Last week, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth traveled to the Indo-Pacific, making stops in Hawaii and Guam before continuing to the Philippines and Japan, two key US allies. This marks his first trip to the region as secretary of defense, and while news reporting of his trip has been overshadowed by other developments, its timing and the deliverables he announced are significant. With concerns among allies over potential tariffs and broader US intentions in the region, the trip signaled the administration’s commitment to key security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

Hawaii and Guam are central to these discussions, serving as vital control centers for any contingency in the region. Understanding the requirements of the US Indo-Pacific Commander and component commanders—particularly regarding munitions, stocks, and capabilities—is essential. In remarks at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Secretary Hegseth reinforced that the “Indo-Pacific is the region of consequence.” Seeing firsthand how Guam is both tactically and strategically important underscores its role in executing missions west of the international dateline. The choice to visit the Philippines and Japan first sent a strong signal about the importance of these alliances and both stops delivered notable announcements.

Key bilateral advancements

During his visit to the Philippines, Hegseth and Philippine Secretary of Defense Gilbert Teodoro reaffirmed that the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty applies to “armed attacks against either country’s armed forces, aircraft, and public vessels—including those of their coast guards—anywhere in the South China Sea.” The Philippines plays a crucial role in regional security, with joint cooperation and military agreements to strengthen deterrence and readiness. This is especially critical given China’s increasingly assertive actions in the South China Sea, including the militarization of artificial islands, harassment of Philippine vessels, and coercive tactics undermining regional sovereignty.

Both officials emphasized the importance of the Visiting Forces Agreement and US access to bases under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in strengthening regional security. They announced new initiatives including deploying unmanned surface vessels and a mobile, ground based anti-ship missile launcher to bolster maritime domain awareness and interoperability. Furthermore, they committed to conducting advanced bilateral Special Operations Forces exercises in the Batanes Islands and expanding cyber capabilities to enable greater information and intelligence sharing.

These developments are much welcomed, as the Filipinos want deeper cooperation with the United States. At a Pacific Forum dialogue in Bangkok in March, for instance, a Filipino representative did not mince words, stating: “We’re getting the same results whether we choose to appease or confront Beijing, so strengthening deterrence with the United States and others to prevent Chinese aggression is the way to go.”

A significant highlight was the newly announced US-Philippine Defense Industrial Cooperation vision statement. The two leaders discussed exploring new lines of effort to advance defense industrial production for munitions, unmanned systems, critical minerals, logistics support, ship and aircraft repair, and more. This is a positive development as it further deepens areas for cooperation across new technology, innovation, and co-production, which will be helpful in both a bilateral and multilateral construct as part of the Partnerships for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience initiative.

Similarly, during his stop to Japan, Hegseth and Japan’s Defense Minister Nakatani Gen agreed to accelerate plans to jointly develop and produce missiles such as Advanced Medium-Range Air to Air Missiles as well as to speed up the process for the maintenance of US ships and planes in Japan.

Hegseth also reaffirmed that the United States would place a unified operational commander at US Forces Japan to serve as a joint headquarters, essentially enhancing joint command and control capabilities with the United States and Japan. Significantly, Japan’s recent announcement to create the Japan Joint Operations Command is an important step in the right direction to coordinate its miliary elements. These moves only strengthen the bilateral military planning and operational cooperation needed to support any crisis or contingency in the Indo-Pacific.

Overall, these efforts further build integrated planning, expanded basing, and advanced defense cooperation to counter China’s growing military assertiveness and gray zone activities. Japan has been pivotal in working to knit a tighter collective security network through various trilateral dialogues and its role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) with the United States, Australia, and India.

Addressing critical gaps

These reaffirmations and enhancements with our allies are important. At the Honolulu Defense Forum (HDF) in February—an annual gathering hosted by the Pacific Forum—over 400 US and allied senior government and industry leaders convened in Honolulu to discuss defense and technology needs in the Indo-Pacific. The conclusions were clear: the global security environment is increasingly dangerous, and the risk of kinetic conflict in the next five years is real in the Indo-Pacific. This urgency underscores the need to restock munitions, integrate supply chains, and surge production in key capacity areas like shipbuilding, and align standards to facilitate flexible cooperation in times of crisis.

Speaking at the forum, Adm. Samuel Paparo, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, stressed urgency and the need to reform the defense bureaucracy. He warned that “our current posture faces serious challenges that directly threaten the security, freedom, and well-being of the United States and our allies and partners.” While media coverage focused on his remarks about China’s military “rehearsals” around Taiwan, he emphasized that “we are all directly threatened.”

Addressing these challenges for the region requires a fundamental reassessment of how the United States and its allies’ approach regional security, particularly as stockpiles remain below required levels and acquisition systems struggle to deliver capabilities at the necessary speed and scale, including:

• Addressing contested logistics challenges—The Indo-Pacific’s vast distances and supply chain vulnerabilities demand a distributed logistics network with prepositioned supplies, multinational maintenance hubs, and where possible standardize parts and supplies across allied forces.
• Reforming procurement for rapid innovation—The Ukraine war has demonstrated the shortened innovation cycle in warfare. The United States should reform its procurement processes to reflect this reality as well as secure domestic supply chains. At the same time, co-production with allies is crucial for strengthening industrial production and supply chain resilience.
• Expanding minilateral defense arrangements—Existing agreements like the Australia-United Kingdom-United States security arrangement (AUKUS) and the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation under the Camp David Accords should be further strengthened. So should the Quad. Additionally, bolstering Taiwan’s resilience through diversified energy sources, secure communications, enhanced civil defense, and asymmetric capabilities is essential.
• Modernizing the US defense acquisition system—The system should be reformed to accelerate procurement in shipbuilding, munitions, and missile defense to maintain military readiness. Bureaucratic obstacles should be stripped away, and new, flexible private-public contracts should be pursued to ensure that US forces can acquire critical capabilities at the speed of modern warfare.
• Safeguarding US military presence in the Indo-Pacific—Increased defense systems to safeguard US forces, particularly missile defense for Guam and Hawaii, should be part of a broader “Golden Dome for America” concept for any military contingency.

Hegseth’s trip covered many of these areas and the announcements made were positive affirmation that the United States intends to deepen operational cooperation with our allies. However, critical gaps remain that must be addressed through continued engagement.

This trip should serve as a precursor to deeper discussions with allies and partners, beginning at the upcoming Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in late May. These discussions must focus on expanding military training and cooperation in the region, addressing contested logistics challenges, reforming procurement for rapid innovation, and expanding minilateral defense arrangements to build military capability and plan for contingencies.

Maintaining international commitments while reducing barriers to cooperation and enhancing priority areas that further integrate our allied militaries and industries is crucial for building trust, fostering cooperation, and ensuring that the Indo-Pacific remains a region of stability, security, and prosperity, while moving forward.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Kimberly Lehn ([email protected]) is the Senior Director of the Honolulu Defense Forum at Pacific Forum located in Honolulu, Hawaii

David Santoro ([email protected]) is President and CEO of Pacific Forum.

Photo: U.S. Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, aboard the U.S. Pacific Fleet boathouse in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on March 24, 2025 || Credit: U.S. Navy, Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino