PacNet #45 – The prescience of Abe’s vision for Taiwan

Pursuit of a rules-based order for the Indo-Pacific had been one of Abe Shinzo’s foreign policy hallmarks. In hindsight, it now appears prescient in addressing the shift in the region’s power dynamics.

During the two years since he stepped down as prime minister, Abe had focused increasingly on Taiwan as a geopolitical flashpoint warranting greater Japan-US coordination. The attention Abe paid to Taiwan undoubtedly looks farsighted now, and has established his legacy as a premier that identified many of the systemic challenges facing not just Japan, but the region at large.

When Abe outlined his vision for the Indo-Pacific during his first term (2006-07) in office, few would have expected that his 2007 speech before the Indian parliament about the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans would become the foundation for multilateral cooperation in Asia. Over the past 15 years, however, the concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” has not only been adopted by Abe’s successors, but also been embraced by the United States and other nations. Not only was the concept of FOIP adopted by the Trump administration, but the concept has become the foundation for new mechanisms for regional cooperation including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) and AUKUS.

Taiwan had been an integral part of the Abe government’s Indo-Pacific strategy, as the prime minister noted the strategic importance of the island publicly on numerous occasions. Under Abe in 2019 Japan signed onto the US-Taiwan Global Cooperation and Training Framework, which had been established in 2015 to promote Taiwan’s strengths in international cooperation and governance. It was, however, after leaving office in 2020 that Abe stepped up his support for Taiwan, connecting the need to defend Taiwan’s democracy and economy as part of a broader strategy to counterbalance increased threats from China.

China’s increasing militarization and willingness to leverage economic dominance to take punitive actions against governments it opposed had been in effect well before Abe’s resignation. Yet Beijing’s weaponization of its economic presence and aggression on perceived core interests, including Taiwan, only intensified from the outbreak of the global pandemic.

In an exclusive interview with the Wilson Center in March 2022, Abe cautioned that the possibility of China invading Taiwan could not be dismissed.

“China has taken a position that Taiwan is a part of China…at the same time, we are in a situation where Taiwan is not recognized as a nation by most of the countries in the international community. Of course, it is not even a member state of the United Nations,” Abe said, adding that while Beijing has not yet made clear whether it would act to assert its claim over Taiwan, “the fact that they have not done so does not mean that they have decided that they won’t.”

Certainly, Abe’s wariness about Beijing’s moves to intimidate Taiwan was shared by his successors Suga Yoshihide and Kishida Fumio. It was Suga who in April 2021 signed onto the joint statement with the United States which declared the “importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” the first time since 1969 that Taiwan was mentioned in a bilateral statement. Since then, the G7, NATO, and other groups have followed in highlighting the vulnerability of Taiwan and the need for the international community to come to its defense as part of a broader strategy to push back against Chinese aggressions.

Japan’s reassessment of its policy toward Taiwan since Abe left office has been striking. Having skirted issues related to Taiwan in light of Japan’s own defense strategy—which concentrates on self-defense mechanisms—Tokyo has emerged as a leading champion of greater support for the Taiwanese government amid Beijing’s growing pressure. The support is not merely altruistic, but reflects growing alarm about the spillover effect for Japan. It has led to a review of Japanese policy toward Taiwan in its June 2021 defense white paper, recognizing not only the strategic importance of Taiwan, but also the growing concerted efforts by China to destabilize Taipei.

No longer shying away from expressing support for Taiwan, Tokyo has ramped up efforts to support it more comprehensively, including economically and politically. As the prime minister who signed Japan on to the preceding TPP trade agreement, Abe’s commitment to ensure that Taipei be part of the CPTPP multilateral trade framework has been particularly noteworthy. In a virtual meeting with Tsai Ing-wen in March 2022, Abe told the Taiwanese president that it was in the interest of the international community for Taiwan to join the CPTPP as soon as possible. In addition, Tokyo was at the forefront of providing Taiwan with vaccines in summer 2021, and Japanese consumers quickly mobilized and expressed support for Taiwan by snapping up Taiwanese pineapples boycotted by China.

Abe played no small part in directing the convergence of political and public support for Taiwan, repeatedly arguing that Beijing not only threatened Taiwan and the international order, but directly threatened Japan’s own security and stability as well. In the weeks since his assassination, however, global attention on Taiwan has only increased with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s early August visit. As China stepped up military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in direct response to the House speaker’s tour of Taipei, the immediate concern is whether or not such military actions will continue in the longer term, and the possibility of such conduct leading to direct conflict.

In the longer term, though, Pelosi’s visit is expected to lead to a reassessment of US policy towards Taiwan. While both Washington and Tokyo remain in agreement about the need to continue supporting Taipei and stave off acts of aggression by China, those objectives can be reached more effectively through greater coordination of action by Japan and the United States. Defending Taiwan militarily, economically, and politically will be one of the biggest challenges for the US-Japan alliance, and no doubt would have been the focal point of Abe’s foreign policy agenda ex-officio.

Shihoko Goto ( is Director for Geoeconomics and Indo-Pacific Enterprise and Deputy Director of the Asia Program at the Wilson Center based in Washington DC.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

PacNet #22 – Feminist foreign policy and Ukraine: For now, Japan leads the way

A gendered war is taking place in Ukraine, powered by patriarchal authoritarianism that thrives on unencumbered violence. Some women bravely serve in Ukraine’s military, the media, and in support roles on the front lines. Yet stereotypical gendered norms have been reinforced as most refugees are women, while Ukrainian men must stay and fight. Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) principles seem ignored by the security sector, as women are absent in peace talks, and reports of sexual- and gender-based violence abound. By applying a feminist foreign policy (FFP) lens—focused on a re-imagination of conflict resolution and human security—we consider how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has influenced Indo-Pacific foreign policies, particularly aid, defense, diplomacy, trade, and immigration. We find that Japan stands out as demonstrating alignment with some FFP principles, and may be ripe for formal FFP adoption. Given other Asian states’ mixed responses, however, the invasion of Ukraine may split the Indo-Pacific on this framework.

Aid, sanctions, and immigration

First, FFP principles recommend consideration of women, children, and minority communities in aid provision, with emphasis on humanitarian aid over military/defensive responses. Tokyo has provided ¥12 billion ($95 million) in emergency humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and promised more. This aid demonstrates consideration of women by including hygiene products alongside tents, winter clothing, and generators.

Japan is an above average official development assistance (ODA) contributor to gender equality as a member nation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee. To build on this achievement, Japan could stipulate requirements similar to its Jordanian Palestinian Refugees ODA program for its aid to countries accepting Ukrainian refugees. This program included Alleviation of Social Gaps, which prioritized the empowerment of women refugees through vocational training and access to reproductive health education.

A second plank of FFP is prioritization and allocation of resources to peace over state security, including “gender equality [and] … the human rights of all.” As such, arms trade with non-democratic countries that abuse human rights and subjugate women, and Indo-Pacific military build-up would signal anti-feminist responses. Japan has generally set a positive example by supporting Ukraine without inflaming conflict. Its commitment to restricting military equipment exports has led to its supply of bulletproof vests and non-lethal equipment, but no weapons (though it recently announced the shipment of drones). Tokyo, while a recipient of US extended nuclear deterrence, has also warned against any use of nuclear weapons, acknowledging the painful history of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Third, emphasizing consultation with and equality of all impacted groups, an FFP perspective opposes neo-colonialism, the forceful control or influence of other states. Meanwhile, sanctions are not the preferred option because they typically hurt those already most vulnerable. Sanctions, however, are less militaristic than lethal support, and therefore more acceptable in FFP terms. Eight years ago, when Russia annexed Crimea, Japan failed to sanction Moscow in a bid to maintain diplomatic talks over islands both Russia and Japan claim as their own. By contrast, Japan has moved more decisively in 2022, following US and EU sanctions early on. To date, Japan has restricted Russian banks, and sanctioned oligarchs, companies, and military entities. While Japan still relies on Russian fuel, seafood, and various goods, it has revoked Russia’s most-favored nation trade status, impacting  ¥1.54 trillion ($12 billion) in imports.

Fourth, a country’s FFP would also need to include a generous immigration policy, in this case focusing on the 4.2 million Ukrainian refugees rather than state security. Japan has considered amending its limited immigration policy and opened its doors to friends and family members of its Ukrainian population. The new policy would allow them to stay longer or work.

It won’t be an easy fix—Japan’s past hesitancy towards refugees will require complete immigration policy transformation to align with FFP principles. In 2020, Japan approved 47 out of 3,936 asylum applications (1.19% of the total). Though an improvement from 2019’s 0.42% acceptance rate, other countries are accepting more Ukrainians in response to the crisis. Still, Tokyo seems determined to lessen restrictions. To demonstrate national support for the consideration of individual refugees, Japanese Foreign Minister Hiyashi Yoshimasa returned to home from Poland personally escorting 20 Ukrainian refugees.

A divided Indo-Pacific?

The provision of military aid is essential for FFP precedent. While Japan is all-but-mandated to follow FFP-aligned guidelines due to Article 9 restrictions, other countries with fewer hurdles can more easily adapt their aid distribution.

What precedent, then, does Japan’s restriction of military aid to Ukraine set for its future responses to a conflict in Asia? Furthermore, in case of a contingency—such as China invading Taiwan—how might the reactions of Indo-Pacific countries to the Ukraine crisis predict alignment with feminist values? There has been debate about whether comparing Taiwan to the invasion of Ukraine makes sense, but in either case we are likely to see both adhesion to and straying from FFP principles.

The Indo-Pacific is split on Ukraine. The only other Indo-Pacific nation to demonstrate a feminist-aligned response to Ukraine is New Zealand, which sanctioned Russia and sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine instead of weapons. Australiadid all that and sent military aid. South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have been moderately aligned in their responses, with offers to support other countries’ refugee intakes financially and cut trade ties with Russia and implement sanctions, but refusing to accept Ukrainian refugees.

Most states, however, have been quiet on Russian sanctions and avoided direct criticism. Vietnam has vaguely condemned Russia, but abstained from voting on the March 2 UN Security Council resolution deploring the invasion. India has worked around Western sanctions, while China has criticized sanctions amid misogynistic remarks about Ukrainian women. Smaller countries like the Federated States of Micronesia have cut diplomatic relations with Russia without imposing sanctions. The Philippines offered military bases to the United States if the war spreads to Asia, but moved ahead with the purchase of Russian defense equipment. Similarly, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Malaysia have chosen to protect Russian arms trade over supporting Ukraine. Given anti-colonialist affinities between Indo-Pacific nations and Ukraine, failing to offer stronger, clearer alignment with the West’s rules-based order and with feminist principles may be a lost opportunity for smaller Indo-Pacific states.

It is unclear if Japan’s response is what Ukrainian feminists want. Japan, however, has taken what might be considered feminist approaches to foreign policy, offering humanitarian aid, resisting calls to provide military support, sanctioning Russia, and even increasing its intake of refugees. In so doing, Japan has modeled a foreign policy that other nations should emulate, especially smaller states, which could face similar threats in the future. Feminist foreign policy advocates hope that it continues to do so, while also addressing domestic gender equality challenges faced by Japanese women and its LGBTQ community. Any attempt at formal adoption of a Japanese FFP should include self-reflection on where Japan stands internationally on domestic gender policies, especially if Tokyo wants to set an example for other Indo-Pacific countries.

Hannah Cole ( is Program & Publications Manager and Non-resident James A. Kelly Korea Fellow at Pacific Forum. Maryruth Belsey-Priebe ( is a Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Fellow at Pacific Forum and Harvard International Relations graduate student. Tevvi Bullock ( is a WPS Fellow at Pacific Forum and PhD candidate in Gender, Climate & Humanitarian Action at Monash University.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

PacNet #15 – Women, Peace and Security under a Biden-Harris Administration (Part Two: Prevention and Protection)

The following is the second in the three-part series on what the Biden-Harris administration means for the Women, Peace and Security agenda. For part one, click here. For part three, click here.

In their “Agenda for Women,” US President Biden and Vice President Harris promise to improve women’s financial security, protect their reproductive rights, and address gender-based violence (GBV)—all important elements of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda, as codified in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325). UNSCR 1325 rests on four pillars: Participation, Prevention, Protection, and Relief and Recovery. Having explored the Participation pillar in PacNet #13, in this article, we examine Prevention and Protection. The Prevention pillar addresses the root causes of conflict and how to prevent it holistically with an emphasis on women as peacebuilders, while the Protection pillar focuses on shielding women from the harms inflicted during conflict, including sexual violence. The following analysis covers the potential impact that the Biden-Harris approach to foreign relations may have on the implementation of these core WPS objectives throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Biden-Harris on the WPS Protection and Prevention Pillars

The domestic legislative histories of President Biden and Vice President Harris reveal a sensitivity and understanding of WPS issues and help to sketch out what kind of example they will set in the Indo-Pacific on women’s protection and prevention issues. In particular, the president has taken steps to advance the implementation of policies that align with the WPS Protection and Prevention pillars. In the early 1990s, he was disturbed by the fact that marital rape was virtually impossible to prosecute in most states, despite some 15% of American women experiencing marital rape annually. Consequently, he introduced a Senate Violence Against Women bill in 1990, supported by women’s rights groups and his Republican colleagues. Though it took several years, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was signed into law by President Clinton in September 1994, and has been characterized by Biden as his “proudest legislative accomplishment.” According to the US Department of Justice, the VAWA has been responsible for a 72% drop in intimate partner violence (IPV) rates from 1993 to 2011, and has been renewed and expanded several times since its enactment.

During Vice President Harris’ time as attorney general for California, she pursued “tough on crime” policies, some of which disproportionately affected low-income women. Commentators argue that as a black female prosecutor facing intersectional racial and gender prejudices, she had to prove her commitment to tackling crime. After obtaining greater national power in her role as Senator, Harris championed criminal justice reform and fought for women’s issues within and outside the justice system. In 2019, Harris co-sponsored the EMPOWER Act to protect workers on Capitol Hill from harassment. Harris also frequently positions violence against women as an economic issue, supporting the view  that  women’s economic empowerment is critical to preventing women from becoming  trapped in abusive relationships.

The VAWA expired in February 2019. Though the House of Representatives passed a 2019 VAWA Reauthorization Act supported by all Senate Democrats, Senate Leader Mitch McConnell refused to bring the bill to a vote. Going forward, Biden and Harris have made VAWA reauthorization one of the top first-100-day priorities, and will expand it with clauses that provide greater justice and support for survivors of gender-based violence. Clauses added to the Act will aim to provide greater protection for young people experiencing sexual violence; curtail online harassment, abuse, and stalking; and put an end to the rape kit backlog.

WPS Protection and Prevention Pillars in the Indo-Pacific

On matters related to the WPS Protection and Prevention pillars in the Indo-Pacific, there are numerous opportunities for the Biden-Harris administration to push for greater implementation. Rates of violence against women vary widely among Indo-Pacific countries, but continue to be high in all: 37% of women encounter some form of violence in their lifetimes in South Asia, 40% in Southeast Asia, and 68% in the Pacific. While the percentage of women who have experienced some kind of physical or sexual violence in their lifetimes is lowest in Bhutan at 15%, 46% of women living in Timor-Leste experience gender-based violence (GBV), with the highest rates (68%) in Kiribati and Papua New Guinea. Asia also reported 20,000 intentional deaths of women and girls in 2017, more than any other region of the world. Importantly, data on violence against women is extremely difficult to collect, and most experts suggest the actual numbers are higher, especially in regions where GBV is culturally acceptable. Data collection challenges and the spike in GBV as a result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic make the implementation of the Protection and Prevention pillars all the more urgent.

Women’s inclusion as peacebuilders in formal conflict negotiations is also an important element of the WPS Prevention pillar. As mentioned in our previous installment, studies have shown that women’s involvement in formal peace processes increases by 35% the probability that a peace agreement will last over 15 years. However, global figures reveal that women represented only 13% of negotiators, 6% of mediators, and 6% of signatories in major peace processes between 1992 and 2019. Women’s contributions as peacebuilders in the Indo-Pacific continue to be outside formal efforts to achieve peace. Notable grassroots women’s movements in Myanmar, the Pacific Island countries and territories, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste have amplified women’s voices in conflict mitigation.

The Next Four Years for WPS in the Indo-Pacific

“End violence against women” and “Protect and empower women around the world” are the last of five planks of the Biden-Harris Agenda for Women (the first three planks covered women’s economic security, health care access and inequities, and work-family responsibilities), and includes support for confronting GBV and pursuing ratification of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). (The only other countries to have failed to ratify CEDAW are Iran, Somalia, and Sudan.) These are important steps, yet aside from the indicators previously mentioned, and statements on supporting women’s leadership globally, it is highly recommended that the Biden-Harris administration go further to empower women as peacebuilders, a key approach to achieving and sustaining peace agreements. To effectively address this aspect of the WPS agenda, this new administration could outline specifics of their approach for the Prevention pillar and emphasize the need to keep women engaged in high-level talks and negotiations. The new administration could also encourage countries in the Indo-Pacific to take up the principles in the Protection pillar to shield women from the worst impacts of conflict. Read our full policy recommendations in our in-depth Issues & Insights article, in which we delve more deeply into the purpose of the Prevention and Protection pillars, the state of Indo-Pacific women’s rights, and how the Biden-Harris administration, US Indo-Pacific Command, and the State Department can act to continue their development in the Indo-Pacific. In the last part of this series, we will dive deeper into the Relief and Recovery pillar and the implications of Biden-Harris’ foreign policy on the status of women as the world moves into a period of pandemic recovery.

Maryruth Belsey Priebe ( is a WPS Research Advisor at the Pacific Forum. She is also a Harvard Extension School MA in International Relations student specializing in the nexus of WPS and climate security and has a manuscript under review entitled, “The News Media: A Catalyst for Women, Peace and Security in Qatar.”

Jennifer Howe ( is a resident Women, Peace and Security fellow at the Pacific Forum. She graduated from Durham University, UK with an MA in Politics and international Relations. Her publications include “Conflict and Coronavirus: How COVID-19 is Impacting Southeast Asia’s Conflicts,” in Issues & Insights and “The Impact of COVID-19 on Women in Hawaii and the Asia-Pacific” in COVID-19 Research & Perspectives.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.