

While the DPRK-China relationship is a formal security alliance established by the DPRK-China Friendship Treaty signed in 1961, it differs from the usual asymmetric security alliance. Most of all, China’s diplomatic strategy, dating back to Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) of avoiding direct confrontation with the United States and allowing itself time to build up its national strength (韜光養晦) to become a regional superpower has kept the North Korean nuclear issue from becoming a priority in Chinese foreign policy. In this vein, during the Cold War, China sought to stabilize the regional security environment more broadly through détente with the United States and improved diplomatic relations with South Korea to create a stable security environment in the region.

In addition, China, which joined the NPT after the successful nuclear test, rejected North Korea’s demand for the transfer of nuclear technology, claiming to defend the non-proliferation regime as a “responsible member” of the international community. As such, the Sino-North Korean asymmetric alliance is less likely than others to compel a response to each other‘s demands because the usual security-autonomy exchange formula has not been established. China‘s failure to provide security guarantees and North Korea‘s declining dependence on China have contributed to the diminishing value of each other.

The situation is further complicated by North Korea‘s concerns and wariness about Chinese interference in its internal affairs. The alliance treaty clearly outlines concerns about these two countries interference in the internal affairs of the other. North Korea has been vigilant in preventing the expansion of pro-China groups within its elites group. Most importantly, North Korea has also conducted numerous nuclear and missile tests to demonstrate its nuclear capabilities to the world. Dismantling the country’s nuclear weapons is a challenging task, given North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, which are widely accepted as a foregone conclusion. Unlike previous six- party talks, where all parties committed to the denuclearization of North Korea, Russia and China have expressed reservations about the application of tougher UN sanctions.

As North Korea’s nuclear program advances, it is anticipated to take a pragmatic stance grounded in national security concerns, rather than a normative approach, and even if China tries to contain North Korea’s nuclear program it will not be easy due to the fragile cohesion of the DPRK-China alliance. Thus, although China will undoubtedly be significant in forthcoming North Korean nuclear discussions, it is improbable that it will act as a normative arbitrator of anti-proliferation principles.

As North Korea develops its nuclear capabilities, China’s leverage is likely to diminish. Therefore, rather than negotiating a complete nuclear agreement, China will likely move toward negotiating step-by-step nuclear disarmament. South Korea should be aware of this possibility and actively encourage China to play a responsible role. The time to do so is now.

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