Comparative Connections Summary:
May-August 2023

REGIONAL OVERVIEW

Building Partnerships Amidst Major Power Competition

BY RALPH COSSA, PACIFIC FORUM & BRAD GLOSSERMAN, TAMA UNIVERSITY CRS/PACIFIC FORUM

Major power competition was the primary topic du jure at virtually all of this trimester’s major multilateral gatherings, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continuing to serve as a litmus test—a test many participants struggled to avoid taking. It was clear which side of the fence the G7 leaders stood on; Putin’s invasion was soundly condemned and Sino-centric warning bells were again gently sounded. At the BRICS Summit and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (sans the US), those alarms were clearly muted, as they were at the ASEAN Regional Forum, at which foreign ministers from all three were present. Headlines from the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue focused on the meeting that did not occur, as China’s defense minister pointedly refused to meet with his US counterpart. At the ASEAN-ISIS’ Asia-Pacific Roundtable, participants lamented the impact of major power tensions on ASEAN unity, even though ASEAN’s main challenges are internal ones that predate the downturn in China-US relations. Meanwhile, Beijing and Washington both expended considerable effort at these and other events throughout the reporting period fortifying and expanding their partnerships, even as many neighbors struggled not to choose sides or to keep a foot in both camps.

US-JAPAN RELATIONS

A Busy Diplomatic Calendar for Biden and Kishida

BY SHEILA A. SMITH, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & CHARLES MCCLEAN, YALE MACMILLAN CENTER

US-CHINA RELATIONS

US-China Effort to Set “Guardrails” Back on Track for Now

BY SOURABH GUPTA, INSTITUTE FOR CHINA-AMERICA STUDIES

The placement of the proposed “guardrails” that Joe Biden and Xi Jinping sought to erect last fall in Bali finally commenced in earnest with the visits to Beijing by three Cabinet secretaries and one National Security Council principals-level appointee. Important steps were taken to put the balloon incident behind them, with lines of communication re-opened, assurances exchanged, and incremental forward progress recorded even in areas such as export controls, where US and China had previously clashed. Defense exchanges remain an area where progress lags. Whether the “guardrails” can survive their first contact with US election year polemics remains to be seen. As ties stabilized, both sides also engaged in sanctions and countermeasures as well as domestic rulemaking to secure their national economic and security interests. All along, the administration continued building “situations of strength” with its allies and partners to shape the strategic environment around China, which Beijing viewed as an act of encirclement.

US-KOREA RELATIONS

Diff’rent Strokes for Different Folks

BY MASON RICHEY, HANKUK UNIVERSITY

The May-August 2023 reporting period saw further divergence between Washington’s relations with Seoul and Pyongyang. This dynamic was an acceleration of a trend already evinced at the April Joe Biden-Yoon Suk-yeol summit that produced the Washington Declaration modernizing US-South Korea extended deterrence, and the alliance as a whole. Washington-Seoul bonhomie contrasts manifestly with Washington-Pyongyang relations, whose level of hostility remains the same as four months ago, 14 months ago, or 24 months ago. That is, all the positive action during summer 2023 came from the continued dramatic growth in the US-South Korea alliance, notably via the extraordinary formation of a genuine trilateral US-South Korea-Japan quasi-alliance. This development has been in the works for the last 18-24 months, was given momentum by improving South Korea-Japan government relations and a Yoon-Kishida summit in May, and was concretely founded in August at the US-South Korea-Japan summit at Camp David.

US-INDIA RELATIONS

From Non-Alignment to Realignment

BY AKHIL RAMESH, PACIFIC FORUM & CLEO PASKAL, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

The US and India expanded cooperation across various domains in the second reporting period of 2023. The two moved to materialize projects and initiatives that were conceived in the first quarter, in wide-ranging domains with significant geopolitical and geoeconomic scope including defense cooperation, critical and emerging technologies, and infrastructure development. While New Delhi continued to straddle groupings such as BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the US-India partnership broke ground on more initiatives than any of India’s other bilateral relationships. Modi and Biden visited each other’s capitals and reaffirmed their commitment to a rules-based international order. The rousing reception Modi received in Washington and the continued US preeminence in most major trade and technology initiatives conceived by India highlighted the growing partnership between the two democracies. And the two leaders, while facing elections next year, seem willing to work together on common global priorities—sometimes at domestic political costs.

US-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS

New Leaders Challenged by US-China Rivalry

BY CATHARIN DALPINO, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Over the summer three Southeast Asian nations—Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia—conducted political contests or prepared for them, with Washington and Beijing watching closely for shifts in alignments or opportunities to make inroads with new leaders. Despite this, and possibly because of it, China made bold moves in the South China Sea and caused outcry in the region with the release of a map supporting its claims to the “Nine-Dash Line.” Beijing also showed signs of worry about Russian inroads into Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. The high-profile visit to Washington of Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr. enabled both countries to reconfirm the US-Philippines alliance publicly, although it gave little indication of where the broader relationship may be headed. ASEAN continued to make little headway in helping to resolve the conflict in Myanmar; and the 2023 chair, Jakarta attempted to redirect the group toward economic goals and a common approach to looming food insecurity in the region.

CHINA-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS

China-US Rivalry Very Much ‘in Play’: Outcome Uncertain

CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

Stark Choices Confront Taiwan Voters

BY DAVID KEEGAN, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES & KYLE CHURCHMAN, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Taiwan’s presidential election campaign has begun. Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s vice president and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Hou Yu-ih from the Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) Party, Ko Wen-je of Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), and independent Terry Gou offer Taiwan voters four different visions of Taiwan’s future relationship with China. As senior US and Chinese officials resumed long-stalled face-to-face meetings, China warned once again that it has no room for compromise or concession on Taiwan. Yet, when Lai completed almost invisible transits through the US en route to Paraguay and back, China’s military response seemed almost pro-forma. When US, Japanese, and South Korean leaders reiterated at the trilateral Camp David summit their staunch opposition to China’s intimidation, China chose to interpret their words as one more promise to support Taiwan. The US accelerated weapons deliveries to Taiwan and expanded training for Taiwan’s military, and Taiwan announced that its defense budget will increase by 7.5% in 2024. Taiwan’s TSMC moved forward on constructing its Arizona factory despite some hiccups, and the US and Taiwan signed a long-awaited trade deal—the first part of their 21st Century Trade Initiative.

NORTH KOREA-SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS

In Both Pyongyang and Seoul, an Ominous Hardening

BY AIDAN FOSTER-CARTER, LEEDS UNIVERSITY, UK

In mid-2023, the (non-existent) relations between the two Koreas got even worse, if that were possible. Confronting enlarged US-ROK military exercises, and the first visit of a US nuclear-armed submarine to the peninsula since 1981, Pyongyang’s nuclear threats grew ever more frenzied. In Seoul, President Yoon Suk Yeol institutionalized his hard line by downsizing and repurposing the Ministry of Unification (MOU). Criticizing MOU for acting in the past as a support department for North Korea, Yoon evidently conceives its future role as being to hinder Kim Jong Un’s regime—publicizing its human rights abuses, for instance—rather than help. Much as the DPRK’s ever-expanding WMD threat requires robust deterrence, for Seoul to start emulating Pyongyang’s unalloyed hostility hardly seems conducive to peace. The period under review also saw two attempts by North Korea to put a spy satellite into orbit; both failed. By contrast, the North’s missile launches hardly ever go wrong these days. The large solid-fuel Hwasong-18 ICBM, with a 15,000-km (9,300-mile) range, which first flew in April, had a second successful test on July 12.

CHINA-KOREA RELATIONS

Economic Security Dilemmas

BY SCOTT SNYDER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & SEE-WON BYUN, SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY

PRC Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming’s public statement in June sharpened Beijing-Seoul frictions following President Yoon Suk Yeol’s Taiwan remarks in an April interview, sparking mutual accusations of interference in internal affairs. Multilateral engagements offered opportunities to reaffirm China-ROK relations through bilateral talks between China’s Commerce Minister Wang Wentao and South Korea’s Trade Minister Ahn Duk-geun (May), Defense Ministers Li Shangfu and Lee Jong-sup (June), Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and Park Jin (July), Finance Ministers Liu Kun and Choo Kyung-ho (July), and Trade Ministers Wang Shouwen and Ahn (August). The revival of high-level exchanges, Beijing’s lifting of travel restrictions on South Korea in August, and North Korea’s border reopening that same month are sources of optimism in China-Korea relations despite overarching tensions. Discord remains on regional security priorities, South Korea’s overt alignment with the United States under the Yoon administration, and the escalating US-China technology war. Meanwhile, Chinese and Russian delegations joined Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Korean War, reflecting the shape of North Korea’s first post-COVID diplomatic activity.

JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS

From Talking Past Each Other to Barely Talking

BY JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

China’s mid-August decision to allow group travel to Japan days ahead of the 45th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the two nations as well as indications that China would be open to a meeting between Xi Jinping and Fumio Kishida on the sidelines of the Group of 20 (G20) leaders’ summit in India in September gave hope for improvement in China-Japan ties. The optimism proved short-lived. Chinese media responded that Japan would first have to turn away from following the US lead, stop encouraging Taiwanese pro-independence forces, and strictly abide by the four communiques signed between Beijing and Tokyo. China’s protests over Japan’s release of radioactive water culminated in a total ban on Japanese marine products. The PRC also expressed annoyance with Japanese restrictions on the export of computer chips, the ministry of defense’s release of its annual Defense of Japan 2023 white paper, Tokyo’s closer relations with NATO, and its tripartite agreement with South Korea and the US. Japan expressed uneasiness with Russia-China cooperation and became concerned with renewed Chinese interest in Okinawa, with its purchases of Japanese land, cyberattacks, and its refusal to import Japanese seafood products.

JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONS

Camp David: Institutionalizing Cooperation Trilaterally

BY JI-YOUNG LEE, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY & ANDY LIM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Japan-South Korea relations are going strong. In the months leading up to the historic Camp David trilateral summit in August, we saw the return of shuttle diplomacy between Korea and Japan. If President Yoon Suk Yeol’s March visit to Japan was groundbreaking, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s May visit to Seoul signified the continued momentum of improving bilateral ties. The Aug. 18 trilateral summit meeting, where President Biden, President Yoon, and Prime Minister Kishida announced bold steps to cement trilateral cooperation into the institutional fabric of the relationship, represents the deepest attempt in recent memory. A successful trilateral summit like this one was possible only because Seoul and Tokyo mended their bilateral ties. A positive cycle is expected the other way around, as well. For example, the “Commitment to Consult” —to expeditiously “share information, align messaging and coordinate response actions” among the three leaders— will likely create more incentives and opportunities for Seoul and Tokyo to keep bilateral relations friendly and cooperative.

CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONS

Testing the Limits of Strategic Partnership

BY YU BIN, WITTENBERG UNIVERSITY

In the summer months, both the upper and lower limits of the China-Russia strategic partnership were put to considerable tests. In the West, China’s peace-probing effort continued despite virtual stalemate in the Ukraine war and its sudden twists and turns (drone attacks on the Kremlin and Wagner mutiny). Beijing treaded carefully in restoring relations with Kyiv with the new Ukrainian ambassador in place. In the East, Russian and Chinese militaries conducted a series of aerial and naval exercises/operations with unprecedented scope and closer interoperability for almost three months (from early June to late August), something not seen even at the peak of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s. All of this occurred against the backdrop of increasingly hardened US-led alliance networks both in Indo-Pacific and beyond.

AUSTRALIA-US/EAST ASIA RELATIONS

Stabilizing China Trade and Seeking Indo-Pacific Balance

BY GRAEME DOBELL, AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE

Australia has peeled back China trade coercion as it ramps-up the alliance with the United States to balance China. The Labor government, elected in May 2022, claims a diplomatic thaw with China as a key achievement. The major defense step was agreeing for Australia to get nuclear submarines under the AUKUS agreement with Britain and the United States. The government’s 2023 National Defense Statement describes “an intense contest of values” in the Indo-Pacific, with growing “risks of military escalation or miscalculation.” Because of the worsening strategic environment, the Australian Defense Force is judged “not fully fit for purpose” as the government seeks greater long-range strike capability. The era of alliance integration will see more US troops, planes, and ships in Australia, and the creation of a US-Australia combined intelligence center in Canberra. The contest with China in the South Pacific frames a new Australian aid policy and a greater US role in the islands.

September 13, 2023

This PacNet was developed as a part of the United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Next-Generation Leaders Dialogue to encourage creative thinking about how this vital partnership can be fostered. For the previous entries please click here, here, here, here, and here.

In recent years, Japan and the United States have taken a series of steps to bolster deterrence-building vis-a-vis the Taiwan Strait. In 2021, for example, Tokyo and Washington reportedly formulated a joint plan that entails the US Marine Corps setting up an attack base along the Nansei island chain in preparation for a Taiwan Strait military contingency. Moreover, following the conclusion of US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) discussions in 2023, it was announced that Washington would repurpose a Marine Corps regiment in Okinawa and equip it with anti-ship missiles that can target PLA Navy ships during a Taiwan Strait military conflict. The Republic of Korea (ROK), however, has long been reluctant to toe the same line. The election of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, and recent public animosity towards China within South Korea, may change things. Seoul’s shift towards becoming more proactive on Taiwan issues has been notable. In May 2021, for example, Taiwan was named for the first time in a joint statement between the ROK and the United States. In February 2023, ROK Foreign Minister Park Jin stated in a CNN interview that Seoul opposes any unilateral change of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait via force and that such a change would have a “direct impact” on South Korea. This marked a remarkable departure from earlier posturing. It would be remiss to not transform such willingness, however slight, into incremental steps amenable to Seoul that ultimately support Taiwan’s defense. This article will identify and discuss three such steps that should be taken.

First, trilateral discussions involving the three countries should be organized to establish whether Seoul will allow troops from US Forces Korea (USFK) to support US operations during a Taiwan Strait military contingency. A commitment from Japan to permit the US to utilize its bases in-country to defend Taiwan, a move already expected by Chinese foreign policy elites, would enable Seoul the space needed to provide USFK the “strategic flexibility” to operate beyond the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, discussions can be held to formulate plans for ROK and Japanese forces to provide rear area and intelligence-gathering support in the event of a Taiwan Strait military contingency. In such discussions, it is critical for Washington to reassure Seoul of USFK’s ability to deter the DPRK from engaging in any military adventurism during a Taiwan Strait conflict. Washington, for example, could enter into a NATO-style nuclear sharing agreement with Seoul. Additionally, Seoul must be prepared for a distracted Washington in the event of a Taiwan conflict and be prepared to engage in more burden-sharing regarding deterrence efforts vis-à-vis Pyongyang. With the ROK’s already sizable military advantages over the DPRK, this should not be significant challenge.

Second, the three countries should seek to bolster cooperation with Taiwan via joint coast guard operations. Japan has proven proactive in this regard. In 2017, for example, Taiwan and Japanese officials signed an MoU enabling the conduct of joint search and rescue operations. Likewise, the US has sought to bolster Coast Guard ties with Taiwan and the two nations established a Coast Guard Working Group in 2021. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act also mandates a report on National Guard cooperation with Taiwan, which should be expanded to include Coast Guard training as well. Given such precedent, Seoul should follow suit and initiate joint Coast Guard training exercises with Taiwan. All four nations should conduct training exercises together, particularly in the waters off Pacific Island countries with which Taiwan has diplomatic relations. Given Seoul’s potential concerns regarding provoking Beijing, cooperation can focus on issues such as drug trafficking, marine debris, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

Third, the three countries should continue efforts to bring the Chip4 Alliance to fruition. The proposed alliance will enable the three countries to, together with Taiwan, build a more robust and comprehensive semiconductor supply-chain that reduces Beijing’s leverage on the international stage. All four nations possess a unique comparative advantage when it comes to semiconductors. As ROK Minister of Trade, Industry, and Energy Lee Chang-yang stated: “South Korea holds its strengths in memory chip [production], Taiwan is strong in the foundry business. The US has the equipment and technology and Japan is strong in minerals and components.” Chip4 has shown promise despite initial doubts regarding the initiative. In February 2023, for example, Chip4 held its inaugural video meeting featuring senior officials from all four nations thus assuaging concerns about preliminary delays. In March 2023, Japan lifted export controls previously imposed on the ROK’s semiconductor industry, thereby eliminating more barriers to cooperation in the semiconductor space. In the same month, South Korea appointed semiconductor expert Lee Eun-ho to be its envoy to Taiwan. Lee, the former president of the Korean Security Agency of Trade and Industry, a government institution that helps South Korean corporations comply with export controls, has already spoken favorably about Chip4. His appointment is a strong signal that the ROK is increasingly serious about heightening cooperation with Taiwan in the semiconductor space.

While Tokyo and Taipei’s participation is more or less assured, doubts remain regarding Seoul’s commitment to a potential Chip4 alliance given that 60% of its semiconductor exports go to China. Given past economic coercion by the PRC, Seoul is inevitably concerned that any decision to join Chip4 would be met by economic retaliation against its semiconductor industry. Seoul, however, should keep two things in mind. First, trends suggest that South Korean semiconductor exports to China will decrease precipitously going forward regardless of Seoul’s decision-making. Beijing has, after all, set a target self-sufficiency rate in semiconductors of 70% by 2025 and launched aggressive state subsidy programs to realize this goal. South Korean companies must be reminded that market opportunity in China will fall as Beijing pursues such autarky, even if it falls short of meeting its targets. Semiconductor exports from the ROK to China have already fallen 13.4% year-on-year. Second, Beijing has exhibited significant reluctance to sanction TSMC despite heightening cross-strait tensions. Moreover, US export controls, endorsed by the Netherlands and Japan, have made Chinese firms more dependent on South Korean companies such as SY Hynix and Samsung for critical semiconductor materials. Concern about potential countersanctions, therefore, should be minimal.

The aforementioned steps listed in this article provide three, realistic avenues through which the United States, ROK, and Japan can cooperate in a trilateral manner over Taiwan while also bolstering bilateral ties between each other. Any or all of these steps will remind Beijing that military action against Taiwan is strongly opposed by other East Asian security actors. As Beijing continues its campaign of military and economic coercion against Taipei and consolidates increasingly formidable military capabilities with an eye on Taiwan, such deterrence-building efforts are sorely needed.

Daniel Fu ([email protected]) is a Research Associate at Harvard Business School.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen (C) leaves Taoyuan International Airport on March 29, 2023, for a 10-day tour of Central America via the United States. (Photo courtesy of the presidential office) (Kyodo)

September 6, 2023

This PacNet was developed as a part of the United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Next-Generation Leaders Dialogue to encourage creative thinking about how this vital partnership can be fostered. For the previous entries please click here, here, here, and here.

On a warm August afternoon in Virginia, beneath a lush canopy of ash trees, President Joe Biden, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, and President Yoon Suk Yeol convened to show the world that their response to adversity is unity. In contrast to the gridlock that has characterized the nadir in Japan-ROK relations since 2018, the Spirit of Camp David charts a course for the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship predicated on steadfast alignment in the face of unprecedented threats. Among the summit’s initiatives is a plan to regularize trilateral ballistic missile defense and anti-submarine warfare exercises—a response to North Korea’s record-breaking tempo of provocative missile tests over the past year and a stark reminder of the stakes underpinning the trilateral relationship.

Considering the backdrop of a deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific, this turning point is vital to the sustainability of the regional order. However, while the latest round of Japan-ROK rapprochement is promising, it remains fragile, and therefore the progress of the US-Japan-ROK trilateral could unravel, like after similar past breakthroughs. Still, by articulating a common vision and actionable agenda, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are undeniably closer to escaping the well-trod cycle of previous decades. To continue making progress toward a relationship that will survive the next resurgence in Japan-ROK bilateral tensions, additional efforts must both increase the political costs of regression and demonstrate to domestic populations that these relationships can be sources of strength and catalysts for prosperity.

Fortunately, a complementary agenda with initiatives on preserving a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific already exists in the form of the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States). South Korean integration into the Quad’s activities would provide a channel through which Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul can work together on concrete lines of effort, thereby reinforcing their relationship against bilateral turbulence.

Amid the increased volatility in the region, the resurrection of the Quad stands out as a momentous victory for stability. In a few short years, the Quad has emerged as a focal point of multilateral collaboration in the Indo-Pacific and a central pillar of the Biden administration’s regional strategy. The Quad is a major force for good in the region: its promise is rooted in an ambitious agenda that aims to meet the needs of the Indo-Pacific through leveraging the comparative advantages of its members as liberal democracies. That agenda has grown from the Quad’s origins in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the mid-2000s to its current state with working groups tackling a slate of issues, including cyber security, climate change, infrastructure, and critical and emerging technology.

While South Korea may not officially join the Quad in the near future, that should not preclude its involvement. During the Quad’s revitalization in 2020 and 2021, Japan-ROK tensions and former President Moon Jae-in’s indisposition toward the group understandably made South Korea’s participation a nonstarter. Now that relations have improved and Yoon has expressed interest in certain working groups, the situation has changed. Nonetheless, the Quad countries have signaled their grouping will not expand its membership as it is still gaining momentum and defining its purpose. However, after two years of building the lines of effort of its various working groups since its first leader-level summit, the Quad should soon begin to consider opportunities for partnerships and consultations on certain initiatives with highly capable like-minded countries such as South Korea.

To start, the Quad could invite Seoul to send observers to working group meetings. South Korea already engages bilaterally with Quad countries on many of the issues in the Quad’s portfolio. Seoul’s financial resources, technical know-how, and positive reputation in the region would empower the Quad to scale up its activities and build a more compelling agenda, particularly in areas such as critical and emerging technology, where South Korea is already a world leader. From Seoul’s perspective, the Quad is an opportunity to act on its Indo-Pacific foreign policy ambitions of increasing South Korea’s presence outside the Korean Peninsula, thereby transforming into a “global pivotal state.”

Considering South Korea’s position as a strong US ally, leading Indo-Pacific democracy, and technological powerhouse, South Korean involvement in the Quad would not only be a force multiplier for the grouping, but also a boon for the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship. Incorporating South Korea into the region’s most promising democratic coalition would provide critical opportunities to rebuild the connective tissue of the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship that have atrophied over the past several years. Through the Quad, Japanese and South Korean officials would have more opportunities to interact, exchange views, and build personal ties in a constructive multilateral environment. Acting in concert upon their shared strategic interests would lay the foundation for a more cooperative bilateral partnership by increasing trust and fostering mutual understanding.

The tenor of Japan-ROK ties habitually fluctuate, but the Quad could bring structural support to the relationship. With the Spirit of Camp David, leaders in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul took advantage of the current upswing in trilateral ties to proclaim their shared ambitions and collective purpose. Adding the Quad’s comprehensive lines of effort to those objectives would enhance the trilateral’s scope and further cement its future. The Quad will not always be closed to new members, and in the meantime it ought to pursue relationships with like-minded partners that would support its goals. Incorporating South Korea—even initially at the observer level—would lead to a more capable Quad, a more stable trilateral relationship, and ultimately, a more prosperous Indo-Pacific.

Joshua Fitt ([email protected]) is an Associate Fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: Yonhap

September 1, 2023

The war in Ukraine has drawn concerns that a potential conflict may happen across the Taiwan Strait. In Ukraine, the attack and occupation of nuclear facilities, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (NPP) by the Russian military, initiated a dangerous situation for the safe and secure operation of civilian NPPs, including the spent fuel facilities. It also hindered the International Atomic Energy Agency’s effort to assure the proper accounting and control of nuclear materials in these facilities. If a military conflict were to happen across the Taiwan Strait, there would be similar concerns.

There are six operating or shutdown nuclear reactors (two pressurized water reactors, PWRs and four boiling water reactors, BWRs) in Taiwan. Of the six, the four BWRs located in the northern tip of Taiwan pose the biggest safety, security, and safeguards concerns. Taiwan’s first NPP, Chinshan 1 & 2, were BWRs similar to Fukushima Daiichi 1 NPP that was involved in the 2011 accident in Japan, with spent fuel pools that are located high up above ground. Taiwan’s second NPP, Kuosheng 1 & 2, were of a later BWR design, with spent fuel pools located at a lower elevation. The two PWR reactors have spent fuel pools located at ground level.

When Chinshan 1 & 2 went offline in 2018-2019, more than 6,000 spent fuel assemblies were stored in the two elevated spent fuel pools. At Kuosheng 1 & 2, the capacities of both ground-level spent fuel pools have become insufficient to support reactor operation. To free up space in the pools for newly discharge spent fuel, TAIPOWER, the utility company, moved those 15-year-old spent fuel assemblies to the upper (refueling) pools for storage, which are located well above the ground level.

According to the US National Academies of Sciences, the vulnerability of a spent fuel pool depends in part on its location with respect to ground level as well as its construction. In a potential military conflict across the Taiwan Strait, the spent fuel pools located above ground in Chinshan and Kuosheng may thus be susceptible to accidental attacks from misfired or stray missiles. Significantly, to protest the Pelosi visit to Taiwan in August 2022, two missiles fired by the Chinese military landed in water about 50 km north of the Chinshan NPP.

The Fukushima accident highlighted the vulnerability of elevated spent fuel storage. The explosion that occurred in the reactor building of Fukushima Daiichi 4 destroyed the roof and most of the walls on the fourth and fifth (refueling) floors. The Japanese utility company, TEPCO, had to reinforce the region underneath the pool with steel beams and concrete to prevent pool leakage and a potential collapse of the pool. To reduce the vulnerability, Unit 4 pool’s inventory of 1,535 spent fuel assemblies (half of that in Chinshan 1 pool) was moved between November 2013 and December 2014 into a common pool on the ground level built after the accident.

If an attack caused an explosion similar to what happened in Fukushima Daiichi 4, damaging the roof and walls on the fourth and fifth floors in Chinshan or Kuosheng NPP, a loss-of-cooling (due to damage to the pool spray system), and/or loss-of-coolant (due to leaky pools) accident could occur. To prevent a loss-of-cooling-and-coolant accident in any one of the Chinshan or Kuosheng high-elevation pools, spent fuel must be removed and placed in water pools or dry storage casks located at or below ground level.

A sense of urgency

Spent fuel has accumulated in Chinshan and Kuosheng NPPs over the 40 years of their operating lives. Due to objections from the local public over moving the spent fuel to dry cask storage and the lack of suitable storage or disposal sites in the geographically limited island, spent fuel discharged from Chinshan 1&2 reactors has remained in the refueling-turned-into-storing pools adjacent to the reactor wells, which is high above ground. To support continued reactor operation of Kuosheng NPP and to free up space in its lower-level spent fuel pools, spent fuel assemblies were moved into the upper (refueling) pools, situated well above ground.

The Fukushima accident and the subsequent action by TEPCO to move the spent fuel into a ground-level common pool built after the accident should have led TAIPOWER to conclude that spent fuel stored at Chinshan and Kuosheng high-elevation pools creates a significant risk. The war in Ukraine and rockets/missiles landing in or around Zaporizhzhia NPP (with all six PWRs’ spent fuel pools located at ground level) should have given TAIPOWER another warning that spent fuel in high-elevation pools should be moved to ground-level pools or dry cask storage. TAIPOWER should have a sense of urgency for this “clear and present” danger in Taiwan, especially given that it has the technology and resources to accomplish the task. Taiwan’s internal politics and objection of the local public are the primary causes for the procrastination.

The longer-term problem with moving the spent fuel off the island centers around something called “consent rights,” which is complicated given US involvement in the installation of the NPPs in Taiwan.

Consent-rights and possible solution to remove Taiwan’s spent fuel

The United States holds the prior consent rights for Taiwan’s spent fuel (over the “alteration” of nuclear material by Taiwan) based on the terms of Taipei’s 123-Agreement with Washington in conjunction with the original construction of Taiwan’s NPPs. The United States also has a bilateral safeguards agreement with Taiwan, as well as a trilateral safeguards agreement with both Taiwan and the IAEA (INFCIRC/158). The US rights over Taiwan’s nuclear activities are so extensive that Washington instructed the German government in the 1980s that any nuclear items supplied to Taiwan by a German exporter would be subject to US “control rights,” which included US “fallback safeguards rights” if deemed necessary. Nowhere else does the United States have as much leverage over a foreign nuclear program. Yet whenever Taiwan has requested the United States to take-back the spent fuel, Washington has declined.

The alternative to resolve the spent fuel issue in Taiwan may be a cooperative multi-site/multi-national arrangement (MSMNA). Such an arrangement could help manage the spent fuel in existing/emerging nuclear-power programs. Emulating the URENCO model for a uranium-enrichment enterprise, an MSMNA can be led by nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and major uranium producers (MUP)—the two groups of countries having the most at stake for a sustainable global nuclear enterprise—to provide a safe and secure supply of energy and assure nonproliferation in the backend of the nuclear fuel cycle. It involves an NWS for the assurance of nonproliferation, just as United Kingdom is an essential partner in the URENCO enrichment enterprise.

An MSMNA could be formed by a consortium consisting of any one of the NWS (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, or the United States) and an MUP (Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, etc.), and providing spent fuel interim storage and/or final disposal at multiple sites within MSMNA countries.

Broadly, an MSMNA can help a country decouple their power generation from the back-end nuclear fuel cycle. Such decoupling is essential for solving the intractable spent fuel dilemma, providing a better way to manage nuclear weapon-usable materials, and facilitating a resilient nuclear fuel cycle to support a sustainable use of nuclear energy. Examples for using MSMNA services in conjunction with the Taiwan dilemma include the removal of Taiwan’s spent fuel by MSMNA and their assignment to any one of the MSMNA countries for 40-year interim storage and/or final disposal.

Removing the spent fuel from Taiwan would eliminate its “clear and present” spent fuel danger, while fulfilling its goal of ensuring a “nuclear-free” Taiwan. This should be a priority.

Jorshan Choi ([email protected]), PhD, PE is a retired scientist, formerly with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: By Ellery – Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=15275876

August 29, 2023

On Aug. 21, Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Axios’ Taipei-based China reporter, released a bombshell report about the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School in Tanzania that she alleges is ground zero in China’s efforts “to shape African politics in a fight for influence on a continent rich in raw materials and energy.” She details how the Chinese Communist Party seeks to use the school to build a coterie of autocracy-friendly African leaders who could help China build a reliable political bloc on a continent of growing economic and diplomatic importance. Interviews reveal Chinese teachers preach that the ruling party should be paramount and the merits of fierce intra-party discipline.

Her reporting is excellent, but none of China’s actions should surprise. Trade may have been one manifestation of China’s ambition, but it has never been the only one, nor was trade only for trade’s sake. Rather, as Michael Pillsbury shows in The Hundred-Year Marathon, the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy both spans generations and is more ambitious. Rather than simply make China wealthy, it seeks to make China the sole hegemon.

To replace the United States in this role requires reshaping the world order. Chinese officials have been blunt about such ambition. Long before President Xi Jinping took China’s helm, Chinese officials had talked about their desire to craft a new world order. In 1997, for example, Chinese Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the “Joint Russia-Chinese Declaration about a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New World Order” that would constrain if not supplant American hegemony. Just two years later, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the nucleus of what would soon become the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, issued the so-called Bishkek Declaration that declared, “The Parties believe that multi-polarity…contributes to the long-term stability of the international situation.” In 2001, it was the turn of Russian President Vladimir Putin to join Jiang Zemin in a call for “a just and fair new world order.” In 2005, Zheng Bijian, famous for coining the term “peaceful rise” to assuage Western concerns about Chinese ambitions, explained that “China…advocates a new international political and economic order one that can be achieved through incremental reforms and the democratization of international relations.”

Such embrace of multipolarity to weaken the United States is now standard within Chinese political discourse. Speaking at the ASEAN foreign minister meeting in September 2020, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi “urged the United States to follow the historical trend toward multipolarity in the world and democracy in international relations.” Xi frequently speaks of a “new type of great power relations.”

“Chinese-style modernization does not follow the old path of colonial plunder or the hegemony of strong countries,” he declared, while speaking by video to an array of political party leaders from around the globe.

It is against this backdrop that China seeks to solidify its gains in Africa. A scramble for Africa is nothing new. In the 19^th century, European powers carved up the continent. During the Cold War, Washington and Moscow viewed the continent through the lens of their own geopolitical competition. With the end of the Cold War, the United States forgot about Africa. President George H.W. Bush visited Egypt once, but never traveled to sub-Saharan Africa. President Bill Clinton waited until his second term before visiting sub-Saharan Africa. The pattern continued under George W. Bush and even Barack Obama, who had Kenyan ancestry. President Donald Trump, meanwhile, was contemptuous of the continent and never bothered to visit. When the president or secretaries of State would visit, they inevitably declared a new beginning and renewed commitment that quickly sputtered out. This was also the pattern with President Joe Biden’s administration, despite hosting US-Africa Leaders’ Summits.

Other countries, recognizing both Africa’s strategic and economic potential, have not been so dismissive and have sought to fill the vacuum left by US neglect. Within the continent, Morocco, Ethiopia, and South Africa have long played a game of influence. Revisionist states such as Iran and Turkey have also battled for economic and diplomatic influence on the continent. Russia, too, has made spotty advances. Its efforts to grab Mozambique’s hydrocarbon-rich Cabo Delgado province failed, but it has made great progress across the Sahel as French influence hemorrhages, and now seeks to extend its footprint into Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire.

China’s turn to Africa has been more noticeable and sustained. Since 2000, China has become the largest trading partner for almost every country in Africa. Whereas Washington lectures, Beijing builds. China built hospitals on main roads in Kinshasa and Bangui. Entire boarding gates in airline hubs like Addis Ababa appear filled with Chinese businessmen. China inaugurated its first overseas naval base in Djibouti, threatening to squeeze the American military out of one of its main logistical hubs. Current fighting between Taiwan-friendly (but unrecognized) Somaliland and China-friendly Somalia over the dusty town of Laascanood have the hallmarks of a China-Taiwan proxy war. Chinese leaders have long been astute at the power of debt-trap diplomacy, but African leaders are not stupid. They understand they must balance their creditors to immunize themselves against any predatory action. Ethiopia, for example, now welcomes European investment to balance China, while Rwanda turned to Turkish construction firms to prevent China from gaining too much leverage over the tiny country.

Nor does Beijing’s old strategy of bribing the man at top necessarily work. A case in point is the Democratic Republic of Congo. Chinese firms believed they had consolidated control over Congo’s rich lithium resources when they bribed President Joseph Kabila for concessions, but after Félix Tshisekedi succeeded him in 2019, he too wanted his cut; China had to renegotiate to grease the new patronage networks.

This brings us back to China’s new leadership academy for dictators. If Congo’s tentative democratic turn threatened Beijing’s long-term multi-trillion-dollar lithium interests, then what better insurance policy than to immunize the continent against democracy? Practically speaking, streamlining the palms Beijing needs to grease, or the politicians Chinese officials must call makes the practice of policy easier from Communist China’s point-of-view.

Chinese Communist officials neither understand nor tolerate democracy; they disdain it. While Africa has suffered recent setbacks on the road to democracy, it has still made great strides. With its new school in Tanzania, China seeks to reverse that. While the United States’ own indifference to African democracy is a lost opportunity, the Chinese strategy will nonetheless fall flat because Africans have agency. They suffered through decades of socialism, but now see the fruits of democracy and free-market reforms. Hundreds of millions of Africans have emerged from poverty and now fuel a middle class. Teaching autocracy and preaching a return to the past will never work. Rather, only those who treat Africans as equals on the road to prosperity will “win” the new great game.

Michael Rubin ([email protected]) is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: REUTERS/Alet Pretoriu

August 29, 2023

The Pacific Islands have consistently sought a stronger regional voice since the establishment of the Pacific Islands Forum in 1971, most recently manifesting in the Blue Pacific Continent.

But now increased attention from great powers threatens such regional efforts.

Over the past decade, concerns associated with the rise of China, particularly Beijing’s rapid naval modernization and growing strategic and commercial inroads in the region, have brought the Pacific Islands into the geopolitical limelight. The United Kingdom’s “Pacific Uplift” (2019), Indonesia’s “Pacific Elevation” (2019), New Zealand’s “Pacific Reset,” (2018) and Australia’s “Pacific Step-up” (2018) also reflect this trend. After the trilateral AUKUS deal garnered mixed reactions from the Pacific Islands, Australia’s Albanese administration has prioritized bilateral ties with the island nations, not only through high profile diplomatic visits but also by stabilizing relations with China and placing climate change back on the agenda.

The Pacific Islands feature as major partners in Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022) and the Roadmap for a 21st Century US-Pacific Islands Partnership (2022). The Partners in the Blue Pacific seeks to expand cooperation between the Pacific Islands and American partners on issues such as climate change and people-centered development. Under its Pacific Partnership Strategy, the United States has renewed the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with the Federal States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, while the agreement with the Republic of Palau has been extended. The Marshall Islands is yet to settle the renegotiation of the COFA treaty, with the lingering effects of Washington’s atomic testing during the 1940s and 1950s acting as a holdup. The Compacts oblige Washington to protect those nations and allow it access to their territories. Citizens of Compact nations can serve in the US military; significantly, Compact islands have a higher military participation rate than any US state.

Washington has also tried to strengthen its diplomatic presence. On his visit to Tonga in late July, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken criticized “problematic behavior” springing from China’s engagement in the region. It was his third visit to the Pacific Islands in two months. The visit closely followed the State Department’s announcement that the United States plans to ramp up American diplomatic presence in the region to “catch up” with Beijing, which has permanent diplomatic facilities in eight of the 12 Pacific Islands Washington recognizes. Furthermore, at the Compact Review Signing Ceremony with Palau, Blinken announced Washington will commit a whopping $7.1 billion to the Freely Associated States over the next two decades. The United States is also set to host a second summit with Pacific leaders this September.

China has stayed close on the heels of such developments. Beijing has not only replaced Taiwan as a major investor and aid provider in the region, thus expanding acceptance of its one-China Principle, but it has also criticized the “Band-Aid Diplomacy” of the West, describing it as a mere temporary fix to the problems faced by the Pacific Islands that fails to bring any real socioeconomic progress. China has thus emphasized the formation of the “China-Pacific Islands Community with a Shared Future” rooted in South-South Cooperation. Beijing has further enhanced its regional role from that of a predominantly commercial actor through the Belt and Road Initiative to a security provider under the Global Security Initiative. Qian Bo, China’s special envoy to the Pacific Islands, recently met Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown, who chairs the Pacific Islands Forum.

Such developments have drawn other powers to the region. In May 2023, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi unveiled a 12-point plan for the Pacific Islands focused on health care and community development at the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation summit in Port Moresby, highlighting the significance of the region for New Delhi’s Act East Policy. The occasion also marked the first official visit by an Indian prime minister to Papua New Guinea (PNG). India might also expand its solar infrastructure STAR-C initiative under the International Solar Alliance to several nations in the region.

France also has huge stakes in the region—with 1.6 million citizens across seven overseas territories, the largest Exclusive Economic Zone, and two sovereign forces with 2,700 military personnel—though its diplomatic influence remains modest. While pushing for a “French alternative” to the unfolding Sino-US competition in the region, Macron has promised Vanuatu financial assistance for security, combating climate change, and education on an unprecedented visit to  the independent Pacific Island nations undertaken by a French President. He has further promised to look into the dispute between Vanuatu and the French territory of New Caledonia and has also announced a new statute for New Caledonia, which will replace the 1998 Noumea Accord, while confirming the transfer of 200 more soldiers and 18 billion CFP francs (approximately $165 million) to the armed forces of New Caledonia.

Regionalism under threat?

Such developments are bound to impact the region enormously and the Pacific Islands are highly cautious about the loss of regionalism to great power competition. The 2019 State of Regionalism Report published by the Pacific Islands Forum noted that the best way of preventing the region from getting embroiled in great power competition is for the Pacific Islands to act collectively as a Blue Pacific Continent prioritizing sovereignty and leveraging benefits from all actors involved. ASEAN can serve as a lesson—while a strongly professed regional identity once helped it in safeguarding mutually held concerns and aspirations; growing external influence has fissured unity and weakened the region. Strengthening regionalism would hence allow the Pacific Islands to become friends with all and enemies to none.

The reality is more complex, however. In July 2023, the Solomon Islands and China agreed to enhance police cooperation as part of their security deal struck in 2022, elevating diplomatic ties to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” The 2022 agreement had heightened anxieties in the region. In March 2023, the United States, Australia and the UK unveiled details of the AUKUS plan as a response to China’s growing footprint in the Pacific, 18 months after the partnership was formally announced. Prime Minister Sogavare not only criticized Australia and New Zealand for “suddenly withdrawing financial support worth millions of dollars” (a claim both countries deny), but has also stated that “nothing” could stop him from seeking China’s help in policing if disorder broke out in the Solomon Islands. He is set to review a 2017 security treaty with Australia that provided police support to Honiara. Canberra views this as an opportunity to “revitalize the security relationship.” The no-confidence motion  recently raised against Vanuatu’s Prime Minister Ishmael Kalsakau over a bilateral security deal with Australia further reflects this trend as lawmakers worry about upsetting its major development partner, Beijing.

Others have stepped closer to the United States. Fijian President Ratu Wiliame Katonivere seeks to balance Chinese influence by strengthening relations with Western democracies, a major policy departure from former prime minister and interim president Frank Bainimarama. Fiji not only joined the Washington-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which seeks to lessen economic dependency on China, but also scrapped the memorandum of understanding on police training and exchange signed with China in 2011. Furthermore, Prime Minister Rabuka ended Chinese police presence in Fiji, citing differences in political and judicial systems. Officers from Australia and New Zealand will remain.

PNG presents a similar case. While Prime Minister Peter O’Neill shared close ties with Beijing, his successor, James Marape, has moved closer to the United States. In May 2023, the two nations inked a deal on defense and maritime cooperation reportedly allowing American aircrafts and vessels to access PNG’s territory more extensively.

Note, however, that Beijing remains not only the top lender to Fiji, but also a major export partner of PNG. As geopolitical tensions simmer, leaders of Vanuatu, Fiji, New Caledonia’s ruling FLNKS party, the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), PNG and Solomon Islands are deliberating on declaring a “neutral” position.

Turning challenges into opportunities

Such dependence casts a dense shadow of doubt on the ability of island nations to balance great power influence. Heavy economic reliance on any one external actor is also detrimental to the fragile island economies which have been hit hard by COVID. While Pacific Island states have denied taking sides, growing “Pacific militarization” not only threatens to fragment regionalism and hamper strategic neutrality, but might also overwhelm regional priorities such as climate change. For instance, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s endorsement of Japan’s discharge of treated nuclear wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear plant is “deeply concerning” for the Pacific Islands. To China, it is a win as it has tarnished Japan’s image as a credible ally.

Furthermore, leaning towards either China or the United States (such as in the case of the Solomon Islands, PNG, and Fiji) can create a wedge between Pacific Island nations and hamper bilateral cooperation thus impacting regionalism.

Despite this strategic tightrope, growing geopolitical interest in the region brings a myriad of opportunities to attain socioeconomic development and address environmental concerns. Yet to translate such developments into developmental opportunities without compromising sovereignty and autonomy, the Pacific Islands should focus on collective capacity building, including greater regional cooperation at official forums, integrated efforts at civil society building, empowering youth and women, and promoting stronger media literacy and independent media that strengthens their capacity to act in the regional interest.

Cherry Hitkari ([email protected]) is a Non-resident Vasey Fellow and Young Leader at Pacific Forum.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: Papua New Guinea government/Handout via REUTERS

August 28, 2023

Russia faces four potential military problems in the Indo-Pacific:

1. Vulnerability of the sea leg of its nuclear triad as part of the Pacific Fleet.
2. Escalation of tensions around Japan’s territorial claims to the Kuril Islands.
3. Large-scale regional armed conflicts, primarily on the Korean Peninsula, but also around Taiwan or in the South China Sea, and between India and China.
4. Shifts in strategic trends between Russia and China, and between Russia and India.

Russia’s regional security outlook revolves around these four problems.

The future deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the region by the United States and its allies (especially Japan and the Republic of Korea) is a direct threat to Russian strategic nuclear forces. These missiles could also lead to a clash in the Kuril Islands due to aggressive actions by Japan. The US Army and US Marine Corps both have programs nearing completion (LRHW Dark Eagle and SMRF Typhon for the former, and uncrewed Long Range Fires launchers for the latter). Japan is also actively developing such capabilities (including in the hypersonic domain), and the Republic of Korea has already fielded such weapons, namely the advanced missiles of the Hyunmoo family.

The integration of early warning and space situational awareness systems by the United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan should be considered in the same context. In the long term, this will likely result in the build-up of joint and integrated air and missile defense, as well as counterspace capabilities, including through the development and forward deployment of new land- and sea-based missile defence capabilities by those countries.

Meanwhile, the Australia-United Kingdom-United States trilateral partnership (dubbed AUKUS)—which will equip the Australian Defence Force with nuclear-powered submarines and long-range precision weapons and strengthen Australian anti-submarine warfare capabilities—will further increase threats both to the submarine and surface forces of the Russian Pacific Fleet.  Australian submarines will free up US Navy forces and assets to counter the Russian Navy, and, possibly, patrol in the Northern Pacific themselves. The fielding of increasingly capable anti-submarine warfare patrol aircraft also contributes to increasing vulnerabilities for Russia.

None of these developments are explicitly labeled “anti-Russian,” but capability matters more than policy.

Adversary pressure in the immediate vicinity of the Russian sea, air, and land borders in the Indo-Pacific is also maintained by freedom-of-navigation operations, flights of bomber aircraft (within the so-called Dynamic Force Employment doctrine), and reconnaissance flights by the United States and its allies—including during exercises and tests of Russian strategic nuclear forces. The United States’ (and allies’) interests in establishing and enforcing so-called “air defense identification zones”—a fictional concept that often leads to media headlines about “airspace violations”—create additional pressure.

The “materialization” of US extended nuclear deterrence, expressed not only in a declarative “nuclear umbrella” for allies, but also in the possible forward-deployment of nuclear warheads, adds an additional dimension to these problems.

Moreover, there seem to be changes to the way extended deterrence operates. US nuclear capabilities protect “US allies and partners,” but the latter’s conventional forces are developing a role in facilitating and supporting US missions involving nuclear weapons. To put it more bluntly: enhanced and expanded allied non-nuclear capabilities now enable US nuclear missions, aligning with the new US concept of integrated deterrence.

As for possible armed conflicts in the region—be it in the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, or South Asia—each would have a direct effect on Russia because Russia is a Pacific country. The consequences of such conflicts would lead to dramatic changes in supply chains (which already face immense pressure due to the breakdown of relations between Russia and “the West”), the shake-up of the regional markets (which are increasingly important for Russian exports and imports), and migration waves, and thus directly affect the Russian economy. The effects would be even greater because of the inevitable involvement of China, Russia’s strategic partner.

So far, Russia has managed to maintain relatively stable and even fruitful relations with both China and India. (Its relationship with Japan suffers, however, and the relationship with Republic of Korea will probably follow suit both due to Seoul’s ever-growing involvement in providing military industrial support to Western countries and to Moscow’s possible cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.) To be sure, the future of Russia-China and Russia-India relations will depend not only on Moscow, but also on Beijing and New Delhi. Given increasing strategic tensions, augmented by the US interest in rallying India to its side against China (as well as in limiting Russia-India cooperation), established strategic relations might evolve. These changes might not lead to direct military conflicts but could well drive Moscow to greatly re-prioritize Russian military development.

Russia’s military security depends squarely on the Russian Far East. The Pacific Fleet has the most advanced SSBNs of the Borei family, new surface ships and submarines with Kalibr cruise missiles are entering service, anti-ship and air/missile defense missile batteries are deployed to the Kuril Islands and throughout the region, and even a new heavy bomber regiment might be established. The Russian Navy and Long-Range Aviation also routinely hold joint patrols with their Chinese counterparts. Furthermore, the deployment of US-made intermediate-range, ground-launched missiles in the region (which seems inevitable) would mean the so-called “moratorium” on such weapons no longer stands, and Russia will likely deploy similar capabilities as well, with everyone’s security undermined.

But Russia has bigger vulnerabilities, in that it lacks general-purpose naval forces: submarines, surface ships, and aviation. At this point, it is unclear if the Russian defense industry can address this problem, given the priority it gives to the Western front. Growing military-technical cooperation with China might offer a solution, however.

Still, if Russia wants to remain a relevant military power both in the region and globally, Moscow must do more, otherwise even the ability to sustain the regionally deployed elements of its nuclear triad will be questioned—both by adversaries and partners.

Dmitry Stefanovich ([email protected]) is Research Fellow at the Center for International Security, IMEMO RAS.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: Russian Defense Ministry via Reuters

August 22, 2023

Is war between the United States and China inevitable? This was the central question asked of panelists at the opening session of this year’s Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur. My answer was “No, it is not inevitable, but it is no longer unimaginable or as unlikely as it was a few short years ago, and the trends are going in the wrong direction.”

In the United States, there is growing bipartisan consensus on the need to be tougher on China and the upcoming presidential election season will make it difficult, if not impossible, for President Biden to appear soft in the face of Chinese provocation.

Chinese assertiveness toward Taiwan and most recently toward the Philippines, a formal US treaty ally, increases the prospects of an accidental (or deliberate) act spiraling out of control. Taiwan presidential election politics, and Beijing’s perceptions of its implications, add uncertainty.

As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) improves its capabilities to the point that it believes it is capable of taking Taiwan by force—I don’t think the PLA is there yet but more important is the PLA’s, or more accurately, Xi Jinping’s assessment of where they are—the possibility of PRC military action against Taiwan grows. So, tensions are unlikely to subside or the prospects of direct conflict  will remain.

Let me stress that I don’t believe either side is looking for a fight. I have described US China policy as involving four “C’s,” which I have further described as “three do’s and a don’t.” The three do’s are cooperate whenever possible, compete where appropriate, and confront when necessary. The fourth C, the don’t, is to avoid direct conflict until or unless it is thrust upon us.

The three C’s have been the essential elements of US China policy for decades. What’s changed has been the degree of emphasis behind each. Over a decade ago, the Obama administration, at least initially, stressed cooperation; it offered an outstretched hand to those who would unclench their fist. Today, the emphasis is on competition and confrontation. I can sum up the reason for the change in two words, and they are NOT Donald Trump.

President Trump pursued some policies, and adopted some approaches, that made matters worse, or at least more difficult. But, while Trump’s bedside manner may have been harsh, his diagnosis and prescription were correct: China has been gaming the system and has failed to honor its World Trade Organization commitments. What was (and remains) missing can be summed up in a single word: reciprocity.

Meanwhile, my two-word description explaining the US change in emphasis is “Xi Jinping.”

President Obama started with the right policy, but for the wrong China. His policy fit a China still governed by Deng Xiaoping Thought. China has abandoned Deng Xiaoping Thought. “Hide your strength and bide your time” has been replaced by “Wolf Warriors,” who remind China’s neighbors that China is a big country and they’re not. Collective leadership and term/age limits to prevent another Mao have been replaced by the new Mao, who has de facto made himself “emperor for life.” State-owned enterprises have been revitalized rather than phased out. It doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white, as long as it subscribes to Xi Jinping Thought. To get rich is no longer glorious; it now results in a target being painted on your back. And “one country, two systems,” along with the legally binding international treaty that was supposed to ensure basic freedoms of the people of Hong Kong, is now null and void, a “scrap of paper,” as described by Beijing.

The odds of the people of Taiwan accepting such a formulation are now somewhat less than zero. Meanwhile, Taiwan Strait centerline agreements, aimed at preventing accidental conflict, have been rendered moot, given near-daily PLA Air Force violations, not to mention missile and drone overflights of Taiwan-held territory.

PRC colleagues see things differently, of course. From Beijing’s perspective, Washington is the source of all problems. While I could easily draw up a list of what Washington should do better or differently, Chinese colleagues find themselves unable, or at least unwilling, to identify Chinese actions that are problematic. To do so would imply criticism of Xi Jinping, which would not be career-enhancing. It’s difficult to find solutions if you cannot recognize that Chinese actions are a major part of the problem.

One case in point: China created man-made islands on top of disputed low-tide elevation reefs in the South China Sea and then illegally, by almost everyone’s interpretation of international law, declared 12-mile limits around them and warned ships and aircraft to stay away. The United States (among others), intent on “flying and sailing anywhere allowed by international law,” refuses to comply. My Chinese colleagues tell me that US freedom-of-navigation operations are the source of the problem, even though the root cause is Chinese territorial claims related to these illegal islands, which have been heavily fortified despite President Xi looking President Obama in the eye and telling him they would not be militarized.

Conference organizers asked if cooperation on common interests could survive further bifurcation. Washington hopes so, hence the visit to Beijing of John Kerry, the US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, and Janet Yellen, the US Secretary of the Treasury, to talk about the broader economic relationship. Still, despite a mutual desire for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, Beijing refuses to take firm measures against Pyongyang as it repeatedly violates legally binding United Nations Security Council resolutions. And, despite its professed commitment to non-interference, respect for sovereignty, and no-first-use or threatened use of nuclear weapons, Beijing refuses to condemn Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” (which everyone else calls an invasion and act of war), while continuing to profess a “no limits” relationship. Beijing also continues to reject military-to-military talks, essential to guard against accidental conflict, as well as US proposals for strategic nuclear discussions. Bifurcation seems well underway, despite Washington’s willingness, even eagerness, to talk.

The final question was “how can regional states navigate around these tensions?” The answer is “very carefully.”

Countries will do what’s in their perceived national interests. But they should ask themselves, if they fail to condemn the blatant Russian violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty, what signal are they sending to other potential violators? Maps from the time of Peter the Great show Ukraine as part of the Russian Empire. All Central Asia, the so-called “Stans,” likewise were controlled by the Czars. Are they next? Meanwhile, how different are Russian claims of sovereignty over Ukraine—not a “real country” according to Putin—from Chinese claims about nine dotted lines and the South China Sea? Speaking of which, how many more decades will it take to develop a South China Sea Code of Conduct? Which countries are supporting ASEAN efforts to return democracy to Myanmar as opposed to empowering and arming the junta? If China follows Moscow’s example and tries to take Taiwan by force, what happens next? (Check the Pacific Forum website for an answer to the “If Taiwan Falls” question.)

The central question that should be asked today is, what’s more threatening to regional security over the long run, Washington’s “Cold War Mentality” (as Beijing defines US attempts to revitalize and strengthen its defensive alliances and partnerships) or Beijing’s “Middle Kingdom Mentality,” as exemplified by its Wolf Warrior diplomacy, economic coercion, and occasional diplomatic hostage-taking? Neighbors should keep this question in mind as they figure out how to navigate these troubled waters.

For more from this author, visit his recent chapter of Comparative Connections.

Photo credit: Kevin Lamarque/File Photo/Reuters

August 22, 2023

This PacNet was developed as a part of the United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Next-Generation Leaders Dialogue to encourage creative thinking about how this vital partnership can be fostered. For the previous entries please click here, here, and here.

In April 2022, the United States launched its “Declaration for the Future of the Internet.” It asserts that human rights and democratic values must remain central to future technological development, innovation, and investment. Along with Japan, South Korea, and 58 other signatories, the United States argued that universal values should be embedded and enhanced at every stage of technological design, implementation, and diffusion. It’s time for the United States and its allies to match words with actions and ensure that developing countries have access to the resources they need to make that future a global reality.

The year following the declaration’s release saw numerous instances where Washington and its allies took steps laying the groundwork for an international digital ecosystem that better reflects liberal ideals, such as the establishment of a multilateral code of conduct surrounding export controls on tech with the potential to harm human rights. As two of the United States’ closest allies, Japan and South Korea are particularly well-placed to lead the charge, both within and outside of their shared region, given their respective global reputations as democratic tech leaders.

Both countries rank highly as competitive hubs of scientific and technological innovation via the Bloomberg Innovation Index and the United Nations’ WIPO Global Innovation Index. Moreover, in a joint statement announcing South Korea’s plan to host the third Summit for Democracy, the United States and Korea promoted “ensuring new and emerging technologies work for, and not against, democratic societies” as a priority. Yet, despite this capacity and commitment to bring more countries into a global and free internet architecture, much work remains to meet the vast needs of the developing world.

Global GDP growth has reached pre-pandemic levels, but a combination of rising inflation, dollar-induced depreciation, and loss of trade demand has given way to cost-of-living crises that exacerbate preexisting inequalities worldwide. While all countries lost out on growth that never materialized, emerging economies are expected to lose more within the same 2020-2024 period: from an estimated cumulative output loss of 30.4 to 33.8%, compared to advanced economies’ loss of 15.6 to 18.3%.

This, in turn, reflects the uneven spread of quality technological development—according to the World Economic Forum, over one-third of the global population remains detached from the digital economy despite 95% being “in range of some form of connectivity.”

More worrying is that many of these developing nations lacking in tech infrastructure are often already debt distressed. An estimated $2.5 trillion in financing is needed through 2026 for these countries to continue servicing pre-existing debt, not to mention any new debt from the pandemic-induced growth rut.

Comprehensive technological development—if spearheaded now by the United States and its strongest tech-enabled allies like Japan and South Korea—can play an immensely impactful and equalizing role for these nations. By 2025, the evolution of the digital economy is due to reap an expected value of $100 trillion.

China stands as one of the few major powers attempting to meet the technological and infrastructural demands of the developing world at scale, such as via its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This effort has not been without its controversies, however, with critics alleging that it seeks to reshape the world in an increasingly illiberal image most benefitting China’s interests by diluting and, ultimately, dismantling the long-standing multilateral development-finance institutions, norms, and standards predicated on the preservation of human rights and liberal values. Recent international convenings, such as the 2023 Munich Security Conference and the subsequent G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Summit, affirmed growing consensus views that China’s efforts to equip the developing world with tech is something that must be countered. The 2023 Munich Security Conference Report, for example, purports that “China is spearheading a group of autocratic states intent on promoting their techno-authoritarian vision.”

Wealthy democracies must step up and offer a feasible tech alternative to developing countries. Regardless of Beijing’s underlying motivations, its indigenously developed technologies tend to come embedded with certain behaviors, standards, and norms that clash with values central to modern liberal democracy. Constant government surveillance is a feature with authoritarian applications—enabled by pre-made virtual “backdoors” (such as the secretly installed one allegedly used by Beijing to spy on the African Union’s headquarters after its construction) and the expansive mandate of China’s 2017 National Cybersecurity Law (which allows the government unfettered access to data held by any Chinese entity). Constrained personal privacy and limited freedom of speech are other standards that could be detrimental to human rights if exported to newly digitized developing countries.

The reality, however, reveals China as the only country willing to get involved as a creditor and investor at the scale that is needed globally. There are countless examples of digital connectivity projects across the globe—involving smart cities, fiber-optic cables, 5G, and other ICT infrastructure—where Beijing has taken the lead via its enterprising tech companies. Aiding these companies, like Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, and Xiaomi, was their significant first-mover advantage from being long-established players in emerging markets that traditional investors wrote off as unprofitable.

The United States should thus work with its tech-proficient partners to provide a concrete, credible, and compelling alternative. As countries with national champions that are highly competitive in the tech field, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are uniquely well-placed to enter the market to advance developing countries’ tech sectors while also encouraging norms more in line with democratic values. Google, Samsung, and Sony, for example, are all massive players in the sector capable of providing high-quality tech consumer goods as well as fundamental infrastructure critical for digital transformation.

An area of significant partnership potential for the trilateral grouping lies in focused, joint investment in local tech companies across Asia that show a significant commitment to democratic norms, processes, or values. The US-led Tech4Democracy initiative, which involves a series of challenges for local startups across the globe to compete for funding and recognition, presents a ready framework that South Korea and Japan could tailor specifically for the Asian region. An Asia-centric version of the initiative would galvanize grass-roots investment in the types of values-centric technology that the original Declaration for the Future of the Internet calls for. Successful Tech4Democracy Asia participants would go on to benefit from the wealth of technological knowledge and expertise enjoyed by Seoul and Tokyo, eventually creating future technologies capable of competing with Chinese options lacking in democratic safeguards.

Overall, investing nations should ensure that the eventual “democratic option” presented is an equally affordable alternative to Chinese tech; this conversation should be a continuing one that empowers emerging economies as agents of their own development, and not as passive vehicles within the wider great power competition. The private sector of each investor nation, then, will need to be incentivized and mobilized to engage within these markets in new and meaningful ways; something that undoubtedly will be more difficult for democratically governed states than authoritarian ones, but well-worth the normative impact in the end. In this regard, the United States would benefit significantly from leaning on the experience of South Korea and Japan, both of which have long histories of public-private partnerships with their domestic tech sectors.

Declaring the norms of a digital future is meaningless if not paired with complementary action—and developing country leaders have evidently become disillusioned with the rhetoric-first approach. Until wealthy democracies are willing to front the costs of enriching emerging markets with technologies currently largely segregated to high-income markets, there is simply no reason for developing nations to deny the only other option out there.

As host for the next Summit for Democracy, South Korea faces a huge potential opportunity to drive the crafting of an alternative to Chinese tech in a dynamic region eager for investment and competition. Fostering the next generation of democratically minded tech stands as one promising avenue, but such an initiative will undoubtedly take significant time, money, and effort. For now, leaders across the developing world—regardless of regime—know that to get cheap, ready tech to improve the lives of their citizenry, China is the way to go.

Tabatha T. Anderson ([email protected]) is a master’s student in international cyber policy at Stanford University and a geopolitical analyst at a cybersecurity firm. Views expressed in this piece are hers alone.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: (Photo by PIUS UTOMI EKPEI / AFP) (Photo by PIUS UTOMI EKPEI/AFP via Getty Images)

August 21, 2023

The outputs from the US-Japan-ROK Trilateral meeting at Camp David last week were impressive. They ranged from the geostrategic to values and principles and to actual mechanisms to effect policies. Starting with the Camp David Principles of shared values, mutual respect, and concern for peace and stability in the region, working through the Commitment to Consult, and then delivering concrete actions in the Fact Sheet and Joint Statement (also called the “Spirit of Camp David”).

While the summit was the fourth between the three leaders, it is clearly the culmination of previous discussions and reveals a desire by the United States to institutionalize the relationship so that it outlasts any future Korean and Japanese tensions. After all, the US-Japan-ROK trilateral is actually the oldest minilateral—with a longevity that far exceeds the US-Japan-Australia trilateral or the recent newcomer AUKUS—but it has precious little to show for it. The Biden administration should be commended for seizing the opportunity that President Yoon Suk-yeol’s government offered in terms of his willingness to repair ties with Japan and engage with the United States on the Indo-Pacific. The only question now is whether the Camp David agreement has put too much on the table at once, making execution difficult.

The structure of the readouts is rather neat. It’s clear that the outcomes are to sit atop the Commitment to Consult and the Camp David Principles. While the latter readout sounds rather anodyne to American readers—respect for international law, shared norms, and common values—any reader of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and National Security Strategy will instantly recognize in them the values bedrock of the US competition with the People’s Republic of China. What makes this statement particularly noteworthy is that traditionally Japan and South Korea rarely expressed their foreign policy in these terms, right up until the end of the Cold War. Seeing them join in this statement—and knowing of the personal support by both President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida for their inclusion—shows how far the three countries have come on common assumptions. The principles statement on Taiwan is also remarkably bold: “We reaffirm the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community.” This warning to China—for that is what it is—shows the spirit of the administration’s “integrated deterrence” framework.

Looking at the Fact Sheet and Joint Declaration, there are a few differences, though both sweep broadly over the same areas. Perhaps the most impressive part is the huge leap that the trilateral has taken as institutionalized security architecture. While previously institutionalized—famously in the Trilateral Coordinating Oversight Group (TCOG) in the late 1990s—this did not survive the early 2000s. The Camp David agreement has replaced the TCOG model with multiple ministerial tracks expected to take place annually, ranging from the already existing summits to the foreign and defense ministerials. Added to these, however, are two new annual ministerials, one for finance and one for commerce and industry. While commendable, this only adds to the number of ministerials that confront the bureaucracies of all three in other fora and one wonders how the ministers will actually be able to handle the added pressure. Certainly, groupings like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) will also compete with the trilateral for the time and energy of ministerial staff, and we may see even more outsourcing of the policy outlines to the private sector and think tank sector in all three countries, where policy discussions touch upon sectors like energy, critical and emerging technologies, and supply chains.

What stands out are the economic initiatives and the newly formed Indo-Pacific security frameworks. The three countries have agreed to an “early warning system” that will share information on “possible disruptions to global supply chains” to “confront and overcome economic coercion.” However, it sounds as though the three countries either have not decided exactly how they will bolster themselves against economic retaliation or, as plausibly demonstrated by the warning system, coordination on semiconductor and chip manufacturing capabilities will remain limited for now, either to bilateral levels or within the private sector. Although the growing closeness of the three countries may help insulate ROK and Japanese economies against retaliation by China, they have yet to outline specific countermeasures. Furthermore, internal issues such as the allocation of subsidies to address industrial chip capacity building in the ROK and Japan under the CHIPS Act remain unaddressed. Much like the US-ROK summit in April, the summit skirted a direct mention of semiconductor issues, instead showing an implicit focus on supply chain resilience and critical and emerging technologies through the Trilateral National Laboratories Cooperation and the Trilateral Economic Security Dialogue.

The commitment to build relations with ASEAN and Pacific Island nations is also a commendable step in developing a reliable trilateral relationship with nations across the Indo-Pacific and an attempt to avoid the ASEAN backlash occasioned by AUKUS and the Quad. The Trilateral Development Finance Cooperation will build inter-trilateral connections since the ROK lacks an infrastructure financing mechanism, as opposed to the US and Japan, which share financing responsibilities through the Quad. As the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) are both experienced in building freshwater and gas infrastructure, the US may turn to its skill in financing in order to develop public goods for the region in the form of infrastructure. They will also seek to coordinate disaster relief efforts as natural disasters increasingly impact Indo-Pacific countries. Then, there is the introduction of a Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation Framework, which provides a broad forum for collaboration on potential maritime issues such as coast guard operations, maritime domain awareness, countering illegal unregulated fishing, and the development of maritime blue-water capabilities. The framework gives South Korea the flexibility to negotiate the ROK Navy’s role in the maritime domain given the recent maritime emphasis of the ROK Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The summit at Camp David has set an ambitious agenda for the future of the trilateral relationship. The numerous initiatives cover vulnerable regions of the Indo-Pacific and build on national strengths by focusing on critical areas such as cybersecurity and critical and emerging technologies. There is a clear indication that the trilateral relationship has moved from its focus on the Peninsula to being a regional body, emphasizing cooperation with ASEAN and Pacific Island nations, and taking a clear stance on Taiwan. It also creates several avenues for the three to work on economic security and maritime security. It will be interesting to see how successful those two tracks will be, relative to each other. The trilateral meeting at Camp David is historic and has made immense gains. However, it remains to be seen how many of these initiatives will make progress and whether the attempts to institutionalize the relationship will succeed. For the sake of peace in the region, let’s hope that they do.

Dr. John Hemmings ([email protected]) is Senior Director for Indo-Pacific Foreign and Security Policy at Pacific Forum.

Hanah Park ([email protected]) is a research intern at Pacific Forum.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein