YL Blog #50 – Expansion of the Hawaiʻi National Guard’s State Partnership Program to Combat Indonesia’s Food Insecurity

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Background: The State Partnership Program

The State Partnership Program Overview

Since 1992, the United States Department of Defense’s (DoD) State Partnership Program (SPP) has served as one of the cornerstones for building and sustaining 88 meaningful partnerships around the world that share values for common prosperity.[1] Using partnerships between state-level National Guard Bureau (NGB) units and militaries of sovereign nations in each region of the world, the SPP facilitates security cooperation and addresses regional issues across a multitude of civil-military domains. Engagements in the program include subject matter expert exchanges, capability familiarizations, joint drills, and senior leader visits.[2]

Through the SPP, the NGB supports national defense and security goals while also building whole-of-society partnerships to further regional security and stability.[3] The SPP exists to improve the capabilities of partner nations and protect their citizens; strengthen relationships with partners to facilitate cooperation, access, and interoperability; improve cultural awareness and skills among United States military personnel; and foster the integration of reserve and active component forces into a “total force.”[4]

The NGB initiatives are not limited to military engagements alone. They include support for economic, diplomatic, and social programs that are designed to alleviate localized partner challenges indicating potential for civil-military incorporation. Notably, the SPP uses the National Guard’s competencies in humanitarian, crisis response, and disaster relief missions to further security cooperation and enhance stability in foreign counterparts. In the Indo-Pacific, this yields significant potential to strengthen the U.S.’s ties with foreign governments and better position itself to respond to conflict in the region.[5][6]

As of 2023, the NGB has partnered with Indo-Pacific countries of Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, and Vietnam with Hawaii as the partner of the Philippines and Indonesia.[7] In particular, the Hawaiian National Guard’s partnership with Indonesia represents an example of the program’s success in the Indo-Pacific region. Since 2006, the U.S. has used the SPP to foster deep and long-lasting relationships with the vital Pacific nation. A major aspect of the partnership is Gema Bhakti, a decade-old annual exercise where Soldiers from both countries meet to share best practices and display capabilities for bilateral benefit.[8]

The Opportunity for State Partnership Program Expansion

The United States Government demonstrates its intent to maintain and expand its global posture in the Indo-Pacific Region to counter the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) direct attempts to alter global order in its favor. In the 2022 National Defense Strategy and the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, the DoD argues that the PRC is working to undermine U.S. partnerships with Indo-Pacific states, not just militarily, but in diplomatic, technological, and economic spheres as well. As a result of this heightened aggression, the United States’ strategy involves a diversified expansion of its global posture.

The methods proposed to accomplish this goal extend beyond the usual military approaches, such as interoperability, capabilities sharing, and force projection. In combination with those efforts, the DoD plans to leverage collaboration in key infrastructure investments, economics, intelligence sharing, health, technology, climate change, and diplomatic outreach. The SPP can supplement recent efforts by the Biden Administration by developing pre-existing military-to-military ties to achieve foreign policy goals, in addition to strategic military objectives. As these engagements become common practice and mature in sophistication and outreach, they have the potential to further incorporate military-to-civilian channels and offer opportunities for civilian-to-civilian and business-to-business partnerships between countries.

As a pre-existing channel for the U.S. to strengthen ties with Indo-Pacific partners, the SPP can act as a conduit for partnership expansion in the region. As National Guardsmen are employed domestically for disaster relief, emergency management, and humanitarian missions, they inherently carry expertise and equipment which lends well to solving similar crises in partner countries.

Countries that face the risks of natural disasters, are in the process of economic development, or experience internal conflicts will benefit greatly from these effects. The security of these countries is, by default, systematically vulnerable because of their propensity to these disasters and conflict. By taking a proactive approach to address these issues, the United States can foster increased collaboration with its partners while simultaneously reducing the need for future humanitarian responses.

Further, these efforts will complement the ongoing work of key organizations such as the United States Department of State (DOS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in achieving their goals and objectives. According to estimates from the USDA, approximately 11% of American agricultural producers either serve in the military in a reserve capacity or have a military service background.[9] These producers contribute significantly to the agricultural industry, accounting for $41 billion in agricultural sales.[10] Moreover, 17% of all farms have a producer who is currently serving or has served in the U.S. Armed Forces.[11] The USDA recognizes the valuable experience and skills that military personnel bring to the field of agriculture and has implemented specialized programs to integrate military experience with careers in farming. These programs provide access to capital, land, education, and training resources, as well as business planning support.

Similarly, USAID maintains a strong collaborative relationship with the DoD, ensuring that their development and defense efforts mutually reinforce each other and help partner countries achieve outcomes aligned with U.S. national security goals and partner values. Through coordination with the DoD, USAID brings together a diverse team of foreign service, civil service, military, and technical professionals.[12] USAID also hosts military liaisons from the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as well as sponsors U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps fellows to support environmental reform initiatives that have an impact on agriculture.[13] These joint efforts allow for equitable collaboration on policy, planning, outreach, and education, with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of operations currently serving as the primary focus of the USAID-DoD partnership.[14]

Therefore, it is important to note that, by leveraging the SPP, interagency partners across a broad whole-of-government spectrum can incorporate and facilitate proactive disaster relief and humanitarian response to assist developing countries. This is possible through a consolidated effort, thereby promoting economic growth, enhancing regional security, and promoting stability in the Indo-Pacific Region.

Case Study: Indonesia’s Food Insecurity

Indonesian Food Security Issues

Indonesia plays a vital role in maintaining stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region, and it is a key partner to the United States. Indonesia is the fourth largest country by population and engages in an annual $30 billion in trade with the U.S.[15] With a $100 million yearly budget for Indonesia, USAID leads several programs aimed to improve the country in terms of democratic governance, anti-corruption, climate and the environment, economic growth, education, and health.[16] The relationship between the two countries showcases strong engagement and cooperation, particularly in the security domain. The United States holds a prominent position as Indonesia’s largest security partner, with estimated pre-COVID engagements exceeding 200 annually.[17] The engagements between the United States and Indonesia encompass a wide range of activities, but the most prominent are military exercises.[18] These highlight the depth and breadth of the partnership and the United States’ commitment to supporting Indonesia’s security and sovereignty in the region.

Domestically, however, Indonesia faces significant challenges in achieving a sustainable food-secure environment; the Global Food Security Index places Indonesia at 63 out of 113 countries worldwide.[19]      Indonesia recognizes this issue as its primary human security concern and has worked diligently to address domestic food security. Currently, the Widodo administration’s focus on food security is inward-looking and centered on food distribution and increasing rice production.[20] However, the Indonesian agriculture industry as a whole faces inefficiency of scale and is unable to uphold the pillars of food security i.e., availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability.[21] Major barriers to establishing a sustainable food-secure environment in Indonesia are limited infrastructure, little access to educational resources, conflicts involving water rights, natural disasters, risk mitigation for crop preservation, and land security.[22] Without resources and strategies to address the aforementioned challenges, Indonesia struggles as a food-insecure country and is unable to ensure a sustainable and resilient agricultural sector.

State of Hawaii and Food Security

Hawaii has struggled with its own food security concerns in the past and continues to import 80% of its food.[23] This heavy reliance on external sources leaves Hawaii vulnerable to food availability concerns in the event of disruptions in the food supply chain, such as natural disasters or pandemics. Recognizing these vulnerabilities, the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency has identified logistics, education, environmental protection, and critical infrastructure as key areas that enable an archipelagic state to remain in a food-secure status.[24] To further mitigate the effects of food insecurity, Hawaii leverages the logistical competencies and environmental policies set forth by the Hawaii NGB through successful civil-military integration efforts.[25]

The Hawaii Army National Guard Environmental Office is a major proponent and subject matter expert for policy, technical means, and guidance on environmental stewardship for the State of Hawaii.[26] The State Adjutant General’s environmental policy focuses on conservation, compliance, land management, and sustainability.[27] The NGB performs endangered and native species protection, pest management, pollution prevention, waste stream diversions, green purchasing, and sustainable operations that employ water conservation, and fuel and energy efficiency.[28] [29] Examples that showcase the NGB’s environmental policies include a cost and resource-effective goat and sheep grazing technique for pest management, which slashed the use of herbicides to safeguard agricultural land from adverse chemical impacts. [30] Another example is a sustainability program that focuses on waste stream reduction and recycling activities that are programmed as project goals.[31] This program also conducts stormwater management, integrates natural resources management, builds safe drinking water plants, supports emergency management operations, and aids in energy conservation.[32]

The NGB showcases logistical expertise in key areas that affect agriculture and food supply. These include the acquisition of agricultural raw materials, tracking and distribution of food resources, farm asset management, fuel supply in rural areas, and forward deployment of survival equipment.[33] Additionally, during critical times of need, such as natural disasters or health emergencies, the NGB coordinates and delivers aid to communities regionally. The NGB logisticians are skilled above and beyond conventional military force parameters as they are industry experts with specialized military training. Their individualized skills include supply chain management, food services, petroleum systems management, airdrop and rigging specialties, water treatment proficiency, and laboratory proficiency.[34] Therefore, the NGB can impact dimensions of food security that promote availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability. By sharing the State of Hawaii’s environmental policies and logistical performance with partners in developing countries, food insecurity and hunger can be alleviated in similar archipelagic nations throughout Indo-Pacific.[35]

The Indonesian Military’s Efforts to Address Food Security

The Indonesian Armed Forces, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), plays a supervisory role in local villages and agricultural communities, working in alignment with Indonesia’s agricultural development agenda.[36] However, corruption within civil enterprises, stigma against civil-military integration, and the TNI’s history of human rights abuses have tarnished the reputation of the military as an agent of positive change.[37] Further, Indonesia’s food security challenges stem, in part, from internal inefficiencies and the lack of robust agricultural policy. Limited distribution and diversification of resources hinder the government’s ability to increase agricultural yield, failing to effectively address agricultural production challenges. Addressing these challenges to improve food security in Indonesia requires comprehensive strategies and the allocation of adequate resources.

Indonesia recognizes the inseparable relationship between food sovereignty, security, and national stability. Jakarta acknowledges the successful utilization of military operations other than war, particularly in Indo-Pacific states like Hawaii, where infrastructure and logistical elements of their armed forces have bolstered their civilian sectors, like agriculture.[38] Since the 1960s, the TNI has attempted to safeguard the agricultural industry, collaborating with the U.S. on initiatives, such as the Green Revolution project.[39] Consequently, food security has become a significant aspect of national defense, making it a key focus for the Indonesian military.[40] Tasked with ensuring regional stability, the TNI’s mission extends to the agricultural domain and supporting national food security. However, despite fifty years of dedicated efforts, plagued by logistical inefficiencies and implementation challenges, the intended results of achieving food security remain elusive, and the issue of food insecurity persists.[41]

According to Indonesian National Defense Law No. 34 of 2004, the army is authorized to undertake defense responsibilities on land.[42] In 2015, the president granted the TNI an active role in advising and assisting farmers by providing insights on best agricultural practices and infrastructure development. This agreement serves as the legal foundation for the TNI’s ongoing civil-military integration efforts, which take the form of a territorial coaching system aimed at addressing food insecurity. Through this program, TNI soldiers procure and distribute high-yield seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides and develop irrigation infrastructure to support farmers.[43] However, due to paradigmatic misconception of food security and food sovereignty, Jakarta has invested in improper policy which disproportionately focuses on agricultural production versus trade.[44] This policy is currently being implemented by the TNI. Additionally, collaboration with Western technology partners, similar to the Green Revolution project, is a significant component of this strategy, introducing genetically enhanced farming aids to Indonesia. Consequently, this increased reliance on foreign companies contributes to Indonesia’s foreign debt and undermines the authority of local villages. Overall, the current strategy inefficiently diverts financial benefits away from the farmers. The desired goal of grassroots self-sufficiency remains unachieved, with the current approach primarily benefiting large-scale landowners.

Despite widespread corruption, the TNI enjoys acceptance in Indonesia as an organization guided by professional values and considers the promotion of food security as one of its primary contributions to national security. Nonetheless, it faces significant challenges in integrating with the civilian sector and meeting the standards set by the Ministry of Agriculture. While the TNI focuses on educating and facilitating farmers to achieve self-sufficiency, an essential logistical aspect i.e., distribution to enable trade for commodities, remains absent from Indonesia’s strategy. Although the Green Revolution briefly enabled Indonesia to be self-sufficient in food imports in the late 1980s,[45] the lack of proper transport mechanisms quickly strained its ability to access food markets, leading to financial challenges.

Potential for Military-to-Civilian Application: Past Examples

The SPP has demonstrated its potential to aid partners through real-world response situations and joint exercises. Notable examples below highlight the effectiveness of the SPP in providing critical support during times of crisis:

In September 2014, the Guam and Hawaii National Guard collaborated with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to respond to the devastation caused by Typhoon Haiyan. This humanitarian disaster claimed the lives of over six thousand people and displaced many more. The SPP between the United States and the Philippines, established in 2001 and one of the most active partnerships within the National Guard, had already laid the foundation for civil-military assistance through numerous exercises and events over the course of a decade. When Typhoon Haiyan struck, the coordination and efficiency achieved through the SPP proved invaluable in providing aid to a nation in desperate need of basic necessities, such as food, water, and shelter.[46] The level of coordination required in responding to a natural disaster mirrors the challenges associated with addressing food security.

In May 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, in response to a major food availability crisis, the Ohio National Guard mobilized four hundred soldiers to support regional food banks and warehouses, serving residents in eighty-eight counties across the state. The pandemic had caused economic uncertainty and severely affected the ability of families and individuals across the United States to afford and access food.[47] This logistical support demonstrates the NGB’s commitment to ensuring that necessities, including food and water, are available to those in need.

In September 2022, the United States Military and the TNI conducted the tenth annual joint operational-level staff exercise called Gema Bhakti in Jakarta, Indonesia. Gema Bhakti is aimed at promoting positive military relations, enhancing security and stability in the region, increasing cultural awareness, and improving command and control proficiency among forces. This exercise brought together over a hundred military and interagency personnel from U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Hawaii National Guard, along with TNI operators and a diverse cohort of non-governmental agencies.[48] This collaborative exercise showcases the successful integration and interoperability between Indonesia and the State of Hawaii, highlighting their joint commitment to effective operations in the security domain.

The SPP’s Potential to Enhance Food Security in Indonesia

These examples demonstrate how the SPP can play a significant role in bolstering the logistical capabilities of Indonesia’s agriculture industry. Through joint exercises, disaster response, and coordinated efforts, the SPP can empower the TNI and, in turn, impact the agricultural industry to enhance production and trade, ultimately alleviating food security challenges in an equitable manner. Logistics is another crucial problem to solve, not only for military operations, but also for the agricultural sector. A successful logistical strategy is essential to ensure the smooth and efficient flow of agricultural goods and services from producers to consumers.[49] This involves data-driven decisions on production, procurement, storage, transportation, and distribution.[50] Effective supervision of these activities is vital to meet the demands of Indonesia’s food-insecure populace and address the challenges related to production and trade. Furthermore, reducing agricultural losses resulting from inefficiencies and promoting environmentally conscious agricultural policies are equally important objectives. By achieving these goals, the Indonesian agricultural industry can contribute to food security and sustainability.

The SPP serves as a valuable platform for sharing logistical knowledge, enhancing coordination, and building capacity in combatting food insecurity to promote stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Through collaborative efforts facilitated by the SPP, the State of Hawaii and Indonesia can leverage their shared expertise and resources to strengthen food security and ensure the availability of basic necessities during times of crisis and peace alike. By working together, they can create value and address the needed competencies to support Indonesia’s agriculture industry and overall well-being.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The SPP is a valuable platform for the United States to deepen its ties with Indo-Pacific partners, enhance security capacity, and reduce dependence on the PRC. The NGB’s capabilities in disaster relief, emergency management, and humanitarian missions, combined with the SPP’s military-to-military connections, allow for effective collaboration and the transfer of expertise to address crises in partner countries. This strengthens regional stability, fosters stronger relationships, and contributes to a more resilient and self-reliant network of allies in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Hawaii-Indonesian partnership serves as an excellent case study to prove the viability of SPP expansion to achieve these goals. The utilization of the SPP to address food insecurity in Indonesia will prove to be an effective tool to enhance the U.S.’s presence in the Indo-Pacific region in a role that transcends conventional military engagements. To effectively harness the potential of the SPP to address food insecurity in Indonesia, the United States and Indonesia must collaborate and establish a comprehensive policy that involves a whole-of-government commitment and outlines appropriate actions and a national plan.

To achieve this, the TNI should work in tandem and specifically engage with the Hawaii National Guard on environmental policy. The Hawaii National Guard should also guide the TNI in adopting and promoting human-centric, economically viable, and sustainable farming practices. This collaboration would facilitate the transfer of knowledge and skills necessary for Indonesia to enhance its agricultural sector. Furthermore, the cooperative infrastructure mechanisms established by the SPP can enable the United States to assist Indonesia in other areas that build security capacity such as technology, transportation, and distribution networks. By creating a viable trading network, supported by the provision of technology and transportation infrastructure, food loss can be minimized, and Indonesia can establish an independent agricultural commodities exchange. These effects would all contribute to the stability and security of the food supply chain in the region.

Additionally, through the industrialization of data collection and analysis facilitated by the NGB, technology and information transfers can greatly benefit the Indonesian agriculture sector.[51] This would enable the implementation of a national-level review process, allowing for the evaluation and improvement of agricultural practices across the country.[52] By fostering a collaborative approach guided by a comprehensive policy and the expertise of the NGB and Hawaii National Guard, the SPP can serve as a catalyst for resolving Indonesia’s food insecurity. Through the adoption of sustainable farming practices, establishment of viable logistical support, and utilization of technology and data analysis, Indonesia can enhance its agricultural capabilities and achieve greater food security.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the United States Army, United States Air Force, or United States Government.

Disclaimer: All opinions in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent any organization.

Sharoon Kashif is an Air Force intelligence officer who serves as a South Asia subject matter expert for the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. He is also an alumnus of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and has brought his diverse experience at the Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations Asia Conference in both 2022 and 2023. 

Caleb Workman is an Officer in the United States Army. He  graduated from the Colorado School of Mines,  where  he  earned  a  BS  in  economics,  an  MS  in  engineering  and  technology  management, and minors in global politics and military science.

[1] “State Partnership Program – The National Guard.” Accessed May 29, 2023. https://www.nationalguard.mil/leadership/joint-staff/j-5/international-affairs-division/state-partnership-program/.

[2] “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, August 15, 2011. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41957/5.

[3] “State Partnership Program – The National Guard.”

[4] “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, August 15, 2011. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41957/5.

[5] “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress.”

[6] U.S. Department of Defense. “Building Partnerships Around the Globe.” Accessed May 29, 2023. https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Building-Partnerships-Around-the-Globe/.

[7] “Building Partnerships Around the Globe.”

[8]  National Guard. “Hawaii National Guard Joins Gema Bhakti with Partner Indonesia.” Accessed May 29, 2023. https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/State-Partnership-Program/Article/3153297/hawaii-national-guard-joins-gema-bhakti-with-partner-indonesia/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nationalguard.mil%2FNews%2FArticle%2F3153297%2Fhawaii-national-guard-joins-gema-bhakti-with-partner-indonesia%2F.

[9] National Agricultural Statistics Service. Producers with Military Service. ACH17-22, United States Department of Agriculture, Nov. 2020, https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2020/census-military-producers.pdf.

[10] Farmers with Military Service Are Unsung Heroes of American Ag. https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2023/05/01/farmers-military-service-are-unsung-heroes-american-ag. Accessed 19 June 2023.

[11] National Agricultural Statistics Service. Producers with Military Service. ACH17-22, United States Department of Agriculture, Nov. 2020, https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2020/census-military-producers.pdf.

[12] “Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation | Stabilization and Transitions.” U.S. Agency for International Development, 1 Mar. 2023, https://www.usaid.gov/about-us/organization/military.

[13] “Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation | Stabilization and Transitions.” U.S. Agency for International Development, 1 Mar. 2023, https://www.usaid.gov/about-us/organization/military.

[14] “Agriculture and Food Security.” U.S. Agency for International Development, 15 Mar. 2023, https://www.usaid.gov/agriculture-and-food-security.

[15] United States Trade Representative. “Indonesia.” Accessed July 20, 2023. http://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/indonesia.

[16] USAID. “Indonesia Country Profile,” n.d. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/USAID%20Indonesia%20Profile%202023_2_0.pdf.

[17] US Department of State. “Integrated Country Strategy – Indonesia.” Integrated Country Strategies, March 31, 2022. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/ICS_EAP_Indonesia_Public.pdf.

[18] US Department of State, “Integrated Country Strategy – Indonesia.”

[19] Global Food Security Index (GFSI). “Global Food Security Index (GFSI),” February 7, 2023. https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index.

[20] Canada, Asia Pacific Foundation of. “Indonesia’s Scheme to Ward Off Food Security Crisis Falls Short of Expectations.” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. Accessed July 20, 2023. https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/indonesias-scheme-ward-food-security-crisis-falls-short.

[21] “Global Food Security Index (GFSI).”

[22] Rusmawati, Estiana, Djoni Hartono, and Adiwan Fahlan Aritenang. “Food Security in Indonesia: The Role of Social Capital.” Development Studies Research 10, no. 1 (December 31, 2023): 2169732. https://doi.org/10.1080/21665095.2023.2169732.

[23] Lyte, Brittany. “How Hawaii Squandered Its Food Security — And What It Will Take To Get It Back.” Honolulu Civil Beat, April 23, 2021. https://www.civilbeat.org/2021/04/how-hawaii-squandered-its-food-security-and-what-it-will-take-to-get-it-back/.

[24] “How Food Secure Are We If Natural Disaster Strikes? – Hawaii Sea Grant.” Accessed May 29, 2023. https://seagrant.soest.hawaii.edu/how-food-secure-are-we-if-natural-disaster-strikes/.

[25] “Natural Resources: U.S. Army Garrison Hawaii.” Accessed May 29, 2023. https://home.army.mil/hawaii/index.php/garrison/dpw/natural-resources#qt0:0.

[26] “Hawaii Army National Guard Environmental Office.” Accessed May 29, 2023. https://dod.hawaii.gov/env.

[27] Logan, Brigadier General Arthur J. “The Adjutant General’s Environmental Policy.” Hawaii Army National Guard, February 19, 2015. https://dod.hawaii.gov/env/files/2012/11/BGLogan_tag-policy.pdf.

[28] U.S. Army. “A Win-Win for Natural Resources, Hawaii Army National Guard in the Aloha State.” Accessed May 29, 2023. https://www.army.mil/article/201548/a_win_win_for_natural_resources_hawaii_army_national_guard_in_the_aloha_state.

[29] Hawaii Army National Guard Environmental Mission. “Hawaii Army National Guard .” Accessed May 29, 2023. https://dod.hawaii.gov/env/our-work/.

[30] “FY16 Secretary of Defense Environmental Awards.” Department of Defense, April 19, 2017. https://www.denix.osd.mil/awards/denix-files/sites/12/2017/04/2-Narrative_S-NII-HIARNG.pdf.

[31] “Hawaii Army National Guard – Accomplishments.”

[32] “Hawaii Army National Guard – Accomplishments.”

[33] Acquire Skills in Distribution. “Army National Guard.” Accessed May 29, 2023. https://www.nationalguard.com/careers/supply-and-logistics.

[34] “Army National Guard – Distribution Skills.”

[35] Subramaniam, Yogeeswari, Tajul Ariffin Masron, and Niaz Ahmad Mohd Naseem. “The Impact of Logistics on Four Dimensions of Food Security in Developing Countries.” Journal of the Knowledge Economy, October 4, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13132-022-01037-3.

[36] Napitupulu, Heri , Taufik Hidayat, Arry Bainus, and Windy Dermawan. “Food Securitization In Indonesia: The Involvement Of Indonesian Military In Food Security Program.” SPECIAL EDUCATION 2022 1, no. 43 (n.d.).

[37] Izadi, Roya. “State Security or Exploitation: A Theory of Military Involvement in the Economy.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 66, no. 4–5 (May 2022): 729–54. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211070574.

[38] Bainus, Arry , and Dina Yulianti. “Questioning the Paradigm of Indonesian Military Involvement in Agriculture.” Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 12, no. 4 (n.d.): 309-324.

[39] Bainus and Yulianti, “Questioning the Paradigm of Indonesian Military Involvement in Agriculture.”

[40] Napitupulu et al., “Food Securitization In Indonesia: The Involvement Of Indonesian Military In Food Security Program.”

[41] Bainus and Yulianti, “Questioning the Paradigm of Indonesian Military Involvement in Agriculture.”

[42] Bainus and Yulianti, “Questioning the Paradigm of Indonesian Military Involvement in Agriculture.”

[43] Bainus and Yulianti, “Questioning the Paradigm of Indonesian Military Involvement in Agriculture.”

[44] Bainus and Yulianti, “Questioning the Paradigm of Indonesian Military Involvement in Agriculture.”

[45] Bainus and Yulianti, “Questioning the Paradigm of Indonesian Military Involvement in Agriculture.”

[46] National Guard. “Airmen and Soldiers from Guam and Hawaii Help Rebuild Philippines School.” Accessed May 29, 2023. https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/State-Partnership-Program/Article/576545/airmen-and-soldiers-from-guam-and-hawaii-help-rebuild-philippines-school/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nationalguard.mil%2FNews%2FArticle%2F576545%2Fairmen-and-soldiers-from-guam-and-hawaii-help-rebuild-philippines-school%2F.

[47] US Army “Ohio National Guard Assists with Mass Food Distribution.” Accessed May 29, 2023. https://www.army.mil/article/235410/ohio_national_guard_assists_with_mass_food_distribution.

[48] National Guard. “Hawaii National Guard Joins Gema Bhakti with Partner Indonesia.” Accessed May 29, 2023. https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/State-Partnership-Program/Article/3153297/hawaii-national-guard-joins-gema-bhakti-with-partner-indonesia/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nationalguard.mil%2FNews%2FArticle%2F3153297%2Fhawaii-national-guard-joins-gema-bhakti-with-partner-indonesia%2F.

[49] Transportation Management Solutions. “The Role of Logistics Management in the Agricultural Industry | TMS,” June 1, 2020. https://www.tms-transportation.com/blogs/logistics-management-in-agriculture/.

[50] “The Role of Logistics Management in the Agricultural Industry | TMS.”

[51] Grebmer, Klaus von, Jill Bernstein, Nilam Prasai, Shazia Amin, Yisehac Yohannes, Olive Towey, Jennifer Thompson, Andrea Sonntag, Fraser Patterson, and David Nabarro. 2016 Global Hunger Index: Getting to Zero Hunger. Bonn, Washington, DC, Dublin: Welthungerhilfe ; IFPRI ; Concern Worldwide, 2016.

[52] Grebmer et al., 2016 Global Hunger Index.

PacNet #50 – Fold, call, or raise? China’s potential reactions to AUKUS

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Over a month has passed since the announcement of the defense cooperation agreement among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS). While the deal includes cooperation in a variety of areas, the most eye-catching aspect of the cooperation is the sale of nuclear-powered submarines, a crown jewel of US military technology, to Australia. Although AUKUS does not mention China directly, it is well-understood that China motivated the formation of this partnership. Given the scope of AUKUS and its relatively long implementation timeframe, there are four ways to analyze Chinese reactions: threat assessment, nuclear nonproliferation, potential responses, and the regional arms race.

The threat assessment

The Chinese worry about Australia obtaining nuclear-powered submarines, but do not consider the threat urgent. They are concerned by the impact such submarines could introduce to China’s maritime domains, especially in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Beijing, therefore, has focused on the deal’s geopolitical impact and attacked AUKUS, arguing that it is the product of a “Cold War mentality” among Canberra, London, and Washington and that it will undermine regional security and stability. Some have equated AUKUS with an “Asian version of NATO,” with the potential to expand to include other like-minded countries.

Despite the severity of the challenge, there is also an impulse in Beijing to “wait and see” as to its real impact, as the details remain elusive and consultations will take time. The Chinese are not yet clear whether the submarines will be built, or whether they will come from retired US fleet. In addition, Beijing believes that AUKUS might be scrapped by future political transitions in the Australian government, especially considering its high financial and strategic costs. The fact that three former Australian prime ministers have expressed varying reactions to AUKUS leaves China with a sense of hope that this may not be a done deal.

Impact on proliferation

The most stringent Chinese attacks on AUKUS have focused on its implications for nonproliferation. The Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Vienna made a statement on Sept. 16 on the deal’s “undisguised nuclear proliferation activities.” He called for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to publicly condemn AUKUS, which, he claimed, demonstrates the “double standard” the United States and United Kingdom pursue in nuclear exports. According to a prominent Chinese arms control expert, director of the Arms Control Center at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Guo Xiaobing, AUKUS violates the mission and core obligations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in five different ways:

  • It contributes to the proliferation of a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction.
  • It contributes to the proliferation of fissile materials that could be used to make nuclear weapons.
  • It has the potential to lead to the proliferation of uranium enrichment technologies.
  • It undermines the NPT because it sets a bad precedent.
  • It could fuel a regional arms race.

To be sure, AUKUS does not violate the NPT. In the IAEA Safeguard Glossary (2001 Edition), section 2.14, on the use of nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity which does not require the application of IAEA safeguards, it is stipulated that “[n]uclear material covered by a comprehensive safeguards agreement may be withdrawn from IAEA safeguards should the State decide to use it for such purposes, e.g. for the propulsion of naval vessels” (emphasis added). This, in other words, excludes nuclear-powered submarines from IAEA safeguarding requirements. As such, then, China’s attack on AUKUS is that it violates the spirit of the NPT, but not its letter.

Potential responses

Given the impact of AUKUS is not immediate, Chinese reactions will take time to manifest. At present, China appears to prioritize understanding the scope and details of AUKUS and attacking its legitimacy for geopolitical and nonproliferation reasons. Still, in retaliation, some have proposed additional economic sanctions on Australia through trade. Hu Xijin, chief editor at Global Times called for “no mercy” to Australia if Canberra dares to “assume it has acquired the ability to intimidate China now that it has nuclear submarines and strike missies.” He has also proposed that China should “kill the chicken to scare the monkey” if Australia takes any aggressive military moves. In the event of perceived attacks from Australia, this could mean that China will retaliate militarily.

The most important challenge for China

For Chinese strategic thinkers, the real danger and core challenge of AUKUS (and the United States’ overall coalition-building in the region) lies in the intensification of the arms race in the Indo-Pacific. Although Beijing considers that the goal of its military buildup is to offset, or undermine US military dominance in the region, rather than targeting any regional countries, Chinese officials seem to be coming to the painful realization that their military modernization has led regional players to seek new (or more) weapons. Plainly, Beijing is realizing that its actions have contributed to a regional arms race. What’s more troubling for China is that this arms race is between China on one side and the United States and its allies and partners on the other. Beijing, then, must counter multiple countries at the same time.

Equally upsetting for China is that this arms race is created, fueled, and supplied by the United States. Starting with nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, China believes that the United States will receive—and deliver on—rising demands from allies and partners in the region for newer and more advanced weapon systems, even if they are not nuclear-powered submarines; South Korea, for one, has made this request for a decade.

Beijing must decide if it should “fold,” “call,” or “raise.” “Calling” or to “raising” vividly reminds China of the fall of the Soviet Union, and how Moscow exhausted its resources in its arms race with the United States. “Folding” does not appear to be an option—Beijing is unlikely to give up its regional ambitions. Beijing could call for arms control dialogues, but that will require compromises, and it is unclear that there is an appetite for this in China at the moment. Still, AUKUS might force China to make tough decisions.

Yun Sun ([email protected]) is a Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

PacNet #49 – Xi Jinping’s top five foreign policy mistakes

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Xi Jinping’s aggressive foreign policy is stimulating increased international opposition to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) agenda, undoing years of effort by Chinese officials to assure regional governments that a stronger China will be peaceful and non-domineering. Here are five examples of Xi’s self-defeating decision-making in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) foreign relations.

Wolf Warriorism

Xi has ordered his diplomats to demonstrate “fighting spirit” and to “dare to show their swords.” Accordingly, over the past two years Chinese diplomats have aimed jarring insults and threats at various countries, not just Western democracies, but also Brazil, Kazakhstan, Iran, Pakistan, Venezuela, Thailand, and South Korea. The result is unsurprising. Public opinion surveys by the Pew Research Center and other pollsters show a marked increase in negative feeling toward China since 2019 in Europe, Australia, Japan, the United States, and other countries. Former Singaporean senior foreign ministry official Bilihari Kausikan said “China’s ‘Wolf Warriors’ are doing a better job than any American diplomat of arousing anti-Chinese feelings around the world.” Chinese diplomats could defend their country’s actions differently. Instead, Wolf Warriorism acts as an extension of domestic politics, with little regard for harm done to China’s international prestige and relationships.

Galwan Valley skirmish

According to Indian sources, this June 2020 battle on the disputed Sino-Indian border began when Chinese troops ambushed and killed an Indian colonel who had approached the Chinese unarmed and in good faith to negotiate de-escalation. Whether or not Beijing ordered this particular act, a PRC policy of creeping expansionism made an eventual confrontation almost inevitable absent a tacit Indian surrender. For years the Chinese have built infrastructure to facilitate quick military mobilization in disputed areas. The Chinese government found it intolerable when the Indian side started to do the same in response.

The clash caused a long-term hardening of Indian attitudes and policy toward China. The Indian government cancelled several infrastructure construction deals with China, halted the purchase of Huawei information technology equipment, and sought to economically decouple from China in other important sectors. New Delhi re-committed itself to blocking Chinese expansion into disputed areas. India has signaled a deeper commitment to the Quad, was quick to express support for the AUKUS agreement, and now sends warships into the South China Sea—acts that Beijing finds threatening.

South China Sea policy

Having already distinguished itself as the most aggressive of the South China Sea claimants, Beijing started building sizeable artificial islands in 2013. China has now installed military facilities, including runways, docks, barracks, and missile batteries, on at least three reefs in the Spratly group. The PRC’s South China Sea policy highlights Beijing choosing to impose its will upon weaker neighbors rather than seeking a mutually acceptable compromise. It is also another example of the Chinese government disregarding an international agreement to which China was a signatory. Beijing has argued that China’s “historic rights” to the South China Sea take precedence over the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and contemptuously rejected the 2016 ruling against China by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

The upside of these outposts, located far from mainland China, is uncertain. They might be more liability than asset to the PRC in a time of conflict. As for the downside: more than any other single Chinese policy, the new bases convinced international observers that PRC foreign policy under Xi was taking an aggressive turn, with more emphasis on winning rather than managing strategic disputes, and less effort to avoid alarming other governments in the Indo-Pacific.


Rather than blazing a creative new solution to the cross-Strait dispute, the man celebrated for “Xi Jinping Thought” has simply doubled-down on his predecessors’ demonstrably failed policies. Xi maintains that unification is essential to China’s “rejuvenation,” although the PRC is abundantly prosperous and secure without controlling Taiwan. He has continued to insist that Taiwan’s destiny is “one country, two systems” (1C2S). Taiwan’s people, however, never supported 1C2S, and the destruction of Hong Kong’s liberties has thoroughly discredited the concept. That Xi would still speak of 1C2S in a message to Taiwan as recently as Oct. 9 indicates a stunning intellectual and political sclerosis.

Finally, Xi has increased military pressure on Taiwan. This has deepened resentment on the island toward China and bolsters support for the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, which now holds both the presidency and a legislative majority. The heightened sense of danger has prodded Taiwan to implement asymmetric defense, which will make it more capable of fighting off an attempted PRC invasion. The Biden administration has reaffirmed US support for Taiwan as “rock solid.” Even Japanese leaders are now openly discussingthe increasing likelihood that Japan would help defend Taiwan.

Xi’s Taiwan policy works to eliminate possible solutions other than a war that, even in the best-case scenario, would be disastrous for China.

Economic coercion against Australia

In April 2020, Canberra displeased Beijing by calling for an inquiry into the origins of the pandemic. The PRC retaliated by cutting importsof 10 Australian products. As in previous cases, Chinese officials implausibly denied that the restrictions were politically motivated, a gratuitous show of duplicity.

The consequences of this Chinese policy were worse for China than for Australia. Canberra did not accommodate the 14 political demandsmade by the Chinese embassy in November 2020. Australia suffered little from the import bans, finding other buyers for much of the supply turned away by China. Australian Treasurer Josh Frydenberg recently described the damage done to Australia’s economy as “relatively modest.” In addition to the reputation cost to Beijing, the Chinese government’s campaign against Australia drew greater international attention to the dangers of doing business with China. Power shortages in China during autumn 2021 are partly due to a coal shortage, worsened by the sanction against Australian coal imports. The attempt to punish Australia has increased momentum for addressing China’s systematic violation of both the spirit and the letter of its World Trade Organization obligations. Canberra’s refusal to capitulate may serve as an inspiration for other governments under Chinese economic pressure over a political disagreement, diminishing the usefulness of this tactic.

What drives Xi? First, he has relied heavily on pandering to Chinese nationalism. Appearing to defend China’s interests against challenges by foreigners makes the Xi regime more popular and implicitly makes opposing Xi seem unpatriotic.

Second, Xi rules during a period of Chinese hubris. By 2012, when Xi assumed leadership, China was the world’s second-largest economy and on track to surpass the United States for the top spot. Beijing had hosted the Olympic Games in 2008, China’s coming-out party as a world power, while the financial crisis in 2007-2008 convinced Chinese observers that America was in rapid decline even as China surged ahead.

A third contributing factor is hyper-authoritarianism. Xi has concentrated numerous decision-making powers in himself, built up a personality cult, and prioritized political correctness over pragmatic analysis. The resulting political climate is not conducive to advisors warning Xi that he is making mistakes.

Xi’s goals include increasing China’s international stature and quashing international criticism. He says he wants to cultivate the image of a “credible, loveable and respectable China.” Xi seeks to maximize China’s access to global markets and technology. He wants to hasten the withdrawal of US strategic influence from the region. He wants the world to believe “China will never seek hegemony, expansion, or a sphere of influence.”

Xi’s major foreign policy errors, however, have undermined these goals. The PRC government under Xi has indulged nationalistic domestic public opinion at the risk of sabotaging the important longer-term national objectives that Xi has specified as central to his “China dream.”

A PRC that other states perceive as aggressive is engendering coordinated strategic opposition. This will make it harder for China to become a regional and global leader. If other governments believe China is expansionist, they will believe every strategic gain by China emboldens Beijing to strive for more. During Xi’s tenure this logic has become commonplace in discussions about Beijing’s designs on Taiwan and the South China Sea. There is also an important economic and technological cost to China, as worried trade partners decouple to reduce their vulnerability to PRC coercion and to avoid selling China the rope that China might hang them with.

Chinese remember Mao’s leadership as 70% good. Xi may have difficulty reaching even that modest standard.

Denny Roy ([email protected]) is a senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu. He specializes in strategic and international security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

PacNet #44 – How AUKUS Advances Australia’s Commitment to Collective Defense

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An earlier version of this article was published at The Strategist.

Canberra’s announcement that it will acquire nuclear-powered submarines through its new defense pact with London and Washington, AUKUS, has generated considerable scrutiny. The decision to expand the basing and rotational presence of US forces in Australia has added to the heat. But in the breathless commentary on these moves, what they tell us about Australia’s foreign and defense policy has been largely misunderstood.

These announcements don’t signal a new direction in Australian strategic policy or a reorientation of our alignment preferences away from the region.

To the contrary, they mark an acceleration of Australia’s push to assume a larger and more active geostrategic role in upholding a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific—both by acquiring advanced military and defense industrial capabilities and by supporting the strongest possible US security presence in our region, including through longstanding efforts to deepen high-end military integration between Australia and the United States.

The strategy behind these announcements isn’t new either. It’s articulated in Australia’s 2017 foreign policy white paper and 2020 defense strategic update. Underscored by deep anxieties over China’s growing power and assertiveness, and a clear-eyed assessment of America’s eroding regional military position, these documents recognize that Washington can no longer defend the Indo-Pacific strategic order by itself. Together, they lay out the case for a stronger Australia and our pursuit of a collective regional strategy to supplement America’s position and constrain Chinese power.

Look at the language. The white paper talks about “building a more capable, agile and potent Australian Defence Force” and working collectively with the United States and like-minded partners to “limit the exercise of coercive power” and to “support a balance in the region [favorable] to our interests.” The defense update says that “Australia [will] take greater responsibility for our own security” by growing our “self-reliant ability to deliver deterrence effects,” enhancing “the lethality of the ADF for … high-intensity operations,” and being more capable of “support[ing] the United States and other partners” in our region “if deterrence measures fail” and “Australia’s national interests are engaged.”

Both documents call for broadening and deepening Australia’s cooperation with the US, including by enhancing force posture initiatives and military interoperability and by “selectively increasing interdependence with the US and other partners” to assure our shared defense industrial, munitions and logistics supply chains.

Those surprised by Australia’s decisions haven’t been paying attention.

Of course, there is—or should be—much more to Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy than this high-end alliance integration agenda. Shaping our strategic environment, deepening our regional partnerships and building our influence by supporting regional countries’ own priorities are critical. Some of these elements are progressing well, like our security networking with Japan, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore. Others are worryingly underdone, such as our investment in diplomacy, economic engagement, and development assistance in Southeast Asia.

But just because these issues and partnerships weren’t at the center of last week’s announcements doesn’t mean AUKUS or the US alliance are displacing the other elements of our strategy.

Indeed, it’s worth remembering that the only revolution last week was Washington’s once-a-century decision to share its submarine nuclear-propulsion technology with an ally—something Canberra has quietly wanted for years, and a decisive capability upgrade, but not a sea-change in the trajectory of Australian strategy.

So why the hype about a purported Anglospheric pivot and new dependency on the alliance?

One explanation lies in the confusing pomp and ceremony that accompanied the made-for-television AUKUS announcement. Amid the flags and mawkish talk of a “forever partnership,” it looked very much like a new alliance and conjured unhelpful images of English-speaking nations throwing their weight around the Indo-Pacific.

But AUKUS is neither an alliance nor a vehicle for strategic policy coordination. It’s basically a memorandum of understanding for sharing advanced technology, defense industrial capabilities, and technical know-how—one that will hopefully build on the expanded US national technology and industrial base that has struggled to break down export controls between the US and Australia. If effective, it should provide two-way benefits akin to a defense free-trade zone, empowering Australia’s pursuit of cutting-edge capabilities and filtering Australian innovation into US (and UK) defense projects—the kind of defense industrial integration Canberra has wanted for some time.

This raises a second reason for heightened concern: the risk that we will become gravely reliant on US technology by buying nuclear-powered submarines and other new kit. It’s true that co-developing a boat with the US and UK will require their support to design, build, and service it. But this was also true of the French submarine, which was to be outfitted with US weapons and sensors.

More to the point, the ADF is already irreversibly dependent on American technology. The engines on our P-8A anti-submarine warfare aircraft (and most others) are maintained in the US, our F-35s and EA-18G Growlers rely on sensitive US data, most of our munitions are made in America, and our entire military depends on US satellites and other systems to talk to itself. An AUKUS-built submarine hardly poses a new problem.

Nor is it the case that buying US technology will necessarily leave us vulnerable to abandonment or entrapment. The suggestion that America must be prepared to fight for primacy in Asia to keep servicing our submarines is far-fetched to say the least. On the flipside, those who argue Australia’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines will bind us to US war plans over Taiwan fail to appreciate how hard that would be in practice. We’re not doing freedom-of-navigation patrols now, despite persistent US requests.

Indeed, one reason Washington has been reluctant to share nuclear-propulsion and other exquisite technology with allies is precisely because such capabilities provide independent options, making allies potentially less pliant. Australia currently enjoys, and must protect, a high degree of self-reliance within the alliance. Rather than jeopardizing that, AUKUS could support the establishment of deep maintenance and sustainment facilities for the new submarines in Australia, along with a “sovereign guided weapons and explosive ordnance enterprise” so that we can build high-end munitions, thereby increasing our sovereign industrial capabilities. This may not be a given, and Canberra must push for it. But it’s simply not true that AUKUS is categorically riskier or all one-way in a dependency sense.

A final cause of concern relates to the Australia-US decision to advance new air, land and sea force-posture initiatives on Australian soil, which many worry will turn us into a US military outpost. In addition to increasing the already high number of US warplanes rotating through Australia, the real significance of this decision will be the establishment of a combined maritime logistics, sustainment, and maintenance facility. This will enable Australian, US, and other allied warships and submarines to rotate through Western Australia on a more regular basis, and undertake deeper refurbishment work there, allowing for expanded operations and more time spent in the Indo-Pacific—which is particularly important given that American dry-dock and maintenance facilities are strained and distant.

These decisions aren’t to be taken lightly and do position Australia to be a staging post for US power projection and military operations. But they are not new choices. They represent sovereign decisions expanded by Canberra with bipartisan support ever since Prime Minister Julia Gillard launched the 2011 Australia-US force posture initiatives. And they get us back to the core purpose of Australia’s increasingly active defense strategy: sustaining the strongest possible US military presence in the region and playing a more significant collective defense role ourselves.

Critics of AUKUS and the alliance need to be more responsible. Australia is about to acquire one of the world’s most potent military capabilities because of the alliance and Washington’s readiness to empower our armed forces. The capability itself is a big deal—lethal and high-endurance submarines are the best way to deter Chinese aggression. But in form the AUKUS deal is little different from the way we’ve got US defense technology in the past, save for the fact that we now have an opportunity for more transfers of technology and technical know-how to Australia. Negotiating appropriate terms and conditions for this pact is crucial. But we must remember that AUKUS and the new force posture initiatives aren’t a break with the past—they’re part of our ongoing push to accelerate Australia’s contribution to collective defense in the region.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

PacNet #38 – Afghanistan: A Strategic Watershed?

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I fear that the fall of Kabul and the return of the Taliban is not just a catastrophe but a strategic watershed as well.

As Singapore was falling during World War II, then-Australian Prime Minister John Curtin made his famous call: “Australia looks to America.” But even though Singapore had been surrendered, at least Britain was continuing to fight.

How much fight is left in Biden’s America? More than currently seems, I suspect and hope; but that’s the question that all US allies must now ponder and adjust accordingly.

My fear is that a COVID-obsessed West might sleep-walk past this new reality: the likelihood of bigger and more sophisticated terror attacks, now that Afghanistan is once more open as a terrorist base; and the near certainty that Russia and China will be even more adventurist now that this American president has declared that a country that had cost so much is no longer worth a single additional American life.

This is not a perception that can be allowed to stand if alliances are to last.

Australia must maintain the US alliance and do more to show our appreciation for it; and to help put even more spine into it—because the freedom and prosperity of the modern world has rested squarely on America’s readiness to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend [and] oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”

It’s been a golden moment in world history that we mustn’t let slip away.

Australia must step up, to help avoid an American retreat with calamitous consequences.

Large though our current military build-up is, it’s now too small and too slow.

As well, we can’t keep weakening our country by agonising over issues that never trouble our strategic competitors.

At the very least, this should be a massive wake-up call rather than an inconvenient interruption to politics-as-usual.

Tony Abbott is a former Prime Minister of Australia.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

PacNet #36 – 10 Things Every Sailor and Marine Should Know Before Deploying to Southeast Asia: A Regional Primer

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An earlier version of this article was published on the US Naval Institute Blog.

With a little bit of advance preparation and intellectual investment, a deployment to Southeast Asia can be a life-changing professional experience for sailors and marines. Here are 10 points, based on several decades of personal experience in Asia, that can help any service member arrive ready to accomplish the mission, represent their service well, and enjoy themselves while doing it.

1. Southeast Asia matters. It is not just a battlefield. 

Those focused on geopolitical dynamics may regard Southeast Asia as strategic territory where the United States must win hearts and minds now and be prepared to sink ships in a future conflict. However, the region’s nations also have unique, vibrant cultures, and strong identities. Southeast Asian states are home to more than 655 million people. Their economies weigh in with a GDP of more than $3 trillion. Ensuring strong bilateral relationships is essential to the well-being of the United States. That is why most of our regional exercises are not about fighting an enemy state but strengthening bilateral relationships.

Prevailing in the strategic competition with China is critical to US security and many Southeast Asians will be ready to discuss shared concerns, but US friendship should primarily be about the bilateral partners’ diverse concerns. We won’t expand the trust and confidence we need by treating Southeast Asian partners like cartological chokepoints or the spoils of a prize fight.

2. Southeast Asia is neither with us nor against us. It is for itself.

Southeast Asians want to benefit from their relationships with the United States and with China but there is little confidence either power would look out for Southeast Asian interests. China is ASEAN’s largest trade partner, and ASEAN became China’s largest trade partner in 2020. To avoid falling into Chinese orbit, Southeast Asians are generally glad for the counterbalance delivered by the US military. Balancing these competing relationships is akin to charting a course between two reefs. To cleave too closely to the United States exposes them to the risks of abandonment and the ire of China.

3. Southeast Asia is incredibly diverse.

Indonesia is the world’s fourth-most populous country, largest Muslim-majority nation, and 10th-largest economy. It shares an island with Timor Leste, a predominantly Catholic nation with fewer people than Trinidad and Tobago. The per capita income in the city-state of Singapore is more than $100,000 a year, one and a half times that of the United States. Twenty-six million Indonesians earn less than one dollar a day.

To represent the US Navy well in Southeast Asia, get to know the various countries you visit.

4. Southeast Asian Sailors have plenty to teach you about gray zone operations.

Southeast Asian navies matter. So do their coast guards. In some cases, their ships are older. Some are decommissioned US vessels. Not even the most technologically advanced states possess the combat equivalent of a 96-cell US destroyer. Sensitive communications are often carried by unclassified apps such as WhatsApp, Facebook, or Line. This does not mean they are incapable. These maritime forces are engaged, day-in and day-out, in securing their nations’ sovereignty. Dangerous, close encounters with Chinese forces are common. They also regularly face off with neighbors in disputes over maritime boundaries and resources.

You will quickly notice that your Southeast Asian partners will approach problems in ways foreign to you. Pay attention; listen up; absorb the good. Do not lecture.

5. Nontraditional threats are a top regional priority.

In Southeast Asia, coast guards have become more popular in recent years but still commonly share constabulary duties with navies. Naval services across the region regularly face threats of terrorism and insurgency, as well as human and narco-trafficking. Environmental crimes and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing cost billions and imperil livelihoods. These threats to coastal communities demand national security prioritization.

Learn how your fellow sailors in Southeast Asia deal with these issues.

6. History matters.

When the United States arrived in Southeast Asia as the newest colonial power, our counterinsurgency operations were nothing to recall with pride. The US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty is now an important pillar of regional security, but the United States only recently returned war trophies seized from Balangiga in 1901. During the Cold War, the United States was associated with violent coups that resulted in tens of thousands of deaths in several nations. Senior Vietnamese leaders have personal memories of the war against the United States. Washington dropped more explosives on Cambodia and Laos than the Allies dropped globally in World War II. Despite this, Vietnam welcomed two US Navy aircraft carriers.

Our past should engender a spirit of understanding and humility from US sailors in Southeast Asia.

7. ASEAN is central and not an “underdeveloped EU.”

The European Union is about governments relaxing sovereign control to pool resources, prevent state-to-state conflict, and facilitate flows of capital and people. Put over-simply, ASEAN is aimed at enabling governments’ efforts to strengthen their own states. ASEAN is built on principles of consensus and non-interference. You may hear the term “ASEAN Centrality”—it is a concept that reinforces ASEAN’s credibility and legitimacy, respecting its role as the driving force behind the region’s collective agenda.

Do not fall for the trap that ASEAN is destined to “mature into” something that exists elsewhere.

8. Southeast Asia does not want an Asian NATO, nor an Asian Combined Maritime Force.

NATO functions on the basis of shared threat perceptions and common interests. Its Cold War counterpart, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, fell apart shortly after the Vietnam War. Southeast Asian states are concerned about China’s behavior, tilting the alignment of some of those states toward the United States, but fears of entrapment and abandonment dictate that no Southeast Asian state is ready to tie itself into a collective defense pact.

Other officers envision opportunities to create a Combined Maritime Force. Attempts to sell the idea in Southeast Asia have fallen flat. If geared toward China, they are non-starters. Efforts geared toward the nontraditional threats at the top of regional states’ maritime priorities gain some traction. However, most of the nontraditional threats operate within domestic waters, so beyond information-sharing and coordination, there is little desire to invite in foreign security operations.

9. Corruption is rampant—do not let it trap you.

According to Transparency International, in ASEAN only Singapore and Malaysia rank among the world’s 80 least corrupt states. Things that might be illegal or unethical in the United States are often the way the system is designed in Southeast Asia.

Understand the relevant regulations and internalize your ethics training. If your command is not giving you training, ask for it before deploying. See the bevy of high-profile cases associated with the Fat Leonard scandal: Some of those Americans were filthy traitors. Others made much smaller mistakes; these individuals are free, but the ethics violations put their careers on ice.

10. Enjoy your liberty.

Done right, a deployment to Southeast Asia will be an experience that will stay with you. These ports offer world-class opportunities for sightseeing, shopping, and the relaxation needed for superior performance at sea.

A typical port visit is four days. Given the limited time and all the opportunities, mission success requires a plan. Planning requires information. Do as much as you can before you deploy. Shelling out a couple of bucks for a guidebook to read underway can save hours. Even if your deployment schedule is not fixed, taking along a library can be a great investment for your liberty crew. The sailor-centric non-profit YCAPS has a great list of suggestions.

A deployment to Southeast Asia is an opportunity to have a unique experience. To represent the US Navy well in Southeast Asia, get to know the countries you have the opportunity to visit. We hope these 10 suggestions will help you do just that.

John Bradford ([email protected]) is a senior fellow in the maritime security program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Now retired from the US Navy, he spent more than a dozen years as a surface warfare officer in ships forward deployed to the Western Pacific and studied in Indonesia and Singapore as an Olmsted Scholar.  

Blake Herzinger ([email protected]) is a non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow at the Pacific Forum and US Navy Reserve foreign area officer. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent those of his civilian employer, the US Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US government. @BDHerzinger.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

PacNet #35 – South Korea’s Military Inferiority Complex Must End

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According to a survey by the Korea Institute for National Unification, in November 2020 more South Koreans believed that North Korea had a stronger military than South Korea. That changed for the first time in 2021—by a slim margin. More now believe the South Korean military is more robust than North Korea’s (37.1%) than the other way around (36.5%).

Why has it taken so long for the South Korean public to acknowledge the superiority of their own military?

The Trump Effect

Donald Trump’s four-year term as president of the United States was a nerve-racking time for many in South Korea.

He repeatedly disparaged the free trade agreement between South Korea and the United States, and made excessive demands in cost-sharing negotiations. Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan said that President Trump had a personal dislike for South Korea, something he allegedly voiced in front of Hogan’s Korea-born wife.

President Trump’s approach made many in South Korea wonder if decoupling might be imminent, possibly helping convince many South Koreans that their country was in a much weaker position than North Korea.

The Appearance of Strength

The Republic of Korea Army is one of the largest standing armies in the world, and its size is the backbone of its defense against North Korea.

However, many South Koreans fulfill their mandatory military service because it is compulsory rather than out of a sense of patriotic duty. Also, because today’s South Korea is a much wealthier country than in the 1960s and 1970s, there is a belief that the South Korean Army has grown soft and effete.

By contrast, the sight of thousands of goose-stepping and battle-ready North Korean soldiers and the procession of their latest missiles during their infamous military parades is impressive to behold.

Plus, while South Korea and the United States have frequently conducted extensive and highly publicized joint military exercises, North Korea has long had an ace up its sleeve. Since 2006, North Korea has conducted six nuclear weapon tests, and undertaken numerous and varied missile tests. Neither South Korea nor the United States appear to have any path to denuclearizing North Korea.

A Reality Check

Yet the North Korean military is not as formidable as it appears. Their weakness was apparent in 2017 when a North Korean soldier defected to the South across the DMZ. After he was shot by his former comrades during his escape, the doctor responsible for saving the soldier’s life reported that he had found inside the soldier’s body parasites he had only previously read about in medical textbooks.

Food security between the two Koreas is so stark there is even a notable height difference between South and North Koreans—North Korean soldiers are so malnourished that many have become physically stunted.

The South Korean military is also a much more modern fighting force. The South Korean Army boasts weapons such as K2 main battle tanks and K9 howitzers—many of which the South Korean government has exported to other countries—and has Apache attack helicopters.

In 2019, the South Korean Air Force bought 40 F-35 stealth fighters, and in 2020, it announced that it would buy 40 more. Earlier this year, South Korea showed the world the prototype of its own indigenous 4.5 generation fighter jet, the KF-21 Boramae.

Not to be outdone, the South Korean Navy has three Sejong the Great-class Aegis destroyers and plans to buy three more. Recently, the South Korean Navy announced plans to enter into service its first aircraft carrier by 2033.

Meanwhile, North Korea’s tank forces are obsolete and impotent in the face of South Korean K2 Black Panther tanks, its geriatric air force belongs in a museum, and its navy is hopelessly outgunned and outhulled. Aside from its fleet of submarines, none of North Korea’s conventional forces could ever hope to challenge South Korea’s Armed Forces.

Doomsday Weapons

North Korean strategists are aware of South Korea’s military prowess and industrial output, which is why they have no intention of relinquishing their nuclear weapons.

Yet, having nuclear weapons is very different from using them. The moment one of their nuclear bombs detonates in South Korea, that would guarantee a vengeful retaliation from the full might of the South Korean and the United States militaries.

Even if the US didn’t come to South Korea’s defense, South Korea has its own arsenal of missiles. While South Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, its mix of ballistic and cruise missiles are an integral part of its aptly-named Kill Chain and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation plans. Not only are South Korea’s missiles already capable of targeting every inch of the Korean Peninsula, but the Hyunmoo-4, tested just last year, reportedly carry a payload as large as 2 tons to ranges of up to 800 kilometers. Once it is completed, it is rumored that the Hyunmoo-4 will have a 3,000-kilometer range and be capable of supersonic flight.

After South Korea and the United States mutually agreed to lift the former’s missile restrictions and allow Seoul to develop solid-fuel space rockets, these agreements have ensured that North Korea no longer has a monopoly on offensive missile technology and capability. South Korea also recently successfully tested a locally developed submarine-launched ballistic missile.

To ensure its second-strike capability in the event of a war, South Korea also has anti-missile defense systems—Patriot missiles and THAAD. In addition, South Korea is also developing its domestic anti-missile defense, the L-SAM, and plans to build its own version of the Iron Dome to counter North Korea’s artillery.

Perception Matters

Many believe that the North Korean military is full of hungry soldiers with nothing to lose. They also assume that the South Korean military includes pampered soldiers who grew up in an affluent society. They reason that the typical North Korean soldier is more willing to fight and win.

Yet, in November 2010, after North Korea opened fire and shelled Yeonpyeong-do, South Korean marines fired back within 13 minutes. One of the two South Korean marines who died that day, Staff Sergeant Seo Jeong-woo, was on leave but returned to base after the attack. There are also signs, including attention-grabbing defections, that the dedication of North Korean conscripts is not nearly as strong as its state media would have the outside world believe.

The erroneous view that South Korea’s military and soldiers are somehow weaker or less capable than North Korea’s serves Pyongyang’s goals at the expense of Seoul and Washington’s national interests.

Korea ranked 10th worldwide in terms of nominal gross domestic product in 2020. As such, South Korea would have much to lose should the Korean War ever reignite. Combined with the perceived South Korean weakness vis-a-vis North Korea, South Korea’s political leaders and voters enter into negotiations with North Korea from a disadvantaged position.

South Koreans need to understand that their country is superior and that this superiority extends to the military. While triumphalism would not aid South Korea in dealing with North Korea, neither does an inferiority complex.

The South Korean government must address this problem. Tiptoeing around North Korea’s pride and placating North Korean demandsmust end. The way for that to change is for the South Korean government to change its own narrative, making clear all the advantages their country—and their military—enjoys.

John Lee ([email protected]) is a blogger and freelance writer and columnist whose work has appeared in NK News. He has also been featured in Channel News Asia, the South China Morning Post, and La Croix. He lives in South Korea. Twitter: @koreanforeigner.

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PacNet #25 – Improving US-China Crisis Communications—Thinking Beyond the Air and Sea

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As the Pentagon’s China Task Force prepares to deliver its final report to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin next month, one of the key issues on the table is how to strengthen US-China crisis communications. The focus is likely to center on improving safety for air and maritime encounters near China’s borders and handling crises if they occur. This is logical given the occasional “near misses” between US and Chinese forces—a repeat of the 2001 EP-3 incident could be a disaster. But there are already rules on the books and misaligned interests mean that encouraging China to enforce them will be difficult. US policymakers should not overlook the chance of productive talks for crises in other domains, including on land and in nuclear, space, and cyber, where the rules are more ambiguous and both sides have reasons for restraint.

Crisis communications talks can be useful under two conditions: incomplete mechanisms or “rules of the road” that require new agreements and common interests that promote enforcement and refinement of existing rules. The Obama administration focused on air and maritime cooperation because of the lack of concrete agreements. The 1998 Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), created after the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, provided a venue for the two sides to discuss maritime incidents but lacked the detailed protocols that Washington had reached with Moscow in the 1972 Incidents at Sea agreement. Driven by leadership from both Obama and Xi, the two sides agreed to a similar protocol for US-China naval encounters in 2014; an annex covering air incidents was added the following year. Encouraged by Washington, China also agreed to follow the multilateral Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in 2014.

With detailed rules already on the books, the next step for both sides should be greater enforcement and consultation when incidents do happen. The problem is that the incentives for each side are misaligned. Washington seeks the predictability and stability of safe air and naval encounters, but China’s strategy for dissuading the United States from operating freely in the Western Pacific or intervening on behalf of an ally (or Taiwan) benefits from the “costly signal” offered by dangerous intercepts—one example was a September 2018 close call in which a Chinese destroyer maneuvered within 45 yards of the USS Decatur in the South China Sea. Chinese representatives, with less to lose, also refused to participate in an MMCA dialogue scheduled for December 2020. Crisis communications talks are of little value when one side refuses to follow existing protocols or participate in discussions.

Given the challenges for making current agreements stick, US officials should have low expectations for “more communications channels and mechanisms” in these domains, as Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan put it in 2019. One idea occasionally discussed is expanding the naval agreement to cover the Chinese Coast Guard and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia, which have been involved in several tense incidents with US ships over the years, or to include representatives from these forces in the MMCA. But China’s incentive is to retain maximum flexibility of these assets, which are helpful in a “gray zone” campaign of gradually expanding control of contested regions without resorting to war. Thus, Beijing has shown little willingness to expand the regime to include “white hull” ships.

There have also been periodic calls for a maritime and air “hotline,” such as a link between the US Indo-Pacific Command and a PLA theater command. The two sides have managed to establish three hotlines so far: a presidential link in 1998, a link connecting the defense ministries in 2008, and space hotline in 2015. However, as Kurt Campbell recently noted, China has been reluctant to use these systems in real-world situations, with the phones essentially ringing out in “empty rooms.” Even if Beijing were more willing to use these systems, a new hotline linking operational forces would be of little value given the PLA’s more centralized decision-making structure.

With limited hope for progress in these domains, members of the China Task Force should look for progress elsewhere. One potential avenue is discussions on land crises. Unlike the air and maritime domains, there are no detailed protocols for how land forces can communicate and resolve crises. The two sides, to be sure, are not preparing for a land conflict against the other but could find themselves in one given a disaster on the Korean Peninsula. Lack of communication could set the stage for accidental fire incidents or miscalculations about each side’s intentions.

Historically, Beijing has had no appetite for discussing Korean contingencies with the United States, apart from some conversations among academics. Such talks, from China’s perspectives, would amount to collusion with Pyongyang’s primary enemy and thus risk narrowing China’s own leverage with the hermit kingdom. Nevertheless, China has an interest in avoiding an unnecessary clash with US and Republic of Korea forces, and discussions with the PLA do not need to be focused explicitly on Korea to have value in such a contingency. The two might, for instance, consider holding a crisis simulation tied to a terrorist threat against China’s overseas interests in which forces from both sides are part of the solution. This would help generate ideas about how both sides would operate and quickly communicate and deconflict their activities, without alienating North Korea.

Crisis communications might also be strengthened in the “strategic domains”—space, cyber, and nuclear. Like the land domain, there are no in-depth protocols between China and the United States covering conflict escalation within or between these arenas. While China has incentives to seek advantage in these domains, including targeting US infrastructure or space systems to achieve what PLA strategists call “integrated strategic deterrence” against US intervention, Beijing is also vulnerable to retaliatory strikes. Several incipient changes in China’s nuclear posture, including a move to a “launch on warning” system and advent of dual-use long-range missiles, are also creating new challenges for nuclear stability that need to be addressed. It is thus encouraging that retired Major General Yao Yunzhu, one of China’s leading authorities in crisis management, has proposed new talks on “strategic stability” in the nuclear realm, including on the targeting of nuclear command and control structures, as well as “standards, rules, and norms” for space, cyber, and artificial intelligence.

The new US administration should consider several mutually supporting ways of bringing crisis communications in these domains into the picture. Detailed talks at the Track 1.5 level might be helpful, especially if the PLA itself is represented; this may include crisis simulations testing the utility of the existing procedures or hotlines in a nuclear conflict (or highlighting the need for changes to those systems). This might be augmented by discussions of space, cyber, and nuclear issues in high-level forums such as the Defense Consultative Talks (which have been on hold since 2014). Finally, Washington should support talks involving forces that currently do not communicate much with foreigners, including the Strategic Support Force and Rocket Force. Such talks would be of use even if they shed a small amount of light into this otherwise opaque part of the PLA.

In short, expectations for new air and maritime agreements should be low and military relations may only be helpful in warding off provocative PLA moves by amplifying US messages about the consequences of conflict. Those messages can be sent diplomatically but are probably more effectively received through sustained presence, new deployments and operational concepts, and coordination with US allies and partners. If a crisis does occur, it is up to China to follow agreements on the books and use existing hotlines.

Instead, US policymakers should focus on areas where the rules aren’t already clear and there are common interests. Coming to agreements in the larger context of mutual mistrust and great power competition will be difficult, but with support of the Biden and Xi administrations, may help make crises beyond the air and maritime domains more predictable.

Dr. Joel Wuthnow ([email protected]) is a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the US National Defense University. The views in this essay are his own and not those of NDU, the Department of Defense, or the US government. He is on Twitter @jwuthnow.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

PacNet #24 – Comparative Connections Summary: May 2021

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Quadrennially, we write to assure readers that there will be more continuity than change as a new foreign policy team takes office. Globally, this would not be the case this year. In its first few months, the Biden administration made 180-degree turns on issues such as climate change, World Health Organization membership, the role of science in the battle against COVID-19, immigration, and the Iran nuclear agreement. In our region, however, there has been more continuity. The Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy focused on the Quad—the informal but increasingly structured grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the US—and the Biden administration has doubled down on this effort, conducting the first (virtual) Quad summit. It has largely continued the “cooperate when we can but confront when we must” approach toward China. And while Trump appeared to have disdain for US alliances, every national security document from his administration underscored the central role US alliances played in its Asia strategy.

The early months of 2021 offered a full diplomatic agenda for US-Japan relations as a new US administration took office. Joe Biden was sworn in as the 46th president of the United States amid considerable contention. Former President Donald Trump refused to concede defeat, and on Jan. 6, a crowd of his supporters stormed the US Capitol where Congressional representatives were certifying the results of the presidential election. The breach of the US Capitol shocked the nation and the world. Yet after his inauguration on Jan. 20, Biden and his foreign policy team soon got to work on implementing policies that emphasized on US allies and sought to restore US engagement in multilateral coalitions around the globe. The day after the inauguration, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan reached out to his counterpart in Japan, National Security Secretariat Secretary General Kitamura Shigeru, to assure him of the importance the new administration placed on its allies. The COVID-19 pandemic continued to focus the attention of leaders in the United States and Japan, however.

In its final days, the Trump administration took more actions to impose costs on China for its objectionable policies and to tie the hands of the incoming Biden team. The first 100 days of President Biden’s administration revealed substantial continuity in policy toward Beijing, with strategic competition remaining the dominant feature of the US-China relationship. Senior Chinese officials delivered speeches that pinned blame entirely on the US for the deterioration in bilateral ties. A round of combative, yet serious, talks took place between senior US and Chinese officials in Anchorage, Alaska. The US added new sanctions on Beijing for undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy. In coordination with its allies, Washington imposed sanctions on Chinese individuals deemed responsible for carrying out genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang. Steps were taken by the US to demonstrate “rock-solid” support for Taiwan in the face of stepped-up Chinese coercion. Cooperation on climate change was launched with John Kerry’s visit to Shanghai to meet with his counterpart Xie Zhenhua, and Xi Jinping’s participation in the US-led Leaders Summit on Climate.

In the first four months of 2021—the first three and a half of a Biden administration focused on domestic progress and COVID-19 vaccinations—US relations with the Korean Peninsula assumed familiar contours after four years of an unorthodox Trump administration. The US and South Korea quickly reached a military burden-sharing agreement and pledged cooperation in a variety of areas, although the regular differences of opinion lurk under the surface regarding how closely Seoul should work with both North Korea and Japan. The US-China rivalry remains a shadow over the Asia-Pacific security and political economy situation, complicating South Korea’s regional hedging strategy. Finally, North Korea’s nuclear program advanced apace, US and South Korean attempts to open dialogue were rebuffed, and the Biden team’s North Korea policy review will not endear it to Pyongyang.

The Feb. 1 coup in Myanmar dealt a serious blow to the ASEAN diplomatic order and presented the incoming Biden administration with its first major policy challenge in Southeast Asia. More profoundly, the coup set into motion a political and humanitarian crisis that has pushed Myanmar into an economic free fall. The imposition of Western sanctions gave China and Russia an opening to strengthen ties with the Tatmadaw. Myanmar was an extreme example of political turmoil, but the instability surrounding Thailand’s anti-regime and anti-monarchy movement persisted into the new year. In January, Vietnam embarked upon a more orderly political transition through the 13th National Party Congress, resulting in a leadership structure focused on ensuring stability, both external and internal.

Beijing confidently forecast continued advances in high-priority efforts promoting regional economic integration, ASEAN’s prominence as China’s leading trade partner, as well as strengthening supply chain connections disrupted by the pandemic and US trade and economic restrictions. Ever-closer cooperation to counter COVID-19 saw Chinese pledges add to its leading position providing more than 60% of international vaccines to Southeast Asian countries. Nevertheless, the unexpected coup and protracted crisis in Myanmar headed the list of important complications. The incoming Biden administration showed no letup in US-led military challenges to China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, while strong high-level US government support for the Philippines in the face of China’s latest coercive moves supported Manila’s unusually vocal protests against the Chinese actions. Beijing also had difficulty countering Biden’s strong emphasis on close collaboration with allies and partners, seen notably in the first QUAD summit resulting in a major initiative to provide 1 billion doses of COVID vaccines for Southeast Asia and nearby areas. The effectiveness of Chinese vaccines was now questioned by Chinese as well as foreign specialists and Beijing’s domestic demand was growing strongly, slowing donations and sales abroad.

For the leadership of Taiwan, the significance for Taiwan’s relationships with the US and China of the end of the Trump administration and the arrival of the Biden administration formed the defining concern as 2021 began. Taiwan welcomed two steps that the Trump administration took in its waning days: announcing a visit to Taiwan by the US ambassador to the UN (even though it was later cancelled) and repudiating the longstanding Taiwan Contact Guidelines, which was widely seen in Taiwan as overly restrictive. Taiwan’s anxieties regarding the Biden administration were quickly allayed, as incoming senior officials repeatedly called US support for Taiwan “rock solid” and issued new far less restrictive Guidelines. Taiwan also benefited from unusually direct expressions of support from Japan and other international partners.

As in 2019-20, inter-Korean ties remained frozen, other than a rare lawsuit. Revelations that in 2018 Moon Jae-in’s government had pondered building the North a nuclear power plant caused a brief furor. Seoul’s propaganda balloon ban backfired, prompting widespread criticism—but no thanks from Pyongyang, which was also unimpressed by scaled-down US-ROK war games. North Korea tested its first ballistic missile in nearly a year, amid concerns of a new arms race; some analysts deemed the South culpable, too. Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong fired four verbal volleys, mostly insults. Another undetected defector highlighted failings in ROK border security. MOU Lee In-young was ubiquitous and loquacious, but scattergun in the causes he championed. Moon’s government remained reticent, or worse, regarding DPRK human rights abuses. With just a year left in office, and notwithstanding rare criticism of the North by ministers, Moon was expected to double down on engagement despite Pyongyang’s lack of reciprocity.

China’s relations with North and South Korea gained momentum in the first four months of 2021. China-North Korea relations were propelled by an exchange of messages between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Chinese President Xi Jinping around North Korea’s successful convening of the Worker’s Party of Korea’s (WPK) Eighth Party Congress, the appointment of former North Korean Trade Minister Ri Ryong Nam as North Korea’s new ambassador to China, and another round of messages in March that emphasized the importance of close relations. In a Jan. 21 Cabinet meeting, South Korean President Moon Jae-in pledged to develop relations with China to new heights, and in a Jan. 26 telephone call with Moon, Xi expressed support for Korean denuclearization and joint development of China-South Korea relations. China and South Korea held consultations on maritime enforcement cooperation, defense lines of communication, health security, and free trade negotiations.

After several years of seeking to counter each other while insisting that their relations were at a recent best, Tokyo and Beijing became overtly contentious. A major event of the reporting period was China’s passage, and subsequent enforcement, of a law empowering its coast guard to take action, including through the use of force, to defend China’s self-proclaimed sovereignty over the Japanese administered Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Heretofore reluctant to criticize Beijing over its actions in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu finally did so in April, and pledged to work with the United States to resolve China-Taiwan tensions. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned that a continuation of such moves would cause Chinese-Japanese ties to hit bottom and threatened retaliation for any interference on Taiwan. No more was heard about a long-postponed Xi Jinping visit to Japan.

Unsurprisingly, historical issues proved difficult to disentangle from other foreign policy issues in Japan-South Korea relations, which remained at the “worst level since the normalization” in the first four months of 2021. The Seoul Central District Court’s ruling on Jan. 8 that the Japanese government should pay damages to victims of sexual slavery during World War II set the tone for contentious relations at the beginning of the year. While the Moon Jae-in administration made gestures to mend ties, the Suga administration maintained that South Korea should take concrete measures to roll back the 2018 South Korean Supreme Court ruling on Japanese companies requiring them to compensate wartime forced laborers. Export restrictions levied by Japan against South Korean companies in 2019 remain in place, while the case is with the World Trade Organization after South Korea reopened a complaint in 2020 that was filed and then suspended in 2019.

For Moscow and Beijing, the changing of the guard in the White House in January 2021 meant no reset of ties with Washington. Instead, the newly inaugurated Biden administration turned the screws on both China and Russia by reinvigorating alliances, firming up sanctions, and prioritizing force deployment, particularly to the Indo-Pacific region. In contrast to Biden’s multifaceted diplomatic offensive, China and Russia seemed passive, if not inactive, both in terms of their bilateral ties and their respective relations with the US. Top Russian and Chinese diplomats met in person just once in the first four months of 2021 in the middle of sharply escalated tensions across the Taiwan Strait and in East Ukraine. Meanwhile, Beijing and Moscow waited to see if the transition from Trumpism would lead to a brave new world (“new concert of powers”), a grave new world of Kissingerian “great games” in the era of WMD plus AI, or something in between.

Japan-Southeast Asia relations were relatively stable, despite COVID-19, as summarized by three trends: emphasizing multilateral actors; prioritizing enhancement of bilateral relations with two countries (Indonesia and Vietnam); and the synthesis of Japan’s Free and Open Indo Pacific “vision” (FOIP) and ASEAN’s ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Japan and Southeast Asian states managed to achieve tangible cooperation, as illustrated by the establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases (ACPHEED). Yet, strategic dynamics among Southeast Asia, Japan, and the United States are shifting because of changes in Japanese and US political leadership. Japan, the most reliable partner for Southeast Asia in the Trump era, seemingly faced a relative decline in the importance attached by Southeast Asia because of the United States’ renewed commitment to the region. In the context of this new diplomatic reality, the foremost challenges that Japan and Southeast Asia will likely face in 2021-2022 are Myanmar and ASEAN Centrality in the Indo-Pacific.

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