Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP3 – Understanding JI Resilience and Australia’s Counterterrorism Efforts in Indonesia

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Executive Summary

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains one of Indonesia’s longest standing state security threats. It has survived major organizational transformations, state security crackdowns, and international military operations in its pursuit of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia that could extend to incorporate Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah rose to prominence for its role in orchestrating the 2002 Bali Bombings, which prompted the United States and Australia to engage Jakarta with the shared goal of destroying the organization and its links to al-Qaeda. Security pressures from Indonesian security services and international forces led to the dismantling of much of Jemaah Islamiyah’s leadership by 2007, which pushed it into a state of hibernation, where members focused on consolidating numbers and religious outreach. The emergence of the Islamic State and its Southeast Asian affiliates in 2014 occupied much of the Indonesian security services’ resources, which gave space to Jemaah Islamiyah to regenerate its strength with renewed vigor. The 2017 discovery of a JI military training program in Syria re-alerted Indonesian counterterrorism authorities to the risk posed by the group, and successive waves of arrests and crackdowns ensued. Although the COVID-19 pandemic meant that many terrorist groups ceased offensive operations and maintained a low profile, Jemaah Islamiyah began to infiltrate Jakarta’s state apparatus, civil society, and academia to promote its political objectives. Jemaah Islamiyah’s long history in Indonesia has proven it to be adaptable, patient, and persistent in pursuit of its objectives. Although it is not currently engaged in military operations, JI’s long history in Indonesia has shown the group is adaptable, patient, and long-term in its thinking. Observers suspect that leaders in Jemaah Islamiyah are biding their time and seeking gaps in state authority that they can exploit to pursue their organizational goals.

Click here to download the full paper.

About the Author

Tom Connolly is a postgraduate student at the University of New South Wales and an analyst at the Australian Department of Defense. The views expressed in this Issues & Insights are his own, and not necessarily representative of the Australian Government.

YL Blog #37 – Addressing Invisibility: Crafting a South Asian Action Plan for Unpaid Care Work

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Despite social progress brought about by economic development in the past decades, women in South Asia continue to bear the brunt of disproportionately distributed unremunerated care work. Unpaid care work refers to all unremunerated services provided within a household that involve catering to the needs of its members. Such activities include cooking, looking after children and elderly, production for subsistence, collection of everyday necessities such as fuel, washing clothes, etc. Of these activities, childcare, cooking, and cleaning occupy nearly 85% of the total time spent by women on unpaid care work globally. While unpaid care work supports economic activities, it remains absent from both gross domestic production (GDP) calculations and developmental policy formulations.

Time use surveys (TUS) show that developing nations portray greater gender disparity in the amount of time spent on care work than developed nations. This inequality is defined by both macroeconomic factors such as the state of the national economy as well as microeconomic factors such as personal incomes, with those in the lower rungs being more disadvantaged. A 2018 report of the International Labor Organization (ILO) noted that women engage in nearly 80% of unpaid care work hours in the Asia-Pacific region, which is 4.1 times more than men. This leads to “time poverty” which leaves women with little to no time to participate in paid work, let alone recreational activities.

The driving factors behind such disproportionate share of unpaid care work include unequal access to the labor market; socio-cultural (gender) norms; lack of social care infrastructure; and the legal and institutional environment. These interrelated factors are further defined by age, class, ethnicity, and spatio-temporal factors such as regional disparities. Even if women participate in paid economic activities, unpaid care work either falls on women as a “double burden” or is outsourced to domestic helpers instead of being redistributed among men and women within the household. These domestic helpers, who too are mostly women, in turn depend on women in their own families for their share of unpaid care work. This creates a dichotomy where one woman’s freedom binds the feet of another. Furthermore, exposure to long term or high intensity unpaid care work cause extreme physical and emotional stress that might lead to serious psychiatric and physical morbidities.

Unpaid care work thus stands as a major albeit invisibilized non-traditional security threat to women, for it does not just impact their lifespan and quality of life; hamper their prospects for socioeconomic progress, political participation, access to healthcare and education but also limits their life choices and agency thus preventing them from realizing their full potential. As climate change becomes more conspicuous, women’s share of unpaid care work such as fetching water, gathering firewood, etc. increases. The impact of unpaid care work on women thus needs to be addressed in congruence with other threats to human security.

South Asia in Perspective

While South Asia is a vibrant region with diverse cultural, linguistic, regional, socioeconomic and political distinctions, most communities follow a patriarchal, patrilocal kinship system where men are seen as the primary breadwinners and women, as primary caregivers. Traditionally, women have limited inheritance rights and their expected roles as full time caregivers severely hamper their economic activities outside the household; this is in addition to restrictions imposed on their mobility owing to concerns of guarding their “chastity” and “family honor” in some communities. A “good wife” and “good mother” is expected to completely devote herself to cater to the needs of her family members, those who fail to comply are often dubbed as “deviant” or “bad” women. Unpaid care work remains highly invisibilized across South Asia which is viewed as a “duty” that women are expected to render out of “love” for the family. However, it is possible for a woman to love her family and also expect that household tasks are evenly distributed among family members in order to avoid oppressing any one individual more than the others.

Nevertheless, for the vast majority of women living in the Asia-Pacific, unpaid care work is burdensome and limiting. A United Nations report noted that women spend nearly 5.867 hours (352 minutes) per day on unpaid care work in India as compared to just 51.8 minutes spent by men. In Pakistan, women spend 11 hours more than men on unpaid care work. In Bangladesh, women spend 11.7 hours as compared to 1.6 hours spent by men. In Nepal, women spend 7.5 hours per day, which is 2.5 times higher than men. In Bhutan, women were found to be spending 15% of their time on domestic care work which is 2 hours 11 minutes more than men. A 2017 Time Use Survey in Sri Lanka noted that 87.3% of women and girls were engaged in household and care work in comparison to 59.7% men and boys. Data collected by the United Nations in 2016 similarly noted that women in Maldives spent 6 hours, almost double that of men. The disparity is the most concerning in Afghanistan, where women spend a total of 18.7 hours a day on unpaid care work as compared to just 5.6 hours spent by men.

In almost all cases, the situation has been worsened by the Covid-19 pandemic. Reasons range from loss of employment due to stringent lockdowns to lack of accessibility to affordable healthcare among women, and almost universally includes subjection to physical, sexual and emotional abuse in the household. Countries like Afghanistan are also deeply affected by the political rise of extremist forces such as the Taliban. Many countries in South Asia are yet to officially adopt and institutionalize the collection of Time Use Survey data. Though revealing of the grim situation, such surveys do not necessarily capture the reality on the ground.

While the 2022 ASEAN Regional Plan of Action on Women, Peace and Security recognizes addressing unpaid care work as a priority, most countries  in South Asia have not adopted a National Action Plan (NAP) for Women, Peace and Security so far. In the light of the Taliban government’s onslaught on women’s rights, it is highly unlikely that Kabul would continue to commit itself to such a plan. Furthermore, the political sensitivity surrounding the issue acts as a major stumbling block in the official adoption of NAPs in these countries. While advocacy for the same continues, the implementation of an informal collaborative action plan can serve as a timely solution.

A South Asian Action Plan for Unpaid Care Work

As rapidly growing economies that house nearly a quarter of humanity, almost half of which are women; recognition of unpaid care work in South Asia is the need of the hour. The following informal Action Plan can serve as a solution:

  1. Recognizing the intersectionalities of class, caste, region, religion, language, etc. that define the identity of a South Asian woman. It is also important to identify the most affected groups such as single women led households as targets and provide them with additional support.
  2. Recognizing unpaid care work as an economic activity and including it in developmental policy making.
  3. Including more women and men genuinely concerned with the issue in decision making and policy framing panels so that all policies related to employment are coherent of unpaid care work.
  4. Strengthening the Social Protection Systems and Social Care Infrastructures through increased budgetary allocations on childcare, elderly care, women’s health and education.
  5. Creating a culture of gender sensitivity regarding unpaid care work at all levels of education.
  6. Investing in capacity building among women in order to economically empower them. This must take the form of developing women-led banking networks promoting ease in granting loans, development of Self Help Groups and Skill Training workshops for women. Forming a joint resource fund for building such economic capacities among women.
  7. Promoting transnational collaboration among research institutes to identify overlapping issues, mutual concerns and challenges as well as issues unique to each region in order to develop the most effective and feasible tools to measure the impact of unpaid care work.
  8. Promoting regular and improved gender disaggregated data collection.
  9. Facilitating flexible work schedules and arrangements such as part-time jobs, etc. in addition to regular jobs for women and creating awareness among women about their rights and the initiatives launched.
  10. Institutionalizing paid parental leave and leave for elderly care for both men and women.
  11. Recognizing that women are among the worst hit in cases during Health Emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Ensuring provision of accessible and affordable healthcare including mental healthcare for women.
  12. Regularizing paid care work in informal sectors, promoting equal wages among men and women and improving working conditions in both formal and informal sectors.
  13. Providing universal monetary entitlements for unpaid care work including pension entitlements to compensate for inability to join the active workforce.
  14. Countering cultural stereotypes promoting toxic masculinity that prevent men from participating in domestic chores through active media campaigns.
  15. Promoting men in paid care work to counter the perception of women being primary caregivers. Identifying and Promoting local cultural norms which offer greater gender equality in terms of unpaid care work.
  16. Promoting childcare facilities at workplaces.
  17. Reaching a consensus on a set of defined parameters such as enhancing economic independence among women, reducing time spent on unpaid care work, etc. to enable a comparative study among nations in South Asia, monitoring progress as well as identifying and sharing best solutions.
  18. Building an active legal redressal mechanism with stringent implementation to deal with cases of physical, sexual, mental and emotional abuse faced by women in unpaid and paid care work in both informal and formal sectors.
  19. Countries displaying comparatively better records such as India, Sri Lanka, etc. must encourage and take lead in negotiating with countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc. that lag behind.
  20. Encouraging the active participation of civil society and women’s Self Help Groups to form transnational alliances and act as pressure groups in demanding better conditions for women.

A collaborative effort in the form of an informal National Action Plan to be jointly formulated and implemented by governments at all levels, regional organizations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and civil society groups alike would not just empower women but also help in establishing better political relations in the region. Lessons can be taken from the 2022 ASEAN Regional Plan of Action on Women, Peace and Security in formulating a nuanced and meaningful action plan.

Peace must not be understood as mere absence of violence. Violence continues to exist as systematic oppression embedded in societal institutions such as family where it often takes the guise of “duty,” “love,” and “care”; gendered unpaid care work being one such manifestation. Similarly, national and regional security assessments must also take into account individual development. Addressing women’s unpaid care work would thus not just free them from the shackles of patriarchy but would also socially and economically empower them. Such measures would pave the way for a peaceful and secure South Asia in the true sense of the word.

Cherry Hitkari ([email protected]) is a Non-resident Vasey Fellow and Young Leader at Pacific Forum. She is a Postgraduate student of Chinese language and holds a Bachelor’s (Hons.) in History and a Masters in East Asian Studies with specialization in Chinese Studies from the University of Delhi.

Disclaimer: All opinions in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent any organization.

 

PacNet #31 – Time for a shift on the Korean Peninsula

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North Korea conducted another intercontinental ballistic missile test on April 13, the second in less than a month. Unlike previous launches, however, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un presided over what Pyongyang claimed was an ICBM powered by a solid-fueled engine. This would represent another milestone in Pyongyang’s decades-long effort to field an operational missile capability despite being the subject of one of the most stringent UN Security Council sanctions regimes in existence. A reliable North Korean solid-fueled ICBM would be of particular concern to the United States during a war-time contingency—solid-fueled missiles can be assembled rapidly, are easier to conceal compared to liquid-fueled variants, and can be prepared on-site, giving the United States far less time to locate and neutralize them before launch.

As expected, the United States, South Korea, and Japan condemned the latest test. Tokyo, which issued an emergency alert to residents on the island of Hokkaido, requested an emergency UN Security Council meeting. The next day, Washington authorized two separate bilateral military drills with South Korea and Japan, including B-52 bombers and F-35 fighters. The drills were designed to send a message: more missile tests, particularly those with the capacity to reach targets on the continental United States, will result in more defensive measures by Washington and its East Asian allies in response.

Drills beget drills

None of these moves are especially surprising. The Biden administration is spending significant effort this year bolstering the credibility of US extended deterrence to its South Korean and Japanese allies. In January, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and South Korean Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-sup engaged in a series of meetings in Seoul, during which Washington pledged to “enhance the implementation of US extended deterrence” through increased deployment of US strategic assets on and near the Korean Peninsula.

This came roughly two weeks after South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol suggested it may be time for South Korea to build its own nuclear weapons, or at least request the return of US tactical nuclear warheads on South Korean soil. Yoon’s comments got the attention of US defense officials; in the ensuing months, a variety of US strategic combat systems have been rotated to the area.

In February, US and South Korean officials participated in table-top exercises at the Pentagon with a specific focus on responding to a number of scenarios involving North Korean nuclear use. US B-1B Lancers joined exercises with South Korean forces at least four times this year. The USS Nimitz, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, docked in the South Korean port city of Busan in late March. In April, Washington and Seoul executed the largest military field exercises in five years. Separate exercises occur as well, including trilateral anti-submarine warfare drills between US, South Korean, and Japanese naval forces. Similar exercises are now ongoing, with Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo regularizing them in the future to improve naval force inter-operability.

This has predictably elicited strong countermeasures from the North Koreans. The “security dilemma”—where “defensive” exercises are perceived by the adversary as a belligerent action—is very much alive on the Korean Peninsula. What Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo view as entirely justifiable, Pyongyang views as aggressive and thus deserving of retaliation.

Can the cycle of escalation be broken?

It is hard to see this cycle ending anytime soon. Ordinarily, such situations would be contained through diplomatic engagement, either between the parties themselves (oftentimes discreetly) or through a trusted intermediary. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any diplomatic channel on the horizon. The Biden administration has reached out to the Kim regime multiple times to jumpstart a new negotiation after talks failed during the Trump era. But Kim Jong Un rejected the overtures and is unlikely to green-light any serious negotiating effort as long as US policy centers on North Korea’s total and irreversible denuclearization. South Korea, which acted as a facilitator of direct US-North Korea diplomacy during Moon Jae-in’s presidency, is no longer seen by the North Koreans as a credible interlocutor due to President Yoon’s hardline approach toward Pyongyang. (North Korea has even ignored daily military-to-military phone calls from the South for nearly two weeks.)

In an ideal world, China would exploit its considerable financial and political leverage over North Korea to aid Washington in bringing the Kim regime to the negotiating table. Yet, given the terrible state of US-China relations, Beijing has little incentive to help Washington on a foreign policy dispute that has confounded multiple US administrations for decades.

Additional economic pressure is unlikely to bring Kim to the table either. The UN Security Council has been deadlocked on the North Korean nuclear issue since 2017, with the United States and China arguing over who is at fault. Permanent members Russia and China use their veto power to block individual sanctions designations, and the prospect of a new UN Security Council sanctions resolution passing is too low to even theorize about. Beijing and Moscow increasingly see sanctions as worsening the internal food and economic crisis in North Korea and should therefore be loosened or removed. The United States found out the hard way when it tabled a draft resolution in May 2022, only to walk away from the council chamber disappointed after the Russian and Chinese delegations cast a double veto. Even if the North Koreans conducted another nuclear test, there is no guarantee the Security Council could conjure up the unanimity required to issue a statement condemning it. With the UN paralyzed, the Biden administration has relied on unilateral sanctions designations ever since to penalize North Korea for everything from illicit financial practices and fuel smuggling to the development of weapons of mass destruction and human rights abuses. Even so, the North Koreans have proven by necessity to be highly meticulous sanctions evaders.

Washington, therefore, is left with a short list of options. Continuing to strengthen the sanctions regime is the most likely course of action, if only out of bureaucratic habit, yet by definition is highly reactive to North Korean behavior and holds low probability of success. Maintaining the current pace of US military deployments in East Asia will be welcomed by Seoul and Tokyo but also risks prompting more North Korean missile tests and military exercises—up to and including a seventh underground nuclear test. Fostering a detente between the two Koreas is probably a dead-end as long as the Yoon administration’s hard line continues.

The North Korean nuclear issue is a low priority for the Biden administration. The United States is currently content with treading water and waiting for the Kim regime to accept its overtures. Assuming Washington wants to solve or at least contain the problem, the time has come for a major policy shift. The most dramatic shift would be recognition among the United States and its allies that denuclearization is infeasible when North Korea already possesses dozens of nuclear warheads, will likely construct more, and is in the process of diversifying its delivery systems. Avoiding a war through a mixture of deterrence, engagement, and practical diplomacy should now be the paramount US national security objective on the Korean Peninsula, not transforming North Korea into a non-nuclear state. If the United States intends to maintain a consistently high pace of military exercises with South Korea, Washington should establish protocols to minimize confusion and mixed signaling with North Korea.

This will likely require direct communication between US and North Korean military officers and perhaps advanced, mutual notifications about the timing and location of various military and missile exercises to decrease misperceptions. In addition, the United States, in coordination with China, should be willing to exchange basic information on nuclear safety and maintenance with North Korea—that the United States is highly unlikely to recognize North Korea as a legitimate nuclear-armed state does not obviate the need to ensure Pyongyang’s nuclear practices are up to standard. The United States should also stop prefacing US-North Korea engagement on the nuclear issue alone; maintaining a cold peace on the Korean Peninsula involves discussions beyond the nuclear component, including, but not limited to, the disposition of conventional forces on both sides of the 150-mile Demilitarized Zone, de-escalation mechanisms between the two Koreas, and common rules of engagement along disputed boundaries like the Northern Limit Line.

Only when realistic, achievable goals are set can an effective strategy be formulated.

Daniel R. DePetris ([email protected]) is a fellow at Defense Priorities, a foreign policy think tank based in Washington, D.C., a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune and a foreign policy writer for Newsweek.  

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter, observe a warhead missile launch exercise (20 March 2023, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)) by KCNA via KNS/AFP.

PacNet #30 – Now is the time for a US-Japan-Taiwan security trilateral

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Japan is determined to uphold the international order in the Indo-Pacific but cannot achieve that goal alone. Therefore Tokyo enhances its partnership with allies through minilateral arrangements like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (with the United States and Australia). Some even advocate Japan’s cooperation with another minilateral, the Australia-US-UK (AUKUS) pact, in high-tech areas like hypersonics or cybersecurity. The rise of such minilateral frameworks among like-minded countries can make the region more stable and resilient.

Yet another potential framework also merits attention: trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and Taiwan.

Pacific Forum recently published “The World After Taiwan’s Fall,” attracting attention throughout the region. In the volume, David Santoro, Ralph Cossa, and other scholars emphasize the significance of Taiwan in maintaining the current rules-based order. The United States is undoubtedly the biggest supporter of Taiwan—especially in military terms. The Taiwan Relations Act has since 1979 allowed for the transfer of defense articles, something the United States has honored across both Republican and Democratic administrations.

However, during a contingency on Taiwan, Washington would struggle to stave off an attack without Japanese help, chiefly because it has no military bases and deployments on the island. For the US military to rescue Taiwan, it needs proximate locations for operations. Guam, the US territory with Andersen Air Force Base and Apra Harbor, could be a starting point for the US military. A more effective missile defense plan is also needed to protect Guam and continuously project power. The Philippines, under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., has also offered the US military four additional bases which could be used in a contingency.

The closest US bases to Taiwan, however, are in Okinawa, part of the Japanese archipelago and the First Island Chain. Kadena Air Base is one of the US bases that would play a crucial role in a Taiwan contingency. It is 400 miles from Taipei and the only significant US base to reach the Taiwan Strait without refueling. Article 6 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan grants the US military use of facilities and areas not only for defending Japan but also “maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” However, US bases are located on Japanese sovereign territory and Japan’s consent is not automatic. Prior consultation, before US military combat operations commence, is therefore critical in responding to a contingency in Taiwan.

Japan has its own reasons for concern over a Taiwan contingency. If Taiwan falls, Okinawa would then be vulnerable to PRC takeover, as the Pacific Forum report warns. Yonaguni, the westernmost island of Okinawa, is only about 70 miles from Taiwan. In 2016 the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) afresh established a camp on the island. The following year, then-Commander of USPACOM Harry Harris and then-Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Kawano Katsutoshi jointly visited the brand-new camp.

In December 2021, the late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo insisted that a Taiwan contingency is the equivalent of a contingency for Japan. This should come as no surprise: in addition to strategic considerations, bilateral ties between Japan and Taiwan are underpinned by deep friendship. Japan is by far the most liked country among the Taiwanese public. Thousands of ordinary people in Taiwan expressed deep condolences for the assassination of Abe Shinzo, due to his deep commitment to Taiwan. When the 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami hit Japan in 2011, the Taiwanese people enthusiastically expressed solidarity with their Japanese friends. Taiwan, an island of just 23 million people, contributed the second-highest amount of donations following this disaster, behind only the United States.

Japan has tried to enshrine the Taiwan issue as the priority of the US-Japan alliance. In February 2005, the US secretaries of state and defense and the Japanese foreign and defense ministers held the ministerial 2+2 meeting. Already at the time, common strategic objectives of the joint statement included the Taiwan Strait. The joint statement of the 2+2 meeting in June 2011, “Toward a Deeper and Broader US-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership,” encouraged “the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues through dialogue.” During then-Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide’s visit to Washington DC in April 2021, the joint statement also underscored the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait at the summit level for the first time since the end of a formal diplomatic ties with Taipei. Following the leaders’ meeting, the G7 shared their concerns over the Strait. At an incoming summit in Hiroshima in May, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio is expected to coordinate the G7 nations to express continued concern.

Notwithstanding, there is no platform to coordinate the efforts of the three sides. As Beijing takes more assertive actions, these three governments should act now. In my view, the three parties should discuss trilateral security cooperation. Thinking about the triangle security-wise, the weakest side is the tie between Japan and Taiwan. The first challenge for trilateral cooperation is strengthening the security linkage between Tokyo and Taipei.

This new minilateral should start with modest steps. The framework should be functional during a contingent scenario, and establishing a communication channel will be critical, especially at the beginning, to plug the lack of contact. Another gap to fill is cooperation in the maritime domain. Unlike in Ukraine, this would be a significant battle theater, but Taiwan’s navy and coast guard are far less—or not at all—integrated with their US and Japanese counterparts.

A big picture is definitely needed. But a small step is suitable for creating momentum, especially to avoid antagonizing Beijing too much and too soon. There could be several measures to take for practical use. In 2022, it was reported that Japan was considering sending active-duty personnel from the JSDF instead of retired personnel. Someone with an active connection with the JSDF will be an essential channel between the two militaries. As China steps up its efforts in the East and South China Seas, cooperation between the two island countries in the maritime domain is also critical. The memorandum of understanding regarding the collaboration between the US Coast Guard and its Taiwanese counterpart could be a good example to follow. Based on the tangible results of security cooperation between Japan and Taiwan, a trilateral partnership could be established. In fact, trilateral collaboration has already been built up in Taipei. President Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly touched on “GCTF”—the Global Cooperation and Training Framework—to advance cooperation in practical areas, including training, public health, and digital economy. Honolulu could be another acceptable location to smooth communication among the three parties. The tropical city is host to US Indo-Pacific Command, and active personnel from the JSDF and other militaries are dispatched there.

As discussed above, Japan should pursue another minilateral framework in the Indo-Pacific to stabilize the region; it is high time to forge trilateral security cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Taiwan. And some minor steps would be fitting for the very beginning.

Masatoshi Murakami ([email protected]) ) is an associate professor at Kogakkan University in Japan and a visiting fellow with the Air Command and Staff College of Japan and Nakasone Pease Institute. He previously worked with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a career diplomat and has conducted research as a visiting fellow at Pacific Forum this spring.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

PacNet #25 – Bangladesh’s remarkable journey and challenges ahead

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A country’s nationalism lives through its shared vision from generation to generation. In the early post-colonial era, the early dreamers of Bangladesh shared a vision of independence, economic development, and an equal society. As it celebrates 52 years of independence on March 26, Bangladesh cherishes the same vision and has achieved remarkable successes. However, many short and long-term challenges have also emerged, especially in the last two years.

Bangladesh’s economic success

During the last half-century, Bangladesh has had remarkable economic success. The country followed the “fast-growth” model, and the world community has dubbed Bangladesh a “Tiger Economy” and a “Frontier Five” economy.

Bangladesh also successfully manages its “demographic dividend” as it has built its economy on remittance and ready-made garments. It is the world’s sixth-largest human resources exporter, earning $22 billion in remittance in 2021, eighth among top remittance earners worldwide. The country’s export-oriented economy is also growing fast, at $44.39 billion in 2021, a 13.68% increase from the last year.

The country’s GDP has also reached $443 billion, the 35th-largest in the world. Bangladesh is currently undergoing its Least Developed Country graduation, projected to be completed by 2026, at which point Bangladesh would emerge as a Developing Country.

Bangladesh’s social safety net has also expanded remarkably. Bangladesh announced praiseworthy stimulus packages during the pandemic to protect its economy. The government had also widened the net. The Asrayan Initiative by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina—a house-building project for the homeless and displaced—also demonstrates the effort to broaden the net.

However, the pandemic and Ukraine war have brought new short-term challenges. The country has suffered from energy and food crises alongside declining reserves and soaring inflation. But efforts are made to address these challenges as the country is already practicing austerity and exploring alternative energy import destinations, such as Brunei.

Bangladesh has also sought to ensure its infrastructural development in the last decade, which currently dominates the country’s development narrative. Over the last decade, Bangladesh has undertaken many mega projects to improve the country’s existing infrastructure. Bangladesh has already inaugurated Padma Bridge and Metro-Rail project. The public enjoys the benefits as the projects reduce time, provide better security, and introduce smoothness to daily life.

Bangladesh is also taking part in regional connectivity projects. The country has improved its connectivity with India, is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and has a share in Trans-Asian highways.

Bangladesh in international politics

Bangladesh is a firm believer and promoter of multilateralism and its role is increasing in world politics.

In the last 50 years, Bangladesh has achieved success and displayed its commitment to global peace. The country participates in UN Peacekeeping Operations. At the UN level, Bangladesh has participated in 54 peacekeeping missions in 40 different countries over five continents with more than 175,000 uniformed personnel, including over 1,800 female peacekeepers. Bangladesh’s “ambassadors of peace” have also given their lives to uphold global peace: according to Bangladesh Army, till May 2019, a total of 117 Bangladesh Army personnel have made the supreme sacrifice, and 209 more were injured.

For the Rohingya Muslims, perhaps the most persecuted community of our time, Bangladesh provides temporary shelter and security to 1.2 million in Cox’s Bazaar—the largest refugee camp in the world. Bangladesh also advocates ensuring their safe and dignified repatriation to their ancestral home. Bangladesh is also a frontrunner in climate change, and has a vocal role in mitigating the adverse impact of climate change and served as the chair of the UN Climate Vulnerability Forum.

Bangladesh has sound participation in many other multilateral institutions. Bangladesh is an active member of the Organization of Islamic Countries, Developing 8, and many more organizations. Bangladesh currently serves as the chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Organization and acts as an observer at ASEAN.

Bangladesh has shared its economic success with the world, as a donor state from a through currency swap loans to debt-ridden Sri Lanka and Sudan. Bangladesh has also brought a share in the New Development Bank, through which Dkaha has entered into the development finance market. 

Bangladesh has a strong diaspora community in several Middle Eastern countries, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Bangladeshi diaspora communities are one of the major sources of the country’s soft power and contribute to their host country’s economy.

Bangladesh’s soft power also reaches beyond the region. Through its participation in peacekeeping, Bangladesh has found friends in many African nations. Sierra Leone has given Bangladesh a special place in its heart by announcing Bangla as its second language. Gambia also helped the country by lodging a case against Myanmar in the International Court of Justice on Rohingya ethnic cleansing. Japan, meanwhile, has deepened relations with Bangladesh over the decades with the country emerging as the largest recipient of Japan’s Official Development Assistance and flourishing political-cultural relations between the countries.

Challenges overcome, challenges ahead

Immediately after independence in 1971, Bangladesh was a war-torn country with millions of hungry people. Recurring calamities such as floods, cyclones, and drought have repeatedly ravaged Bangladesh’s food security. Yet Bangladesh became self-sufficient in rice production. The country also ensured 100% electricity for all citizens by 2022. Bangladesh also curbed militancy and tackled the menace of terrorism. Throughout the journey, Bangladesh also removed illiteracy and early marriage to a great extent. The human rights narrative also changed gradually as the country achieved mentionable success in women’s rights, children’s rights, and transgender rights.

Yet, Bangladesh still faces many challenges. The pandemic and Ukraine war have both brought economic turmoil to Bangladesh. Soaring inflation, declining forex reserves, a dollar crunch, and food and energy crisis are hurting the country’s development.

The economic setbacks have increased poverty and squeezed efforts to ensure decent work. 24% of the population (40 million people) remain under the poverty line as of 2022. The number of people living slightly above the line is also very high. Government must tackle skyrocketing imports and forex fluctuation, and widen the social safety net to protect the commoners.

Apart from the economic challenges, Bangladesh also has many political challenges. Political violence remains a recurring event in the country. Weak institutions, distrust among major political parties, rampant corruption, nepotism, and complicated bureaucracy hurt Bangladesh’s journey toward a sound political system. All political parties, civil societies, and stakeholders must work together to create a sustainable and violence-free political system.

Despite several achievements in human rights, the country still has a long way to go. Even though Bangladesh has achieved significant economic success, human development still needs to catch up with economic development. Besides domestic issues, the brewing geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific and great power rivalry in the region poses challenge to Bangladesh. For a while now, Bangladesh has maintained a deft balance between the great powers.

Bangladesh has achieved praiseworthy success since independence. It had also overcome many challenges. The journey continues, however, and many obstacles lie ahead.

MD Mufassir Rashid ([email protected]) is a Research Associate at The Center for Bangladesh and Global Affairs.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

PacNet #23 – Japan’s new strategic policy: Three overlooked takeaways

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Japan has signaled its intent to strengthen its national security and defense posture significantly in an increasingly volatile Indo-Pacific. When he met President Joe Biden in January 2023, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, referring to Japan’s new National Security Strategy, declared he would “fundamentally reinforce our defense capabilities.” This includes raising the Japanese defense budget to approximately 2% of GDP by 2027. This will gratify many in Washington who share a determination to strengthen the alliance militarily and bolster combined deterrence postures.

Kishida’s remarks came a month after the release of the new National Security Strategy, accompanied by the National Defense Strategy (renaming the prior National Defense Program Guidelines) and Defense Build-Up Program (formerly Medium-Term Defense Program).

Together these documents together present a grim picture of the security situation Tokyo and its US ally face. The NSS states that “Japan’s security environment is as severe and complex as it has ever been since the end of World War II.” Russian aggression in Ukraine, Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas and across the Taiwan Strait, and North Korea’s nuclear missile ambitions top the list of dangers. The NSS identifies them as countries that seek to “revise the existing international order.” In the context of strategic competition, the NSS states the boundaries between peace and war have become blurred through “gray zone” activities, malicious operations in the cyber and information spaces, the use of economic statecraft, and a vigorous technological arms race.

The NSS (along with NDS and DBP) represents a highly coordinated response on Japan’s part. They have been dubbed “historic,” a “paradigm shift,” and a “revolution” by some analysts, while some have offered more skeptical appraisals on their actual implementation. Heretofore debates have primarily centered on defense budget increases and acquisition of counter-strike capabilities.

But there are three other key leitmotivs of the documents that have not attracted as much comment.

First, the NSS unabashedly foregrounds “universal values” as a “national interest” and “fundamental principle” of its strategy. While many observers have questioned the sustainability of the former prime minister (and current vice president of the Liberal Democratic Party) Aso Taro’s “values-oriented diplomacy” since his time as party leader, it appears to be back with a vengeance. The NSS speaks of “upholding universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law.” It excoriates states that do not share such values and points to their malignant actions to undermine a “free, open, and stable international order.” Japan’s commitment to project its Free and Open Indo-Pacific “vision” thus frames the almost Manichean contest between liberal democracies and authoritarian states as “a historical inflection point.” Japan now states it “will maintain and protect universal values.” For a country that long eschewed taking ideological leadership and intrusive democracy promotion, this emphatic statement is quite a departure.

Second, Japan’s new security strategy emphasises its “holistic” approach. This is evident in its “integrated” approach to strategy—where it will lever all aspects of its “comprehensive national power” (a term originally invented by the Chinese) to achieve its strategic objectives. It will employ diplomacy, defense capabilities, economic strengths, technological prowess, and intelligence assets in service of an integrated strategic approach. It seeks to create a “comprehensive defense architecture” by increasing coordination across organizational sectors such as the Japan Coast Guard and Maritime Self Defense Force, for example. The documents are replete with references to “cross-governmental” and “whole-of government” coordination, and “cross-community collaboration” (in advanced technology and R&D), indicating desire to break down institutional “siloing” that could impede a joined-up approach to the implementation of strategy.

This “integration” includes the military domain, where Japan continues to build a “Multi-Domain Defense Force” by marrying the “traditional” land-sea-air domains with the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains. Integration also extends to allies and partners, with greater efforts to harmonize US and Japanese forces, since “No country can protect its security alone.” This includes bilateral integration with the United States through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism and Flexible Deterrent Options. The former focuses on information sharing, improving common situational awareness and coordinating responses from peacetime to conflict contingencies. The latter is designed to coordinate combined responses to deterring Chinese coercive activities within the maritime domain through military signalling and escalation control. Greater interoperability with close strategic partners, such as Australia and the United Kingdom, through Reciprocal Access Agreements, which provide legal and logistical frameworks  necessary to facilitate overseas training and military operations in one another’s countries, are a means toward improving inter-military coordination and force interoperability. This will result in a “multi-layered network” knitting together Japan’s regional ally and “like-minded” partners (e.g. Australia, India), in conjunction with “minilateral” mechanisms such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Trilateral Strategic Dialogue. Japan is thus transcending its role as a single bilateral “spoke” of the US-led “hub-and-spoke” alliance system to become a subsidiary “hub” itself.

Japan is now acting to become accountable for its own national defense, eventually assuming responsibility for dealing with any invasion more independently (by 2027). This does not portend a move to complete national defense “autonomy” and a decoupling from the US alliance, but rather a determination to progressively assume of the primary burden for self-defense of its national territory.  Though it will rely on its US ally for some time, this will be a major step, prospectively freeing up US forces based in Japan for other activities. The DBP also indicates that “Such a defense capability must come with high readiness and response capability.” To achieve this, the increased defense budget will need to be allocated accordingly to acquire counter-strike capabilities that can deter or defeat an enemy invasion, supported by a robust defense industrial base (a “virtually integral part of defense capability”), and a hardening of its defense facilities, with ample stocks of fuel and munitions. As well as providing for the defense of Japanese territory, this makes a greater contribution to the alliance considering the diminishing resources (and increasing obsolescence) of the US’ force posture.

Third, combined with greater responsibility for its own national defense is the emphasis on streamlining the “responsiveness” of its defense architecture. This is part to the overarching recognition that “a strategy that integrates its national responses at a higher level” is required. The 2016 Peace and Security Legislation set the groundwork for this by freeing Japan of some of the former constraints upon it activities and permitting more collaboration with allies and partners. If deterrence fails, responsiveness of government and defense apparatus will be at a premium. To improve reaction times, decision-making procedures will become more “seamless,” contingency plans drawn up, and the mobility and readiness of rapid reaction forces improved (“mobile deployment capabilities,” per the NDS). This builds upon the earlier establishment of a National Security Council (in 2013) and centralization of decision-making in the Prime Minister’s Office, initiated under Abe Shinzo. This extends to inter-service crisis response coordination between the Self Defense Forces, police, and Japan Coast Guard, for example.

Japan’s new strategic approach is perhaps best seen as an apotheosis of the determined efforts put in motion during the premiership of the late PM Abe, and a validation of these. This trajectory has been pursued by his successor Kishida, first in his “vision for peace” address to the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022. Unified by a clear statement of national objectives, including universal values and a commitment to uphold a rules-based order, Japan is investing heavily in marshalling the requisite resources to back this (“pragmatic realism”), drawn from the whole spectrum of the comprehensive national power it possesses. This is a recognition that strategic competition occurs across all domains, and it has become a national security imperative for Japan to improve its ability to deter and defend against attacks on its national territory, whilst assuming a greater burden within the US-Japan alliance. The ambitions of the national security documents, by their own admission are “unprecedented in terms of size and content.” Nevertheless, they signal Japan’s “steadfast resolve” to achieve them.

Time will tell if they are successfully implemented, or if they can be realized within the urgent timeframe available before a potential conflict breaks out.

Thomas Wilkins ([email protected]) is an Adjunct Senior Fellow (non-resident), Pacific Forum, Senior Fellow, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and Associate Professor, University of Sydney.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Prime Minister Kishida Fumio commemorates the 70th anniversary of the foundation of the Maritime Self-Defense Force on Nov. 6 by Pool via Reuters. 

PacNet #21 – How feminist is Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy – PART TWO: The ‘Needs Improvement’

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In Part I of this series, we examined Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific strategy (CIPS or the Strategy) in terms of how well it aligned with the country’s Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), which is functionally Canada’s feminist foreign policy (FFP). In Part II we take a deeper dive to examine ways the strategy could improve to better reflect the country’s FFP aims on four issue areas: i) regional peace, resilience, and security, ii) boosting trade with and within the region, iii) norm-setting and commitment to rule of law, and iv) promoting people-to-people connections, and sustainable future. 

Promoting peace, resilience, and security

While the Strategy aligns with the FIAP in a call for an increased presence of women in peacekeepers, it does not include an expansion of Canada’s Elsie Initiative on Increasing the number of Women in Peace Operations, a policy that has already set Canada apart as a FFP leader, wherein women’s representation in roles includes their presence in positions of power.

More problematic is that CIPS, despite alluding to peace and conflict resolution, remains reliant on militarism, which is problematic for an already over-militarized region. For instance, it has a strong emphasis on bolstering Canada’s military and spy network, and, by aligning its language with other Western powers, the bulking up of Canada’s military could potentially make it part of a disruptive force that stokes greater regional tensions at a time when a fresh, gender-sensitive approach is needed. More distressing is the confrontational tone on the People’s Republic of China (more on this in the last section). The strategy brands China as a “disruptive global power,” using more strident language regarding China than previous foreign policy. This approach may also be contrary to the wishes of countries in the region that do not wish to be caught in the middle of a great power struggle and rapid military build-up that could potentially stir regional instability.

Essentially, through securitization of several aspects of Canada’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, the strategy is in tension with Canada’s FFP, which may pose a challenge to regional stability and tarnish Canada’s role as a global peacebuilder.

Boosting trade with and within the region

Canada’s announcement of the Women Entrepreneurship Strategy (WES), as well as working collaboratively within existing regional structures, is a good start in carrying out the country’s FFP in the economic arena. On the other hand, the trade section of the strategy isolates China by aligning with policies like the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), and others that bypass China, raising concerns of further antagonization of this regional competitor.

More importantly, the funding allocations within the strategy fail to tackle some anti-FFP aspects of existing trade policies. For instance, Canada has yet to remove its support for the Inclusive Trade Action Group’s investor-state dispute settlement process that supports multinational corporations’ penalization of countries introducing legitimate measures aimed at meeting human rights obligations and sustainable development goals, including those related to gender equality. The ISDS process has been used by Canadian mining companies to override the wishes of local communities related to water and land protection, and as such may inadvertently contribute to lowering of resilience and security of communities. Notably, gender-based violence (GBV) tends to increase when Canadian-owned extractive companies move into communities. In Indonesia, hundreds of Papua New Guinea women have alleged they have been raped by security personnel at these sites. Some argue that poorly designed trade policies like the ISDS allow Canadian companies to operate internationally with impunity, resulting in negative socio-economic consequences for impacted communities.

Furthermore, historically, trade policies have encouraged the privatization of public services such as healthcare, clean water, and education services. Such programs are consistent gender equalizers, and their loss can significantly undermine women’s stability. Yet CIPS does not address concerns related to these and other problematic trade policies already in place.

Norm-setting and international normative frameworks

While the strategy does mention the aim to work within existing frameworks, especially those that prioritize regional voices, CIPS ignores some important agreements, like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which includes 15 East Asian and Pacific nations of different economic sizes and stages of development including China; or the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement that has been operating for nearly 50 years. Instead, FinDev aligns itself with the US-sponsored IPEF which notably excludes China.

Furthermore, the FFP Dialogue text contains phrases such as, “dismantling persistent gender inequalities between women, men,” and “transforming social norms, power relations and discriminatory social, political, legal, and economic systems and institutions and structures that perpetuate, intentionally or unintentionally, inequality and exclusion.” Such activist language is a defining feature of Canada’s FIAP, yet this activist approach is toned down in the strategy. In a region with some of the widest gender disparities, CIPS makes no mention of transforming norms that perpetuate gender inequalities or challenging unequal power relations and systemic discrimination. Neither does CIPS define Canada’s foreign policy approach towards Indo-Pacific nations with more traditional gender roles, wherein, initiating a commitment to WPS would itself be a challenge. CIPS demonstrates awareness regarding Indo-Pacific diversity and state commitment to the WPS agenda. However, the document does not outline the significance of Canada’s FFP approach in its strategic engagement with Indo-Pacific states that do not have a dedicated WPS policy.

Connecting people and building a sustainable green future

As noted in Part I, the strategy does make important references to expanding the FIAP and creating and expanding sustainable investment programs. However, given how closely tied development and non-traditional challenges like climate change are to women’s empowerment, and how determinative women’s stability is in state stability, the strategy misses important opportunities to demonstrate Canada’s FFP objectives. If 2022 taught us anything, it was that extreme climate events have already and will continue to have enormous and adverse and costly impacts on human wellbeing. Moreover, climate and other disasters are expected to exacerbate existing fragilities and tensions, particularly for the vulnerable, threatening to roll back hard-one progress already made for the advancement of gender equality. So, a CIPS aligned with FFP principles on development and non-traditional security threats is more crucial now than ever before.

Additionally, while the Strategy acknowledges that “China’s sheer size and influence makes cooperation necessary to…address existential pressures, such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and global health,” the strident stance on China in the rest of the Strategy makes it much more challenging to build Canada-China cooperation regarding key issues such as climate change or health security. If such language derails future talks in the short- and long-term, it will embody another significant opportunity lost for making progress on these crucial issues.

Conclusion

Looking at Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy as a whole, it is heavy on the militaristic rhetoric and confrontational toward China. While like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific have commonly recognized the threat China poses to regional security, there is less consensus on how to address Beijing’s provocations. Though China poses a geopolitical challenge to norm-setting by the United States and other Indo-Pacific players, the region should not overlook the need to engage with Beijing for gender inclusive approaches to regional security, health, climate and growth through consistent cooperation and diplomatic dialogue. Canada, as a late entrant into the region, has the potential to play a larger role in promoting cooperation. Unfortunately, CIPS doesn’t offer many solutions. The strategy lacks the specificity, activism, and funding needed to tackle some of the most intransigent problems related to gender inequality, blunting its impact on regional peace and security.

How could future iterations of the policy improve? Canada should look to the Indo-Pacific people for how to approach China. More specifically, while there are many ASEAN voices expressing views on China’s role in the region, Canada should define future foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific based on greater consultation with Indo-Pacific women’s groups—who acutely understand security from a grassroots perspective—to gain their perspectives on China and other matters. Beyond this, updates to the strategy should include reflection on whether CIPS implementation has demonstrated an effective whole-of-government integration and coordination with other federal feminist policies and initiatives. Without such self-examination and consultations, Canada’s approach to the Indo-Pacific is likely to mirror existing approaches to the Indo-Pacific with regard to women, peace and security and be no better than any other strategy on offer.

Maryruth Belsey Priebe ([email protected]) is the Director for Women, Peace & Security (WPS) Programs and a Senior Fellow at Pacific Forum International, holds a Harvard International Relations graduate degree, is a member of the Research Network on Women, Peace & Security in Canada, and a Teaching Fellow at Harvard Extension School. Maryruth researches at the intersection of gender and climate security.

Astha Chadha ([email protected]) is a Women, Peace & Security (WPS) Fellow at Pacific Forum, PhD Candidate at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Japan, and a researcher at the university’s Democracy Promotion Center. She is a Japanese Government MEXT scholar, and her research focuses on Japan-India relations, Indo-Pacific security, South Asian affairs, and impact of religion on international relations.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau at the APEC Summit by Justin Trudeau on Twitter. 

PacNet #20 – How feminist is Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy – PART ONE: The Good

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Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy (hereafter, CIPS or “the strategy”), launched in late 2022, is a strong assertion of Ottawa’s mutual strategic interests, the aspirations of a middle power, and a Pacific state’s position in the Indo-Pacific that represents over $9 trillion in economic activity. Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy was aptly summed up by the country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mélanie Joly:

“The future of the Indo-Pacific is our future; we have a role to play in shaping it. To do so, we need to be a true, reliable partner. Today, we are putting forward a truly Canadian strategy—one that involves every facet of our society. It sends a clear message to the region that Canada is here, and they can trust we are here to stay.”

Canada’s CIPS highlights the country’s commitment to making the free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific more inclusive through an emphasis on human rights, sustainable development goals (SDGs), and a feminist foreign policy (FFP)—defined as policy that rebalances power inequalities, and is informed by the everyday experiences of people who feel the consequences of such policies. While Canada has not developed an FFP, in 2017 the country launched its Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), its international assistance programming policy centered on championing gender equality. The FIAP has become the country’s de facto FFP, making Canada the second nation in the world (after Sweden) to develop such a policy. Furthermore, since the launch of the FIAP, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) has announced and begun listening sessions for establishing a formal FFP. The FIAP centers on gender equality and women’s rights, and specifies that Canadian foreign policy—including diplomacy, trade, security, development, and consular services—builds on a series of sectoral feminist policies and initiatives developed in recent years.

The new CIPS makes clear references to Canada’s FIAP as a key focus of Canada’s approach to the Indo-Pacific. But has the FIAP informed CIPS enough to give it feminist credentials? Referring to both the FIAP and dialogue documents related to development of a formal FFP, the following analysis looks at how the strategy aligns with Canada’s own feminist principles. Part I of the discussion—covered in this article—begins by looking at how well CIPS aligns with Canada’s FFP in four topic areas foundational to a middle power like Canada and its aspirations in the Indo-Pacific. These include i) regional peace, resilience, and security, ii) boosting trade with and within the region, iii) norm-setting and commitment to rule of law, and iv) promoting people-to-people connections, and sustainable future.

Promoting peace, resilience, and security

To examine the Strategy’s peace and security pillar, we look at the FIAP, which references Canada’s National Action Plan (NAP) for Women, Peace and Security (WPS), a policy that addresses more than an increase in representation of women in the military. It takes a whole-of-government approach covering not only peace and security policies, but also development assistance and humanitarian action. Furthermore, the FIAP covers participation of women and girls in peacebuilding, women’s rights in post-conflict state-building, and sexual violence in conflict, wherein it specifically ties women’s (human) security to larger security challenges. With this in mind, it is reassuring to see that CIPS calls for the increase of women peacekeepers, though this is perhaps the only way the Strategy aligns with Canada’s FFP on these topics.

Boosting trade with and within the region

On trade, the FIAP acknowledges that trade has “not always benefited everyone equally,” noting the importance of a progressive trade agenda that considers gender equality during trade negotiations, as well as strong environmental protections and labor rights. It calls out the importance of addressing sexual and gender-based violence, consultations with women’s organizations and movements, and the need to consider differential needs of women and men in Canada’s trade agenda.

So, how does CIPS stack up against these aspirational goals? It uses progressive rhetoric like emphasizing the need to support a trade system that is inclusive to create economic prosperity for everyone; enhances support for women entrepreneurs; and expands international partnerships through Canada’s Women Entrepreneurship Strategy (WES), designed to “help women grow their business through increased access to financing, talent, networks and mentorship.” It also hints at engaging in regional cooperation through a commitment to working within local economic systems by developing a Canada-ASEAN free trade agreement, a comprehensive economic partnership with Indonesia to launch a Canadian trade gateway in Southeast Asia, the Canada-India early progress trade agreement (EPTA). Prioritizing women, pluralism, and emphasizing collaboration over competition are all strategies that align well with the FFP.

Norm-setting and building a sustainable green future

An important element of Canada’s FIAP is the emphasis on “collaborating” in common causes and “learning” from partners. As such, engaging with existing regional frameworks is one way to put Canada’s FFP principles into practice. On this, the Strategy reinforces Canada’s multilateral missions to the United Nations, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and of course reinforces Canada’s commitment to its WPS NAP. The strategy also notes plans to appoint a special envoy to coordinate a whole-of-government approach, espouses ASEAN centrality, and calls for advancing Canada’s relationship with ASEAN to the level of strategic partner. By these measures, CIPS demonstrates Canada’s willingness to prioritize the voices of the region.

Looking at objectives 3 (investing in and connecting people) and 4 (Building a sustainable and green future) of the Strategy allows us to examine both development and non-traditional challenges within Canada’s middle power tool chest. Canada’s FFP Dialogue has leaned into a development agenda focused on achieving the SDGs by 2030, in part through the full and equal participation of women, and a focus on resilience through environmental protection and climate change mitigation. The FIAP also notes the importance of education and business development opportunities for women, and the need to address the disproportionate burden of unpaid care and domestic work of women.

How does the strategy address these issues? First, and most promisingly, it references expansion of the FIAP, focuses on entrepreneurship through the WES, and connects to many other women-focused partner programs. The strategy also offers a host of green and sustainable investment programs, like FinDev sustainable infrastructure investments; the Dark Vessel Detection program (designed to halt IUU fishing); DRR expertise sharing; Expand Canada Climate Finance Commitment; Powering Past Coal & cleantech demonstrations; and Advancing Canada’s Global Carbon Pricing Challenge, among others.

Conclusion

Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy has many progressive elements, wherein it references Ottawa’s Feminist International Assistance Policy and other feminist principles in important aspects of Indo-Pacific growth, trade, connectivity, prosperity and inclusiveness. There is explicit recognition of the centrality of the Women, Peace and Security agenda which reflects a gender-sensitive awareness of Ottawa’s strategy towards the Indo-Pacific. These alone make Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy normatively progressive compared to other Indo-Pacific strategies. However, as Part II will suggest, the Strategy diverges from Canada’s previously stated feminist principles in some crucial ways.

Maryruth Belsey Priebe ([email protected]) is the Director for Women, Peace & Security (WPS) Programs and a Senior Fellow at Pacific Forum International, holds a Harvard International Relations graduate degree, is a member of the Research Network on Women, Peace & Security in Canada, and a Teaching Fellow at Harvard Extension School. Maryruth researches at the intersection of gender and climate security.

Astha Chadha ([email protected]) is a Women, Peace & Security (WPS) Fellow at Pacific Forum, PhD Candidate at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Japan, and a researcher at the university’s Democracy Promotion Center. She is a Japanese Government MEXT scholar, and her research focuses on Japan-India relations, Indo-Pacific security, South Asian affairs, and impact of religion on international relations.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly responds to questions at a news conference by Mélanie Joly on Facebook.

PacNet #14 – South Korea’s Indo-Pacific pivot strategy

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2022 ended with South Korea adopting specific Indo-Pacific terminology with the Dec. 28 release of its Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region (SFPPIP). The key takeaway: The SFPPIP, and President Yoon Suk Yeol, signal an end to South Korea’s “strategic ambiguity” under the previous president, Moon Jae-in. Seoul pivoting away from Beijing and toward Washington—delicately, but clearly.

This “Free, Peaceful Prosperous Indo-Pacific” formulation from South Korea converges with the US and Japanese “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) formulation(s) enunciated since 2016-17. The key shared element is the SFPPIP assertion that “in realizing the vision for a free Indo-Pacific, the Republic of Korea is committed to partnering with like-minded countries that share the values of freedom, rule of law, and human rights as well as international norms.” This indicates a normative base for foreign policy.

Much of the SFPPIP was uncontroversial, such as cooperation across the Indo-Pacific on economic, environmental, counterterrorism, and international crime issues. The SFPPIP identified ASEAN as a “key partner” for peace and prosperity and noted wider formats for economic cooperation like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

However, the SFPIPPR also displayed sharpness of purpose on the security front. First, it announced that it would “pursue partnerships with minilateral groupings”; specifically, the South Korea-Japan-US trilateral, a future Australia-South Korea-US trilateral, and the AP4 (Australia-Japan-New Zealand-South Korea) NATO Partners format. Second, the SFPPIP singled out continued participation in (the US-led) RIMPAC, and Pacific Dragon (Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, United States) naval exercises. On the minilateral front, the SFPPIP announced South Korea would “gradually expand” cooperation with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

In 2022 Chinese state media had attacked South Korea over such participation—warning in April with regard to the Quad; in July with regard to the AP4 format at NATO and trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo; and in August regarding the Pacific Dragon exercises in the Western Pacific.

On the bilateral front the SFPPIP was careful but revealing. It stated that:

our inclusive Indo-Pacific Strategy neither targets nor excludes any specific nation. We will work with every partner that is aligned with our vision and principles of cooperation.

This is conditional inclusivity; China falls short in specific normative values enunciated in the SFPPIP vision and principles. Mounting distrust of China in South Korea cuts across the SFPPIP linkage that “our partnerships will be based on strong mutual trust.”

In bilateral relations, the SFPPIP focus was to “continue to strengthen our alliance with the United States.” It identifies Canada as “a comprehensive strategic partner with common values,” and Australia as “a comprehensive strategic partner” with whom South Korea further “deepen[s] our ties by identifying new cooperation agenda in the areas of national defense.” It made a similar pledge to “advance our special strategic partnership with India, a leading regional partner with shared values.” Concerning Japan, despite previous frictions, it aspires to “seek a forward-looking partnership that supports our common interests and values.” Security convergence with those countries is predicated by their shared values; namely democracy, the rule of international law, and norms embedded in the “free” component within the SFPPIP formulation.

In the wake of a strained Yoon-Xi Summit in November, the SFPPIP’s China section was one sentence. It proposed that with China,

a key partner for achieving prosperity and peace in the Indo-Pacific region, we will nurture a sounder and more mature relationship as we pursue shared interests based on mutual respect and reciprocity, guided by international norms and rules.

This language was limited and revealing. To hope for a sounder and more mature relationship in the future implies the current relationship is rather unsound. “A partner for peace” was strained given that the SFPPIP’s “peace” section pinpointed the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait as (China-related) flash points threatening peace, with freedom of navigation specifically called for. Talk of guidance via international norms and rules raises the question of a China not guided by universal norms and rules. “A partner in prosperity” pointed to potential economic cooperation; for which the SFPPIP advocated resuming the China-Japan-South Korea Summit, which last met in 2019, and reinforcing the CJSK Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, to focus on green and digital transitions. This reflects the weakness and marginality of the CJSK mechanism.

Some China-related barbs are discernible in the SFPPIP. On the one hand, the SFPPIP contained no reference to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which South Korea has distanced itself from. On the other hand, the SFPPIP announced South Korean participation in the launching of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in 2022 as “building economic security networks…in support of open and free trade,” an initiative denounced in China. The SFPPIP outlined that “to stabilize supply chains of strategic resources, we will seek cooperation with partners with whom we share values.” This values-driven rationale pointed to the Indo-Pacific supply chain initiatives developed by the Quad countries and, again, denounced by China. Trilateral cyber-security cooperation with the United States and Australia was another China-related issue arising in the SFPPIP.

Very different responses ensued from Washington and Beijing to the SFPPIP. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan immediately welcomed the whole SFPPIP and its focus on shared “universal values” underpinning cooperation. In contrast, China’s foreign ministry merely “noted” the SFPPIP while warning about Korea being involved in “exclusive coteries,” leaving its state media to criticize the SFPPIP as South Korea “pivoting towards the US.”

The biggest areas of ambiguity in the SFPPIP rest with South Korea’s reiteration of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. South Korea could, like Washington, consider raising those two issues at regional platforms like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit.

Regarding the South China Sea, Seoul is unlikely to carry out freedom of navigation exercises, though it could consider giving verbal public support to such US operations. Seoul’s increasing deployments and exercises in the West Pacific with the United States and like-minded states like Japan, Australia, and Canada could also be extended into the South China Sea. Seoul calling for observance (i.e., by China) of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on the South China Sea could advance the SFPPIP call for the rule of law in the South China Sea. Side-stepping the still-uncomfortable US-China confrontation, Seoul could quietly strengthen the maritime capabilities of South China Sea littoral states like Vietnam and the Philippines most under threat from China.

Regarding the Taiwan Strait, it is again unlikely for Seoul to deploy its naval units on transit operations there, though South Korea could consider giving public verbal support to such US transit operations. South Korea could strengthen some links with Taiwan, though. Military-to-military links are probably too much to expect, given the furor from China. However, they could maintain political-economic links, including supporting Taiwan’s application for membership of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Seoul’s responses to Chinese actions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait during 2023 will show up the exact nature of South Korea’s delicate tilt signaled in its new Indo-Pacific strategy

David Scott ([email protected]) is member of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) and is a prolific writer on Indo-Pacific geopolitics (www.d-scott.com/publications).

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol introduces his officials to U.S. President Joe Biden before their meeting at the presidential office on May 21, 2022 in Seoul, South Korea. (28 June 2022, The Heritage Foundation) by Jung Yeon-Je-Pool/ Getty Images

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP1 – Why Gender Balance Matters for Equity and Peace in the Indo-Pacific

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Abstract

Who shows up at events and conferences matters. Public and closed-door events are where successes and failures are analyzed; where conceptions about security, what it means, and how we can achieve it bump up against one another; and where problems are solved in novel ways. The greater the diversity of perspectives, the more powerful the outcomes. But within the security sector, predominantly all-male panels—or “manels”—suggest a lack of gender diversity, resulting in the exclusion of women, people of non-binary identities, or both. Manels represent a more serious lack of gender inclusion at leadership levels, making it difficult for women to gain recognition through promotion to senior decision-making positions. The following is a discussion of Pacific Forum’s work to study more than nine years of programming with a goal of understanding historical trends in order to implement and measure policies to increase the number of women attending and speaking at Pacific Forum events. The analysis identified room for improvement, and marks a jumping-off point for Pacific Forum’s work on mainstreaming gender within institutional programming.

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About the Author

Maryruth Belsey Priebe is the Director for Women, Peace & Security (WPS) Programs and a Senior Fellow at Pacific Forum International, is the author of numerous articles on gender and sustainability, and holds a Harvard International Relations graduate degree (2023) for which her thesis, “Gender All the Way Down: Proposing a Feminist Framework for Analyzing Gendered Climate Security Risks” was nominated for the Deans Price for Outstanding ALM Thesis. Using social science, feminist foreign policy perspectives/analyses/theories, and data analysis, her research focuses on the nexus of gender, climate change, and peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. Maryruth’s circular food economy policy work has been selected for inclusion in the OpenIDEO Food Systems Game Changers Lab, and she has held several research and fellowship positions focused on women’s leadership. She is also a Teaching Fellow at Harvard Extension School, a member of the Research Network on Women, Peace & Security in Canada, and is a volunteer for multiple gender-climate causes. Maryruth tweets @greenwriting.