PacNet #38 – EU holds the key to US-China rivalry

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An earlier version of this article appeared with The Hinrich Foundation.

President Biden came into office vowing to confront China more forcefully and professing a desire to work closely with US partners to form a “united front” on shared China concerns. This was a key point of differentiation with the previous Trump administration, which sometimes seemed intent on taking a wrecking ball to longstanding US alliances. Trump had gone so far as to refer to EU trade practices as “worse than China.”

Repairing bruised relations with the European Union and enlisting its support on common policies to push back more vigorously against China has been a top priority for the Biden administration. Results thus far have been mixed and the ultimate success of the policy remains in question.

Focusing on the European Union is a sensible recognition of the critical balancing position Europe occupies. EU policies that align more tightly with US measures to counter China would substantially strengthen the punch they pack. A European Union that sits on the fence—let alone one that leans towards China—would sap effectiveness from almost any US strategy. Ironically, the most significant rivalry in the Indo-Pacific might hinge on decisions taken in Brussels.

While the United States and the European Union have had a close working partnership for three-quarters of a century, their interests and viewpoints are far from identical, especially on China policy

Both sides largely share concerns over China’s alleged human rights abuses and its drive to obtain technological capacities that have potentially game-changing military applications. They also share broad discomfort over China’s authoritarian system, its geopolitical worldview, and its growing propensity to flex its military muscle in the South China Sea.

But sharper distinctions between the United States and the European Union arise over how best to “manage” China’s rise. The EU has been more inclined to try to thread the needle: challenge China on human rights and geopolitics when needed but strive to maintain robust commercial ties and emphasize cooperation on global issues such as climate change.

US-China policy assumes a greater disruption to the trade and investment relationship, especially in technology, and anticipates a relationship increasingly defined by clashes rather than cooperation.

Divergent voices within Europe

The key question is whether the policy common ground currently shared by the United States and the European Union will expand or contract. There are important voices within the European Union pulling in different directions.

French President Emmanuel Macron has been an emphatic voice within the European Union arguing against following the more aggressive US lead, warning that such a course would reduce Europeans to American “vassals.” Macron argues for a middle path that avoids picking sides between the US and China. During a recent visit to China, Macron plainly stated: “We mustn’t decouple with China.”

Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, has articulated a vision more in line with the US perspective. In her estimation, the EU-China relationship has grown “more distant and more difficult” as a result of “a very deliberate hardening of China’s overall strategic posture” and “increasingly assertive actions.”

For now, the EU approach appears to “de-risking”—reducing dependence on China in strategic sectors—rather than the partial decoupling suggested by US policy.

The direction the European Union ultimately leans will be key. Almost across the board, on issues ranging from export controls to investment reviews or the usage of Chinese telecommunications equipment in critical infrastructure, greater policy coherence between the European Union and the United States will enhance the effectiveness of the measures.

China’s triangulation

The critical role played by the European Union has certainly not been lost on officials in Beijing. Attempting to split the European Union from the United States to the maximum extent possible—triangulation—is the most sensible course for China to pursue.

China has made substantial efforts to cultivate strong bonds with Europe. Arguably, the high water market for these efforts occurred during the waning days of the Trump administration. The European Union and China appeared to have reached an agreement on a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment despite urgent pleas from incoming Biden administration officials to wait until the new US administration assumed office and official input from team Biden could be provided. The US entreaties were ignored by the European Union.

Achievement of the long-sought investment deal with the European Union was perceived as a major coup for China and a devastating setback for the United States, especially given its unsuccessful last-minute efforts to slow the train. The wheels would come off the CAI in 2021 however. Acrimonious disputes over EU sanctions in response to alleged human rights abuses in China caused Europe to pause its implementation process and the agreement remains in limbo today, presumed dead.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has presented a far greater impediment to China’s efforts to court EU sympathies. China has professed neutrality and has avoided condemning Russia, let alone applying sanctions. Moreover, China has indirectly helped Russia fund the war by substantially increasing imports of oil and gas, a move which has been widely interpreted in the West as a not-so-subtle tilt towards Russia.

From the EU perspective, the invasion is nothing short of cataclysmic—a direct challenge to the very founding principles upon which the European experiment is based. The prevailing view in Brussels is that unconditional condemnation and material support to help Ukraine repel Russian advances are required.

China’s position is causing the EU to fundamentally reconsider its relationship. According to European Commission President von der Leyen: “How China continues to interact with Putin’s war will be a determining factor for EU-China relations going forward.”

US shortcomings

If China has not played its EU cards flawlessly, neither has Washington. The Biden administration has frequently proceeded in a manner that makes it less likely that the hoped-for common front with the European Union can be achieved. The European Union has been rankled by what it sees as a lack of consultation and coordination from the United States and an insufficient appreciation for collateral damage being inflicted on EU interests as the United States conducts its strategic rivalry with China.

A case in point is the recently passed Inflation Reduction Act, which takes aim at China’s dominance in the electric vehicles sector through the provision of massive subsidies for EVs produced in the United States, or in countries that have a trade agreement with it. There is no trade agreement between the European Union and the United States. EU producers in this critical sector would therefore not be eligible for IRA subsidies and would find themselves competitively disadvantaged vis-a-vis not only US producers, but also Korean, Mexican, or Canadian producers.

It should have been blindingly obvious to US officials that the EV subsidies contained in the IRA would significantly sideswipe EU producers and precipitate a firestorm of protests from Brussels. Yet, both the White House and Congress either missed the point or deemed it to be insufficiently important. Predictably, EU officials were apoplectic upon being apprised of the IRA provisions.

In the aftermath of intense diplomatic fallout, the US is now scrambling to do damage control that could have been more effectively accomplished on a preemptive basis. An inelegant band-aid solution seems at hand, in the form of a limited agreement on critical minerals that will be generously interpreted as a “trade agreement” for the purposes of the IRA. This would largely address the European concerns by making EU producers eligible for US subsidies.

Despite the likelihood of a resolution on the horizon, the entire episode is unlikely to have increased European confidence in their working relationship with the United States.

Can they get their act together?

A seamless US-EU policy on China will never happen. But the divergences in viewpoint should be manageable. Both sides recognize that we are in a new strategic era that will require a new and more guarded approach to China. Differences arise over how aggressively and to what extent China guardrails need to be put into place.

The key question moving forward is whether we’re headed towards a greater convergence or divergence in outlook. In either case, the logic in favor of working together more constructively on China policy—if for no other reason than to limit collateral damage—is overwhelming. It’s time for both sides to conduct themselves accordingly. Avoid presenting the other side with any fait accompli. More robust consultation and transparency as policies are being developed and negotiations are being conducted will go a long way. Above all, drop the internecine squabbles and stay clear of the unforced errors that are setting the relationship back.

Stephen Olson ([email protected]) is a Senior Research Fellow at the Hinrich Foundation with over 30 years of international trade experience. Previously, he was an international trade negotiator in Washington DC and served on the US negotiating team for NAFTA negotiations.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Flags raised during EP President Martin Schulz’s welcoming of PRC President Xi Jinping to the European Parliament in Brussels by European Union 2014 – European Parliament.

PacNet #35 – Mekong water usage tests China’s claimed good-neighborliness

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China claims to be a uniquely benevolent international actor—a great power that, unlike other great powers past and present, does not practice “power politics” (self-interested bullying of smaller states) and is not “selfish” or warlike. The PRC government styles itself as the custodian of principles that, if implemented, would excise international relations of conflict and injustice.

Smaller neighbors to China’s south particularly fear domination by a strong China. To assuage their concerns, Beijing proclaims that it “opposes the strong bullying the weak” and supports “building a world of shared prosperity and promoting common development of all countries through every country’s development.”

The issue of managing fresh water resources provides a rigorous practical test of these sweet-sounding PRC assurances. Three major Southeast Asian rivers—the Mekong, the Salween, and the Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy)—originate in the PRC-controlled Tibetan plateau. Even with this geographic advantage, China has insufficient water. Chinese make up 20% of the world’s population, but their country contains only 6 or 7% of the world’s fresh water supply. The good-neighborliness promised by Beijing’s official diplomatic rhetoric collides with the permanent scarcity of a vital resource. Not surprisingly, the latter wins out in actual PRC policy practice. But while unswervingly serving its own self-interest, Beijing also employs familiar methods to limit damage to the PRC’s desired international image.

Underneath the ceremonial public statements, the actual Chinese belief is that China owns the Lancang and that Chinese people have the right to take or use the water as they wish. They don’t think of it as a regional resource to be shared equitably with their neighbors.

China’s official position, repeated by PRC officials such as Ke Yousheng, China’s permanent representative to the United Nations’ Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, is that “we should also respect the legitimate rights and interests of riparian countries in the rational development and utilization of water resources, and take care of each others’ interests and concerns.” The reality is that Beijing prioritizes taking care of Beijing’s interests, with little “respect” for the interests and concerns of downstream neighbors.

Before arriving in Southeast Asia as the Mekong, the river flows through PRC territory as the Lancang. China operates 11 hydropower dams along the Lancang, with another 95 dams on tributaries that feed into the river. The Chinese dams harm the livelihoods of millions of people in the downstream Southeast Asian countries in two ways. First, the dams remove sediment, which includes nutrients that helps plants grow, from the waters flowing through them. As a consequence, rice fields that use Mekong water for irrigation are becoming less productive. Second, by impounding or releasing large amounts of water, the dams can cause or worsen droughts or floods downstream. In 2019, Chinese dams held back such an immense amount of water that downstream countries suffered a severe drought while the Lancang section of the river enjoyed unusually large water levels. Conversely, the Chinese dam operators sometimes open the floodgates during dry seasons without warning, making the river level downstream rise by several meters overnight and causing massively damaging floods. China is also compounding these negative effects by building dams in the downstream countries that will supply electricity to China.

Chulalongkorn University Prof. Thitinan Pongsudhirak argued in 2021 that Chinese officials adjust the flow of water into the Mekong as a diplomatic tactic—for example, releasing more water as a gift before an important meeting between Chinese and Southeast Asian officials. “It’s very clear that the Chinese are using the dams for political leverage,” he said.

Reminiscent of its engagement with ASEAN to advance Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, Beijing uses its influence over a regional organization to manage the political problem of Chinese dams disrupting the Mekong.

In 1995, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos signed an Agreement on the Cooperation and Sustainable Development of the Mekong River and founded the Mekong River Commission (MRC). China declined to join, thus avoiding the agreement’s obligations. Since then the MRC has criticized Chinese dam-building and demanded more information about the operations of dams in China that affect the flow of the river.

Beijing countered by establishing an alternative organization, the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) forum, in 2016. As Hoang Thi Ha, an analyst at Singapore’s ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, notes, “The LMC is a prime example of Sino-centric multilateralism, in which China is the one who sets the rules and frameworks.” For instance, the LMC sponsors research projects that highlight the negative impacts of climate change, but not the problems caused by dams, helping Beijing divert criticism away from its own behavior.

The other important aspect of PRC damage control is the creation of alternative narratives that fight back against accusations that the PRC has acted dishonorably. The issue of the Lancang dams has given rise to several examples.

Beijing offers up the typical colonialist argument that its increased influence and economic penetration result in blessings for the region rather than exploitation: “China is solidly promoting Chinese-style modernization, which will bring new benefits to the development of the countries along Mekong River.”

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, China faced outside criticism for its reluctance to share key data, presumably out of fear it would make the PRC government look bad. Beijing has responded by insisting that China has been extraordinarily transparent. Similarly, answering complaints that China does not publicize information about Lancang River water storage and release by Chinese dams (which the Chinese government considers a national security secret), government functionaries have retorted that China “provided hydrological data of Lancang River free of charge during flood season to MRC for 15 consecutive years [since 2002].” That data was wholly inadequate; it included only rainfall and water level information from two Chinese-operated hydrological stations, and only for part of the year. China agreed to release additional information starting in 2020 only under outside pressure. PRC media opportunistically called it “a major step taken by China that fully demonstrates the country’s goodwill and sincerity as a responsible upstream neighbor.” Outside analysts continue to question the accuracy and timeliness of the data provided by the PRC government.

The “major step” of releasing additional data resulted from an April 2020 report in which a US-based environmental watchdog organization used satellite data to expose the extent of downstream damage caused by China’s dams.

The PRC government responded to this embarrassing revelation with a three-headed alternative narrative. The first point of this narrative was that the study defaming Chinese dams was scientifically flawed. Secondly, PRC commentators argued that Chinese dams actually help the downstream countries by evening out the flow of water. In particular, these commentators said, the dams made the drought of 2018-2019 less severe for Southeast Asia. Finally, Chinese media and officials attributed criticism of the dams to a US anti-China agenda. A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson called the 2020 report a “malicious move to drive a wedge between” China and its neighbors. Chinese vice foreign minister Luo Zhaohui claimed that “For political purposes, some countries outside the region have repeatedly used the Mekong water resources issue to spread rumors and stir up trouble, alienating all parties and undermining sub-regional cooperation.”

This allegation is consistent with PRC strategic communication about the South China Sea dispute. In that case, Beijing argues there would be no disharmony between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors if the United States was not “stirring up trouble.”

Beijing might be able to have it both ways with the Chinese domestic audience, persuading them that their government can provide water and electricity while simultaneously being a “good neighbor.” But for China’s actual neighbors, this is increasingly non-credible, as is the notion of PRC exceptionalism. 

Denny Roy ([email protected])is a senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu. He specializes in strategic and international security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

PacNet #32 – Europe’s China confusion does the world a disservice

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An earlier version of this article appeared in The Japan Times.

Talk about mixed messages! Days after European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made one of the toughest speeches ever on China by an EU official, French President Emmanuel Macron visited that country with a delegation of business leaders.

Macron’s visit saw him meeting with supreme leader Xi Jinping, emphasizing points of convergence with Chinese proposals to end the Ukraine war and touting Europe’s “strategic autonomy”—diplomatic speak for creating distance from the United States on important policy matters.

It’s music to Chinese ears. Beijing is eager to exploit those differences to dilute any consensus on China policy within Europe and widen gaps between it and Washington to prevent the emergence of a unified position toward China.

European incoherence is worrying and not for just obvious reasons. Internal differences deprive the world of a credible alternative to the hard line toward China that dominates thinking in the United States. This is especially troubling for Japan, whose logic in many ways mirrors that of Europe.

In a speech the week before Macron’s visit, von der Leyen said that Xi “essentially wants China to become the world’s most powerful nation,” and that had been accompanied by a “deliberate hardening” of China’s strategic stance, with the country becoming “more repressive at home and more assertive abroad.” She pulled no punches, noting that “Just as China has been ramping up its military posture, it has also ramped up its policies of disinformation and economic and trade coercion. This is a deliberate policy targeting other countries to ensure they comply and conform.”

The EU identified China as a “systemic rival” in its 2019 strategic outlook. That label takes on special significance given von der Leyen’s pledge “to ensure that our companies’ capital, expertise and knowledge are not used to enhance the military and intelligence capabilities of those who are also systemic rivals.”

For her, however, and in distinction from US policy, the preferred policy is to de-risk trade with China, not to decouple. “We do not want to cut economic, societal, political or scientific ties. … But our relationship is unbalanced and increasingly affected by distortions created by China’s state capitalist system. So we need to rebalance this relationship on the basis of transparency, predictability and reciprocity.”

That means recognizing Chinese ambitions for what they truly are, rather than what some might want them to be—or as they may be presented—and promoting competitiveness and resilience within EU economies and businesses. That means reducing vulnerabilities created by reliance on single suppliers for critical or essential materials. That means employing defensive measures, like the trade controls mentioned above.

Her tough words contrasted with Macron’s message. He and Xi issued a joint communique in which they agreed to “improve market access” for each other’s businesses and designated 2024 as a “China-France Year of Culture and Tourism,” a move intended to get Chinese tourists to visit France as pandemic travel restrictions are eased. They also closed a deal to open a second production line for Airbus in China, another boost to the company’s ambitions in that market.

Macron emphasized the need to promote Europe’s “strategic autonomy,” or as he explained in an interview during his visit, reducing dependence on the United States and preventing Europe from getting “caught up in crises that are not ours.” Addressing the Taiwan situation, he added that “the worst thing” would be for Europeans to “become followers on this topic and take our cue from the US agenda and a Chinese overreaction.” Those comments generated considerable pushback in Europe; the Biden administration focused instead on cooperation with France.

China welcomed Macron; von der Leyen, a member of Macron’s group, not so much. Politico contrasted the treatment given the two. Macron was met on the airport tarmac by the foreign minister; von der Leyen got the ecology minister at the regular passenger exit. Macron’s schedule was overflowing, von der Leyen’s was bare-bones. Macron had a glittery state banquet with Xi while von der Leyen held a news conference at EU delegation headquarters. As Politico summarized the atmosphere, “While state media trumpeted the Sino-French relationship, Chinese social media demonized von der Leyen as an American puppet.”

If all that was too subtle, Fu Cong, China’s ambassador to the EU, was blunt in remarks to the Financial Times the day of von der Leyen’s speech. “We do hope that the European governments and the European politicians can see where their interests lie and then resist the unwarranted pressure from the US,” adding “it will only be at their own peril.” After all, he noted, “Who in their right mind would abandon such a thriving market as big as China?”

The easy explanation for EU schizophrenia is “good cop, bad cop.” That assumes a level of foresight and coherence in European diplomacy that seems unduly optimistic. Most observers concede that there are, as Mikko Huotari, director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies explained, substantive differences between von der Leyen and the major EU governments on how to handle EU-China relations.

There is also a self-serving element to Macron’s statements: In this and similar formulations, European strategic autonomy would be led by France. In his typically incisive and caustic analysis, Tufts University professor Dan Drezner writes that “Macron is playing his part of the French president and trying to call attention to himself.” According to Drezner, the appropriate “considered response is a polite shrug.”

Still, there is a real cost to Europe’s incoherence but it isn’t the one that typically comes to mind. A European position that is both clear-eyed about China while acknowledging the need for engagement would provide an important counterweight to the narrow-minded consensus that dominates thinking in the United States.

Writing in The National Interest last month, Paul Heer, a former American national intelligence officer for Northeast Asia, worried about the “bipartisan consensus on the nature and scope of the threat from China,” challenging the validity of the premises upon which those judgments are based and warning of groupthink that could lead US policy dangerously astray.

Heer agrees that China is a formidable and ruthless opponent and one that requires a comprehensive, whole-of-government competitive US response. Still, he rejects — citing the Annual Threat Assessment of the US intelligence community — that it is “an ‘existential’ winner-take-all threat to US global power and influence or to the American way of life, requiring a wholly adversarial cold war US response.”

His conclusion matches that of Harry Hannah, another former American intelligence official, who argues in a Stimson Center Red Cell report that a fixation on China risks repeating Cold War mistakes, especially that of ignoring or underplaying other developments that could be equally if not more important to US national security. Hannah is especially keen to empower other actors whose interests and values align with that of the United States, even though they may not be identical. Ignoring them or forcing them to toe the US line, he argues, plays to Beijing’s preference for a great power “Group of Two” that marginalizes other countries—many of which are US allies or partners.

A united Europe, one with a coherent and consistent policy toward China, could, in this conception of global order, balance China without going to the US extreme. While Europe alone can’t check China, its approach approximates that of Japan and together they offer a more inviting alternative to those skeptical of the all-or-nothing US policy. It is a credible option for those in Washington uncomfortable with the prevailing hard line, too.

Europe can’t replace the United States on issues of Indo-Pacific security. Forging a framework for constructively engaging one of the world’s superpowers is just as vital, however. Brussels can’t do that alone. Only by working with Tokyo and other like-minded countries can Europe succeed.

Japan has been reaching out to Europe for some time now, a process that began two decades ago and accelerated under the Trump administration as Tokyo and Brussels sought allies to gird an international order weakened by Beijing, Moscow and, sadly, Washington. Japan and the EU signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement, the Economic Partnership Agreement and the Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure to strengthen their cooperation and counter the forces of revisionism.

The United States needs to adopt a more flexible approach to its allies and partners, giving them the space to maneuver as they see fit—as long as they work toward the same goals. But this demands that those allies step up as well. Recent events show that Brussels understands the challenge; meeting it remains beyond its grasp.

Brad Glosserman ([email protected]) is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University as well as senior adviser (nonresident) at Pacific Forum. He is the author of Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions (Georgetown University Press, 2019). This article is drawn from a forthcoming book on the new national security economy.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: President Xi Jinping and President Emmanuel Macron at an official ceremony at the Great Hall of the People (6 April 2023, CNN) by Gonzalo Fuentes via Reuters. 

PacNet #31 – Time for a shift on the Korean Peninsula

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North Korea conducted another intercontinental ballistic missile test on April 13, the second in less than a month. Unlike previous launches, however, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un presided over what Pyongyang claimed was an ICBM powered by a solid-fueled engine. This would represent another milestone in Pyongyang’s decades-long effort to field an operational missile capability despite being the subject of one of the most stringent UN Security Council sanctions regimes in existence. A reliable North Korean solid-fueled ICBM would be of particular concern to the United States during a war-time contingency—solid-fueled missiles can be assembled rapidly, are easier to conceal compared to liquid-fueled variants, and can be prepared on-site, giving the United States far less time to locate and neutralize them before launch.

As expected, the United States, South Korea, and Japan condemned the latest test. Tokyo, which issued an emergency alert to residents on the island of Hokkaido, requested an emergency UN Security Council meeting. The next day, Washington authorized two separate bilateral military drills with South Korea and Japan, including B-52 bombers and F-35 fighters. The drills were designed to send a message: more missile tests, particularly those with the capacity to reach targets on the continental United States, will result in more defensive measures by Washington and its East Asian allies in response.

Drills beget drills

None of these moves are especially surprising. The Biden administration is spending significant effort this year bolstering the credibility of US extended deterrence to its South Korean and Japanese allies. In January, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and South Korean Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-sup engaged in a series of meetings in Seoul, during which Washington pledged to “enhance the implementation of US extended deterrence” through increased deployment of US strategic assets on and near the Korean Peninsula.

This came roughly two weeks after South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol suggested it may be time for South Korea to build its own nuclear weapons, or at least request the return of US tactical nuclear warheads on South Korean soil. Yoon’s comments got the attention of US defense officials; in the ensuing months, a variety of US strategic combat systems have been rotated to the area.

In February, US and South Korean officials participated in table-top exercises at the Pentagon with a specific focus on responding to a number of scenarios involving North Korean nuclear use. US B-1B Lancers joined exercises with South Korean forces at least four times this year. The USS Nimitz, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, docked in the South Korean port city of Busan in late March. In April, Washington and Seoul executed the largest military field exercises in five years. Separate exercises occur as well, including trilateral anti-submarine warfare drills between US, South Korean, and Japanese naval forces. Similar exercises are now ongoing, with Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo regularizing them in the future to improve naval force inter-operability.

This has predictably elicited strong countermeasures from the North Koreans. The “security dilemma”—where “defensive” exercises are perceived by the adversary as a belligerent action—is very much alive on the Korean Peninsula. What Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo view as entirely justifiable, Pyongyang views as aggressive and thus deserving of retaliation.

Can the cycle of escalation be broken?

It is hard to see this cycle ending anytime soon. Ordinarily, such situations would be contained through diplomatic engagement, either between the parties themselves (oftentimes discreetly) or through a trusted intermediary. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any diplomatic channel on the horizon. The Biden administration has reached out to the Kim regime multiple times to jumpstart a new negotiation after talks failed during the Trump era. But Kim Jong Un rejected the overtures and is unlikely to green-light any serious negotiating effort as long as US policy centers on North Korea’s total and irreversible denuclearization. South Korea, which acted as a facilitator of direct US-North Korea diplomacy during Moon Jae-in’s presidency, is no longer seen by the North Koreans as a credible interlocutor due to President Yoon’s hardline approach toward Pyongyang. (North Korea has even ignored daily military-to-military phone calls from the South for nearly two weeks.)

In an ideal world, China would exploit its considerable financial and political leverage over North Korea to aid Washington in bringing the Kim regime to the negotiating table. Yet, given the terrible state of US-China relations, Beijing has little incentive to help Washington on a foreign policy dispute that has confounded multiple US administrations for decades.

Additional economic pressure is unlikely to bring Kim to the table either. The UN Security Council has been deadlocked on the North Korean nuclear issue since 2017, with the United States and China arguing over who is at fault. Permanent members Russia and China use their veto power to block individual sanctions designations, and the prospect of a new UN Security Council sanctions resolution passing is too low to even theorize about. Beijing and Moscow increasingly see sanctions as worsening the internal food and economic crisis in North Korea and should therefore be loosened or removed. The United States found out the hard way when it tabled a draft resolution in May 2022, only to walk away from the council chamber disappointed after the Russian and Chinese delegations cast a double veto. Even if the North Koreans conducted another nuclear test, there is no guarantee the Security Council could conjure up the unanimity required to issue a statement condemning it. With the UN paralyzed, the Biden administration has relied on unilateral sanctions designations ever since to penalize North Korea for everything from illicit financial practices and fuel smuggling to the development of weapons of mass destruction and human rights abuses. Even so, the North Koreans have proven by necessity to be highly meticulous sanctions evaders.

Washington, therefore, is left with a short list of options. Continuing to strengthen the sanctions regime is the most likely course of action, if only out of bureaucratic habit, yet by definition is highly reactive to North Korean behavior and holds low probability of success. Maintaining the current pace of US military deployments in East Asia will be welcomed by Seoul and Tokyo but also risks prompting more North Korean missile tests and military exercises—up to and including a seventh underground nuclear test. Fostering a detente between the two Koreas is probably a dead-end as long as the Yoon administration’s hard line continues.

The North Korean nuclear issue is a low priority for the Biden administration. The United States is currently content with treading water and waiting for the Kim regime to accept its overtures. Assuming Washington wants to solve or at least contain the problem, the time has come for a major policy shift. The most dramatic shift would be recognition among the United States and its allies that denuclearization is infeasible when North Korea already possesses dozens of nuclear warheads, will likely construct more, and is in the process of diversifying its delivery systems. Avoiding a war through a mixture of deterrence, engagement, and practical diplomacy should now be the paramount US national security objective on the Korean Peninsula, not transforming North Korea into a non-nuclear state. If the United States intends to maintain a consistently high pace of military exercises with South Korea, Washington should establish protocols to minimize confusion and mixed signaling with North Korea.

This will likely require direct communication between US and North Korean military officers and perhaps advanced, mutual notifications about the timing and location of various military and missile exercises to decrease misperceptions. In addition, the United States, in coordination with China, should be willing to exchange basic information on nuclear safety and maintenance with North Korea—that the United States is highly unlikely to recognize North Korea as a legitimate nuclear-armed state does not obviate the need to ensure Pyongyang’s nuclear practices are up to standard. The United States should also stop prefacing US-North Korea engagement on the nuclear issue alone; maintaining a cold peace on the Korean Peninsula involves discussions beyond the nuclear component, including, but not limited to, the disposition of conventional forces on both sides of the 150-mile Demilitarized Zone, de-escalation mechanisms between the two Koreas, and common rules of engagement along disputed boundaries like the Northern Limit Line.

Only when realistic, achievable goals are set can an effective strategy be formulated.

Daniel R. DePetris ([email protected]) is a fellow at Defense Priorities, a foreign policy think tank based in Washington, D.C., a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune and a foreign policy writer for Newsweek.  

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter, observe a warhead missile launch exercise (20 March 2023, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)) by KCNA via KNS/AFP.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR4 – A History of Shared Values, A Future of Shared Strategic Interests: US-Australia Relations in the Indo-Pacific

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About this Volume

Authors of this volume participated in the inaugural U.S.- Australia Next-Generation Leaders Initiative, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State through the U.S. Embassy in Canberra. With backgrounds from academia, public policy, civil society, and industry, the cohort brings rich insights on the past, present, and future of the U.S.-Australia relations. This program was conducted from February 2021 – September 2021.

Click here to download the full report.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Americans and Australians in the Pacific Century | Craig Kafura
Chapter 2: “Substantial and Fruitful Benefits”: State Governments as Vectors of CCP Influence in Australia | Rick Umback
Chapter 3: Economic Mate-ship: US-Australian Policy Alignment to Counter PRC Economic Coercion | Rose Rodgers
Chapter 4: Evolving the US-Australia Alliance: An Agenda for Cyberbiosecurity Engagement | Thom Dixon

The United States and Australia have been treaty allies for more than 70 years. This bond endured throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror, and it increasingly looks as though they will be close partners throughout the great power competition with the People’s Republic of China. The two partner countries were among the earliest critics of the PRC’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, have shared concerns over Chinese investment and its impact on their national security, and what growing PRC influence means for them the future of democracy in the Indo-Pacific.

The two countries were early and enthusiastic members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which includes fellow Indo-Pacific democracies Japan and India, and which has moved to address pressing regional challenges such as pandemic response and climate change. Plus, with 2021’s announcement of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) pact Canberra proved its willingness to defy not only Beijing, but also other democracies—especially in Europe—to build out its capacity to defend itself and counter the PRC’s growing regional power.

The contributions to this volume each address the nature, not only of the alliance, but the challenges it will face in the years to come. Craig Kafula of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs notes that public polling in both countries reveals overwhelming agreement on most subjects related to the alliance and its forthcoming challenges, but also differences of opinion that will have to be navigated. Rick Umback of Australian National University’s School of Politics and International Relations examines the growth of PRC influence over local governments and Australia, and the ramifications this has for other liberal democracies in the Indo-Pacific.

Rose Rodgers at the Center for Naval Analyses says the AUKUS has not limited, but actually increased the need for scrutiny of PRC investment in critical and emerging technologies, and other means of screening technological investments. Moving away from what the alliance means for relations with the PRC, Thom Dixon examines the field of cyberbiosecurity—the intersection of cybersecurity and biosecurity—and how US-Australian cooperation in this field is essential to meet two of the great challenges of this age: climate change and pandemic response.

Taken together these analyses—brought to you by the next generation of American-Australian analysts—richly detail the nature of the challenges the allies face, and offer recommendations on how to meet them over the next 70 years of their partnership.

About the Authors

Thom Dixon is undertaking a multidisciplinary PhD at Macquarie University in international relations and synthetic biology. He is a member of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in Synthetic Biology. In 2018, he completed a Non-resident WSD-Handa Fellowship with the Pacific Forum on synthetic biology and Australian foreign policy. Thom is an alumni of the 2017 EU-Australia Leadership Forum and the 2021 US-Australia Next-Generation Leadership Initiative. He is the Vice President of the Australian Institute of International Affairs in NSW and the Manager, National Security and Defence at Macquarie University. His research focuses on the convergence of the life sciences with the information sciences and how international relations can better enable the global bioeconomy.

Craig Kafura is the assistant director for public opinion and foreign policy at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a Security Fellow with the Truman National Security Project, and a Pacific Forum Young Leader. At the Council he coordinates research on public and elite opinion on a wide variety of foreign policy and international affairs issues, with a particular focus on Asia. Since joining the Council in 2011, Craig has authored or coauthored dozens of reports and briefs on public opinion and foreign policy. His writing has appeared in a variety of outlets including Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, and The Diplomat, and he is the coauthor of “Foreign Policy Beliefs Among Leaders and the Public” for The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, 7th edition. Craig holds an MA in political science from Columbia University and a BA in political science from Yale University.

Rose Rodgers is a DC-based political-military analyst. Her research focuses on PRC strategic forces, export controls, nuclear nonproliferation, and arms control. Rose has a Masters in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. She studied Mandarin at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China as a Boren Fellow.

Rick Umback holds a Ph.D. from the Australian National University’s School of Politics and International Relations. His research interests cover the intersection of technology, industry, public policy, politics, and strategic affairs. He is currently employed in the public sector and has previously worked in academia and Parliament.

Photo: Aboard the USS Wasp (LHD 1) at the Port of Brisbane, Army Maj. Gen. Roger Noble, deputy chief of Joint Operations (left) and Rear Adm. Fred Kacher, commander, Expeditionary Strike Group 7 (right) begin the closing ceremony for Exercise Talisman Sabre fon July 27, 2019 from U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Nicolas A. Cloward.

PacNet #27 – Why China’s Middle East diplomacy doesn’t herald a new world order

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An earlier version of this article appeared in The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

March 10’s agreement to reestablish diplomatic relations between Tehran and Riyadh was a no “peace deal,” but the rivals did decide to cool tensions and reopen embassies after a seven-year lapse. China’s role in facilitating the deal raised the most consternation in Washington, leading some to declare that “a new era of geopolitics” had begun and assert that the agreement topped “anything the US has been able to achieve in the region since Biden came to office.”

Yet there are plenty of reasons to be skeptical about the notion that the deal signals a newfound Chinese diplomatic prowess or a shifting regional order. For one, Beijing has been wading into Middle East diplomacy for years—most recently via President Xi Jinping’s December trip to chair regional summits in Saudi Arabia—but with little to show for its efforts. (For a detailed look at China’s past diplomatic activities in the region, see Carol Silber’s “China’s Track Record on Middle East Diplomacy.”)

Further, it remains unclear how crucial Beijing was to the Iran-Saudi negotiations. The two parties had been conducting backchannel talks for years in the hopes of de-escalating tensions, with previous rounds sponsored by Iraq and Oman. Those talks were sidelined with the change in government in Iraq and the spread of protests in Iran last year.

Reports on the new agreement suggest that both sides were readily able to reach consensus on important issues, at least on paper. Riyadh apparently agreed to soften coverage on Iran International, the London-based media outlet funded by Saudis, which Tehran has depicted as the leading anti-regime instigator throughout the recent protest movement. In return, Iran reportedly agreed to encourage its Houthi allies in Yemen to maintain the current year-long truce. Since that war began in 2015, Saudi Arabia has spent millions of dollars defending its territory against Houthi missile and drone attacks, which have often targeted major civilian sites. In short, Riyadh and Tehran already had strong incentives to take at least a few initial diplomatic steps to bolster their internal stability, so forging this deal is hardly a masterstroke for Beijing.

Another open question is whether the deal will be implemented in full, and whether Beijing intends to hold each side accountable. According to the trilateral statement issued on March 10, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to “resume diplomatic relations” and reopen their embassies within two months. They also affirmed their “respect for the sovereignty of states and…non-interference in internal affairs,” as well as their intention to implement their 2001 security cooperation agreement and their 1998 deal covering economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation.

Yet the 2001 security cooperation agreement is vague—although it includes generic language encouraging information sharing and joint training to counter organized crime, terrorism, and drug trafficking, it does not provide a specific path toward initiating such cooperation. Moreover, the trilateral statement makes painstakingly clear that China’s role was “hosting and sponsoring talks,” and it may host another regional summit later this year. It has given no signal that it intends to be the agreement’s guarantor or keep it on track.

Indeed, the risks of derailment are high given the lack of trust between Riyadh and Tehran. Renewed protests in Iran could trigger another surge of regime anger toward Saudi Arabia, whether or not Riyadh and its allies are involved in fomenting the unrest. And although the Houthis are closely aligned with Tehran and depend on its weapons, cash, and training, they might still launch further strikes on Saudi Arabia for their own reasons, thereby threatening the fragile ceasefire. Similarly, Iran’s network of proxies in Iraq and Syria could decide to attack Saudi partners or the kingdom itself, undermining Riyadh’s internal support for compromise.

The deal may even exacerbate the broader geopolitical tensions Beijing likely aims to calm. Iran may perceive the agreement as a tacit endorsement of its current nuclear policy, matching diplomatic intransigence with unprecedented technical advances. If Tehran decides to double down on its nuclear strategy as a result, it will further alarm Western, Arab, and Israeli officials. In other words, while the deal might de-escalate tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, it could simultaneously exacerbate Tehran’s tensions with other actors, potentially raising the possibility of military escalation.

Washington should therefore be clear-eyed about what Beijing’s mediation means—and what it doesn’t. China’s investment in the Middle East will likely continue growing; after all, it is the region’s dominant economic force and has long sought to match its diplomatic standing with its sizable economic footprint. Until now, its diplomatic reputation in the region has not been challenged by realities on the ground. Getting Iran and Saudi Arabia to publicly agree on a de-escalation accord is a win to be sure. But actually holding them to the agreement over the long term is an entirely different challenge—one that will reveal a great deal about China’s true influence.

Henry Rome is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Grant Rumley is the Institute for Near East Policy’s Goldberger Fellow and author of its 2022 study “China’s Security Presence in the Middle East: Redlines and Guidelines for the United States.”

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: A photograph released by Chinese state media showing officials Wang Yi, China’s top foreign policy official, with Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran’s security council, and Musaad bin Mohammed Al Aiban, Saudi Arabia’s minister of state, in Beijing by China Daily via Reuters

PacNet #26 – The UK integrated review and integrated deterrence

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The much-awaited release of Britain’s updated Integrated Review (IR2023)—a “refresh” since the 2021 iteration (IR2021)—has many in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific now trying to assess UK intent and capability in the region. The paper does go some way to addressing concerns that UK domestic politics would pull the ground from underneath “the Tilt” before it had even begun. The region is described as “Inextricably linked” with the security of the Euro-Atlantic, though this strategic logic is compelling, the operational follow-through bears some scrutiny.

So, what is the United Kingdom security posture in the Indo-Pacific and how can it meet the theatre-resourcing demands made by current geopolitical realities and current capacity?

First, there is a superior strategic logic to the idea of linkage between the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific as part of a broader construct the “global commons and rules-based international order.” This framework promotes the idea that the two regions—and Russian and Chinese efforts to destabilize and dominate those regions—are part of a broader geopolitical struggle. The common thread of Russian and Chinese authoritarian systems also reaffirms this conceptualization as does their growing political and military alignment and intention “to remake [the order] in their image” (IR2023). This framework is likewise found in the 2022 US National Security Strategy and the 2022 Japanese National Security Strategy.

At slight variance to this compelling logic, is the debate about resourcing and operational concerns in Europe in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Europe. In both the United States and United Kingdom, there are those experts who believe that London’s focus should be Europe and that attention towards the Indo-Pacific is a “distraction.” Some of these voices are even official, as for example, that of US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin stated in July 2021: “If, for example, we focus a bit more here [in Asia], are there areas that the United Kingdom can be more helpful in other parts of the world.” This view has been a constant refrain by Labour Shadow Defense Secretary John Healey, who stated, “Alliances with like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific are important. We can contribute strongly with technology, capability, diplomacy, to the Indo-Pacific, but there needs to be a realism about military commitments into the Indo-Pacific. Our armed forces are ill-served by leaders who pretend that Britain can do everything, everywhere.”

In all fairness, the IR2021 or IR2023 both make clear that the United Kingdom’s prioritization will be of the Euro-Atlantic—the “region of primary and overriding importance to UK interests – where the build of…efforts would be focused through NATO.” Furthermore, Secretary of Defence Austin’s view does not preclude the sort of diplomatic, economic, technological, and security cooperation that the United Kingdom is already doing in the Indo-Pacific. Of note: the Indo-Pacific Strategy of 2021, calls for an “engaged Europe” as one of its strategic means, and states that the United States will “bring our Indo-Pacific and European partners in novel ways, including through the AUKUS partnership.”

At its heart, this is a disconnect between two different theatres and two different types of threat, posing different operational challenges. In Europe, the threat is largely about annexation of national territory by a revanchist Russia and the possibility of a land war in Ukraine that could spill over into NATO-member territory. Few believe that it is about the future architecture of Europe. In contrast, it is more about the regional maritime system and its importance to the global system in the Indo-Pacific. Admiral John Aquilino, Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command in October 2021 made this clear when he visited the United Kingdom and called the Indo-Pacific the “defining security landscape of the 21st Century.” Noting the centrality of the region’s maritime trade flow “every day, half of the entire world’s container cargo and 70% of ship-borne energy supply flows through this area. The most important message I can send…is how vital the Indo-Pacific is to the future prosperity and security of Europe and global cooperation.”

Is the United Kingdom therefore set to play a role in an integrated deterrence vis a vis China? The jury is still out, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, though the Tilt appears to have been achieved and now the region is to become a “permanent pillar” of UK foreign policy. With the exception of AUKUS and GCAP, which are new since IR2021, much of the Tilt has been achieved through diplomatic and technical/economic agreements rather than through defense or security means. There have been modest increases in the United Kingdom military presence in the region, such as the two naval patrol vessels, and arguably the AUKUS/GCAP agreements are the headline deliverables that will see decades of engagement in the region. IR2023 emphasizes the United Kingdom approach in the region to be via deepening relationships with allies and partners or soft power. The United Kingdom has widened its security and defense network across the Indo-Pacific over the past decade and appears to be trying to deepen this network now. Not much can be drawn from IR2023 until the Defence Command Paper is out—reportedly not due for release until June 2023.

If deterring China is the goal what should the United Kingdom be doing to help achieve this? The United Kingdom is not about to deploy vast numbers of troops, ships, or aircraft to the region especially whilst the war in Ukraine persists. But the United Kingdom could use its footprint across the Indo-Pacific to better support a coordinated deterrence plan with other allies or partners in the region.

France and the United Kingdom have already agreed a plan to coordinate carrier group deployments, which could be a signpost for the integrating effect the United Kingdom brings. With the AUKUS announcement there are likely to be more submarine deployments to the region including the establishment of a trilateral submarine task force. What is lacking for the region is any form of security architecture in which allies and partners can discuss issues and coordinate responses or contribute forces. Evidently this would not include China and by developing an integrated security structure it builds a better integrated deterrence effect where allies and partners are stronger together.

The United Kingdom could expand its experience of establishing maritime Combined Task Forces (CTF) that have been successful in the Arabian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and Malacca Straits[1]. All these CTFs have included a mix of international partners and proved to be successful in deterring illicit activity, strengthening maritime security and reassuring region or international communities. London could establish something similar for the Indo-Pacific, or even several across the region, where partner nations can come together to police the increasingly crowded volatile seas and airspaces of the region? While the United Kingdom can help to establish this/these HQs in the region they would likely not be led by the United Kingdom, and they shouldn’t be. The United Kingdom could provide the backbone, providing a “socket” for the United Kingdom to “plug” into when UK forces were deployed in the region, but more importantly bring like-minded partners together to improve security across the region. The byproduct being a more coherent deterrent strategy toward the region.

[1] In the Arabian Gulf is Combined Maritime Forces including CTF 150, 151 & 152. EUNAVFOR which used to be based out of the UK countering piracy in Somalia and the Indian Ocean. Based out of Singapore was the International Fusion Centre to counter piracy in the Malacca Straits.

Brig Rory Copinger-Symes ([email protected]) is a former Chief of Staff to EUNAVFOR and Director of Security Cooperation in Indo-Pacom Headquarters. He is now a senior advisor to Bondi Partners, an Australian consultancy and advisory firm.

Dr. John Hemmings ([email protected]) is Senior Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the Pacific Forum, a think tank in Honolulu. He has been a witness to two Parliamentary Defence Committee Inquires on the Indo-Pacific region and formerly worked at RUSI on Northeast Asia.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

PacNet #23 – Japan’s new strategic policy: Three overlooked takeaways

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Japan has signaled its intent to strengthen its national security and defense posture significantly in an increasingly volatile Indo-Pacific. When he met President Joe Biden in January 2023, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, referring to Japan’s new National Security Strategy, declared he would “fundamentally reinforce our defense capabilities.” This includes raising the Japanese defense budget to approximately 2% of GDP by 2027. This will gratify many in Washington who share a determination to strengthen the alliance militarily and bolster combined deterrence postures.

Kishida’s remarks came a month after the release of the new National Security Strategy, accompanied by the National Defense Strategy (renaming the prior National Defense Program Guidelines) and Defense Build-Up Program (formerly Medium-Term Defense Program).

Together these documents together present a grim picture of the security situation Tokyo and its US ally face. The NSS states that “Japan’s security environment is as severe and complex as it has ever been since the end of World War II.” Russian aggression in Ukraine, Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas and across the Taiwan Strait, and North Korea’s nuclear missile ambitions top the list of dangers. The NSS identifies them as countries that seek to “revise the existing international order.” In the context of strategic competition, the NSS states the boundaries between peace and war have become blurred through “gray zone” activities, malicious operations in the cyber and information spaces, the use of economic statecraft, and a vigorous technological arms race.

The NSS (along with NDS and DBP) represents a highly coordinated response on Japan’s part. They have been dubbed “historic,” a “paradigm shift,” and a “revolution” by some analysts, while some have offered more skeptical appraisals on their actual implementation. Heretofore debates have primarily centered on defense budget increases and acquisition of counter-strike capabilities.

But there are three other key leitmotivs of the documents that have not attracted as much comment.

First, the NSS unabashedly foregrounds “universal values” as a “national interest” and “fundamental principle” of its strategy. While many observers have questioned the sustainability of the former prime minister (and current vice president of the Liberal Democratic Party) Aso Taro’s “values-oriented diplomacy” since his time as party leader, it appears to be back with a vengeance. The NSS speaks of “upholding universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law.” It excoriates states that do not share such values and points to their malignant actions to undermine a “free, open, and stable international order.” Japan’s commitment to project its Free and Open Indo-Pacific “vision” thus frames the almost Manichean contest between liberal democracies and authoritarian states as “a historical inflection point.” Japan now states it “will maintain and protect universal values.” For a country that long eschewed taking ideological leadership and intrusive democracy promotion, this emphatic statement is quite a departure.

Second, Japan’s new security strategy emphasises its “holistic” approach. This is evident in its “integrated” approach to strategy—where it will lever all aspects of its “comprehensive national power” (a term originally invented by the Chinese) to achieve its strategic objectives. It will employ diplomacy, defense capabilities, economic strengths, technological prowess, and intelligence assets in service of an integrated strategic approach. It seeks to create a “comprehensive defense architecture” by increasing coordination across organizational sectors such as the Japan Coast Guard and Maritime Self Defense Force, for example. The documents are replete with references to “cross-governmental” and “whole-of government” coordination, and “cross-community collaboration” (in advanced technology and R&D), indicating desire to break down institutional “siloing” that could impede a joined-up approach to the implementation of strategy.

This “integration” includes the military domain, where Japan continues to build a “Multi-Domain Defense Force” by marrying the “traditional” land-sea-air domains with the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains. Integration also extends to allies and partners, with greater efforts to harmonize US and Japanese forces, since “No country can protect its security alone.” This includes bilateral integration with the United States through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism and Flexible Deterrent Options. The former focuses on information sharing, improving common situational awareness and coordinating responses from peacetime to conflict contingencies. The latter is designed to coordinate combined responses to deterring Chinese coercive activities within the maritime domain through military signalling and escalation control. Greater interoperability with close strategic partners, such as Australia and the United Kingdom, through Reciprocal Access Agreements, which provide legal and logistical frameworks  necessary to facilitate overseas training and military operations in one another’s countries, are a means toward improving inter-military coordination and force interoperability. This will result in a “multi-layered network” knitting together Japan’s regional ally and “like-minded” partners (e.g. Australia, India), in conjunction with “minilateral” mechanisms such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Trilateral Strategic Dialogue. Japan is thus transcending its role as a single bilateral “spoke” of the US-led “hub-and-spoke” alliance system to become a subsidiary “hub” itself.

Japan is now acting to become accountable for its own national defense, eventually assuming responsibility for dealing with any invasion more independently (by 2027). This does not portend a move to complete national defense “autonomy” and a decoupling from the US alliance, but rather a determination to progressively assume of the primary burden for self-defense of its national territory.  Though it will rely on its US ally for some time, this will be a major step, prospectively freeing up US forces based in Japan for other activities. The DBP also indicates that “Such a defense capability must come with high readiness and response capability.” To achieve this, the increased defense budget will need to be allocated accordingly to acquire counter-strike capabilities that can deter or defeat an enemy invasion, supported by a robust defense industrial base (a “virtually integral part of defense capability”), and a hardening of its defense facilities, with ample stocks of fuel and munitions. As well as providing for the defense of Japanese territory, this makes a greater contribution to the alliance considering the diminishing resources (and increasing obsolescence) of the US’ force posture.

Third, combined with greater responsibility for its own national defense is the emphasis on streamlining the “responsiveness” of its defense architecture. This is part to the overarching recognition that “a strategy that integrates its national responses at a higher level” is required. The 2016 Peace and Security Legislation set the groundwork for this by freeing Japan of some of the former constraints upon it activities and permitting more collaboration with allies and partners. If deterrence fails, responsiveness of government and defense apparatus will be at a premium. To improve reaction times, decision-making procedures will become more “seamless,” contingency plans drawn up, and the mobility and readiness of rapid reaction forces improved (“mobile deployment capabilities,” per the NDS). This builds upon the earlier establishment of a National Security Council (in 2013) and centralization of decision-making in the Prime Minister’s Office, initiated under Abe Shinzo. This extends to inter-service crisis response coordination between the Self Defense Forces, police, and Japan Coast Guard, for example.

Japan’s new strategic approach is perhaps best seen as an apotheosis of the determined efforts put in motion during the premiership of the late PM Abe, and a validation of these. This trajectory has been pursued by his successor Kishida, first in his “vision for peace” address to the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022. Unified by a clear statement of national objectives, including universal values and a commitment to uphold a rules-based order, Japan is investing heavily in marshalling the requisite resources to back this (“pragmatic realism”), drawn from the whole spectrum of the comprehensive national power it possesses. This is a recognition that strategic competition occurs across all domains, and it has become a national security imperative for Japan to improve its ability to deter and defend against attacks on its national territory, whilst assuming a greater burden within the US-Japan alliance. The ambitions of the national security documents, by their own admission are “unprecedented in terms of size and content.” Nevertheless, they signal Japan’s “steadfast resolve” to achieve them.

Time will tell if they are successfully implemented, or if they can be realized within the urgent timeframe available before a potential conflict breaks out.

Thomas Wilkins ([email protected]) is an Adjunct Senior Fellow (non-resident), Pacific Forum, Senior Fellow, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and Associate Professor, University of Sydney.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Prime Minister Kishida Fumio commemorates the 70th anniversary of the foundation of the Maritime Self-Defense Force on Nov. 6 by Pool via Reuters. 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR3 – Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

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Introduction

There is a growing acceptance among countries in the Indo-Pacific region that strategic competition between the United States and China is changing perceptions about security and the adequacy of the existing security architecture. While some have characterized the competition between the two as a new Cold War, it is clear that what is happening in the region is far more complex than the competition that characterized the original Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the economic integration that has taken place since the early 1990s makes it much more difficult to draw bright ideological lines between the two sides. Further, the Asian context of the emerging competition is one where the two competitors have grown to share power. As the dominant military power, the United States has been the primary security guarantor in Asia and beyond. China, on the other hand, has emerged over the past decades as the primary economic catalyst in Asia and beyond. Currently, each side seems increasingly unwilling to accept that arrangement.

Download the full volume here.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Carl Baker

Chapter 1 | Southeast Asia Faces Its Boogeyman – Great Power Competition Returns to Southeast Asia in the 21st Century

Drew Thompson

Chapter 2 | Geoeconomics and Geopolitics in Southeast Asia

Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Chapter 3 | Economic Aspects of National Security

Brad Glosserman

Chapter 4 | China as a technological power: Chinese perspectives and the quantum case

Hoo Tiang Boon

Chapter 5 | Minilateral groupings as an alternative to multilateralism in an era of strategic competition

Thomas Wilkins

Chapter 6 | The Role of Indo-Pacific Economic Institutions in Shaping Security Competition

Prashanth Parameswaran

Chapter 7 | Economic Development Cooperation amid Indo-Pacific Strategic Competition

Gong Xue

Chapter 8 | Regional Security Cooperation in the US-China Strategic Competition

Kei Koga

Chapter 9 | Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation

Raymund Jose Quilop

PacNet #18 – China has a digital grand strategy. Does the president know?

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The answer to the above question is, regrettably, no. We have been unable to find anyone in government, who has heard of this strategy, which raises a few questions: Does China have a digital grand strategy? If so, is it part of our calculations in the current grand strategic competition over technology?

This is worrying. China’s digital grand strategy has a name: Digital China. “Digital China” was elevated to the elite level of a Chinese Communist Party national developmental strategy by Xi Jinping personally, 6 years ago. As a concept, it dates back even further to Xi’s elevation to General Secretary in 2012. In fact, Xi Jinping started thinking grandly about digital technology more than 20 years ago when he was still a provincial governor. All of this has been extensively covered in Chinese-language newspapers for 20 years.

So, why is China’s digital grand strategy so poorly understood?

Because it was published almost exclusively in Chinese. Not in English. Not only that, what is out there has been carefully designed for Western audiences.

On Feb. 27, the CCP Central Committee and State Council issued guidelines (in Chinese only) for accelerating “Digital China,” a standard practice on informatization policy dating back more than 15 years. Within hours, PRC state-owned media launched a propaganda campaign to describe to the world for the first time—in English—what Digital China is. It was artful. It was masterful. It was also inaccurate in many ways.

It was an example of disinformation at its best. Although overlapping with the truth, the state media narrative is inconsistent with Digital China’s theoretical origins, party definition, and current execution, as laid out in authoritative PRC sources. Beijing admitted it had a digital grand strategy for the first time and designed our first impression. Why did it take 10 years to come out? We are not quite sure, but we have a guess.

Nor has Western media covered the project. Only the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong took on the challenge—in the opposite direction. The venerable newspaper repeated the state-controlled message and elevated it. Digital China was now a “grand digitalization plan.” Comically, Digital China is a grand digitalization plan (the term “digitalization” is a CCP term-of-art), just not the one described in South China Morning Post.

In contrast to the obsessive Western coverage of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, Digital China has only been discussed by a handful of China and tech experts—many of whom are still struggling to understand the nature of the strategy. Just a few days before the announcement of Digital China’s new guideline, Pacific Forum published a major research paper on the strategy, “Digital China: the Strategy and its Geopolitical Implications,” where we sought to introduce the plan to a Western audience.

It is difficult to know why the plan seems to have escaped widespread notice in the West. Perhaps the daily nature of the US-China technology competition makes for better reading, perhaps the nature of the strategy—theoretical and couched in dry CCP jargon—makes it hard to digest. But this should not stop anyone from trying to understand what it is and informing our government and the public.

As noted above, the concept has been around since 2012. However, the intellectual—even ideological—origins date back to 2000. At this time, Xi Jinping was governor of Fujian province and was casting around for a campaign that would bring local government into the digital age and jumpstart the digital economy. This role that Fujian has as Digital China’s “ideological source” is still in evidence as the province hosts the annual Digital China Summit.

To some extent, Western confusion is understandable. There have been so many technology plans and strategies that it feels like “just another” strategy/slogan dreamt up by Xi Jinping. As we note in our paper, Digital China did originally emerge as just another plan—a strategic plan, before gradually evolving to become a “grand strategy,” by which Xi wishes to digitally transform China, and through this process provide a “strong digital impetus” for China to become a “Modernized Socialist Great Power.”

So, why should Western policymakers—and Western journalists—care about Digital China? Given that we are in a deep competition with China over technology and data standards, it only makes sense for us to know the overall structure, foundational thinking, and assumptions of Chinese policy. At present, it rather feels as though the United States is responding piecemeal to Chinese actions rather than understanding Chinese intent and then developing a counter strategy of our own.

The US effort to counter Huawei’s penetration and domination of global 5G architecture is a case in point. Huawei is just one part of a much larger Digital China 5G ecosystem made of up dozens if not hundreds of firms. Similarly, concern over TikTok’s usage of data is understandable. But China focuses on “Basic Systems for Data” at strategic level many tiers higher. Efforts to stymie China’s semiconductor ambitions through chokepoints are having an impact. But the Digital China strategy has long anticipated such an action and is already implementing responses, such as digitalized supply chains carried by a new global Industrial Internet, part of Digital China.

Not knowing or understanding China’s grand strategy also impacts US messaging to third party nations. At present, US allies and partners in Southeast Asia and Europe remain skeptical of US motivations. Seeing no strategy of our own, partly-persuaded by a new “Digital China” strategy that state-run media tells them is both forward thinking and focused on global cooperation, they view US policies as mercantilist, driven by the same mindset that saw Washington pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017.

The problem is one of messaging. The United States has not effectively persuaded others that Chinese ambitions are a threat to their national interests as well. But here’s what China is doing, right now. Beijing has executed a digital grand strategy for 6 years and is now building a “new” messaging campaign to describe it to a world often baffled by the US-China technology competition.

What should we be doing?

There are two elements to the Digital China strategy that we believe play against Beijing’s narrative that its intent is only to assist the developing world develop their economies. The first one is that Marxism is a deliberate part of Digital China—right down to the way that the CCP elevated data a factor of production. For the first time in decades, Marxism is being touted as a “modern” ideology, an alternative model to governance and development. The problem with that should be easy enough to understand for those familiar with the failures of Marxism 1.0.

Secondly, the strategy is very much about China becoming the dominant power in the international system through the mastery of data intelligence. A world in which the primary superpower is a Marxist data-obsessed one-party state should scare European and Asian allies and partners—no matter their creed.

At this stage, there’s no way we can know whether China will be successful in this ambition. But we do know that our responses so far are responsive, tactical, and do not draw from a wider appreciation of Chinese thinking. China has an ideologically driven strategic approach. We are playing whack-a-mole.

We’ll say it again: Can someone please brief our president?

Dr. David Dorman ([email protected]) was the inaugural director of the China Strategic Focus Group at US Indo-Pacific Command, executive director of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and as a senior China program manager at the National Security Agency.

Dr. John Hemmings ([email protected]) is Senior Director of the Indo-Pacific Foreign and Security Policy Program at the Pacific Forum. He works on aspects of the US-Indo-Pacific Strategy, including understanding China’s approach towards the region.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.