The production of electric vehicle batteries is among the greatest vulnerabilities in the global supply chain as China enjoys a near monopoly at the top of a hierarchical network. To adequately counter China’s dominance over the sector, the US should turn to allies in East Asia, Rob York and Akhil Ramesh write in a report for the Hinrich Foundation.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s attendance at the G7 summit May 19-21 in Hiroshima capped almost three months of high-level and unprecedented diplomatic endeavors. As part of its aim to make South Korea a “global pivotal state,” the Yoon administration has increased efforts to expand its regional and global stature that reflect Seoul’s growing political, economic, and cultural influence.
Since March, the administration has: proposed a compensation plan to address the forced labor issue with Japan; paid a state visit to Japan as the first South Korean president in 12 years; resumed shuttle diplomacy by welcoming Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to Seoul; concluded a state visit to Washington that involved an address to a joint meeting of Congress; and participated in the G7 meeting (as only the second South Korean president to do so).
South Korea first attended the G7 summit in June 2021 under President Moon Jae-in, following an invitation by then-US President Donald Trump to the 2020 G7 summit (subsequently canceled due to COVID-19). At that time, Trump had also proposed inviting South Korea to join an expanded G10 or G11 group. As the first South Korean president to attend the G7 summit, Moon’s participation highlighted a turning point in South Korea’s presence on the global stage, as it became the 10th-largest economy that year and emerged as a leading success story during the onset of the pandemic.
Yoon has effectively leveraged South Korea’s increasing global influence, as evident during his first G7 summit. On the sidelines of the summit, Yoon held bilateral meetings with the leaders of Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Comoros, and Ukraine—highlighting both South Korea’s expanding international reach and growing demand from allies and partners to see South Korea play a larger role abroad. Yoon, in particular, reinforced Seoul’s efforts to align itself alongside the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to address regional challenges and provide infrastructure and developmental aid by meeting with Quad country leaders. Yoon also participated in a trilateral meeting with US President Biden and Kishida during which the three leaders agreed to enhance trilateral cooperation to “new heights” in addressing North Korea’s growing missile and nuclear threats, economic security, and regional strategic coordination. In his speech to G7 member countries, Yoon emphasized South Korea’s continued commitment to upholding the international rule of law and the need to protect freedom and peace in both Ukraine and North Korea.
The most notable takeaways from Yoon’s first G7 attendance are the normalization and strengthening of trilateral US-Japan-South Korea cooperation and South Korea’s increasing role in international cooperation and development initiatives. Yoon’s meeting with Biden and Kishida marked the third trilateral meeting since his inauguration, with a fourth proposed for the summer. Yoon’s efforts to improve bilateral relations with Japan have facilitated regular trilateral military exercises in the region, as well as set the foundation for expanding trilateral cooperation to areas beyond the traditional security domain.
Additionally, Yoon’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the first meeting between the two leaders since the war in Ukraine broke out, reaffirmed South Korea’s provision of non-lethal and humanitarian aid and pledged South Korean participation in Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction, with Yoon previously suggesting the possibility of providing lethal aid under certain conditions. Yoon’s commitment to partnerships on global health, international development, and climate change further highlighted South Korea’s continuing progress toward expanding its assistance to countries around the world to have a meaningful presence on the global stage.
However, Yoon’s diplomatic endeavors have provoked concern from critics who argue that the Yoon administration’s value diplomacy is exacerbating the “China risk” to South Korean national interests and stress the need for South Korea to quickly restore high-level diplomacy with China to manage such risks. China has already criticized the G7 summit for manipulating China-related issues and the United States for fomenting divisions among Asian countries by pulling Japan and South Korea into a potential proxy war against China.
In an apparent response to the Yoon administration’s G7 participation, China has reportedly blocked all access within the country to Naver, South Korea’s largest search portal, on May 22. Whether China’s action is only the beginning of a series of retaliatory measures meant to signal warnings to the Yoon administration or a sign of continued downturn in China-South Korea relations remains to be seen. However, it is clear that the Yoon administration will continue to pursue strengthened alignment and cooperation with the United States in pursuit of its values-based diplomacy and realization of status as a global pivotal state.
The most important task facing the South Korean government in this regard is the need to maintain the domestic support and consensus necessary to continue pursuing Yoon’s desired foreign policy agenda. Particularly due to the possibility of Chinese retaliation and the economic risks that accompany a weakened China-South Korea relationship, the Yoon administration should clearly convey the benefits to the South Korean public of greater alignment with the United States (and Japan) and an enhanced South Korean role in the global arena.
Furthermore, South Korea should continue creating and bolstering minilateral partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region so as to expand its foreign policy influence beyond its immediate neighborhood and gain recognition as a formidable player within the international community. South Korea’s recent election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council will further support such efforts. As such, the United States should expand the membership for groupings such as the Quad and G7 and support South Korean inclusion in these expanded forums. Doing so would not only allow South Korea to increase the reach and depth of its global contributions, but the United States would also be strengthening a key member of its network of like-minded partnerships in countering the challenges posed by authoritarian regimes.
Jennifer Ahn ([email protected]) is the Research Associate for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. All views expressed are her own.
PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.
Photo: Korea-US-Japan Summit in Hiroshima on May 21, 2023 by Kim Yong Wii/Republic of Korea Office of the President.
Satellite imagery released by Maxar Technologies in January 2023, revealing new construction on Myanmar’s Great Coco Island, has raised concerns and questions. The imagery discloses an extended airport runway and two new widened hangars next to it. A report from Chatham House Policy Institute says that the runway seems freshly lengthened to 2,300 meters (7,500 feet) from 1,300 meters 10 years ago, and the new hangars enlarged by approximately 40 meters. The extensive nature of this development provokes suspicions as to whether the infrastructure under construction is a Chinese espionage base for its military expansion into the Indian Ocean.
Why China?
China has been a friend to the Myanmar military since the late 1980s. Even when Myanmar was isolated during the junta’s rule in the 1990s and 2000s, China remained a supportive partner of the regime. Despite the harmonious relations with the civilian government during the democratic transition of 2011-2020, China has always wanted to keep closer ties with the Myanmar military for economic and security reasons. The 2021 coup has strengthened the Myanmar military’s relationship with China and increased Beijing’s sway over the country. The presence of a Chinese intelligence base on the Coco Islands, long rumored among the international security community, had little to no evidence before the satellite imagery’s release.
Given the prevailing instability across the country, the Myanmar military cannot carry out the ongoing construction on the Great Coco Island without China; only the latter has both the willingness and capability to develop an airport on the remote island.
Why would China secretly—not publicly—develop such infrastructure? What is the project’s goal, in the short or long term?
While not part of the Belt and Road Initiative, the infrastructure development taking place on the Coco Islands reminds of other projects under the BRI in other parts of the world, as these projects often generate controversy and criticism. Specifically, rumors have swirled that these projects serve China’s regional military and security objectives, rather than the needs of the communities they take place in.
For instance, in 2018 and 2019, Koh Kong province in Cambodia underwent the Dara Sakor Airport Development project funded by China’s Union Development Group. The extreme difficulty of attracting visitors to Koh Kong Beachside resort makes the development of an international airport an illogical decision. Dara Sakor, deviating from the initial plan to develop an international airport for commercial airliners, developed a long runway (10,500 feet) with a “tight turning bay” favored by jet fighters. The Dara Sakor investment zone covers 20% of Cambodia’s coastline and lies close to the Ream Naval Base, granted to China for 30 years in return for the funding required to renovate the naval base. Although the developer insisted that the airport will be for civilian use, international observers immediately criticized the project as benefitting Beijing’s military strategy.
Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, another China-sponsored infrastructure project, also raised security concerns. In 2017, Sri Lanka leased a 70% stake in the port to China Merchants Ports Holding Company Limited (CM Port) for 99 years under a concession agreement signed by Colombo’s cabinet of ministers, keeping the remaining 30% under Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA). Although the CM Port and SLPA ostensibly jointly manage the port’s commercial operations, observers still consider the port a Chinese debt trap. As with Dara Sakor, the Hambantota port is poorly connected to the rest of the country, prompting questions as to its purpose. Some analysts believe China could potentially use the Hambantota Port as a pretext to establish a security base due to its strategic location for the import of energy from the Middle East.
Why Coco Islands?
As with the projects above, the Coco Islands’ remote location, poorly connected to the rest of the country, prompts questions as to whether its airport construction will eventually provide critical infrastructure for China, facilitating future military expansion. The Islands are remote from and poorly connected to the rest of the country. This seems consistent, however, with the PLA’s naval base expansion in Djibouti and China’s current aspiration to set up a permanent military base in Equatorial Guinea.
China considers the Atlantic Ocean important for its exports and the Indian Ocean crucial for its energy and raw material requirements. China has and will continue to undertake infrastructure projects along the maritime route as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. The suspicion and concerns over the China-developed infrastructure mainly arise from the lack of transparency and mysterious nature of the relationship, given the previously mentioned cases of BRI construction in corrupt states.
The Coco Islands’ undisclosed construction, along with other infrastructure ventures in its vicinity, has revived the “String of Pearls” Theory, with the Coco Islands as “beads” in China’s strategy to expand its military presence. According to this theory, China will persist in establishing its economic and military footholds in or around the Indian Ocean by investing in dual-use infrastructure development projects. The Maldives, Seychelles, and Madagascar can expect similar projects sooner or later. However, it will remain crucial to observe how China handles tensions in Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, key BRI infrastructure on China Pakistan Economic Corridor.
All in all, the ongoing construction of an airport on the Great Coco Island suggests China’s unwavering determination to broaden its sphere of influence. As Myanmar faces isolation, China sees an opportunity. If it wishes to ease such doubts and suspicions, China should establish a mechanism for sustainable transparency to demonstrate its sincere and responsible economic cooperation. Without transparency, China will find it hard to justify the development of infrastructure of such questionable use.
Furthermore, other major powers, namely the United States, European Union, and possibly India, should enhance their active engagement in the Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean subregions through political discussion and/or security cooperation with ASEAN member states to appropriately respond to the expanding influence of China. It is crucial to explore constructive measures with Myanmar’s neighbors that promote a balanced regional environment, foster ASEAN’s centrality, and ensure collective stability and prosperity.
Shwe Yee Oo ([email protected]) is Resident Nonproliferation Fellow at Pacific Forum.
PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.
Photo: Chinese President Xi Jinping in front of PRC and Myanmar’s flags in 2019 by Fred Dufour of Reuters.
Despite social progress brought about by economic development in the past decades, women in South Asia continue to bear the brunt of disproportionately distributed unremunerated care work. Unpaid care work refers to all unremunerated services provided within a household that involve catering to the needs of its members. Such activities include cooking, looking after children and elderly, production for subsistence, collection of everyday necessities such as fuel, washing clothes, etc. Of these activities, childcare, cooking, and cleaning occupy nearly 85% of the total time spent by women on unpaid care work globally. While unpaid care work supports economic activities, it remains absent from both gross domestic production (GDP) calculations and developmental policy formulations.
Time use surveys (TUS) show that developing nations portray greater gender disparity in the amount of time spent on care work than developed nations. This inequality is defined by both macroeconomic factors such as the state of the national economy as well as microeconomic factors such as personal incomes, with those in the lower rungs being more disadvantaged. A 2018 report of the International Labor Organization (ILO) noted that women engage in nearly 80% of unpaid care work hours in the Asia-Pacific region, which is 4.1 times more than men. This leads to “time poverty” which leaves women with little to no time to participate in paid work, let alone recreational activities.
The driving factors behind such disproportionate share of unpaid care work include unequal access to the labor market; socio-cultural (gender) norms; lack of social care infrastructure; and the legal and institutional environment. These interrelated factors are further defined by age, class, ethnicity, and spatio-temporal factors such as regional disparities. Even if women participate in paid economic activities, unpaid care work either falls on women as a “double burden” or is outsourced to domestic helpers instead of being redistributed among men and women within the household. These domestic helpers, who too are mostly women, in turn depend on women in their own families for their share of unpaid care work. This creates a dichotomy where one woman’s freedom binds the feet of another. Furthermore, exposure to long term or high intensity unpaid care work cause extreme physical and emotional stress that might lead to serious psychiatric and physical morbidities.
Unpaid care work thus stands as a major albeit invisibilized non-traditional security threat to women, for it does not just impact their lifespan and quality of life; hamper their prospects for socioeconomic progress, political participation, access to healthcare and education but also limits their life choices and agency thus preventing them from realizing their full potential. As climate change becomes more conspicuous, women’s share of unpaid care work such as fetching water, gathering firewood, etc. increases. The impact of unpaid care work on women thus needs to be addressed in congruence with other threats to human security.
South Asia in Perspective
While South Asia is a vibrant region with diverse cultural, linguistic, regional, socioeconomic and political distinctions, most communities follow a patriarchal, patrilocal kinship system where men are seen as the primary breadwinners and women, as primary caregivers. Traditionally, women have limited inheritance rights and their expected roles as full time caregivers severely hamper their economic activities outside the household; this is in addition to restrictions imposed on their mobility owing to concerns of guarding their “chastity” and “family honor” in some communities. A “good wife” and “good mother” is expected to completely devote herself to cater to the needs of her family members, those who fail to comply are often dubbed as “deviant” or “bad” women. Unpaid care work remains highly invisibilized across South Asia which is viewed as a “duty” that women are expected to render out of “love” for the family. However, it is possible for a woman to love her family and also expect that household tasks are evenly distributed among family members in order to avoid oppressing any one individual more than the others.
Nevertheless, for the vast majority of women living in the Asia-Pacific, unpaid care work is burdensome and limiting. A United Nations report noted that women spend nearly 5.867 hours (352 minutes) per day on unpaid care work in India as compared to just 51.8 minutes spent by men. In Pakistan, women spend 11 hours more than men on unpaid care work. In Bangladesh, women spend 11.7 hours as compared to 1.6 hours spent by men. In Nepal, women spend 7.5 hours per day, which is 2.5 times higher than men. In Bhutan, women were found to be spending 15% of their time on domestic care work which is 2 hours 11 minutes more than men. A 2017 Time Use Survey in Sri Lanka noted that 87.3% of women and girls were engaged in household and care work in comparison to 59.7% men and boys. Data collected by the United Nations in 2016 similarly noted that women in Maldives spent 6 hours, almost double that of men. The disparity is the most concerning in Afghanistan, where women spend a total of 18.7 hours a day on unpaid care work as compared to just 5.6 hours spent by men.
In almost all cases, the situation has been worsened by the Covid-19 pandemic. Reasons range from loss of employment due to stringent lockdowns to lack of accessibility to affordable healthcare among women, and almost universally includes subjection to physical, sexual and emotional abuse in the household. Countries like Afghanistan are also deeply affected by the political rise of extremist forces such as the Taliban. Many countries in South Asia are yet to officially adopt and institutionalize the collection of Time Use Survey data. Though revealing of the grim situation, such surveys do not necessarily capture the reality on the ground.
While the 2022 ASEAN Regional Plan of Action on Women, Peace and Security recognizes addressing unpaid care work as a priority, most countries in South Asia have not adopted a National Action Plan (NAP) for Women, Peace and Security so far. In the light of the Taliban government’s onslaught on women’s rights, it is highly unlikely that Kabul would continue to commit itself to such a plan. Furthermore, the political sensitivity surrounding the issue acts as a major stumbling block in the official adoption of NAPs in these countries. While advocacy for the same continues, the implementation of an informal collaborative action plan can serve as a timely solution.
A South Asian Action Plan for Unpaid Care Work
As rapidly growing economies that house nearly a quarter of humanity, almost half of which are women; recognition of unpaid care work in South Asia is the need of the hour. The following informal Action Plan can serve as a solution:
A collaborative effort in the form of an informal National Action Plan to be jointly formulated and implemented by governments at all levels, regional organizations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and civil society groups alike would not just empower women but also help in establishing better political relations in the region. Lessons can be taken from the 2022 ASEAN Regional Plan of Action on Women, Peace and Security in formulating a nuanced and meaningful action plan.
Peace must not be understood as mere absence of violence. Violence continues to exist as systematic oppression embedded in societal institutions such as family where it often takes the guise of “duty,” “love,” and “care”; gendered unpaid care work being one such manifestation. Similarly, national and regional security assessments must also take into account individual development. Addressing women’s unpaid care work would thus not just free them from the shackles of patriarchy but would also socially and economically empower them. Such measures would pave the way for a peaceful and secure South Asia in the true sense of the word.
Cherry Hitkari ([email protected]) is a Non-resident Vasey Fellow and Young Leader at Pacific Forum. She is a Postgraduate student of Chinese language and holds a Bachelor’s (Hons.) in History and a Masters in East Asian Studies with specialization in Chinese Studies from the University of Delhi.
Disclaimer: All opinions in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent any organization.
Authors of this volume participated in the inaugural U.S.- Australia Next-Generation Leaders Initiative, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State through the U.S. Embassy in Canberra. With backgrounds from academia, public policy, civil society, and industry, the cohort brings rich insights on the past, present, and future of the U.S.-Australia relations. This program was conducted from February 2021 – September 2021.
Click here to download the full report.
Chapter 1: Americans and Australians in the Pacific Century | Craig Kafura
Chapter 2: “Substantial and Fruitful Benefits”: State Governments as Vectors of CCP Influence in Australia | Rick Umback
Chapter 3: Economic Mate-ship: US-Australian Policy Alignment to Counter PRC Economic Coercion | Rose Rodgers
Chapter 4: Evolving the US-Australia Alliance: An Agenda for Cyberbiosecurity Engagement | Thom Dixon
The United States and Australia have been treaty allies for more than 70 years. This bond endured throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror, and it increasingly looks as though they will be close partners throughout the great power competition with the People’s Republic of China. The two partner countries were among the earliest critics of the PRC’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, have shared concerns over Chinese investment and its impact on their national security, and what growing PRC influence means for them the future of democracy in the Indo-Pacific.
The two countries were early and enthusiastic members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which includes fellow Indo-Pacific democracies Japan and India, and which has moved to address pressing regional challenges such as pandemic response and climate change. Plus, with 2021’s announcement of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) pact Canberra proved its willingness to defy not only Beijing, but also other democracies—especially in Europe—to build out its capacity to defend itself and counter the PRC’s growing regional power.
The contributions to this volume each address the nature, not only of the alliance, but the challenges it will face in the years to come. Craig Kafula of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs notes that public polling in both countries reveals overwhelming agreement on most subjects related to the alliance and its forthcoming challenges, but also differences of opinion that will have to be navigated. Rick Umback of Australian National University’s School of Politics and International Relations examines the growth of PRC influence over local governments and Australia, and the ramifications this has for other liberal democracies in the Indo-Pacific.
Rose Rodgers at the Center for Naval Analyses says the AUKUS has not limited, but actually increased the need for scrutiny of PRC investment in critical and emerging technologies, and other means of screening technological investments. Moving away from what the alliance means for relations with the PRC, Thom Dixon examines the field of cyberbiosecurity—the intersection of cybersecurity and biosecurity—and how US-Australian cooperation in this field is essential to meet two of the great challenges of this age: climate change and pandemic response.
Taken together these analyses—brought to you by the next generation of American-Australian analysts—richly detail the nature of the challenges the allies face, and offer recommendations on how to meet them over the next 70 years of their partnership.
Thom Dixon is undertaking a multidisciplinary PhD at Macquarie University in international relations and synthetic biology. He is a member of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in Synthetic Biology. In 2018, he completed a Non-resident WSD-Handa Fellowship with the Pacific Forum on synthetic biology and Australian foreign policy. Thom is an alumni of the 2017 EU-Australia Leadership Forum and the 2021 US-Australia Next-Generation Leadership Initiative. He is the Vice President of the Australian Institute of International Affairs in NSW and the Manager, National Security and Defence at Macquarie University. His research focuses on the convergence of the life sciences with the information sciences and how international relations can better enable the global bioeconomy.
Craig Kafura is the assistant director for public opinion and foreign policy at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a Security Fellow with the Truman National Security Project, and a Pacific Forum Young Leader. At the Council he coordinates research on public and elite opinion on a wide variety of foreign policy and international affairs issues, with a particular focus on Asia. Since joining the Council in 2011, Craig has authored or coauthored dozens of reports and briefs on public opinion and foreign policy. His writing has appeared in a variety of outlets including Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, and The Diplomat, and he is the coauthor of “Foreign Policy Beliefs Among Leaders and the Public” for The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, 7th edition. Craig holds an MA in political science from Columbia University and a BA in political science from Yale University.
Rose Rodgers is a DC-based political-military analyst. Her research focuses on PRC strategic forces, export controls, nuclear nonproliferation, and arms control. Rose has a Masters in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. She studied Mandarin at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China as a Boren Fellow.
Rick Umback holds a Ph.D. from the Australian National University’s School of Politics and International Relations. His research interests cover the intersection of technology, industry, public policy, politics, and strategic affairs. He is currently employed in the public sector and has previously worked in academia and Parliament.
Photo: Aboard the USS Wasp (LHD 1) at the Port of Brisbane, Army Maj. Gen. Roger Noble, deputy chief of Joint Operations (left) and Rear Adm. Fred Kacher, commander, Expeditionary Strike Group 7 (right) begin the closing ceremony for Exercise Talisman Sabre fon July 27, 2019 from U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Nicolas A. Cloward.
On Aug. 3, 2022, following US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Chinese customs suspended natural sand exports while blocking imports of citrus fruits, chilled white scallops, and frozen mackerel. Export bans are usually symbolic in Taiwan, as farming and fishery exports make up just a fraction of Taiwan’s economy. However, some of the suspended products seem to target specific locales—fishermen, for example, traditionally represent an influential voting bloc in the coastal areas of Taiwan. Beijing may have hoped to turn them toward the relatively China-friendly Kuomintang, and against President Tsai Ing-wen’s Democratic Progressive Party in the local election three months later.
Although China justified the bans by claiming Taiwanese exports violated food safety standards, the timing of this episode suggests Beijing had engaged in economic coercion to change another government’s behavior—and not for the first time.
With China’s rapid economic growth since the late 1970s and early 1980s—and especially after Beijing joined the World Trade Organization in 2001—China’s ability to reward and penalize other countries economically has also grown. As China has increased its interdependence with other countries, it has frequently deployed economic coercion to increase its leverage on issues such as territorial and maritime disputes, in retaliation for criticism over its human rights violations, or to protect its security interests.
Countries in Asia have responded differently toward Beijing’s economic coercion, critically affecting their relations with the regional economic behemoth. Perhaps contrary to the PRC’s expectations, such reactions have contributed to these countries’ growing independence from Chinese coercion, and present an opportunity for the United States to build its regional influence.
Japan
In September 2010, a Chinese trawler collided with two Japanese Coast Guard patrol ships near the Senkaku Islands, an uninhabited—yet disputed—archipelago in the East China Sea. After the Japanese government arrested the trawler captain and sought to put him on trial, China protested. Its expressions of disapproval included halting shipment of rare earth elements (REEs) key to producing hi-tech products like hybrid cars, wind turbines, and guided missiles. The 2010 fishing boat incident triggered Japan’s concerns about dependence on China for processed rare earth materials, as Japan was the largest importer of China’s REEs, and had no alternative supply sources at the time.
The crisis forced Japanese public and private economic actors to pursue multiple REE diversification projects. Notable efforts included increased REE recycling; seeking alternative sources of supply from the United States and Australia; intensifying undersea exploration; and increased use of other substitutes. Consequently, from 2008 to 2018, the share of Japanese rare earth imports from China fell from 91.3% to 58%. China’s ban on rare earth elements showed the downside of “weaponization of interdependence,” by disturbing the global value chain and eventually causing China to lose much of the leverage it had as a key trading partner with Japan.
Australia
The relationship between China and Australia has deteriorated in recent years amid a range of events, starting with Australia banning Huawei from its 5G networks in 2018. The relationship soured further in 2020 as Australia called for an inquiry into China’s response to the COVID-19 outbreak. In response, China imposed an 80.5% tariff on Australian barley and barred imports from Australia such as beef and coal, among other measures. Although Australia has found alternative markets for products such as beef, coal, and copper ore, other products such as lobster and timber continue to suffer compared to their 2019 trade levels.
The case of Australia shows another critical consequence of exercising economic coercion: Rational countries will make the choice not to trade with countries they perceive as aggressors based on the negative perceptions left over from economic coercion, even if this means paying a price economically. This once-close relationship, which took decades to build between the Australian sellers and Chinese buyers, was effectively destroyed by China’s penalties.
South Korea
In July 2016, the US Department of Defense and South Korean Ministry of National Defense announced in a joint statement the alliance’s decision to deploy a US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile battery in South Korea to defend against the increasing North Korean missile threat. THAAD is a highly effective, combat-proven defense against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats. Beijing opposed THAAD in Korea based on the fear that the batteries weakened China’s nuclear deterrent and signaled US intent to contain China.
In response, Chinese tourism to South Korea dropped by about 40% and Korea’s consumer goods and cultural products were boycotted inside its giant neighbor. Estimates of the total cost to South Korea range between $7.5 billion and $15.6 billion. To normalize economic relations and remove informal economic sanctions, the South Korean government in 2017 announced its commitment to “three nos”—no additional deployment of THAAD batteries, no South Korean integration into a US-led regional missile defense system, and no trilateral alliance with the United States and Japan. However, ordinary South Koreans’ views of China deteriorated. According to research by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, in the aftermath of the dispute South Koreans viewed China even less favorably than they view Japan, which colonized the Korean Peninsula from 1910-45 and had consistently been Koreans’ least favored country (with the occasional exception of North Korea).
Lessons of Chinese coercion
Chinese economic coercion poses a serious threat to international trade. Clearly, China has been imposing and administering export restrictions, which requires countries to conform to export duties, export quotas, and to meet minimum export price requirements, to achieve Chinese political goals. To halt such coercion, CSIS Senior Vice President for Asia Victor Cha has introduced the concept of “collective resilience” to counter Chinese economic coercion. Specifically, collective resilience is a concept where the United States organizes partners to build economic leverage and discourage Beijing from engaging in coercion in the first place. Members of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and Chip4 Alliance are often regarded as key partners of the United States. US partners should cooperate with the Biden administration to establish an early warning system, map out critical supply chains, and diversify the resources for important goods to construct a resilient supply chain.
The United States and its allies and partners should build a bloc to deter China’s acts of economic coercion. To build a robust supply chain that reduces China’s role in supplying critical technologies, members of the bloc should first come to an agreement on ways to build fair and resilient economic order. However, the two massive bills passed by the US Congress—the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act—pose a severe threat to this mission. Not only does the IRA provide subsidies to vehicles assembled only in North America, the latter bill provides $52 billion for semiconductor companies constructing new high-end manufacturing plants in the United States. This could undermine US credibility, as both can easily be seen as unfairly subsidizing its companies and violating the spirit, if not specific laws of, the World Trade Organization. At the same time, based on the regional proximity and the influence China has on the region, allies will feel pressure to enter a costly and prolonged subsidy war between the United States and China. Export controls on transfer of cutting-edge technologies to China and building a resilient supply chain in the Indo-Pacific won’t work unless key allies and partners cooperate.
The Biden administration should therefore work with its partners to form economic security strategies on advanced technologies where innovations are spurred, while the commercial competitiveness of each country is protected. The US’ Asian allies have already learned from their Chinese counterpart that the only way to avoid weaponizing the economy is to boost the competitiveness of one’s industry, while reducing the economic dependence of the country exercising economic coercion.
Su Hyun Lee ([email protected]) is a researcher focusing on US-China relations and economic security in Korea National Diplomatic Academy. Previously, she was a 2021-22 Resident Korea Foundation Fellow at the Pacific Forum. She holds BA in East Asian International Studies and MA in International Cooperation both from Yonsei University.
PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.
A country’s nationalism lives through its shared vision from generation to generation. In the early post-colonial era, the early dreamers of Bangladesh shared a vision of independence, economic development, and an equal society. As it celebrates 52 years of independence on March 26, Bangladesh cherishes the same vision and has achieved remarkable successes. However, many short and long-term challenges have also emerged, especially in the last two years.
Bangladesh’s economic success
During the last half-century, Bangladesh has had remarkable economic success. The country followed the “fast-growth” model, and the world community has dubbed Bangladesh a “Tiger Economy” and a “Frontier Five” economy.
Bangladesh also successfully manages its “demographic dividend” as it has built its economy on remittance and ready-made garments. It is the world’s sixth-largest human resources exporter, earning $22 billion in remittance in 2021, eighth among top remittance earners worldwide. The country’s export-oriented economy is also growing fast, at $44.39 billion in 2021, a 13.68% increase from the last year.
The country’s GDP has also reached $443 billion, the 35th-largest in the world. Bangladesh is currently undergoing its Least Developed Country graduation, projected to be completed by 2026, at which point Bangladesh would emerge as a Developing Country.
Bangladesh’s social safety net has also expanded remarkably. Bangladesh announced praiseworthy stimulus packages during the pandemic to protect its economy. The government had also widened the net. The Asrayan Initiative by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina—a house-building project for the homeless and displaced—also demonstrates the effort to broaden the net.
However, the pandemic and Ukraine war have brought new short-term challenges. The country has suffered from energy and food crises alongside declining reserves and soaring inflation. But efforts are made to address these challenges as the country is already practicing austerity and exploring alternative energy import destinations, such as Brunei.
Bangladesh has also sought to ensure its infrastructural development in the last decade, which currently dominates the country’s development narrative. Over the last decade, Bangladesh has undertaken many mega projects to improve the country’s existing infrastructure. Bangladesh has already inaugurated Padma Bridge and Metro-Rail project. The public enjoys the benefits as the projects reduce time, provide better security, and introduce smoothness to daily life.
Bangladesh is also taking part in regional connectivity projects. The country has improved its connectivity with India, is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and has a share in Trans-Asian highways.
Bangladesh in international politics
Bangladesh is a firm believer and promoter of multilateralism and its role is increasing in world politics.
In the last 50 years, Bangladesh has achieved success and displayed its commitment to global peace. The country participates in UN Peacekeeping Operations. At the UN level, Bangladesh has participated in 54 peacekeeping missions in 40 different countries over five continents with more than 175,000 uniformed personnel, including over 1,800 female peacekeepers. Bangladesh’s “ambassadors of peace” have also given their lives to uphold global peace: according to Bangladesh Army, till May 2019, a total of 117 Bangladesh Army personnel have made the supreme sacrifice, and 209 more were injured.
For the Rohingya Muslims, perhaps the most persecuted community of our time, Bangladesh provides temporary shelter and security to 1.2 million in Cox’s Bazaar—the largest refugee camp in the world. Bangladesh also advocates ensuring their safe and dignified repatriation to their ancestral home. Bangladesh is also a frontrunner in climate change, and has a vocal role in mitigating the adverse impact of climate change and served as the chair of the UN Climate Vulnerability Forum.
Bangladesh has sound participation in many other multilateral institutions. Bangladesh is an active member of the Organization of Islamic Countries, Developing 8, and many more organizations. Bangladesh currently serves as the chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Organization and acts as an observer at ASEAN.
Bangladesh has shared its economic success with the world, as a donor state from a through currency swap loans to debt-ridden Sri Lanka and Sudan. Bangladesh has also brought a share in the New Development Bank, through which Dkaha has entered into the development finance market.
Bangladesh has a strong diaspora community in several Middle Eastern countries, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Bangladeshi diaspora communities are one of the major sources of the country’s soft power and contribute to their host country’s economy.
Bangladesh’s soft power also reaches beyond the region. Through its participation in peacekeeping, Bangladesh has found friends in many African nations. Sierra Leone has given Bangladesh a special place in its heart by announcing Bangla as its second language. Gambia also helped the country by lodging a case against Myanmar in the International Court of Justice on Rohingya ethnic cleansing. Japan, meanwhile, has deepened relations with Bangladesh over the decades with the country emerging as the largest recipient of Japan’s Official Development Assistance and flourishing political-cultural relations between the countries.
Challenges overcome, challenges ahead
Immediately after independence in 1971, Bangladesh was a war-torn country with millions of hungry people. Recurring calamities such as floods, cyclones, and drought have repeatedly ravaged Bangladesh’s food security. Yet Bangladesh became self-sufficient in rice production. The country also ensured 100% electricity for all citizens by 2022. Bangladesh also curbed militancy and tackled the menace of terrorism. Throughout the journey, Bangladesh also removed illiteracy and early marriage to a great extent. The human rights narrative also changed gradually as the country achieved mentionable success in women’s rights, children’s rights, and transgender rights.
Yet, Bangladesh still faces many challenges. The pandemic and Ukraine war have both brought economic turmoil to Bangladesh. Soaring inflation, declining forex reserves, a dollar crunch, and food and energy crisis are hurting the country’s development.
The economic setbacks have increased poverty and squeezed efforts to ensure decent work. 24% of the population (40 million people) remain under the poverty line as of 2022. The number of people living slightly above the line is also very high. Government must tackle skyrocketing imports and forex fluctuation, and widen the social safety net to protect the commoners.
Apart from the economic challenges, Bangladesh also has many political challenges. Political violence remains a recurring event in the country. Weak institutions, distrust among major political parties, rampant corruption, nepotism, and complicated bureaucracy hurt Bangladesh’s journey toward a sound political system. All political parties, civil societies, and stakeholders must work together to create a sustainable and violence-free political system.
Despite several achievements in human rights, the country still has a long way to go. Even though Bangladesh has achieved significant economic success, human development still needs to catch up with economic development. Besides domestic issues, the brewing geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific and great power rivalry in the region poses challenge to Bangladesh. For a while now, Bangladesh has maintained a deft balance between the great powers.
Bangladesh has achieved praiseworthy success since independence. It had also overcome many challenges. The journey continues, however, and many obstacles lie ahead.
MD Mufassir Rashid ([email protected]) is a Research Associate at The Center for Bangladesh and Global Affairs.
PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.
The 19th Summit of ASEAN and India on Nov. 12, 2022 in Phnom Penh, commemorating the 30th anniversary of their dialogue relations and celebrating the ASEAN-India Friendship Year, elevated the India-ASEAN strategic relationship. Both sides reviewed their strategic partnership, endorsed by the 12th Commemorative Summit in New Delhi in 2012. They declared establishment of the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), and the goals of making it a meaningful, substantive, and mutually beneficial arrangement.
The CSP, coupled with ASEAN and India’s shared culture and history, could potentially factor in creating a favorable geopolitical environment for India to sustain its ASEAN-centric “Act East” policy. Act East, announced November 2014, upgraded the “Look East” policy, promoting economic, strategic, and cultural relations with the vast Indo-Pacific region at different levels. It involves intensive, continuous engagement with Southeast Asia in connectivity, trade, culture, defense, and people-to-people-contact at bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels. Act East aims to promote economic cooperation, cultural ties, and developing a strategic relationship with countries in the Indo-Pacific through a proactive, pragmatic approach.
India understands the growing strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN appreciates India’s contribution to regional peace and security, trade, building ASEAN community, and India-ASEAN integration. However, with the world economy recovering from the pandemic-cause recession ASEAN and India must work in unison to maintain the upward trajectory of bilateral and multilateral trade, and economic engagements are critical to enhancing strategic relations. The free trade agreement between India and ASEAN in 2010 notwithstanding, there are related downsides, with India facing non-tariff barriers in ASEAN and an import-export imbalance. Nevertheless, given their shared history and culture, India and ASEAN can capitalize on the CSP to enhance bilateral and multilateral engagements.
After launching Act East in 2014, India has focused on comprehensive strategic engagements with ASEAN. All ASEAN countries’ leaders were invited to India’s Republic Day Celebration on Jan. 26, 2018. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Singapore and delivered the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue on June 1, 2018. Outlining India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific, Modi expressed concern over China’s aggression in the South China Sea and emphasized the centrality of ASEAN in India’s Southeast Asia Policy. However, India and ASEAN must do much more to enhance their engagements.
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) revived in 2017, with Australia, India, Japan, and the United States now engaging regularly. The participation of ASEAN countries would help accelerate Quad initiatives.
India is keen to provide a viable alternative to China’s presence in Southeast Asia. While China’s aggression in the South China Sea remains a concern for ASEAN, its members remain divided due to conflicting interests. China remains ASEAN’s most significant trading partner. ASEAN’s total trade with China from January to April 2022 was estimated at $274.50 billion—India’s total trade with ASEAN from April 2021 to March 2022 was $78.90 billion. India also faces the challenge of building a strategic partnership with a divided ASEAN—it has become evident that ASEAN member countries prefer China for economic cooperation while expecting the United States and India as balancing power(s) in Southeast Asia’s strategic domain.
India should consider and use the CSP as a platform for reorienting its ASEAN strategy. Economic and technical cooperation in new areas like health, energy, technology, services, and climate change could create a new level of partnership. Greater coordination between India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and ASEAN’s ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific would complement India’s—and the Quad’s—ASEAN-centric policies, while raising India’s maritime profile in the region.
The ASEAN Member States and India, last Nov. 12, issued a joint statement on ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. They acknowledged that ASEAN-India relations have grown more robust over the last three decades and reaffirmed their commitment to establish and nurture a meaningful and substantive ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Both agree on maintaining ASEAN Centrality in the evolving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. The summit also resolved to strengthen ASEAN-India relations through strategic cooperation for peace, stability, and prosperity in Southeast Asia.
The CSP will remain critical in steering the ASEAN-India relations ahead. However, strategic relations need to be reinforced by stronger economic engagement. India’s support for ASEAN centrality in India’s Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative, ASEAN’s appreciation of India’s ASEAN-centric Act East Policy and ASEAN also upgrading the relationship with the United States to the comprehensive strategic partnership with India have factored in the Indo-Pacific gaining the center-stage. India’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean and as a member of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework makes it a significant player in the region. ASEAN appreciates India’s contribution to regional peace and security, ASEAN integration, and ASEAN community-building. However, despite India’s focused, ASEAN-centric overtures, member states remain divided when it comes to engaging India and China in the economic and strategic domain.
India should take advantage of the CSP to push its economic agenda and reorient its economic agenda and strategic approach toward a greater presence in Southeast Asia. The CSP should ensure more scope of convergence between ASEAN’s Outlook on Indo-Pacific and India’s Indo-Pacific Ocean’s Initiative, which will give more of a boost to the concept of ASEAN Centrality in the approaches of both India, ASEAN, and Quad countries. India, therefore, will have to enhance its presence in ASEAN countries by using the CSP to its benefit, making trade and connectivity the priority areas to tap the potential of this region.
Dr. Shristi Pukhrem ([email protected]) is a Senior Research Fellow at India Foundation. The views expressed are personal.
PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.
Photo: 19th ASEAN-India Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations, on 12 November 2022 in Phnom Penh, Kingdom of Cambodia. (Association of Southeast Asia Nations).
2022 ended with South Korea adopting specific Indo-Pacific terminology with the Dec. 28 release of its Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region (SFPPIP). The key takeaway: The SFPPIP, and President Yoon Suk Yeol, signal an end to South Korea’s “strategic ambiguity” under the previous president, Moon Jae-in. Seoul pivoting away from Beijing and toward Washington—delicately, but clearly.
This “Free, Peaceful Prosperous Indo-Pacific” formulation from South Korea converges with the US and Japanese “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) formulation(s) enunciated since 2016-17. The key shared element is the SFPPIP assertion that “in realizing the vision for a free Indo-Pacific, the Republic of Korea is committed to partnering with like-minded countries that share the values of freedom, rule of law, and human rights as well as international norms.” This indicates a normative base for foreign policy.
Much of the SFPPIP was uncontroversial, such as cooperation across the Indo-Pacific on economic, environmental, counterterrorism, and international crime issues. The SFPPIP identified ASEAN as a “key partner” for peace and prosperity and noted wider formats for economic cooperation like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.
However, the SFPIPPR also displayed sharpness of purpose on the security front. First, it announced that it would “pursue partnerships with minilateral groupings”; specifically, the South Korea-Japan-US trilateral, a future Australia-South Korea-US trilateral, and the AP4 (Australia-Japan-New Zealand-South Korea) NATO Partners format. Second, the SFPPIP singled out continued participation in (the US-led) RIMPAC, and Pacific Dragon (Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, United States) naval exercises. On the minilateral front, the SFPPIP announced South Korea would “gradually expand” cooperation with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.
In 2022 Chinese state media had attacked South Korea over such participation—warning in April with regard to the Quad; in July with regard to the AP4 format at NATO and trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo; and in August regarding the Pacific Dragon exercises in the Western Pacific.
On the bilateral front the SFPPIP was careful but revealing. It stated that:
our inclusive Indo-Pacific Strategy neither targets nor excludes any specific nation. We will work with every partner that is aligned with our vision and principles of cooperation.
This is conditional inclusivity; China falls short in specific normative values enunciated in the SFPPIP vision and principles. Mounting distrust of China in South Korea cuts across the SFPPIP linkage that “our partnerships will be based on strong mutual trust.”
In bilateral relations, the SFPPIP focus was to “continue to strengthen our alliance with the United States.” It identifies Canada as “a comprehensive strategic partner with common values,” and Australia as “a comprehensive strategic partner” with whom South Korea further “deepen[s] our ties by identifying new cooperation agenda in the areas of national defense.” It made a similar pledge to “advance our special strategic partnership with India, a leading regional partner with shared values.” Concerning Japan, despite previous frictions, it aspires to “seek a forward-looking partnership that supports our common interests and values.” Security convergence with those countries is predicated by their shared values; namely democracy, the rule of international law, and norms embedded in the “free” component within the SFPPIP formulation.
In the wake of a strained Yoon-Xi Summit in November, the SFPPIP’s China section was one sentence. It proposed that with China,
a key partner for achieving prosperity and peace in the Indo-Pacific region, we will nurture a sounder and more mature relationship as we pursue shared interests based on mutual respect and reciprocity, guided by international norms and rules.
This language was limited and revealing. To hope for a sounder and more mature relationship in the future implies the current relationship is rather unsound. “A partner for peace” was strained given that the SFPPIP’s “peace” section pinpointed the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait as (China-related) flash points threatening peace, with freedom of navigation specifically called for. Talk of guidance via international norms and rules raises the question of a China not guided by universal norms and rules. “A partner in prosperity” pointed to potential economic cooperation; for which the SFPPIP advocated resuming the China-Japan-South Korea Summit, which last met in 2019, and reinforcing the CJSK Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, to focus on green and digital transitions. This reflects the weakness and marginality of the CJSK mechanism.
Some China-related barbs are discernible in the SFPPIP. On the one hand, the SFPPIP contained no reference to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which South Korea has distanced itself from. On the other hand, the SFPPIP announced South Korean participation in the launching of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in 2022 as “building economic security networks…in support of open and free trade,” an initiative denounced in China. The SFPPIP outlined that “to stabilize supply chains of strategic resources, we will seek cooperation with partners with whom we share values.” This values-driven rationale pointed to the Indo-Pacific supply chain initiatives developed by the Quad countries and, again, denounced by China. Trilateral cyber-security cooperation with the United States and Australia was another China-related issue arising in the SFPPIP.
Very different responses ensued from Washington and Beijing to the SFPPIP. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan immediately welcomed the whole SFPPIP and its focus on shared “universal values” underpinning cooperation. In contrast, China’s foreign ministry merely “noted” the SFPPIP while warning about Korea being involved in “exclusive coteries,” leaving its state media to criticize the SFPPIP as South Korea “pivoting towards the US.”
The biggest areas of ambiguity in the SFPPIP rest with South Korea’s reiteration of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. South Korea could, like Washington, consider raising those two issues at regional platforms like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit.
Regarding the South China Sea, Seoul is unlikely to carry out freedom of navigation exercises, though it could consider giving verbal public support to such US operations. Seoul’s increasing deployments and exercises in the West Pacific with the United States and like-minded states like Japan, Australia, and Canada could also be extended into the South China Sea. Seoul calling for observance (i.e., by China) of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on the South China Sea could advance the SFPPIP call for the rule of law in the South China Sea. Side-stepping the still-uncomfortable US-China confrontation, Seoul could quietly strengthen the maritime capabilities of South China Sea littoral states like Vietnam and the Philippines most under threat from China.
Regarding the Taiwan Strait, it is again unlikely for Seoul to deploy its naval units on transit operations there, though South Korea could consider giving public verbal support to such US transit operations. South Korea could strengthen some links with Taiwan, though. Military-to-military links are probably too much to expect, given the furor from China. However, they could maintain political-economic links, including supporting Taiwan’s application for membership of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Seoul’s responses to Chinese actions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait during 2023 will show up the exact nature of South Korea’s delicate tilt signaled in its new Indo-Pacific strategy
David Scott ([email protected]) is member of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) and is a prolific writer on Indo-Pacific geopolitics (www.d-scott.com/publications).
PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.
China is the center of the global production network. It is the largest trading partner for all its neighbors and has fueled economic growth in and out of the Indo-Pacific for decades. According to the McKinsey Global Institute, even during the COVID-19 pandemic, trade has deepened between China and the United States, Canada, Japan, Southeast Asia, and with the European Union.
Clearly, our economies and societies benefit from our trade relationship with China when we enjoy stable relations. Chambers of Commerce from various countries still want to be part of the China story. The American Chamber of Commerce in China for instance in its 2022 White Paper writes “We remain opposed to any effort at outright decoupling of the US-China relationship. The costs of decoupling from losing trade and foreign investment benefits for both countries would be significant and are unlikely to generate clear winners. To be globally competitive, American producers and service providers must be able to compete in the China market on a level playing field. Nevertheless, extensive market access barriers, protectionism, an opaque regulatory system, and discriminatory enforcement continue to hinder the operations of US business in China today.”
Similarly, the European Parliament’s report EU-China 2030: European expert consultation on future relations with China released in December 2022 states that in 2020, China became the EU’s largest trading partner for goods for the first time, surpassing the United States. This positive trade relationship, according to the European Business in China Position Paper 2022-2023, could be a platform for strengthening bilateral relations. Nonetheless, like their US counterparts, European trading partners have a lopsided trading relationship, as well as concerns about a lack of reciprocation in market access, supply chain resilience, and what Kevin Rudd describes as a strong tilt towards Marxist-Leninist market intervention and social organization based on a platform of nationalism.
Whether in Ottawa or Canberra, Paris or New Delhi, Washington or capitals in Southeast Asia, states around the world aspire to have cooperative and mutually beneficial economic, social, cultural, and security relationships with Beijing. The Canadian Indo-Pacific Strategy highlights this stressing Ottawa will “cooperate with China to find solutions to global issues such as climate change, biodiversity loss, global health and nuclear proliferation.” The EU Indo-Pacific Strategy similarly states that “The EU will also pursue its multifaceted engagement with China, engaging bilaterally to promote solutions to common challenges, cooperating on issues of common interest and encouraging China to play its part in a peaceful and thriving Indo-Pacific region.” Even Japan’s new National Security Strategy, a strategy that includes provisions for counter strike capabilities, articulates the view that:
global issues such as climate change, infectious diseases, energy, food problems, and the environment, which have a direct or indirect impact on Japan’s national security, Japan will expand the circle of cooperation not only to include its ally and like-minded countries (read China), but also many other countries and organizations, and then enhance international efforts.
Japan, Canada, and the European Union are not alone in their aspirations for cooperation with China. In a speech by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken on the Biden administration’s approach to the People’s Republic of China, “investing, aligning, and competing” remain the core principles of a constructive relationship with China. Blinken stressed like other states, combating climate change, non-proliferation, transnational diseases, and “global macroeconomic coordination between the United States and China is key—through the G20, the IMF, other venues,” to overcome the severe socio and economic consequences resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Despite these aspirations for at least an awkward coexistence with China, there are many inconvenient truths to transforming aspiration into reality.
A track record of political interference in elections in the democratic process in Canada, Australia, and other countries suggests China wants to continue to weaken democratic institutions and countries aligned with the US.
In the report The Communist Party’s Coercive Diplomacy by the Australia Strategic Policy Institute, the authors outlined at least 152 cases of Beijing using coercion against Australia, Canada, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and others between 2010 and 2020. Coercion examples included arbitrary detention, trade restrictions, restrictions on investment, official travel, tourism, popular boycotts and state issued threats.
Both actions clearly violate China’s long standing Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, not to mention Beijing’s refusal to condemn Putin’s Ukraine war.
We also continue to see China and prominent Chinese academics such as Yan Xue Tong stress that:
China will work hard to shape an ideological environment conducive to its rise and counter Western values. For example, the United States defines democracy and freedom from the perspective of electoral politics and personal expression, while China defines democracy and freedom from the perspective of social security and economic development. Washington should accept these differences of opinion instead of trying to impose its own views on others.
In short, according to the Asia Pacific Initiative’s Naoko Eto, China sees the current rules-based order is not aligned with its domestic political system and its new interpretations of norms such as human rights, transparency, democracy, rule-of-law that have been the foundation for the post-World War II period of peace, stability, and development.
Seeking to selectively weaken international institutions, norms, and practices, China’s objectives conflict directly with not only the so-called West but also many countries in the Global South including those in Southeast and South Asia. By way of example, the ASEAN way of consensus-based decision making has been hijacked by Beijing in an effort to come to a code of conduct in the South China Sea.
We have also seen Beijing coordinate with other authoritarian states and Belt and Road Initiative partners in their decision-making in international institutions that affect the Global South, including religious and ethnic minorities. Recent examples include Beijing’s efforts to lobby and create a coalition of developing states to vote down a motion to discuss a UN report into China’s serious human rights violations in Xinjiang. We also saw Beijing brought together BRI members to abstain from a resolution on Russia’s “aggression against Ukraine.”
Domestically in China, in April 22, 2013, “A Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere” was approved and released by the central leadership under Xi Jinping. Known as Document 9, the communique stresses guarding against seven political “perils,” including constitutionalism, civil society, “nihilistic” views of history, “universal values,” “promoting neoliberalism, attempting to change China’s basic economic system,” “questioning reform and opening and the socialist nature of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” and the promotion of “the West’s view of media.”
The non-Chinese world is a crack in the Marxist-Leninist system the Communist Party of China (CPC) wishes to imprint in Chinese society. As a result, the party works through the United Front activities to delegitimize, stigmatize and weaken the norms outlined in Document 9 abroad.
The inconvenient truth is that Xi Jinping’s Community of Common Destiny for Mankind and the post-WWII rules-based order—which has been based on US leadership but supported by developed and developing nations alike—are an uncomfortable fit at best or incompatible at worst.
Establishing an awkward coexistence between China and like-minded countries will require transforming aspirations into pragmatic, realistic initiatives. Lyle J. Goldstein advocates for “cooperation spirals” in which confidence is developed through tit-for-tat compromises that spiral up towards more significant cooperation. His focus was Taiwan, economic relations, environmental issues (most critically climate change), the developing world (Africa in particular), the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, Japan, Southeast Asia, and India.
Japan’s late Abe Shinzo took a different approach prior to the pandemic through engagement in third country infrastructure cooperation and trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to reform the Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese trade practices from within.
Abe’s and Goldstein’s approaches to China are based on realistic assessment of the parallel paths China and “the West” are traveling on and realism about the prospects of convergence and changing China. Based on the principles of engagement, resilience and deterrence, each conceptualized a non-zero sum approach to engaging with China firmly wedded to working with like-minded countries
PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.
Dr. Stephen Nagy ([email protected]) is a senior associate professor at the International Christian University in Tokyo, a Senior Fellow with the MacDonald Laurier Institute, a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and a visiting fellow with the Japan Institute for International Affairs.
Photo: Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers a speech during the opening session of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in Beijing, October 19, 2022 (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)