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PacNet #55 – Understanding Japan’s defense debate

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Japan is engaged in an intensifying national debate about defense policy. The government is drafting for release later this year three key documents—the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Program Guidelines, and the Mid-Term Defense Program—obliging politicians and the public to ponder the military budget and policies, such as offensive strike capabilities, that portend profound shifts in Japan’s approach to defense. This discussion covers lots of ground and many of the issues demand a deep dive to understanding their complexity. Let me offer some guides to help navigate this moment in Japanese policy and strategy.

First, former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo shifted the framework within which this debate is taking place. Abe—with the help of the People’s Republic of China—moved the center of gravity of defense and security policy to the right such that there is a new governing paradigm in Tokyo. The Yoshida doctrine, which subordinated “hard” security concerns to economic development and guided Japanese thinking for over half a century, is over. Abe’s harder line, triggered by greater distrust of China and the desire for a higher-profile for Tokyo in regional security, now prevails. However, as will be discussed below, that does not mean that his ambitions have been realized; there remain considerable headwinds.

Second, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine pushed many doubters toward a more realist approach to security policy. Moscow has reminded skeptics, and especially the Japanese public, that borders are not sacrosanct, that forcible revision of the territorial status quo is a reality and that old-fashioned kinetic, destructive war between states remains a very real option in the 21^st century. In an Asahi Shinbum poll taken shortly after the war began, 80% of respondents said that there were more anxious than before about a possible war between Japan and a neighboring country. The military threat emanating from China, felt by a rising number of Japanese—68.9% of Japanese according to the 2021 Genron NPO survey—makes that prospect palpable.

Third, recognition of that threat has not transformed public thinking about national defense. There remains little appetite for power projection. Emphasis remains on defense of the homeland and physical protection of national interests narrowly defined. The power of longstanding views is evident in various polls. Only about one-third (34.1%) of respondents favor increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP, despite the menace just noted. The Cabinet Office’s annual survey of views of diplomacy shows little desire for changes in Japanese policy to embrace more security activism; for virtually all questions on this topic, the majority prefers to maintain engagement at existing levels. Japanese remain split when asked about support for acquiring strike capabilities—according to a Yomiuri Shimbun poll, 46% favor and 46% oppose. Komei’s continuing opposition to ending the “exclusively defense oriented policy” is another headwind.

Fourth, there is widespread belief that the China challenge—given its size, appetite for expansion, and the military modernization program that enables that expansion—cannot be met by Japan alone. Tokyo must find and work with partners to deter and if necessary defend against Chinese aggression and predation. To win the trust of those allies and partners, Japan must quiet doubts about the inclination to “free” or “cheap-ride.” Japan must show that it is willing to defend itself if it expects others to aid in that defense.

Fifth, Japan continues to believe in multilateral, multidimensional security mechanisms. There may have been questions a few years ago about Japanese self-help efforts and the meaning of its “hedge”—some anticipated greater independence as Tokyo expanded and improved defense capabilities—but today there should be no doubt that working with allies and partners is the pre-eminent objective.

Defense policy makers must also emphasize the “multidimensional” aspect. Japan has long championed comprehensive security and economic considerations, both at home and abroad, have invariably assumed great weight in that policy. Those inclinations have not diminished even as hard security concerns grow larger. The need to coordinate among disparate partners, with different views of the region, the threats and the best ways to address them, has also encouraged that expansive approach to security and the creation of a spectrum of working groups to address issues like climate, technology, and public health in those cooperative efforts.

Sixth, while Tokyo is strengthening ties with a wider range of countries, the United States remains its partner of choice. A memo released by the National Security Secretariat summarizing meetings with experts reportedly concludes that “Japan’s best choice will be to hug tight to Washington.” Priority will continue to be put on projects and programs with its ally and managing that relationship will remain one of the prime minister’s priorities. Across the government, coordination with Washington guides decision making. Creation of the Economic “2+2” forum is an expression of that imperative.

At the same time, however, Japanese well understand US politics: Tokyo knows well the countervailing currents in Washington and recognizes that the Biden administration views of allies and engagement generally are not universal. It is often said that even if Donald Trump doesn’t return to the White House, Trumpism might. This drives Japan to dispel the image of the free rider (see four above) and to thicken the weave of relations with partners, as a “hedge” and to make it harder for the US to contemplate withdrawal.

Seventh, be skeptical of numbers as Japan debates defense budgets. Tokyo is well aware of the talismanic nature of the call to spend 2% of GDP on defense. Standing next to President Biden during his visit to Tokyo last May, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio said that his Cabinet would “substantially” increase defense spending within the next five years to a level equivalent to that NATO target. Defense spending has been inching up in recent years and the 1% limit that is often cited is a guideline, not a barrier, and is regularly breached.

In recent days, there have been reports that the Japanese government is embracing a more expansive model of defense budgeting. The Nikkei, for example, noted that the Kishida administration is considering “a broader budget framework that includes funding for scientific research as well as space and cyber programs to respond to evolving security challenges.” This new approach would also add Coast Guard spending (currently in the budget for the Land and Transport Ministry), costs of infrastructure development for military facilities, pensions for former SDF members, and peacekeeping operations (now in the Foreign Ministry budget). According to one estimate, inclusion of those expenditures in the FY2021 defense budget would have bumped the total to 6.9 trillion yen ($40.9 billion), or 1.24% of GDP.

Eighth, keep an eye on how monies are spent. Several years ago, a failure to actually spend the money negated defense budget increases. Much of the debate in Japan has focused on big-ticket items that scratch the great-power itch: next-generation fighters or Aegis Ashore systems, to name but two. More attention should be given to mundane, but essential items such as ammunition, hardening of facilities, logistics and the like. Given Japan’s demographic woes, unmanned vehicles for air and sea should be a priority; they aren’t sexy but they maximize bang for buck. Noah Sneider of The Economist argues that planners are beginning to make this shift.

Finally, the debate over constitutional revision is a red herring. There is little indication that the constitution has effectively prevented Japan from acquiring or expanding defense capabilities. At key moments, Japanese courts have shown considerable deference to the government on issues of national security; it is difficult to see the Supreme Court blocking the government from adopting a policy that it has deemed vital to the nation’s security. (That is no uniquely Japanese phenomenon: Most courts defer to the executive on such matters.)

Hanging over all this is Prime Minister Kishida’s readiness to spend political capital on the defense budget debate. With his Cabinet’s popularity tumbling, that is more important than ever. Much will likely depend on what China does and how that impacts public sentiment.

Brad Glosserman ([email protected]) is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University as well as senior adviser (nonresident) at Pacific Forum. He is the author of “Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions” (Georgetown University Press, 2019).

For more from this author, visit his recent chapter of Comparative Connections.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

PacNet #52 – The first year of Japan’s Digital Agency: In pursuit of coherence and identity

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On Sept. 1, 2022, Japan’s new Digital Agency marked its first anniversary. During his tenure, which only lasted about a year, Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide planned and launched the agency along with a totally new legal framework for Japan’s digital transformation. The motto behind the newly established agency has been “Government as a Start-Up.” The core idea was to utilize the dynamism of young IT start-up companies to push digital transformation that had not developed much from Japan’s first digital strategy (the e-Japan Strategy) in 2001.

The establishment of the Digital Agency represents Suga’s institutionalized commitment to fighting Japan’s digital backwardness, revealed in the government’s IT responses to COVID-19, including the slow contact-tracing operation and difficulties in applying for Japan’s coronavirus financial aid program. The Agency sets out to resolve swiftly the “digital defeat” experienced during the pandemic, which should be overcome with speed, innovation, and public-private cooperation. Though its primary role can be found in domestic issues, it is also highly relevant to Japan’s security, defense, and foreign relations. For instance, the setting of digital standards for the national and local governments by the agency is essential to preventing cyberattacks. At the same time, the advanced data collection and processing it promotes provide the government with an important basis for informed decisions in its foreign policy, which could include designing or negotiating trade agreements, among other things. In short, advancing digitalization is necessary at all political levels and across all dimensions.

From a legislative and institutional perspective, the Digital Agency started strong. Overcoming highly fragmented decision-making was central, as it was one of the main obstacles in promoting digitalization in the past. To promote competency regarding IT policies, the agency has been placed under the direct control of the prime minister, who serves as its official head, and above all existing ministries—a very unusual step in Japanese governance. To strengthen its position, the agency was also equipped with authority over all IT-related spending at the central government level.

Despite the strong institutional basis of the Digital Agency, concerns arose just three days after its establishment as Prime Minister Suga announced his resignation. Without many allies, the strength of the agency depends on the active backing of the prime minister. Suga’s successor, Kishida Fumio, has been criticized for paying insufficient attention to the Digital Agency and the digitalization agenda. However, with the government reshuffle in August 2022, Kishida addressed this criticism directly, linking digital transformation with his main policy agenda and appointing Kono Taro as minister of digital affairs. Apart from being a heavyweight within the Liberal Democratic Party, Kono also accumulated vast experience in the field of digitalization, playing a pivotal role in the establishment of the Digital Agency. Kono’s appointment, Kishida said, was due to his “ability to get things done and move things forward.”

However, numerous other issues continue to undermine the new agency’s activities. The position of the Digital Agency within the government structure is clear, yet its internal structure is unwieldy. One issue is that many elements from other organizations dealing with digitalization, such as numerous officer positions and advisory bodies, were adopted at the expense of a clear chain of command. Further tensions arose when individuals from the private sector received high positions outside the traditional bureaucratic structure without much experience in bureaucratic work procedures. The first chief digital officer, Ishikura Yoko, also did not exert strong leadership due to health reasons and left the agency after only seven months.

This lack of strong leadership and therefore clear prioritization of tasks has been problematic for the agency, as it faces exaggerated expectations from the government and the public. The agency has not only been tasked with acting as a control tower for the digitalization process within the whole government but also with solving practical issues including dissemination of the Japanese digital citizen ID, standardization of local government IT systems, and creation of a common registry for basic data like addresses, companies, and property. This overstrains its capacity and impairs its efficiency.

Of course, the ability to address digitalization-related problems not only relates to a lack of leadership but also to limited and heterogeneous staff. The agency has only 700 employed staff members, about two-thirds of which are seconded from one of the numerous Japanese ministries, and the rest from the private sector. As a public institution, it could not initially hire its own permanent staff due to the legal prerequisite to pass the centralized civil servant exams. Having only temporary staff shared with the ministries or the private sector has been a problem, as they mostly remained loyal to their parent organization, to which they would eventually return. Moreover, the lack of social opportunities during the pandemic hindered the formation of a strong institutional identity.

Finally, the very idea of “Government as a Start-Up” has proven problematic. While located in the former headquarters of Yahoo Japan, with spacious and open workspaces, the Agency’s start-up work culture naturally opposed the principal rationality of bureaucratic work based on accountability, meticulous documentation, and standardized processes.

Yet, in its first year, the Digital Agency has experienced positive changes. After Suga’s resignation, pressure on the agency decreased, providing it with more time to consolidate. Despite differences among staff, it integrated the Japanese identification card called “My Number Card” with the health care system, increasing its usefulness and public acceptance. The agency made progress in establishing cooperation with local governments. Furthermore, it initiated a common framework for standardizing local IT systems, even if the new framework might not be in place for 2025 as planned. The diminished public focus at this stage has helped the agency move away from visible, politically desired outcomes to focus on less glamorous, work-intensive projects essential for digitalization. This includes, among other things, the development of a common basic IT architecture for public sector digitization and the revision of 60,000 existing laws and regulations hindering digitization.

While less attention has been helpful to consolidate the Digital Agency, it must not lose momentum. One of the keys to success will be to maintain or even increase public support for digitalization. Kono’s popularity is an asset because it could popularize and improve understanding of digital transformation’s benefits; certainly a great challenge in Japan, with the highest proportion of elderly citizens in the world.

The other key is the successful integration of private sector personnel, experienced bureaucrats, and career-track civil servants to be hired during 2022. It remains to be seen if the introduction of a career-track civil servant examination tailored for Digital Agency staff will increase the number of bureaucrats well-acquainted with IT and able to improve cooperation with private sector personnel, thus finally creating a strong institutional identity.

Without a doubt, having a functioning and empowered digital agency will be pivotal to deal with future challenges such as issues related to the ageing population or new geopolitical conflicts increasingly occurring within the digital domain.

Raymond Yamamoto ([email protected]) is an Associate Professor at the Department of Global Studies, Aarhus University, Denmark; and Adjunct Fellow at the Pacific Forum, United States.

Karen Ejersbo Iversen is a Chief Adviser at the Danish Agency for Digitisation, Denmark; and Senior Visiting Research Fellow at GLOCOM, Japan.

The opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the view or position of the Danish Agency for Digitisation.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Cybersecurity Japan Public Engagement Technology and Security

PacNet #37 – Abe’s death creates a void in Japan

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Shortly after the March 2011 tragedy struck Japan, critic Azuma Hiroki wrote that “the disaster broke us apart.” He reasoned that the randomness of the death and destruction of that triple catastrophe—earthquake, tsunami, and meltdown at the Fukushima nuclear power plant—shattered a pillar of Japanese identity, the belief that all Japanese were equal. In my book Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions, a senior government official confessed that the events that day “marked the end of our illusions,” as the nation had to face the grim reality that hopes for a return to normalcy after years of stagnation were unlikely.

The murder of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in Nara last week could have a similar impact on Japan. Abe was a passionate and committed conservative nationalist, who had one of the most remarkable second acts in world politics. After becoming the longest serving prime minister in Japanese history, he left office while retaining—and wielding—great influence behind the scenes. He was killed while campaigning in the Upper House election that would be held two days after his death.

That death was as random as those of March 11. Abe didn’t decide to make the campaign stop until the day before. The killer has allegedly said that he didn’t shoot the former PM because of his policies. His reported motivation—the bankrupting of his mother by a religious group—occurred decades earlier.

The attack similarly struck at the belief that Japan is an especially safe and peaceful country. Japanese media have been reluctant, if not unwilling, to call the killing an assassination, reasoning that the murder does not align with the prevailing image of such an act. The dissonance of a political killing is not just a political act, but a blow to national identity.

Abe was a crusader who sought to change Japan and central to his agenda was defense policy reform, which in turn demanded amendment of the nation’s constitution. He was a tireless advocate in and out of office, highlighting the threat posed by a revisionist China and railing against the handcuffs imposed on Japan by a national charter which prevented it from addressing that threat and fulfilling the nation’s destiny as a great power.

While his death likely boosted the performance of his Liberal Democratic Party in Sunday’s ballot—it bested expectations, installing, with allies, a supermajority willing to consider constitutional revision—it may undercut his cause. There is no one with his passion, charisma, and political skill to push reform over the threshold. Most advocates are too raw and too inexperienced to win public trust for such a monumental step.

Public backing is crucial. Constitutional revision is a two-step process. Amendments must first be passed by a Diet supermajority; they must then be approved by a majority of the voting public, which is evenly split on the question. Securing that support will be difficult, more so as members of Abe’s party who share his reform agenda also promote public quietism in favor of stability and governance by elites who know what’s best for the country.

Incumbent Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, the chief beneficiary of his predecessor’s untimely death, is a cipher. No one is quite sure what he stands for. He said after the election that he would promote Abe’s legacy, but advancing a debate is not the same as pushing for constitutional revision. He has long held a more dovish position on foreign policy; Abe, by contrast, worked assiduously behind the scenes to push the government toward a more aggressive stance. Kishida has other priorities, economic reform chief among them, and it is unclear if he is prepared to spend political capital on the causes that Abe held dear.

This does not mean that Japan will retreat. One of the most important elements of Abe’s legacy is the way he shifted his country’s foreign policy framework toward a more assertive, hardline, and high-profile stance. This new trajectory has endured for the two prime ministers that followed Abe and it will continue for the foreseeable future. The United States and like-minded nations will continue to have a partner in Tokyo, one that shares their vision of regional and global order.

Still, Abe’s absence will be palpable. Japan has many capable and intelligent politicians but few can match his energy, experience, commitment, or sheer delight in the political fight (a characteristic that deeply divided Japan and eventually constrained as much as enabled him). Kishida’s ascendance to the prime minister’s office last year was a recognition of that truth, a return to form for Japanese prime ministers—a record that does not inspire great confidence.

Brad Glosserman ([email protected]) is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University as well as senior adviser (nonresident) at Pacific Forum. He is the author of “Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions” (Georgetown University Press, 2019).

For more from this author, visit his recent chapter of Comparative Connections.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Free and Open Indo-Pacific Japan Nationalism Public Engagement Reassurance

PacNet #27 – How the ASEAN Regional Forum Can Promote Security and Prosperity

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The following is a summary of the author’s article published in Pacific Forum’s Issues & Insights. Read the full article here.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1994 to promote peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region following the decline of the Cold War. Today, 28 years later, the 27-member process “driven” by ASEAN is still striving to accomplish its conflict management mission amid a geopolitical environment that has turned distinctly more adverse.

To realize its full potential, the ARF has to expand its mission to address both sides of the security coin, namely conflict management and inclusive security cooperation. It cannot continue to confine itself to its traditional confidence building and conflict resolution mandate.

The ARF is conceived as a forum for open dialogue and consultation on regional security issues that is tasked to manage conflicts and tensions through a three-stage process of confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and, eventually, conflict resolution.

Though the participating countries come from outside the area as well, the “geographical footprint” of the ARF’s focus is Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania.

The ARF has been intensely busy. It has worked on several important areas of security, namely non-proliferation and disarmament; maritime security; counter-terrorism and transnational crime; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. But the work has been essentially for the purpose of promoting confidence among participating countries in pursuit of its three-stage conflict management mandate. It has not been approached as ends in themselves, to advance regional security in the respective areas.

Viewed through its own conflict management prism, the ARF has unfortunately performed poorly. It has not managed to progress beyond the preliminary confidence building stage despite a quarter century of effort. It has not addressed a single conflict in the region.

The constructive relationships it had forged among nations in the working groups (called Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) and Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) have been completely overwhelmed by the rising tide of contention prompted by challenges to established norms, including by ARF members.

The South China Sea has become increasingly militarized. While the presence of warships from states outside the ARF is indicative of those states’ commitments to upholding international rules and norms, it is a sign of tension caused by challenges to those very norms. Military expenditure has surged among many ARF states. The Korean Peninsula continues to be a dangerous flashpoint.

It is patently clear that the ARF must respond quickly and convincingly in the face of the mounting challenges. It can move forward on two fronts. First, it can begin working on addressing specific disputes and conflicts consistent with its current mandate. Second, it can expand its conflict management mandate to embrace inclusive security cooperation as well.

To advance more purposefully along the first front, the ARF would probably need to do at least three things:

1. Summon the necessary political will in ASEAN to lead the conflict management process that it has been entrusted with. ASEAN and its members have accumulated sufficient experience for managing disputes collectively as well as bilaterally.

The experience began when the then ASEAN Five, and later ASEAN Six, played a successful role working together with the United Nations and the major powers to help resolve the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict of 1979-1989. ASEAN itself is recognized as one of the leading models of regional reconciliation and conflict moderation.

ASEAN and the ARF can also draw on extensive resources both within the ARF as well as internationally to assist them in the process of preventive diplomacy, mediation, and settlement. Available parties include the International Court of Justice and the Secretary General of the United Nations. Reputable and neutral mediation agencies such as PACTA Finland, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and the Carter Center may also assist if approached

2. Strengthen the institutional capacity of the ARF Unit and the Office of the ASEAN secretary general to monitor the regional security situation and support the ARF’s initiatives.

3. Task the ARF International Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy to explore the specific disputes and conflicts that the ARF can address. In this regard, it is to be noted that although the ARF’s geographical footprint includes them, conflict management in Southeast Asia and Oceania is the direct responsibility of ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) according to their respective treaty and charter mandates. Only Northeast Asia falls under the direct “purview” of the ARF. ASEAN and PIF, however, should welcome the views of the ARF on the situation in their regions.

It will be much easier for the ARF to engage on the second front, which is the other side of the comprehensive security coin. The benefits will manifest more quickly too. The ARF provides a ready institutional infrastructure for inclusive security cooperation. Not exploiting its full potential would be tantamount to a criminal omission.

To engage in inclusive security cooperation, the ARF will also need to do at least three things:

1. Expand the ARF’s mandate, which is presently confined to conflict management, to include as well inclusive and comprehensive security cooperation.

2. Establish another Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) to be responsible for comprehensive security cooperation. Alternatively, expand the function of the existing ISG on CBM and PD to include security cooperation. Re-cast the substantial work that the ISM’s have done in areas such as maritime security, and counter-terrorism and transnational crime, as work in the areas of security cooperation that also impacts positively on trust-building.

3. Consider additional areas of comprehensive security cooperation. Managing the outbreak of serious infectious diseases that might turn into pandemics could be one such area. Another could be the security impact of climate change on habitat and livelihoods. It is an existential threat for the islands of the South Pacific.

The signature ARF toolkit of confidence-building/preventive diplomacy/conflict resolution will not be applicable for security cooperation.

The ARF is approaching three decades of existence. It can easily achieve more for regional peace and security if it exploits its full potential.

Mohamed Jawhar Hassan ([email protected]) is former Chairman and Chief Executive, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia and, until recently, a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Expert and Eminent Person’s Group.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

Alliances ASEAN Capacity Building Defense Cooperation Geopolitics military Public Engagement South China Sea Southeast Asia