PacNet #51 – 2023 PacNet Commentary half-year index

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July 7, 2023

The comprehensive half-year index includes each PacNet commentary published from January through June 2023 below. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

  1. Taking the US-India relationship to the next level by David Santoro and Akhil Ramesh
  2. The Indian Coast Guard, the Quad, a free and open Indo-Pacific by Dr. Pooja Bhatt
  3. The 118th Congress and China policy – Continuity over change in defending America by Robert Sutter
  4. The Japan Coast Guard’s role in realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific by Capt. Kentaro Furuya (JCG)
  5. Australia’s Maritime Border Command: Grappling with the Quad to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific by Kate Clayton and Dr. Bec Strating
  6. Comparative Connections summary: January 2023
  7. Dealing with increased Chinese aggressiveness – PART ONE by Ralph A. Cossa
  8. Dealing with increased Chinese aggressiveness – PART TWO by Ralph A. Cossa
  9. The US Coast Guard: Provide public goods for a free and open Indo-Pacific by James R. Sullivan
  10. The inconvenient trust: Aspirations vs realities of coexistence between “the West” and China by Stephen Nagy
  11. What China’s challenge to NATO is, and what it isn’t by Rob York
  12. It’s up to the National Unity Government to forge “Union Spirit” in Myanmar by Shwe Yee Oo
  13. After China’s Party Congress, steeling for competition with the West by Kim Fassler
  14. South Korea’s Indo-Pacific pivot strategy by David Scott
  15. For India and ASEAN, an opportune reorientation by Dr. Shristi Pukhrem
  16. The world after Taiwan’s fall – PART ONE by David Santoro
  17. The world after Taiwan’s fall – PART TWO by David Santoro
  18. China has a digital grand strategy. Does the president know? by Dr. David Dorman and Dr. John Hemmings
  19. Rare earths realism: Breaking the PRC’s global refining monopoly by Brandt Mabuni
  20. How feminist is Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy – PART ONE: The Good by Maryruth Belsey Priebe and Astha Chadha
  21. How feminist is Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy – PART TWO: The ‘Needs Improvement’ by Maryruth Belsey Priebe and Astha Chadha
  22. The refresh of the Integrated Review: Putting Britain at the heart of the Atlantic-Pacific world by James Rogers
  23. Japan’s new strategic policy: Three overlooked takeaways by Thomas Wilkins
  24. How to help Korea-Japan rapprochement endure by Rob York
  25. Bangladesh’s remarkable journey and challenges ahead by Md Mufassir Rashid
  26. The UK integrated review and integrated deterrence by Brig Rory Copinger-Symes and Dr. John Hemmings
  27. Why China’s Middle East diplomacy doesn’t herald a new world order by Henry Rome and Grant Rumley
  28. A principled approach to maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific by Ariel Stenek
  29. Toward a resilient supply chain to counter Chinese economic coercion by Su Hyun Lee
  30. Now is the time for a US-Japan-Taiwan security trilateral by Masatoshi Murakami
  31. Time for a shift on the Korean Peninsula by Daniel R. Depetris
  32. Europe’s China confusion does the world a disservice by Brad Glosserman
  33. Myanmar’s Coco Islands: A concern not to be ignored by Shristi Pukhrem
  34. The rise of ISKP in South Asia: A threat to regional stability by Neeraj Singh Manhas
  35. Mekong water usage tests China’s claimed good-neighborliness by Denny Roy
  36. How Biden can make the most of his Pacific Islands trip by Michael Walsh
  37. Comparative Connections Summary: May 2023
  38. EU holds the key to US-China rivalry by Stephen Olson
  39. AUKUS: Enhancing Undersea Deterrence by John Hemmings
  40. Decoding the infrastructure development on Myanmar’s Coco Islands by Shwe Yee Oo
  41. ASEAN unity and the Russia-Ukraine crisis by Shakthi De Silva
  42. Coast Guard cooperation: Heading off a troubling storm? by John Bradford and Scott Edwards
  43. Indo-Pacific middle powers: Rethinking roles and preferences by Alexander M. Hynd and Thomas Wilkins
  44. What happens in Crimea will determine Taiwan’s fate by David Kirichenko
  45. G7 attendance highlights South Korea’s growing stature by Jennifer Ahn
  46. Bangladesh’s Indo-Pacific outlook: A model for maintaining balance by Doreen Chowdhury
  47. Breaking the US-China logjam by Daniel R. Depetris
  48. A work in progress: The Indo-Pacific partnership for maritime domain awareness by Ahana Roy
  49. China’s military engagements with Cuba: Implications of a strategic advance in Latin America by R. Evan Ellis
  50. Despite Blinken’s trip, the US’ slide toward war with China continues by William Overholt

Photo: President Joe Biden speaks with Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi at the G20 Summit by Wikimedia commons. 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR7 – Southeast Asia’s Clean Energy Transition: A Role for Nuclear Power?

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About the Volume

To bring clarity on these developments and their implications in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Forum commissioned several Southeast Asian scholars to write analytical papers on the energy transition that is underway in the region, which are compiled in this volume. Each chapter looks at the current and possible future energy landscape of a specific Southeast Asian country and focuses especially on the place and role of nuclear power in it. This “nuclear focus” is important because, for decades, most Southeast Asian countries have expressed on-and-off interest in nuclear power but never brought it online. Interest is now picking up again, especially for SMRs, so if this time one or several Southeast Asian countries successfully went nuclear, it would be a first.

It is good timing, therefore, to devote attention to how Southeast Asian countries are thinking about nuclear power in today’s context, for multiple reasons, including those related to safety, security, and safeguards.

Download the full volume here.


Table of Contents

Executive Summary

David Santoro & Carl Baker

Chapter 1 | Indonesia Power Sector

Elrika Hamdi 

Chapter 2 | Malaysia Energy Landscape and Requirements 2022-2050

Sabar Hashim

Chapter 3 | Myanmar’s Energy Landscape

Shwe Yee Oo

Chapter 4 | Re-Energizing the Philippines’ Nuclear Power Program: Opportunities and Challenges

Julius Cesar Trajanao

Chapter 5 | Singapore’s Energy Journey: Net-Zeo, New Perspectives, & Nuclear?

Denise Cheong & Victor Nian

Chapter 6 | Thailand’s Energy Landscape and the Potential Role and Place of Nuclear Technology

Doongnyapong Wongsawaeng

Chapter 7 | Energy Landscape and Requirements of Vietnam

Nguyen Nhi Dien

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR6 – Pressing Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: Next-Generation Perspectives

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Introduction

Southeast Asia is a pivotal sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. Spanning 1,700,000 square miles, its total population is 676 million – around 8.5% of the world’s population – and has a collective GDP of US$3.67 trillion (as of 2022). Over the years, it has been associated with both economic dynamism and significant security challenges. As authors in this volume note, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, disagreements over water rights in the Mekong Delta, and the current conflict in Myanmar highlight fault lines not only between Southeast Asian states themselves, but also between great powers such as China and the United States. There are many more – the EU, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea – that pay close attention to developments in the sub-region. Maintaining peace and stability in a region that plays host to one-third of global sea-borne trade, hosts major undersea internet cables, and is a major thoroughfare for energy supplies from the Middle East to the advanced manufacturing hubs in China, Japan, and South Korea is both challenging and complicated.

The primary mechanism for engagement with the individual countries in Southeast Asia has been through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its attendant bodies, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM). Meanwhile, ASEAN member states have promoted the principle of “ASEAN centrality” as a means to prevent major power interference in the sub-region and to retain influence over security cooperation within Southeast Asia and beyond. As a result, the acknowledgement of ASEAN centrality has become a “boilerplate” for strategy and policy documents related to regional security. One example of this is the inclusion of the principle in the 2021 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, the increasingly pressing nature of challenges confronting the broader region, their speed and intensity, are beginning to outpace the evolution of institutions and processes associated with ASEAN.

The ASEAN Way – an emphasis on informal consultation, non-interference, and consensus as the basis of major decisions – has been integral to creating internal cohesion and harmony within ASEAN decision-making and is an enabler of socio-political integration. On the other hand, it has also stymied efforts to develop effective collective responses to conflicts and has made ASEAN hostage to great powers able to use their influence over members to break consensus. While defenders of ASEAN point to its successes and remain confident that it will adapt to regional issues over time, others are increasingly skeptical that ASEAN can retain its status as the gatekeeper of regional security agenda.

It is in this context that Pacific Forum carried out this extended study with support from the Luce Foundation to investigate Southeast Asian perspectives on the “biggest threats or most pressing security issues, now and in the foreseeable future.” We asked a group of our Southeast Asian cohort of Young Leaders (ages 21 to 35), what problems were most pressing to them, and asked them how they thought their countries should address these issues, noting which third-parties would be most important for them to leverage in doing so. We believe this publication, which cuts across a broad range of security issues, is a fair representation of the eclecticism and diversity that characterize the region itself and hope that our readers will find them as useful as we have here at Pacific Forum.

The collection starts with traditional security issues and then moves to more non-traditional security issues, though this does not reflect any internal emphasis or prioritization on the part of the editors. The first essay, by Siu Tzyy Wei, is entitled “Caught in the Middle: The Measured Voice of Brunei’s Foreign Policy Amidst the South China Sea Dispute.” Beginning with the South China Sea is appropriate for any collective study on the region, but Brunei’s position as a “silent claimant” presents a perspective not often heard. The author’s assertion that it is China and external powers – AUKUS and the Quad are mentioned – that are adding pressure to the South China Sea and adding a dangerous complexity, compelling Brunei’s “neutrality,” a striking claim given the threat to Bruneian sovereignty. The second essay moves to another flashpoint, the political crisis in Myanmar; a national issue that has reverberated around ASEAN as well as further abroad in Washington and Brussels. Appropriately titled “The Coming of the Raging Fire: The Revolution in Myanmar,” Thiha Wint Aung analyzes the lead-up to the political crisis and concludes by calling for the international community to explicitly support the people’s “armed resistance” against the military. The third essay presents a bold national case for a region-wide issue: dealing with rising Chinese influence. In “Malaysia’s China Policy Amid China’s Growing Security Concerns,” Fikry A. Rahman argues that Malaysian policy elites will have to prioritize strategic concerns over economic ties vis-a-vis China if it is to adequately defend Malaysian sovereignty.

The next group of essays focuses on non-traditional security issues, beginning with climate change, one of the most pressing global issues. Southeast Asia is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, as noted in the fourth essay, “When it Rains, it Pours: Disaster Displacement and the Future of Human Security in the Philippines Amid Changing Climate.” Katrina Guanio calls for policymakers to be aware of gradual or even sudden human migrations due to inclement weather, such as typhoons, and the impact these have on national health, economic, and security dynamics. Taking an unusual and unique perspective, the fifth essay, “Climate Maladaptation: Migration, Food Insecurity, and the Politics of Climate Change in Timor-Leste” by Ariel Mota Alves, makes the provocative argument that international organizations can sometimes promote detrimental Western development narratives that undermine local solutions to local climate change effects. The sixth essay, “Human Trafficking in Vietnam: A Top-Tier Non-Traditional Security Threat in the 21st Century” by Thu Nguyen Hoang Anh, measures the impact of the scourge of human trafficking in Vietnam and offers practical policy solutions to mitigating its impact on victims. Finally, the seventh essay, by Attawat Assavanadda, looks at “Thailand’s Brain Drain Challenge: Trends and Implications,” noting the push-pull drivers of the phenomenon and its impact on Thailand’s overall development.

As one can see from this summary, the range of topics chosen by our talented Young Leader cohort from Southeast Asia is as diverse, inspiring, and multidimensional as the region itself. Ranging from security issues that are well covered by regional and international media to those that take an eclectic look at local variations of international issues, we are pleased to showcase these essays. As ever, the mission of Pacific Forum only begins with the creation of such young leader cohorts, and empowering them to present their analyses and recommendations should only be a prelude to robust regional conversations and discussions. We have been since our creation – a forum for those discussions – and hope that our readers will take that engaging approach to these essays and their authors.

Dr. John Hemmings
Senior Director, Pacific Forum
Honolulu, Hawaii

Click here to download the full report.


Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Caught in the Middle: The Measured Voice of Brunei’s Foreign Policy Amidst the South China Sea Disputes | Siu Tzyy Wei
Chapter 2: The Coming of the Raging Fire: The Revolution in Myanmar | Thiha Wint Aung
Chapter 3: Malaysia’s China Policy Amid China’s Growing Security Concerns | Fikry A. Rahman
Chapter 4: When it Rains, it Pours: Disaster Displacement and the Future of Human Security in the Philippines Amid Changing Climate | Katrina Guanio
Chapter 5: Climate Maladaptation: Migration, Food Insecurity, and the Politics of Climate Change in Timor-Leste | Ariel Mota Alves
Chapter 6: Human Trafficking in Vietnam: A Top-Tier Non-traditional Security Threat in the 21st century | Thu Nguyen Hoang Anh
Chapter 7: Thailand’s Brain Drain Challenge: Trends and Implications | Attawat Joseph Ma Assavanadda


About the Authors

Ariel Mota Alves is a Timorese student currently pursuing a PhD in Political Science with a Graduate Certificate in Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. His research focuses on the environmental changes in Southeast Asia and Timor-Leste. Ariel is a research intern and student affiliate at the East-West Center in Honolulu.

Attawat Joseph Ma Assavanadda is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong and a member of the Pacific Forum’s Young Leaders Program. His research interests are International Relations and Security in the Asia Pacific, with a particular focus on China-Southeast Asia relations. He obtained his MA in International Relations (International Security Specialization) from Waseda University where he was awarded the Japanese Government “MEXT” Scholarship. He previously worked as a political analyst at Government House of Thailand and a research assistant (master’s level) at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG).

Fikry A. Rahman is the Head of Foreign Affairs at Bait Al Amanah, a political and development research institute based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. His research interests include Southeast Asian regionalism, smaller states’ strategies, the politics and geopolitics of digital connectivity cooperation, maritime security, and Malaysian domestic politics and foreign policy. He was also part of Princeton University’s research project on the Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia, and was thoroughly involved with Malaysian universities on the BRI research projects. His insights have been featured in The Diplomat, Nikkei Asia, New Straits Times, and BenarNews.

Katrina R. Guanio is a Senior Project Officer at UP – Centre International de Formation des Autorités et Leaders or the International Training Centre for Authorities and Leaders (UP-CIFAL Philippines). She works on research studies and projects on migration, gender equality, and sustainable development. Previously, she worked with the Economist Intelligence Unit for the local migration governance indicators of the International Organization for Migration. She is completing her Master’s in Population Studies at the University of the Philippines Population Institute.

Siu Tzyy Wei is a Research Associate at the Global Awareness and Impact Alliance (GAIA). With an aim to develop a deeper understanding of how national factors can evolve and threaten the international system and vice versa, Wei’s research interests lie mainly in the politics and maritime security issues of Southeast Asia. Currently holding a Bachelor of Arts (Honors) in Sociology and Anthropology from Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Wei’s work has been featured in Fair Observer and CSIS Indonesia.

Thiha Wint Aung is an independent political analyst from Myanmar. He received Master of Arts in Political Science from Central European University (CEU) in 2022 and Master of Public Policy from National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in 2020. He formerly worked as Senior Program Manager in Forum of Federations, an INGO providing technical support on federalism and decentralization to various stakeholders in Myanmar. His interests are in social movements, social networks, digital humanities, and Southeast Asia politics.

Thu Nguyen Hoang Anh is a graduate student at European University Institute majoring in Transnational Governance. Previously, she was an intern at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). She was also a senior research fellow and head of the Southeast Asia Research Group at the Vanguard Think Tank. Her research interests include Vietnamese politics, Asian security, and public policy.

PacNet #41 – ASEAN unity and the Russia-Ukraine crisis

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Dato Lim, ASEAN’s former secretary general, recently admitted that ASEAN’s ability to function effectively depends on the capability of its members to align their national interests with regional imperatives. Given the diversity within and between its member states, preserving unity has been a core objective since the organization’s inception.

For example, the 1967 Bangkok declaration—the organization’s founding document—emphasized regional cooperation and strengthening existing bonds of regional solidarity. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation reiterated these sentiments. In the aftermath of the 2012 Bali Concords II, however, ASEAN set out to create a “cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN community” with a “common regional identity.” This drive toward unity was accentuated through the ASEAN Regional Community Vision of 2025, with its target of “one identity and one community” adhering to “shared values and norms.”

Even so, disunity persists. The crisis of Myanmar, for example: In April 2021, two months after the junta took power in a coup, ASEAN forwarded a five-point consensus on the crisis. Violence continues to escalate, however, generating vocal international criticism toward ASEAN’s slow response. While Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have been largely more critical of the junta’s actions, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos have remained taciturn.

Global issues have similarly failed to engender regional consensus. The Russia-Ukraine war is a notable example. ASEAN responses, in terms of policy documents and statements, to the events since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 have been relatively muted. A 2014 joint EU-ASEAN statement following the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, condemned the act and called on all parties to stop the violence. The organization also addressed the situation in Ukraine at the foreign ministers’ level, but interestingly, only after 2022.

On Feb. 26, 2022, March 3, 2022, and April 8, 2022, ASEAN foreign ministers issued statements on the conflict. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was referred to as “hostilities” taking place in Ukraine. Instead of calling on Russia to withdraw from its occupation of Ukrainian territory in contravention to international law, the statements only called for “an immediate ceasefire or armistice” followed by “political dialogues that would lead to sustainable peace in Ukraine.”

Singapore and Laos represent contrasting perspectives. A 2023 survey conducted by Singapore’s Yusof Ishak Institute shows that only 14% of respondents from Laos are “very concerned” about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, compared to over 50% of respondents from Singapore. A 2020 survey asking “Who would you consider your country’s preferred strategic partner if the United States was unreliable” found that 33% of respondents in Laos considered Russia a suitable partner, while less than 1% felt the same way in Singapore. Differing sentiments toward Russia and, more importantly, how each nation frames the conflict, weakens efforts at unity.

ASEAN unity in praxis—voting in the UNGA

From 2014 to February 2023 there were 11 General Assembly resolutions on the Ukrainian crisis. In each, barring one (A/RES/68/262), all 10 ASEAN nations expressed their vote. The trajectories of voting patterns demonstrates the absence of a united position in the organization.

Source: Author’s data, based on United Nations General Assembly Voting Records.

As this graph makes evident, most of ASEAN abstained on resolutions concerning the Ukraine War. Brunei and Vietnam, for example, have consistently abstained on UNGA resolutions. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, initially in favor, shifted to abstaining in each subsequent resolution. Singapore is the only ASEAN country that has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions on the subject on more than one occasion. Even so, it has not consistently voted in favor of resolutions. Laos, in contrast, has either abstained or voted against resolutions on the Ukrainian crisis.

Laos and Singapore on the Ukrainian Crisis 

To delve deeper, let’s explore the voting patterns of Laos and Singapore, the two countries that show the greatest divergence among ASEAN nations. While Singapore has proven most willing among all ASEAN nations to support UNGA resolutions on the Ukraine war, Laos (except for A/RES/68/262, where it did not vote) has consistently voted against.

A/RES/73/194, a resolution adopted on Dec. 17, 2018, is the point where this divergence begins. The resolution directly addressed hostilities taking place in the region and condemned Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory. It also urged the Russian federation “as the occupying power” to withdraw its forces without delay. Examining the resolution reveals three recurring points of contention between Singapore and Laos. This relates to Article 1, Article 5, and Article 8. Each of these articles are repeated in the resolutions of the next General Assembly session (not the next resolution) and in each case Singapore and Laos adopted starkly differing positions, with one voting in favor and the other voting against. Article 1 focuses on Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty by launching an attack on Ukraine.

Article 5 points out the unjustified nature of Russian action in Ukraine, i.e., that it is in violation of international law. Article 8, meanwhile, classifies Russia as an “occupying power” and directs our attention to the importance of it ending its “occupation of Ukraine’s territory.” As a result of these three clauses, and more specifically, the framing of Russia’s actions in these clauses, we see a significant divergence in the positions of Singapore and Laos.

A/RES/73/263, a UNGA resolution adopted five days later, does not include these three articles. Consequently, Laos and Singapore abstained. In A/RES/74/17 we witness the divergence once more, as it contains the three articles noted in A/RES/73/194. A/RES/74/17 was passed in 2019, a year after A/RES/73/194. By then the two nations had begun disengaging forces in Zolote and Petrovske (in Eastern Ukraine) and conducted Normandy Format Meetings – an informal meeting between French, German, Russian and Ukrainian diplomats.

Even so, the positions of Singapore and Laos remained unchanged as reflected by their voting pattern. Whenever UNGA resolutions discuss Russia’s actions as a violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity, note that Russia’s actions are unjustified (and therefore contravene international law), and classify Russia as an occupying power which should withdraw from Ukrainian territory, Laos votes against it while Singapore votes in favor.

This pattern between Singapore and Laos shows the latter’s disregard for the gravity of Russia’s actions. Moreover, it also explains why ASEAN foreign minister meetings did not classify Russia as an “occupying power” in violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity or even mention Russia in any statements.

Laos’ position may have a direct correlation with its economic crisis. According to its statistics bureau inflation hit a 22-year high in 2022 which eroded the population’s purchasing power. The nation also struggles to acquire sufficient foreign currency for its imports which has caused fuel shortages. In May 2022, the government stated that it would look for cheaper fuel sources instead of relying solely on China, Thailand, Vietnam and other nearby nations. Russian gas, meanwhile, is 70% cheaper than other international suppliers which will most likely draw Laos towards Moscow. Laos’ economic dependence on China might also induce it to welcome stronger ties with Russia; thereby diversifying its foreign relations and enhancing its strategic position through “mutual checks and balances among its partners.” At the outbreak of hostilities between Ukraine and Russia, Laos’ Foreign Ministry only stated that it will follow the “evolving, complex and sensitive” situation in the region and called upon all parties to “exercise utmost restraint.” Vientiane also conducted joint bilateral military drills with Moscow as recently as November 2022.

Accordingly, the fact that ASEAN members cannot agree on who violated international law in the Ukraine conflict casts doubt on the organization’s commitment to a “rules-based” international order. Moreover, if members cannot agree on violations taking place in Eastern Europe, thousands of miles from Southeast Asia, its inability to deal with contentious issues closer to home should be expected.

Conclusion

This is a problem because ASEAN Centrality presupposes unity. If ASEAN hopes to be at the center of the region’s security and economic architecture, the organization must not only adopt a proactive role on regional issues, but also maintain unity and a sense of cohesion on framing regional and global issues. That ASEAN members cannot adopt a common position on a conflict in Eastern Europe casts doubt on its ability to guarantee centrality. The absence of “ASEAN Centrality” could also further enable the establishment of new minilateral initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and AUKUS to exert a greater role in shaping security developments in Southeast Asia and the wider Indian Ocean region.

A first step to greater unity would be enhancing cooperation among ASEAN states. Wealthier ASEAN countries should seek to help those, like Laos, in a more precarious financial position reduce its dependence on external actors such as Russia.. Given Laos’ financial position other ASEAN nations should provide economic assistance to Vientiane and thereby reduce its dependence on external actors such as Russia. Regular bilateral meetings alone are insufficient to promote unity—one nation’s difficulties must be viewed as the entire region’s problem. If the ASEAN nations perceived challenges from this perspective the probability that disunity persists on international issues such as the Ukraine-Russia conflict would decline significantly.

Shakthi De Silva ([email protected]) serves as a Visiting Lecturer in International Relations for tertiary-level institutes in Sri Lanka. His most recent publications include a chapter on the securitization policies adopted by Gulf States and South Asia in the book ‘Regional Security in South Asia and the Gulf’ (2023) published by the Taylor and Francis Group (Routledge).

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: ASEAN Summit 2023 May 10, 2023 in Indonesia by CNN Philippines Staff/Southeast Asia News today/Sekretariat Presiden YouTube.  

PacNet #40 – Decoding the infrastructure development on Myanmar’s Coco Islands

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Satellite imagery released by Maxar Technologies in January 2023, revealing new construction on Myanmar’s Great Coco Island, has raised concerns and questions. The imagery discloses an extended airport runway and two new widened hangars next to it. A report from Chatham House Policy Institute says that the runway seems freshly lengthened to 2,300 meters (7,500 feet) from 1,300 meters 10 years ago, and the new hangars enlarged by approximately 40 meters. The extensive nature of this development provokes suspicions as to whether the infrastructure under construction is a Chinese espionage base for its military expansion into the Indian Ocean.

Why China?

China has been a friend to the Myanmar military since the late 1980s. Even when Myanmar was isolated during the junta’s rule in the 1990s and 2000s, China remained a supportive partner of the regime. Despite the harmonious relations with the civilian government during the democratic transition of 2011-2020, China has always wanted to keep closer ties with the Myanmar military for economic and security reasons. The 2021 coup has strengthened the Myanmar military’s relationship with China and increased Beijing’s sway over the country. The presence of a Chinese intelligence base on the Coco Islands, long rumored among the international security community, had little to no evidence before the satellite imagery’s release.

Given the prevailing instability across the country, the Myanmar military cannot carry out the ongoing construction on the Great Coco Island without China; only the latter has both the willingness and capability to develop an airport on the remote island.

Why would China secretly—not publicly—develop such infrastructure? What is the project’s goal, in the short or long term?

While not part of the Belt and Road Initiative, the infrastructure development taking place on the Coco Islands reminds of other projects under the BRI in other parts of the world, as these projects often generate controversy and criticism. Specifically, rumors have swirled that these projects serve China’s regional military and security objectives, rather than the needs of the communities they take place in.

For instance, in 2018 and 2019, Koh Kong province in Cambodia underwent the Dara Sakor Airport Development project funded by China’s Union Development Group. The extreme difficulty of attracting visitors to Koh Kong Beachside resort makes the development of an international airport an illogical decision. Dara Sakor, deviating from the initial plan to develop an international airport for commercial airliners, developed a long runway (10,500 feet) with a “tight turning bay” favored by jet fighters. The Dara Sakor investment zone covers 20% of Cambodia’s coastline and lies close to the Ream Naval Base, granted to China for 30 years in return for the funding required to renovate the naval base. Although the developer insisted that the airport will be for civilian use, international observers immediately criticized the project as benefitting Beijing’s military strategy.

Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, another China-sponsored infrastructure project, also raised security concerns. In 2017, Sri Lanka leased a 70% stake in the port to China Merchants Ports Holding Company Limited (CM Port) for 99 years under a concession agreement signed by Colombo’s cabinet of ministers, keeping the remaining 30% under Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA). Although the CM Port and SLPA ostensibly jointly manage the port’s commercial operations, observers still consider the port a Chinese debt trap. As with Dara Sakor, the Hambantota port is poorly connected to the rest of the country, prompting questions as to its purpose. Some analysts believe China could potentially use the Hambantota Port as a pretext to establish a security base due to its strategic location for the import of energy from the Middle East.

Why Coco Islands?

As with the projects above, the Coco Islands’ remote location, poorly connected to the rest of the country, prompts questions as to whether its airport construction will eventually provide critical infrastructure for China, facilitating future military expansion. The Islands are remote from and poorly connected to the rest of the country. This seems consistent, however, with the PLA’s naval base expansion in Djibouti and China’s current aspiration to set up a permanent military base in Equatorial Guinea.

China considers the Atlantic Ocean important for its exports and the Indian Ocean crucial for its energy and raw material requirements. China has and will continue to undertake infrastructure projects along the maritime route as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. The suspicion and concerns over the China-developed infrastructure mainly arise from the lack of transparency and mysterious nature of the relationship, given the previously mentioned cases of BRI construction in corrupt states.

The Coco Islands’ undisclosed construction, along with other infrastructure ventures in its vicinity, has revived the “String of Pearls” Theory, with the Coco Islands as “beads” in China’s strategy to expand its military presence. According to this theory, China will persist in establishing its economic and military footholds in or around the Indian Ocean by investing in dual-use infrastructure development projects. The Maldives, Seychelles, and Madagascar can expect similar projects sooner or later. However, it will remain crucial to observe how China handles tensions in Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, key BRI infrastructure on China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

All in all, the ongoing construction of an airport on the Great Coco Island suggests China’s unwavering determination to broaden its sphere of influence. As Myanmar faces isolation, China sees an opportunity. If it wishes to ease such doubts and suspicions, China should establish a mechanism for sustainable transparency to demonstrate its sincere and responsible economic cooperation. Without transparency, China will find it hard to justify the development of infrastructure of such questionable use.

Furthermore, other major powers, namely the United States, European Union, and possibly India, should enhance their active engagement in the Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean subregions through political discussion and/or security cooperation with ASEAN member states to appropriately respond to the expanding influence of China. It is crucial to explore constructive measures with Myanmar’s neighbors that promote a balanced regional environment, foster ASEAN’s centrality, and ensure collective stability and prosperity.

Shwe Yee Oo ([email protected]) is Resident Nonproliferation Fellow at Pacific Forum.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Chinese President Xi Jinping in front of PRC and Myanmar’s flags in 2019 by Fred Dufour of Reuters. 

PacNet #33 – Myanmar’s Coco Islands: A concern not to be ignored

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The India-Myanmar relationship is rooted in shared history, culture, and religious values. India and Myanmar share a 1,600-kilometer (1,000-mile) land and maritime border in the Bay of Bengal, adding more significance to the bilateral relations. Furthermore, towns by the Myanmar-India border and cities such as Yangon and Naypyidaw house a large Indian diaspora of roughly 2.5 million.

With India’s active outreach to neighbouring countries with its “Neighbourhood First’ and “Act East” policies, India’s northeastern states are connected to Southeast Asia through Myanmar. As the only ASEAN country sharing a land border with India, Myanmar is a bridge between India and ASEAN.

The strategic importance of Myanmar—with over 1,200 miles of coastline along the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, proximity to the western entrance of the Malacca Strait, and a direct linkage to the Indian Ocean—in maintaining security and stability in the wider Indo-Pacific region is clear to more than just India. In the colonial era, the Japanese imperial forces and the army of the British Empire repeatedly clashed over the control of Burma for the same strategic reasons. Fast forward to 2023 and the “Malacca Dilemma” persists. The People’s Republic of China considers Myanmar a strategically important country in Southeast Asia for hegemonic ambitions in the region.

In January 2023, Maxar Technologies released satellite imagery revealing renewed levels of infrastructure and construction activities on the Great Coco Island. The Coco Islands archipelago lies less than 50 miles north of Andaman and Nicobar Islands—home to India’s first tri-service command. While there has been speculation of Chinese activity in the region since the 1990s, Maxar’s satellite imagery lends credence to this suspicion, and Chatham House in March 2023 showed satellite images of two new hangars, a new causeway, and an accommodation bloc. This has caused much concern, as it showed a newly expanded 7,500-foot runway and a radar station on the island.

Beijing, in its effort to establish an alternative route to the Indian Ocean, is leveraging the global isolation/ostracization of the Burmese junta in Myanmar by Western nations. Since the February 2021 Coup, Myanmar has returned to an era of isolation—ASEAN has drafted a Five-Point Consensus to navigate the return of normalcy in Myanmar, though to not much benefit. The United States and Europe have imposed sanctions on Myanmar, which increases Naypyitaw’s dependence on Beijing.

However, Beijing’s influence in Myanmar is not new. Even under democratic rule, Myanmar was one of the early recipients of Chinese aid under the Belt and Road Initiative. China-Myanmar cooperation was not limited to civilian infrastructure development. Military and strategic installations such the construction of the SIGINT station had begun in the 1990s with the placing of an antenna tower, radar sites, and other electronic facilities forming a comprehensive SIGINT collection facility. Beijing has slowly and steadily established more facilities, not just on the Great Coco Island, but also SIGINT listening stations in the Andaman Sea at Manaung, Hainggyi, and Zadetkyi in Myanmar. Through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), part of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has invested in infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and railway lines, providing it access to the Indian Ocean without having to go through the Malacca Strait.

Cognizant of the strategic significance of these developments, the Indian government has raised the issue bilaterally with Myanmar. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs official spokesperson, Arindam Bagchi, said that “India will take all necessary steps to safeguard its interests” and that the government “keeps a constant watch on all developments having a bearing on India’s security.”

New construction activities on the island, not limited to naval ports and the possibility of a new airbase, pose challenges to India. Military leaders have long warned the possibility of Chinese infrastructure development on the island. As far back as 2005, junta leaders invited Indian defense officials to tour the island and lay to rest any concerns of Chinese involvement.  Upon the visit, the then-Chief of Indian Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash categorically dismissed concerns of military infrastructure development on the island.

Recent developments refute this and, importantly, this coastline provides direct access to the Indian Ocean, giving China an enormous advantage over major competitors, including India. If this comes to fruition, Beijing will be able to control both the eastern part of Malacca Strait via its artificial islands in the South China Sea and the western part through CMEC and Coco Islands in Myanmar. For nations that seek to maintain a safe and secure Indo-Pacific, China’s infrastructure development on the Coco Islands adds a new dimension to this challenge.

Despite US and European sanctions, New Delhi has joined Tokyo, Moscow and Beijing in maintaining diplomatic relations with the military government in Myanmar. The Chinese activities on the Coco Islands raise questions about the benefits of that engagement for New Delhi. The military leadership in Naypyidaw has counted primarily on neighbouring states—India, China, and Japan and Russia—to keep its economy afloat. It may be time for the military leadership to rethink its support for Chinese infrastructure development on the islands, given that it cannot afford to lose more partners.

Shristi Pukhrem ([email protected]) is a Senior Research Fellow at India Foundation. The views expressed are personal.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Myanmar’s military chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and Prime Minister Narendra Modi by PIB.

PacNet #12 – It’s up to the National Unity Government to forge “Union Spirit” in Myanmar

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As we pass the second anniversary of Myanmar’s coup, the international community has yet to develop an effective response to the crisis. The delayed reaction may be due to the ambiguities generated by the parallel governments competing for control of Myanmar: the ruling military (the junta) and the opposition National Unity Government (NUG). The two are deadlocked in the struggle for international recognition, with neither assured of victory. Given the ferocity of the junta’s military campaign, the NUG must be creative and audacious to win the struggle for the future of Myanmar.

For the junta, the path to domestic victory appears to be the violent elimination of the opposition. According to international human rights reports and local/international news sources, the military has burnt down villages, shelled schools, abducted innocent civilians, jailed political activists, and tortured resistance forces to death when captured. Growing friendship with China and Russia after the coup shields the Myanmar military from international scrutiny and helps it legitimize its rule through its own play at hosting a 2023 election.

Working from the shadows, the opposition NUG leads the resistance forces in Myanmar while trying to establish its bona fides with the world’s democratic communities as a legitimate alternative government. The European Union Parliament issued a resolution in October 2021 to support the NUG as the only legitimate representative of the people of Myanmar but critics say the support did not amount to official recognition. US recognition of NUG is also pending despite sanctions on the Myanmar military.

Why is recognition of the NUG delayed? How can NUG make progress in bringing down the junta? What would the actual solution to the Myanmar crisis look like?

To answer these questions, one must understand how the NUG fits into the popular resistance movement against the junta.

The NUG was formed in April 2021 by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the group of ousted elected members of parliament following the February 2021 coup. After months of weakening the regime via a defensive military campaign involving ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the NUG declared a “People’s Defensive War” on Sept. 7, 2021. Despite the functional partnership in coordinating anti-military efforts between NUG and EAOs, months of intense dialogue have failed to achieve a shared vison for the future Myanmar. To build trust and make progress toward inclusive engagement, a primary dialogue platform was needed; the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) became the platform for the dialogue. Founded on March 8, 2021, the NUCC formed under the Federal Democratic Charter (FDC) and is composed of the CRPH, NUG, EAOs, ethnic political parties, civil society organizations, and  civil-disobedient-movement groups. The NUCC seems more inclusive and diverse than previous working groups. The NUCC’s priority is to build “a Federal Union” based on inclusivity, collective leadership, and coordination.

Historical divisions

Looking at history, a deeply rooted distrust is the fundamental cause of the frictions between Bamar majority and other ethnic groups. Even with the Panglong treaty’s signing in 1947—an attempt at building trust and understanding named “Union Spirit”—only Kachin, Chin, and Shan leaders and Aung San (leader of the Governor’s Executive Council) signed the agreement while the Karen sent just four observers to the conference. The treaty called for the leaders to work with the then-Burmese interim government to achieve independence and to form the Union of Burma. Prior to the agreement, Shan and Karen leaders travelled to London and demanded the recognition of separate independent states in 1931 and 1946 respectively but failed to receive approval from the British government. Chin and Kachin did not trust Barman sincerity regarding equal rights. Some say that there was no representation for Karen or Karenni (Kayah), and no deliberation for Mon and Rakhine (considered to fall within Ministerial Burma) despite the promotion of the term “Union Spirit.”

Suspicion has only grown over time due to discrimination, maltreatment, repression, and abuse of power. Consequently, civil war has never ended since the 1948 independence. Although the democratic government endeavored to find a compromise among the ethnic groups to achieve true “Union Spirit” from 2016 to 2020 through four meetings of the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference, it failed largely due to the military’s unwillingness to change its role as the sole guarantor of security and its self-centered view of national reconciliation. Plainly, trust-building has never succeeded, despite improvements in freedom and justice in the country.

It is time for the NUG to carry out the unaccomplished mission of bringing all the different ethnic groups together through the NUCC to create a truly unified alternative government and establish the vital Union Spirit. Given the longstanding insecurities and grievances, the only answer is “mutual understanding and unity” among ethnic groups, including the Bamar majority—something the military regime will never be able to accomplish. The major ethnic armed organizations such as KNU and KIO have been key players but have never been “the priority” when it comes to negotiation for peace with the military. The military has always sought to control peace talks.

The narrative is changing, however. As ethnic militaries play a critical role in countering the regime’s military oppression, their political counterparts should be engaged to restore democracy and draft the constitution for the envisioned Federal Union. Full-spectrum cooperation between the NUG and the EAOs is crucial. It is also an opportunity for the NUG to express the Barman sincerity and willingness to generate reconciliation and inclusive governance. Given that the goal of both NUG and EAOs is to reach a Federal Democratic Union that guarantees equal rights and justice, a negotiated settlement should be within reach. Disagreements are understandable but should never stand in the way of progress.

The challenge for the NUG is to demonstrate that it can work with ethnic groups and make progress. If NUG could find compromise among all different groups, the military’s assertion that it is the sole source of national reconciliation would be exposed as false. Aggregating strength from different groups, including political parties and ethnic minority groups is the right way for NUG, EAOs and other minority groups to expel the junta and create federal democracy based on “Union Spirit.” This kind of solidarity is the “political commodity” the Myanmar people demand through the revolution. The NUG should also realize that the international community will likely remain skeptical of its capacity to reconcile and lead the country to overcome the crisis if it cannot demonstrate progress at building trust with different groups.

The solution to the Myanmar crisis and the key for the NUG is establishment of true and profound “Union Spirit” that will lead to a Federal Union. To begin that process, the NUG should initiate several dialogues, discussions, and negotiations via the NUCC. It is a daunting task but it is within reach.

Shwe Yee Oo ([email protected]) is Resident Nonproliferation Fellow at Pacific Forum.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Anti-coup protesters flash the three-finger sign of defiance during the demonstration against the military coup in Yangon, Myanmar, on Friday, April 23, 2021. Leaders of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations meet Saturday, April 24, in Jakarta to consider plans to promote a peaceful resolution of the conflict that has wracked Myanmar since its military launched a deadly crackdown on opponents to its seizure of power in February. (23 April 2021, AP) by AP Photo.

PacNet #62 – Myanmar’s emerging national identity could change everything

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The Myanmar military is, paradoxically, achieving one of its longest-standing objectives: a tangible national identity. The success of this goal, however, will require the failure of the regime’s more pressing objective: remain in power.

To maintain control, the Myanmar military has demonstrated a willingness to inflict brutality. Many observers assess the regime’s increasing use of air strikes and explicit targeting of civilians as desperation due to depleted and demoralized ground forces. However, these actions also follow the military’s long-standing “four cuts” doctrine: cut off access to food, money, potential recruits, and information within areas opposing central government rule.

Critically, the four cuts doctrine is now directly applied against the majority ethnic Bamar population areas previously relied upon for recruitment and material support which, more than desperation, may signal the Myanmar military’s quasi-religious belief in its own centrality. Even if the regime is desperate, Commander-In-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and his coalition are likely willing to sacrifice everything to maintain privilege and power.

The resulting civil war has mobilized citizens across class, ethnic, religious, and geographic divides toward the common goal of ending the regime. The current opposition to the military is the strongest unifying force in Myanmar’s recent history.

A broader opposition

The Civil Disobedience Movement, which started as a general strike against the coup, drew workers across the country and from diverse sectors of the economy. Even when met with lethal force, peaceful opposition has far outlived comparable past attempts. Simultaneously, violent opposition has expanded beyond the long-established claims of Myanmar’s powerful ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and into traditional military strongholds.

Majority ethnic Bamar areas, notably Magway and Sagaing, are now sites of intense combat against loosely organized, often poorly equipped People’s Defense Forces (PDF), as well as the regime’s indiscriminate raids, killings, and the burnings of civilian homes.

Yet the Myanmar military’s operational and strategic challenges have only intensified. Last month saw the effective end of a tenuous ceasefire with the Arakan Army, the powerful EAO seeking autonomous rule in Rakhine State. The Myanmar military also, after months of clashes, struggles to make operational gains against the Karen National Union—which has resisted central government rule since 1948—in Karen State.

The growing cooperation of some EAOs with the National Unity Government (NUG)— primarily members of the prior civilian government—and NUG-backed PDFs signals potential for much greater operational capacity on the part of the opposition.

Most tellingly, the Myanmar military appears to be losing people faster than it can replace them. The military’s response, no matter how brutal, is likely insufficient to reestablish previous military dominance.

However, the alternative to a central government victory against the opposition is not necessarily one where a popular, or less brutal, regime comes to power. The Myanmar military is in the process of becoming one among many armed factions grappling for territory and resources.

Nevertheless, the continued survival of opposition across Myanmar’s ethnic and geographic boundaries represents the clearest opportunity yet for the emergence of a shared national identity. This identity, should it survive, may prove a critical unifying force giving the nation and its people a more stable and prosperous future.

For most of Myanmar’s turbulent post-colonial history, its ethnic minorities have suffered the brunt of successive military regime attempts at consolidating power. This has often been easy to dismiss for those in the Bamar-dominated heartland now suffering what those in Myanmar’s ethnic states have for decades experienced. These minorities remain suspicious of how the NUG-led opposition might act in power. Growing cooperation suggests this suspicion is gradually relieving, but much mistrust remains.

The damage caused by the double disasters of COVID-19 and the 2021 coup left millions in poverty, and rampant economic mismanagement in the wake of the coup has destroyed the financial system, making access to critical commodities, including medicines, scarce. Yet, perhaps because they have little left to lose, the opposition continues.

Regional realism

It’s easy to assume the current opposition won’t succeed, especially considering the stances of regional powers such as China, India, and Thailand, which continue to either enable or outright support the military regime. That should come as no surprise: those who continue to support the regime look first to their own interests, backing the side perceived as most likely to win.

But it’s more complicated than it seems.

As the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia, with 45% of its population under 25 and expansive natural resources including hydroelectric potential and fossil fuel reserves, Myanmar could become a major regional power, potentially threatening Thailand’s central economic position in mainland Southeast Asia. Thailand continues to endure ongoing political turmoil that appears to share much in common with Min Aung Hlaing’s regime in terms of maintaining power at the expense of political and economic transformation. Keeping Myanmar undeveloped and a source of cheap labor and commodities is therefore a tolerable status quo.

A more unified Myanmar may also prove less amenable to the economic and security interests of India and China when these do not align with the popular will.

The expansive sanctions and efforts at humanitarian aid delivery by the United States and others notwithstanding, international efforts stop short of official recognizing the NUG. Doing so would surely pose significant diplomatic risk, ending whatever engagement is possible with the current regime and upsetting key partners—especially Thailand.

The national identity taking shape in opposition to the regime demands consideration through both realist and idealistic lenses. From a humanitarian perspective, the growing toll of nearly 30,000 homes burned, thousands of civilians killed, and hundreds of thousands displaced is unconscionable. The crisis drains the credibility of ASEAN, while transnational threats of narcotics and arms trafficking are sure to intensify and undermine regional security.

A “wait and see” approach will keep Myanmar’s future opaque. The damage from this civil war will not be reversed anytime soon, yet the opportunity for outside powers to support a national identity, which could lead to stability and prosperity, is unprecedented. Doing so will require backing the opposition against the current regime in recognition of a better future. Growing unity suggests that this is not only possible, but increasingly expected.

Wayland Blue ([email protected]) is a graduate student in the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego focusing on development and security issues in Southeast Asia. He previously worked as the director of research and evaluation for Shade Tree Foundation, a Thailand-based NGO delivering aid and education to Myanmar migrant and refugee families.

An earlier version of this article appeared in Southeast Asia Globe.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Protest against military coup (9 Feb 2021, Hpa-An, Kayin State, Myanmar) by Ninjastrikers

PacNet #51 – Five years after the Rohingya exodus, no significant development

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On Aug. 25, 2017, Myanmar’s military launched a full-fledged “clearance operation” against the Rohingya community in Rakhine state, burning villages to ashes and forcing the Rohingya people to flee to neighboring Bangladesh.  Over 745,000 Rohingya fled there and started living in the camps in precarious conditions. Since then, five years have passed without any justice. The genocidal intent and crimes against humanity have been acknowledged worldwide, yet the perpetrators are still at large, even after staging a coup last year that destabilized Myanmar. The Rohingya issue has been marked by geopolitics, deteriorating camp conditions, and decreasing international attention for the last five years. The only ray of hope is the legal process developing gradually in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Argentine court under universal jurisdiction.

However, as the repatriation process lingers, the Rohingya are becoming more frustrated. The recent media coverage of the Go Home campaign—led by Rohingya stranded in Bangladesh who hope to return to Rakhine state—and United Nations’ Rights Chief Michelle Bachelet’s visit suggests the same.

Precarious camp condition and deteriorating law and order

Since the exodus, the Rohingya have been living in the hilly terrain of Cox’s Bazaar, a border district of Bangladesh. They live in makeshift houses and are confined within the camp. It is also one of the densest camps in the world. Around 1.1 million refugees live within only 27 square kilometers with a density of 40,000-70,000 per square kilometer. Women and children largely make up the demography of the community. Even though Bangladesh has created temporary camps in Bhasanchar that provides better living standards, the capacity there is only 100,000.

As these refugees are living within the camp indefinitely without a proper repatriation plan, they are becoming increasingly frustrated. The precarious camp conditions and uncertainty about their future make them more vulnerable and exposed to gang politics and transnational crimes, such as violent extremism, drugs, and arms peddling. Around 14 gangs are now active within the camp, and the recent murders and violent attacks revealed the presence of terrorist outfits. The deteriorating law and order also claimed the life of the top Rohingya leader, when Mohibullah, a top pro-repatriation leader, was killed in his office within the camp last year.

Geopolitics, decreasing international attention, and “Go Home” campaign

As years passed and several conflicts, like Ukraine, emerged worldwide the international community’s attention has also been diverted. The international community has failed to take any significant steps for repatriation and justice. The geopolitical calculations of great powers crippled the United Nations Security Council. It also allowed the Junta perpetrators to carry on with their draconian measures. The same perpetrators also staged a coup last year. But they hardly faced any strong counter-measure from the great powers. Since then, the repatriation process has also halted indefinitely.

As the great powers failed to fulfill their humanitarian responsibility and international attention decreased, the Rohingya also lost their faith in them. Through the recent “Go Home” campaign, the Rohingya displayed their frustration and called out for international attention. The “Go Home” campaign also revealed the political consciousness of this persecuted community as they reiterated Rakhine as their homeland. During the recent visit of the UN Rights Chief Bachelet, the Rohingya told her that their current stay in Bangladesh is temporary, and they wanted to go back to Rakhine, their ancestral home. This suggests that the international community’s responsibility doesn’t end with providing them with temporal shelter in Bangladesh. Instead, their safe and dignified repatriation to Rakhine should be the goal.

Developments in the legal processes—a slight ray of hope

The most significant developments have come through the legal process. Currently, two cases have been filed, in the ICC against the Myanmar military, and in the ICJ against Myanmar. Another case has been filed in the Court of Argentina under universal jurisdiction. The ICC prosecutors are gathering evidence on allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The prosecutors also visited Bangladesh this year.

Perhaps the most significant development in the last five years was the ICJ’s ruling on  jurisdiction. In 2019, Gambia filed a case against Myanmar over genocidal intent and criminal atrocity. Myanmar authorities rejected the case arguing that the court has no jurisdiction as Myanmar is not a party to the Rome Statute that established the ICJ. Additional objections advanced by Myanmar included that Gambia has no ties with the Rohingya and serves as a proxy for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The judge dismissed Myanmar’s arguments stating that Gambia, as a party to 1948’s Genocide Convention, could act to prevent it and the ICJ has jurisdiction over the case.

In 2021, a Rohingya organization under universal jurisdiction filled another case in an Argentine court. The court accepted the case and agreed to investigate.

The United States finally acknowledged the genocide, even though it already had the very same conclusion in 2018 through the Fullerton Commission. Hence, a ray of hope for justice is still present for the Rohingya.

In Myanmar, the Rohingya also received acknowledgment for the first time in history as the National Unity Government and Arakan Army both acknowledged Rohingya rights.

However, these legal processes and enforcements are also dependent upon the efforts and proactive role of great powers. History suggests that the Bosnians only found justice because great powers and key stakeholders got involved.

Five years after the crisis began, emphasis should now be on repatriation and justice. The international community must increase its role and responsibility to ensure safe and dignified repatriation. Great powers should also hold Junta leaders accountable to the courts. Junta leaders should not be given a free pass, as this will only inspire future perpetrators.

MD Mufassir Rashid ([email protected]) is an Independent Researcher. He has completed his BSS in International Relations and MSS in International Political Economy from the University of Dhaka.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

PacNet #47 – Time for difficult choices on Myanmar

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An earlier version of this article appeared at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Aug. 3, 2022.

The recent executions of four anti-regime activists, including former lawmaker Phyo Zeya Thaw and civil society leader Kyaw Min Yu, known as Ko Jimmy, by the Burmese junta have caused global uproar. After being knocked from international news coverage by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, inflation, and food insecurity, Myanmar’s civil war is back in the headlines. But the United States and other foreign governments remain hesitant to fully embrace the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) or take riskier steps to help push the military from power. Instead, they issue condemnations, tinker with sanctions, and pass the buck to the “five-point consensus” that Myanmar’s neighbors in ASEAN negotiated with the junta more than a year ago. But the five-point consensus was dead on arrival, and assumptions about how the opposing forces would fare on the battlefield have been decisively proven wrong. It is time to make some difficult choices about Myanmar policy.

Since the Feb. 1, 2021, coup in which the Burmese military overthrew Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, the United States and other partners have condemned and withheld recognition from the junta. Even countries such as China and India, which went easy on the condemnation and maintained official ties with the military, were initially ambiguous about the junta’s legitimacy. Beijing has since acknowledged the government of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, but Delhi and many others remain circumspect. Things have gone no better for the generals on the international stage. ASEAN has refused to accept Min Aung Hlaing’s participation in leader-level summits, though it has allowed junta appointees to represent Myanmar at the ministerial level in some cases. At the United Nations, China and the United States agreed to defer any decision on credentialing a new Burmese ambassador, leaving the former National League for Democracy’s emissary—a fierce critic of the junta—to represent the country for the time being.

Faulty assumptions

US officials have had frequent public and private engagements with NUG officials. So have leaders from Europe, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and some ASEAN members. Washington has directed much of its humanitarian assistance for Myanmar to civil society organizations with close connections to the NUG. But Washington has not recognized the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar, nor has it allowed the NUG access to $1 billion in frozen Burmese government assets held in the United States. And the US government has not extended security assistance to anti-junta forces in Myanmar, despite increasing calls to do so in the wake of the Ukraine invasion. A small fraction of the assistance delivered to Kyiv could decisively turn the tide of battle in Myanmar. So why hasn’t any of this happened?

Following the coup, most foreign governments believed that the junta would brutally and efficiently consolidate a new military regime. The scope and resilience of the opposition, both civil and armed, surprised the international community at least as much as it did the junta’s generals. Those faulty early assumptions help explain why the United States and others were slow to embrace the NUG—supporting a doomed resistance would only cause more bloodshed and economic pain for average Burmese citizens. But after a year and a half, grassroots People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and older ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), continue to effectively resist the junta. On their best days, the regime’s forces might control half of the country. Two dry seasons have now come and gone—the periods when the junta is at its strongest due to advantages in air and artillery power—and the military has made no appreciable gains. Despite killing over 2,000 civilians, arresting almost 15,000, and burning more than 28,000 homes to terrorize the population into compliance, large swaths of the Bamar (Burman) heartland in Magwe and Sagaing Regions remain outside regime control. The Karen National Union, Karenni National Progressive Party, Kachin Independence Organization, Chin National Front, and Arakan Army have expanded the frontier territories under their control, with the latter seizing most of Rakhine State. Given battlefield conditions, it is hard to see how the junta can win by force of arms. The choices, then, are either victory for the opposition or a protracted civil war that leads to state collapse in the center and de facto independent fiefdoms on the margins.

Being resigned to a junta victory might explain why the United States and others withheld support for the NUG in the beginning, but it has been clear for many months that the armed resistance is holding its own. Several other factors explain why that still has not been enough to garner recognition or military assistance. It is unclear how much command and control the NUG exerts over the PDFs, many of which remain wholly independent. And the NUG can make no claim to either control or effectively represent the EAOs, which are the most effective resistance to the junta. The Karen National Union, Karenni National Progressive Party, Kachin Independence Organization, and Chin National Front are providing support and limited coordination against their shared enemy. But they do not yet trust the Bamar-dominated NUG. After decades of civil war and the disappointment most EAOs felt with Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, which they viewed as betraying her earlier promises of federalism and inclusivity, it will take more than vague promises to bring them into a confederacy. Most other EAOs, including the powerful Arakan Army and the myriad narco-armies in Shan State, remain content to sit on the sidelines and watch the Bamar have it out.

Toward a new confederation

The NUG does seem more sincere in its goal of a future federal system than any previous Burmese regime. It has established a National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) with representatives from across the spectrum of ethnic organizations, including the Rohingya, who, after a particularly intense wave of violence in 2016 and 2017, were formally declared by the United States to be victims of genocide following decades of state-sponsored persecution. The NUCC is seeking to establish a new federal charter that can garner support from a wide array of EAOs and ethnic civil society organizations. In the absence of such a charter, it is easy to see why many EAOs would believe they are better off carving out their own autonomous piece of the uplands and letting the center collapse. History has taught them that any Bamar-dominated government will inevitably turn its guns in their direction. For the same reason, it would be irresponsible for outside parties like the United States to provide military support to the NUG in the absence of a political roadmap with substantial buy-in from a critical mass of EAOs. Otherwise, it seems all too likely that this civil war will just transition into the next, when a victorious Bamar government seeks to reimpose control over territories in Chin, Kachin, Karen (Kayin), Karenni (Kayah), and especially Arakan (Rakhine) states that have been lost since the coup.

But if the NUCC process does succeed and the NUG transitions into a truly inclusive federal opposition government with support from most of the EAOs, then the United States should quickly extend it diplomatic recognition as the legitimate representative of the peoples of Myanmar. Washington should be prepared to allow such a government to tap the Burmese state funds currently held in the United States, champion its participation in regional and international forums, and be prepared to deliver military equipment and training to the EAOs and PDFs under that government’s control.

In the meantime, Washington should ensure that the both the NUG and EAOs understand what could be unlocked by the expansion and success of the NUCC process. The United States has no say in what a future Myanmar looks like—a strong federal state, a weak confederacy, or even independence for areas like Arakan—but it should make clear that it will put diplomatic and economic resources behind the survival of whatever system the NUG and EAOs negotiate. Those resources could be powerful incentives for hesitant parties like the Arakan Army or many of the armed organizations in Shan State to throw in their lot with the NUG. This could also offer Washington leverage in ensuring the rights of Rohingya in northern Arakan State. The NUG has already promised them the right of safe return and citizenship, but it has no power to enforce that. Either the military or the Arakan Army will decide the fate of Rohingya in Myanmar. Washington should make resources for the latter conditional on the guarantee of Rohingya rights as part of a political roadmap through the NUCC.

What is happening in Myanmar is a revolutionary war against a brutal, intractable regime that has no interest in compromise. Sanctions and diplomacy will not appreciably affect the outcome. Either the junta will lose on the battlefield or the state will fracture. As soon as the NUG and its compatriots have a viable roadmap to avoid state collapse, the United States and its allies should help it achieve victory.

Gregory B. Poling is a senior fellow and director for the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.