PacNet #16 – The World After Taiwan’s Fall – PART ONE

Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid— politically, economically, and militarily—in the event of a takeover attempt by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in the Indo-Pacific, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent such a takeover, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated US attempt with likeminded allies and partners to halt further PRC aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains.

This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the PRC and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray-zone” military actions short of actual combat. The US government, US allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate.

The study

To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study on “the World After Taiwan’s Fall” with the goal of raising awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a PRC victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it. The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a US, Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the Pacific Forum-run Track-2 “US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue” (and sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency), outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, the PRC attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to the PRC despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).

The study’s main finding is that Taiwan’s fall would have devastating consequences for the United States and many countries in the region and beyond. Regardless of how it happens (without or despite US/allied intervention), Taiwan’s fall to the PRC would be earth shattering. The PRC could eclipse US power and influence in the region once and for all. Taiwan’s fall could lead to the advent of a Pax Sinica where Beijing and its allies would pursue their interests much more aggressively and with complete impunity. Nuclear proliferation in several parts of the Indo-Pacific could also be the net result of Taiwan’s fall, leading to much more dangerous regional and international security environments. To several authors, it would thus be necessary to build an Asian equivalent to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to prevent PRC adventurism and ultimately retake Taiwan.

Accordingly, the United States, its allies, and others should take major action—rapidly—to prevent such a development. In particular, the United States should lead an effort to strengthen collective deterrence and defense in the Indo-Pacific; this is especially important in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has shown territory takeovers still happen in the twenty-first century. The United States should also give serious consideration to establishing region-wide nuclear sharing arrangements; at a minimum, it should jumpstart research to examine the benefits, costs, and risks that such arrangements would bring to the Indo-Pacific security architecture, as well as assess the opportunities and challenges that such a development would present.

National perspectives on a PRC takeover of Taiwan

Each national perspective imagines broadly similar implications of a PRC takeover of Taiwan.

United States. Ian Easton’s chapter on the US perspective explained that Taiwan’s fall would be disastrous irrespective of how it happens because the Island is a leading democracy, has unique military and intelligence capabilities, plays a critical role in global high-tech supply chains, and benefits from a special geographic location in the heart of East Asia. Easton further contended that the outcome would be especially dire if Taiwan falls without the United States and others trying (even if they failed) to defend it. The result would be Taiwan’s destruction as a nation, the breakdown of the US alliance system, with some allies going nuclear and others falling into the PRC’s diplomatic orbit, plus increased PRC influence globally. Taiwan’s fall after an intense battle between the United States, its allies, and the PRC would not be as bad: Taiwanese resistance fighters would likely fight on, and the United States might be in a position to build a collective deterrence and defense system to keep the PRC in check. Still, the regional and global security orders would be shattered.

Australia. Malcolm Davis’ chapter on the Australian perspective painted a similarly dark picture. Regardless of how Taiwan’s fall happens, Davis explained that the PRC would be “much better placed to deny US forward presence, to weaken American geopolitical influence in Asia, and expand Beijing’s domination in the region.” He added that a US and allied failure to intervene would generate a “highly permissive environment for Beijing from which it could expand its influence and presence as well as coerce other opponents, notably Japan as well as Australia.” Meanwhile, in the event of a failed US/allied intervention, Davis contended that the outcome would be a substantial US defeat, which would reinforce the perception of US decline, or a protracted high intensity war with the PRC, and neither outcome would be good for Australia. Canberra, then, would have to recalibrate and fundamentally rethink its defense policy, its alliance with the United States, and its strategic relationships with other regional partners.

Japan. Matake Kamiya’s chapter on the Japanese perspective argued that Tokyo, too, would regard the Island’s fall to the PRC as deeply troubling. As Kamiya put it, “If China seizes Taiwan, the consequences—in political, military, economic, and even in terms of values and ideology—would have serious repercussions for Japan.” Kamiya considered that the outcome of Taiwan’s fall would be “equally bad” whether the fall takes place without or despite US/allied assistance. He pointed out that, in Japanese eyes, US credibility would be at stake if a PRC takeover takes place without US intervention and that the US ability to defend Japan effectively would be seriously questioned if there is a failed US intervention. Either way, serious problems would then likely emerge in the US-Japan alliance as a result.

South Korea. Duyeon Kim’s chapter on the Korean perspective echoed Kamiya’s on the Japanese perspective. Kim stressed that “the expected outcomes of Taiwan’s fall for Korea would be the same under the two scenarios—both equally bad in terms of South Korean perceptions and sentiments about the US security commitments to them and their interest in obtaining an independent nuclear deterrent.” Kim, however, did insist that much would depend on the degree to which South Koreans question US credibility and lose trust in Washington, as well as on the political party in power in Seoul, the state of the US-Korea alliance, the state of Korea-PRC relations, and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and strategic calculus. Still, she argued that a determining factor would be President Xi Jinping’s worldview and the PRC’s economic situation. Either way, Kim stressed that a “constant outcome” could be an emboldened and more aggressive North Korea.

India. Jabin Jacob’s chapter on the Indian perspective argued that a PRC invasion of Taiwan would “change very little on the ground for India in terms of the bilateral [India-Taiwan] relationship itself…” Yet he explained that a PRC invasion of Taiwan would force India to refocus its national security policy squarely on the PRC, making it its primary threat. He added that India would also reconsider its relationship with the United States by distancing itself from Washington because a post-US world order would be in the making and, at the same time, seeking to extract concessions from Washington. More generally, Jacob stressed that Taiwan’s fall would have far-reaching (very negative) implications for India in its immediate neighborhood, in its wider Asian and Indian Ocean neighborhood, as well as at the international level.

Europe. Bruno Tertrais’ chapter on the European perspective began with a reminder that Europe has only recently begun to worry about the PRC and the possibility of a conflict over Taiwan and, as a result, views and perceptions on this matter vary widely. Still, Tertrais explained that Europeans agree that the economic and strategic consequences of Taiwan’s fall to the PRC would be problematic for Europe. Tertrais argued that a failed US/allied intervention would be “less damaging for Europe” because a failure to intervene risks inviting “renewed Russian aggressiveness.” In both cases, however, Tertrais explained that “the fall of Taiwan would be a wake-up call for Europe that it must act fast to be in a position to defend itself,” adding that several European countries would likely seek to strengthen their security and defense ties with several US Indo-Pacific allies.

This is Part One of a two-part PacNet. In Part Two, we will review in more depth some of the key findings and recommendations emanating from our study.

David Santoro (david@pacforum.org) is President and CEO of the Pacific Forum. Follow him on Twitter @DavidSantoro1.

Ralph Cossa (ralph@pacforum.org) is President Emeritus and WSD-Handa Chair in Peace Studies at Pacific Forum.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR2 – The World After Taiwan’s Fall

Introduction

Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with likeminded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains.

This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it.

The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).

Download the full volume here.

Table of Contents

Introduction

David Santoro & Ralph Cossa

Chapter 1 | If Taiwan Falls: Future Scenarios and Implications for the United States

Ian Easton

Chapter 2 |  Chinese Victory over Taiwan – An Australian Perspective

Malcolm Davis

Chapter 3 | China’s Takeover of Taiwan Would Have a Negative Impact on Japan

Matake Kamiya

Chapter 4 | If Taiwan Falls to China: Implications for the Korean Peninsula

Duyeon Kim 

Chapter 5 | The Implications for India of a Successful Chinese Invasion of Taiwan

Jabin T. Jacob

Chapter 6 | The Consequences for Europe of a Successful Chinese Invasion of Taiwan

Bruno Tertrais

Conclusions

David Santoro & Ralph Cossa

PacNet #11 – What China’s challenge to NATO is, and what it isn’t

The following has been adapted from the introduction to the recent Issues & Insights volume, “Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China.”

Following the Cold War’s end there were those who questioned NATO’s continued relevance. Such views may have found little currency among scholars of foreign policy and security, but among the general public it was not unheard of to wonder why, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 its rival organization did not also become defunct, especially given the Russian Federation’s friendlier tilt in the decade that followed. On the part of the United States, by the 2010’s a fatigue had settled in among much of the populace over US foreign commitments, especially regarding partner countries not perceived as pulling their own weight. By the middle of that decade, that fatigue had begun to manifest itself in US election results.

Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and its brazen invasion of Ukraine last year may not have succeeded in bringing Ukraine to heel or establishing Moscow as a great military power again, but it did accomplish two other things. For one, it demonstrated for the world what the countries separated by the Atlantic could achieve—even indirectly—by helping partners (even non-NATO members) acquire the means to defend themselves. For another, and for all Putin’s claims to the contrary, it showed that nations near Russia’s western border have a very good reason for wanting NATO membership. Putin, more so than any mainstream American or continental European security scholar, has demonstrated the alliance’s continued relevance in providing for the security of countries that desire self-determination and alignment with the liberal, rules-based international order.

As it approaches its one-year anniversary the outcome of the Ukraine war is still far from clear, as is precisely how the alliance will respond to the challenge that looms beyond it: the People’s Republic of China, with its growing military might, and its economic influence. And there is broad agreement on the appropriateness of the term “challenge”—the US Department of Defense, which calls Russia an “acute threat,” uses the noun “pacing challenge” to describe Beijing. Meanwhile NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept used the verb form, declaring the PRC’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” The forcefulness of these words should not have come as a surprise: US partners in the European Union have been every bit as outspoken about human rights in China as Washington has, as well as against its “malicious cyber activities.” Differences in priority remain, informed by economics, history, and geography (especially considering how much more imminent a threat Russia represents to Europe than the United States), but opinions on both sides of the Atlantic have shifted regarding the PRC, and for many of the same reasons.

That shift, and what policies should follow, is the subject of Pacific Forum’s edited volume “Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China” and its accompanying webinar. With a grant from the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Pacific Forum brought together three distinguished scholars—one to discuss the evolution of views toward the PRC in the United States over the past decade, one to chart the same change in Europe, and a third to discuss how the two sides should best work together in meeting this shared challenge.

Describing the US position, Bradley Jensen Murg argues that increasing American skepticism of Beijing’s intentions is not, as is frequently argued, a unipolar action driven by the insecurity of one great power being replaced by another. Instead, he argues that it is a multifaceted evolution driven by generational change, increased awareness of the PRC’s human rights record, and the failure of international institutions (such as the World Trade Organization) to contribute to PRC liberalization. He further notes that the United States’ views on Beijing are no international outlier but are broadly shared, especially in Europe.

Regarding the European perspective, David Camroux notes that the thinking shifted in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Once a destination for European investment the PRC, thanks to its rapid recovery from the crisis and growing domestic capacity, increased its own financial presence on the European continent, arousing increasing concerns. Subsequent revelations about Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and the suppression of Hong Kong’s protest movement further alienated Europe. He stresses, though, that Europe’s views will likely remain distinct from Washington’s to an extent—Europe does not consider Beijing a “hard security challenge” nor does it possess the hard security capabilities to meet them. Instead, it will continue minilateral engagement with regional powers such as Tokyo, Seoul, Delhi, and Canberra, to reduce dependency on the PRC in a non-confrontational way and avoid direct alignment with Washington in the emerging Great Power Competition.

Concluding the edited volume, Kelly Grieco notes the increasing comity in US and EU positions regarding the PRC, but states that, as the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” NATO faces practical limitations in terms of projecting power in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than working to confront Beijing militarily, European countries’ most beneficial contribution to NATO would be to increase their security commitments in Europe—thus reducing the burden faced by the United States there—and to use their “diplomatic clout and economic, financial, and technological resources to form an effective coalition to balance against [PRC] power and influence.”

Pacific Forum hopes that these scholarly insights will find a wide audience in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, and that NATO will remain an effective partnership—not to defend Euro-American hegemony and primacy, but the values that underpin the rules-based order and its promise of a fairer, more prosperous global community. Pacific Forum also hopes that, amid their shared defense of rules and values, NATO and its partners will find avenues for some cooperation with China—at the governmental and people-to-people level—and that people from China continue to feel welcome to work, study, and live in the United States and Europe.

No one—American, European, Asian, or otherwise—should mistake our disputes with specific PRC policies and actions for antipathy toward the people of China.

Rob York (rob@pacforum.org) is Director for Regional Affairs at Pacific Forum and editor of Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-journal of Bilateral Relations in the Indo-Pacific.

For more from this author, please see his recent chapter of Comparative Connections.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR1 – Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China

Introduction

Rob York

Following the Cold War’s end there were those who questioned NATO’s continued relevance. Such views may have found little currency among scholars of foreign policy and security, but among the general public it was not unheard of to wonder why, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 its rival organization did not also become defunct, especially given the Russian Federation’s friendlier tilt in the decade that followed. On the part of the United States, by the 2010’s a fatigue had settled in among much of the populace over US foreign commitments, especially regarding partner countries not perceived as pulling their own weight. By the middle of that decade, that fatigue had begun to manifest itself in US election results.

Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and its brazen invasion of Ukraine last year may not have succeeded in bringing Ukraine to heel or establishing Moscow as a great military power again, but it did accomplish two other things. For one, it demonstrated for the world what the countries separated by the Atlantic could achieve—even indirectly—by helping partners (even non-NATO members) acquire the means to defend themselves. For another, and for all Putin’s claims to the contrary, it showed that nations near Russia’s western border have a very good reason for wanting NATO membership. Putin, more so than any mainstream American or continental European security scholar, has demonstrated the alliance’s continued relevance in providing for the security of countries that desire self-determination and alignment with the liberal, rules-based international order.

As it approaches its one-year anniversary the outcome of the Ukraine war is still far from clear, as is precisely how the alliance will respond to the challenge that looms beyond it: the People’s Republic of China, with its growing military might, and its economic influence. And there is broad agreement on the appropriateness of the term “challenge”—the US Department of Defense, which calls Russia an “acute threat,” uses the noun “pacing challenge” to describe Beijing. Meanwhile NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept used the verb form, declaring the PRC’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” The forcefulness of these words should not have come as a surprise: US partners in the European Union have been every bit as outspoken about human rights in China as Washington has, as well as against its “malicious cyber activities.” Differences in priority remain, informed by economics, history, and geography (especially considering how much more imminent a threat Russia represents to Europe than the United States), but opinions on both sides of the Atlantic have shifted regarding the PRC, and for many of the same reasons.

That shift, and what policies should follow, is the subject of Pacific Forum’s edited volume “Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China” and its accompanying webinar. With a grant from the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Pacific Forum brought together three distinguished scholars—one to discuss the evolution of views toward the PRC in the United States over the past decade, one to chart the same change in Europe, and a third to discuss how the two sides should best work together in meeting this shared challenge.

Describing the US position, Bradley Jensen Murg argues that increasing American skepticism of Beijing’s intentions is not, as is frequently argued, a unipolar action driven by the insecurity of one great power being replaced by another. Instead, he argues that it is a multifaceted evolution driven by generational change, increased awareness of the PRC’s human rights record, and the failure of international institutions (such as the World Trade Organization) to contribute to PRC liberalization. He further notes that the United States’ views on Beijing are no international outlier but are broadly shared, especially in Europe.

Regarding the European perspective, David Camroux notes that the thinking shifted in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Once a destination for European investment the PRC, thanks to its rapid recovery from the crisis and growing domestic capacity, increased its own financial presence on the European continent, arousing increasing concerns. Subsequent revelations about Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and the suppression of Hong Kong’s protest movement further alienated Europe. He stresses, though, that Europe’s views will likely remain distinct from Washington’s to an extent—Europe does not consider Beijing a “hard security challenge” nor does it possess the hard security capabilities to meet them. Instead, it will continue minilateral engagement with regional powers such as Tokyo, Seoul, Delhi, and Canberra, to reduce dependency on the PRC in a non-confrontational way and avoid direct alignment with Washington in the emerging Great Power Competition.

Concluding the edited volume, Kelly Grieco notes the increasing comity in US and EU positions regarding the PRC, but states that, as the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” NATO faces practical limitations in terms of projecting power in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than working to confront Beijing militarily, European countries’ most beneficial contribution to NATO would be to increase their security commitments in Europe—thus reducing the burden faced by the United States there—and to use their “diplomatic clout and economic, financial, and technological resources to form an effective coalition to balance against [PRC] power and influence.”

Pacific Forum hopes that these scholarly insights will find a wide audience in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, and that NATO will remain an effective partnership—not to defend Euro-American hegemony and primacy, but the values that underpin the rules-based order and its promise of a fairer, more prosperous global community. Pacific Forum also hopes that, amid their shared defense of rules and values, NATO and its partners will find avenues for some cooperation with China—at the governmental and people-to-people level—and that people from China continue to feel welcome to work, study, and live in the United States and Europe.

No one—American, European, Asian, or otherwise—should mistake our disputes with specific PRC policies and actions for antipathy toward the people of China.

Download the full volume here.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Rob York

Chapter 1 | The United States and China: New Perceptions, New Politics, New Policies

Bradley J. Murg

Chapter 2 | Europe faced with China’s Rise: of Shields and Swords?

David Camroux

Chapter 3 | Strategic Realities: Deepen Transatlantic Ties with the European Union—Not NATO—to Cooperate in the Indo-Pacific

Kelly Grieco

PacNet #10 – Is the US capable of shaping a rules-based international order?

An earlier version of this article was published in The Hill.

It is repeated endlessly: US foreign policy is about defending the “rules-based order.” That’s a codeword for the challenge from China, which is trying to rewrite the rules. Fine. But if the US can’t even design its own rules on, for example, the urgent issue of digital privacy or regulating Big Tech, how can it play on that larger stage?

No question, the wisdom that created the Bretton Woods system (the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, etc.) was based on well-conceived rules that were mutually beneficial. Relatively open trade and finance generated unprecedented wealth and power over the past 70 years. But as the rise of China demonstrates, the United States must now grapple with the dilemmas of its success. It is an increasingly multipolar world.

And it is not just about China. The European Union, with a very different approach to trade and tech rules than the United States, sees itself as the superpower of regulation, trying to leverage its $15 trillion economy and 516 million consumers to create global standards. Its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has forced Big Tech to respect its privacy standards or face billion-dollar penalties. While the United States still lacks federal standards, several states, most notably California, have laws like GDPR.

More recently, the European Union is legislating a Digital Marketing Agreement (DMA) aimed mostly at US Big Tech to level the playing field for all digital companies. It is also launching a Digital Services Agreement (DSA) to regulate responsibilities of digital services to consumers in the European Union, and a new initiative to influence setting standards in emerging tech.

Why does this matter? We are in the midst of an unprecedented technology revolution (e.g. artificial intelligence, robotics, 5G, 3D printing, synthetic biology), and innovation will be the key driver of economic growth in the decades ahead. All aspects of our economy and lives are increasingly digitized. The Federal Reserve is even considering a digital dollar. Data and its cross-border flows have become the lifeblood of world trade.

The World Bank estimates that the digital economy is already 15.5% of global GDP. E-commerce hit $25.6 trillion in 2018. This trend was accelerated by COVID-19: From Zoom to telemedicine, digital services are rapidly growing in importance. The United States typically runs a massive trade deficit in goods but large surpluses in services—$290 billion in 2019. Combine that with US status as a leading global innovator in information and communications technology, and the United States may be well positioned to thrive in the digital universe.

That’s where the rules and standards, still wanting for new tech, come in. They will shape markets and facilitate growth and jobs. Yet, for all the public outrage at Big Tech, a deeply polarized Congress has so far failed to pass federal privacy or substantive anti-trust legislation. Not for want of trying: Over the past several years, there have been dozens of tech bills offered. But only a handful get very far in the dance of legislation.

Even bills that have strong bipartisan support have stumbled. Versions of the $250 billion America COMPETES legislation foundered over the past two years. The bill would boost high-end semiconductor manufacturing in the United States as well as tech research and development. Finally, last June, it passed the Senate with a solid bipartisan vote (68-32). The House haggled over it for months, attaching dozens of amendments, and finally passing it last week. Reconciling the different bills will drag the dance out to spring. This is not an inspiring way to compete with China.

A package of anti-trust bills that would make it harder for Big Tech to buy or merge with smaller firms and level the playing field on apps passed House committees last year. But differences within and between the two political parties make it problematic for any to reach President Biden’s desk this year. And with Republicans projected to take the House in November, many assess that if anti-trust bills don’t pass this year, it will become more difficult to do so in the future.

Similarly with international technical standards in global standard-setting bodies like the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). China aggressively floods the zone with its own representatives, while Washington lags in mobilizing private sector stakeholders and US allies to push back against efforts to shape standards to Beijing’s preferences.

The picture is even more troubling regarding trade rules. As Europe and Asia sign a plethora of trade agreements, the United States has taken itself out of the game. In part because of a backlash to job losses to China earlier this century, both political parties are averse to the United States advancing new market-access accords and leaning in a protectionist direction.

Both the Bush and Obama administrations launched and negotiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) accord, a 12-nation pact that would have covered 40% of the world economy. The idea was to fashion a high-standards regional agreement to gain leverage to write the rules and press China to reform or lose markets. China is the number one trade partner of all US Indo-Pacific allies and partners.

But President Trump withdrew from TPP during his first week in office. Japan carried the accord forward, and, ironically, now China has applied to join. In addition, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) signed by 15 Asian nations—including US Asian allies—went into effect last month. The United States remains the outlier.

Some in the administration are trying to fashion a region-wide digital commerce accord, in effect regionalizing high-standards accords the United States already has in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and US-Japan bilateral accord. But that effort has been blocked by divisions within the bureaucracy.

All told, unforced errors have put the United States in an awkward position to shape the rules-based order it seeks. One hopeful sign, however, is the recently formed US-EU Trade and Technology Council. It is an effort to coordinate positions on things such as WTO reform and emerging technologies like 5G and AI. To the extent that the United States and European Union can harmonize their positions, they will gain leverage with China to shape norms.

The situation is less than reassuring. But as tech legislation creeps its way through Congress and the United States and European Union intensify efforts to find policy consensus, I am reminded of the sardonic quip attributed to Winston Churchill that Americans can always be counted on do the right thing—after exhausting all other possibilities.

Robert A. Manning (rmanning@atlanticcouncil.org) is a senior fellow of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He was Director of Asian Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations (1997-2001), a senior counselor to the under-secretary of State for Global Affairs from 2001 to 2004, a member of the US Department of State Policy Planning Staff from 2004 to 2008 and on the National Intelligence Council (NIC) Strategic Futures Group from 2008 to 2012. Follow him on Twitter @Rmanning4.  

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.