YL Blog #53 – Cybersecurity Workshop

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In the realm of cybersecurity, ‘The Future of Cyber Competition’ workshop, hosted at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research on September 12th and 13th, emerged as a pivotal gathering. This workshop served as a focal point for professionals and scholars immersed in the dynamic and ever-evolving landscape of cybersecurity policy. Notable attendees included representatives from the U.S. government, international organizations, and a diverse array of experts from the private sector, all of whom contribute significantly to various facets of cybersecurity. The workshop offered a rare opportunity for these stakeholders to engage in an extensive dialogue about the future of cybersecurity.

Each panel introduced intriguing subjects, including insights from Ukraine’s experiences, strategies concerning cybersecurity in partnership with U.S. allies, and the intricate interplay between information and technology competition. Amid the discussion, a compelling trend emerged – discussions consistently converged towards the topic of collaboration with the private sector.

Indeed, the emphasis of the discussions on collaboration with the private sector is entirely understandable. The cybersecurity domain, still regarded as a relatively recent addition to the broader spectrum of national security, has yet to reach its full maturity. This nascent state of affairs became evident as the United States unveiled its inaugural Cyber Strategy on the eve of the workshop. Unlike well-established norms and frameworks found in traditional security domains, the world of cybersecurity lacks a universally accepted definition, and the formation of international norms and frameworks remains a work in progress. Moreover, the application and efficacy of cybersecurity measures remain subjects of limited research, owing to the paucity of comprehensive case studies. As such, caution must be exercised when extrapolating insights gleaned from specific cases, such as Ukraine, to construct universal principles in the multifaceted realm of cybersecurity. The reality is that there is still much we do not understand about the intricate nature of cybersecurity.

Paradoxically, the Ukrainian case serves as a compelling illustration of the influential role that non-state actors, primarily from the private sector, play in the domain of cybersecurity. In contemporary international conflicts, non-state actors wield an unprecedented degree of influence, a departure from the traditional dynamics observed in conflicts and wars. Panel discussions during the workshop underscored the stark contrasts between non-state actors within the private sector and the actions of nation-states. The differences between the private sector and nation-state actors are too numerous to enumerate comprehensively, yet a fundamental distinction arises from the motives behind their actions: nation-states act with the overarching goal of safeguarding and advancing their national interests, while the private sector operates under the primary objective of profit maximization. Consequently, the reliability of the private sector can exhibit considerable variability, which poses challenges, especially in times of crisis, such as a hypothetical Taiwan Strait contingency. Nonetheless, it is crucial to recognize that effective cybersecurity policy must strike a delicate balance. Given that the private sector possesses advantages in terms of scale and speed, collaboration with the private sector cannot be avoided. Therefore, it is essential to thoroughly examine how to integrate collaboration with the private sector into government cybersecurity policies.

Furthermore, the workshop’s discussions remarkably did not extend to the crucial aspect of cooperation and collaboration among allied and partner nations. Nonetheless, due to the inherent ambiguity of the field and its capacity to transcend various domains and national boundaries, it can be argued that international cooperation and collaboration among countries becomes a necessity. To foster and enhance international cooperation and collaboration in the domain of cybersecurity, several essential steps must be taken. First and foremost, there is an imperative need to establish a comprehensive and universally agreed-upon understanding and delineation of what precisely cybersecurity entails. This foundation should be buttressed by the development of international norms and frameworks, providing a robust structure for the multifaceted cybersecurity arena. Equally important is the establishment of mechanisms for intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration, which would form the bedrock of effective cybersecurity strategies. Moreover, a wealth of practical case studies, encompassing diverse scenarios, is essential to enrich our collective knowledge base. These studies will serve as invaluable reference points for policymakers, practitioners, and academics alike.

The discussions surrounding national security often gravitate towards the conventional threats and risks associated with territorial defense and military strategies. While these conventional concerns remain of utmost importance, it is imperative that the United States, its allies, and its partners acknowledge the increasing significance of non-traditional security domains, chief among them being the realm of cybersecurity. In this rapidly evolving landscape, a robust framework for cooperation and a shared understanding of the complexities involved are paramount. A strategic shift is necessary to address the full spectrum of security challenges, encompassing traditional and non-traditional threats alike.

Cybersecurity is inherently interconnected, transcending borders, industries, and sectors. It is a dynamic field that continually evolves, presenting a challenge that cannot be adequately addressed by any one nation or entity in isolation. Therefore, it is imperative for like-minded nations to collaborate not just in the realms of defense and intelligence sharing but also in the realm of cybersecurity.

In conclusion, the ‘Future of Cyber Competition’ workshop offered a glimpse into the multifaceted and dynamic world of cybersecurity. It underscored the critical importance of collaboration, particularly with non-state actors in the private sector. Furthermore, it highlighted the nascent nature of the field, which calls for further research, the development of international norms, and the cultivation of effective mechanisms for cooperation among nations. To navigate the uncharted waters of cybersecurity successfully, a shared commitment to understanding, cooperation, and collective action is indispensable.

Disclaimer: All opinions in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent any organization.

Ayae Yoshimoto ([email protected]) is a researcher at the Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco, California.

YL Blog #52 – The Role of the Private Sector in Cyber Competition

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The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) workshop on ‘The future of cyber competition’ was held to further an understanding of what lessons the US, and its allies, could take from how cyber has been used during Russia’s war on Ukraine. Discussion between senior US government officials, private sector experts and academia over the two days was key in highlighting that it is important to define what successful public-private partnerships look like, and how effective relationships can be built to best prepare for future conflict.

The importance of public-private partnership is at the forefront of policy debate as global technology competition continues to intensify. The passing of legislation in the United States, such as the CHIPS and Science Act 2022, aimed at securing semiconductor supply chains, and inquiries by Senators into Elon Musk reportedly thwarting a drone attack on Russian targets by denying the use of SpaceX’s Starlink satellites, is indicative of the undeniable presence of the private sector in strategic competition and global conflict. Going forward, US and allied governments need to make considerations around the normative parameters for collaboration and private sector engagement in cyber conflict, particularly given critical digital infrastructure and large troves of personal data is largely operated and managed by private sector entities.

A point raised throughout the CGSR workshop, was that strengthening and encouraging the private sector’s ability to act in geostrategic competition is not necessarily a status quo that should be reinforced. ‘Big tech’ companies are in some instances, operating with the scale and influence of countries, as is the case with SpaceX, which has been central in providing critical communication infrastructure during the Ukraine war. These companies are not bound to national interests and typically view themselves as international organisations headquartered around the world with their primary activities driven by commercial interests. This perspective was raised in conjunction with the point that while Ukraine has demonstrated an adept ability to use soft power to harness private sector support, this is not necessarily replicable in future conflicts. The US and allies need to consider if it is within their interests to normalise the independent involvement of private sector entities with the capacity to function on the scale of a combatant country during conflict particularly in a scenario where a large private entity might aid a foreign adversary.

Regardless, while the nuances of the normative parameters for private sector involvement in geostrategic competition are still developing, the private sector will continue to hold an integral role in cyber and technology competition. Another key point emphasized during the workshop, was the importance of developing a roadmap for engagement and timely communication between government and the private sector. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the need to have these strategies in place prior to a conflict, as opposed to being built mid-flight. Related to this, is the importance of building the skills within both public and private sectors to effectively communicate in technical areas to non-technical audiences, and vice versa when it comes to explaining strategic policy priorities and how the technical capabilities of the private sector might support them. Cyber is a multidisciplinary field, and having individuals that can act as a conduit between technical and high level geostrategic or commercial audiences is vital, and is a function that should exist ahead of a cyber conflict scenario. The private sector is not a uniform entity, and trust and relationships at an individual level need to be built between public and private entities if constructive collaboration is to occur. Building these relationships will also help identify scenarios where collaboration is needed, and the degree of risk appetite and priorities for both the government and private sector entities. This feeds into a need for public-private partners to candidly understand each other’s unique incentives, which the CSGR workshop was clear in highlighting as important for ensuring partnerships of value can be built.

This is where there is an opportunity for greater collaboration between allies and learning from different approaches for public-private engagement in cyber. Notably, Australia is at the forefront of public-private collaboration in scenario planning for major cyber incidents. In 2023, the Australian government held war gaming exercises with major banks and financial service companies to test response strategies to cyberattacks that target critical infrastructure assets. How allies can execute similar programs to work in tandem with global companies to drill scenarios and understand the capabilities, intentions, and limits of private sector entities will help lay the groundwork when real-time responses are needed.

For the private sector, engaging in these activities does not necessarily commit them to supporting a government position during a conflict, but enables them to define the parameters of their willingness to collaborate prior to the fact, build useful relationships and trust, and think through any legal and public relations considerations they might face.

The CSGR workshop was key in highlighting that in the man-made domain of cyber, collaboration is vital, both with allies and the private sector. As geostrategic competition in the Indo-Pacific continues to intensify, China will also be looking to the lessons of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to determine where improvements to their utilization of cyber as a tool for information warfare and disruption can be improved. China’s relationship with the private sector differs greatly to the US and its allies, where China has a higher degree of integration. While the discussion at the CSGR workshop raised the point that this reduces China’s private sector’s ability to act quicky, be agile and innovative in their activities and responses, it did not diminish the fact that the US and partners should continue to collaborate to improve their readiness in the ever-changing cyber domain.

Disclaimer: All opinions in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent any organization.

Bronte Munro ([email protected]) is an Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Washington DC.

PacNet #44 – What happens in Crimea will determine Taiwan’s fate

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The 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea had far-reaching implications for global politics. They demonstrated that it is still possible for countries to get away with redrawing borders through aggression. Though the international community condemned the annexation, imposing economic sanctions on Russia, such sanctions did not restore Crimea to Ukraine, nor deter Russia from invading again in 2022.

The People’s Republic of China has long considered resolving “the Taiwan question” crucial. China’s leader Xi Jinping has stated that the absorption of Taiwan, even if it requires force, is key to his plan to “rejuvenate the Chinese nation.” China’s leaders closely watch the situation in Ukraine, seeing it as a test of American determination and the unity of Western alliances. China also sees the potential for a prolonged conflict in Europe as a distraction for the West. As Russia’s war in Ukraine continues, it consumes American resources and attention.

If Russia ultimately maintains control over newly annexed Ukrainian territory, it could embolden China’s ambitions to annex Taiwan by force. The threat of sanctions may not be enough to deter Beijing: Policymakers in China may also anticipate that the economic dependence of other countries on China could mitigate the severity of these consequences and some Chinese officials believe they can evade US-led sanctions.

It is therefore crucial that Ukraine’s supporters in the West send a decisive message, and send it now.

Red lines

Before the 2022 invasion there was little faith that Crimea could be restored to Ukraine, and that possibility remains an open question in the ongoing conflict. Secretary of State Antony Blinken previously stated that a Ukrainian effort to retake Crimea would be a red line for Putin, but there has been a shift in his stance, as he asserts that there will be no “just” or “durable” peace unless Ukraine’s territorial integrity is restored.

A Biden administration official even told members of Congress in December 2022 that Ukraine has the military capability to take back Crimea. According to retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges of the US Army, there is growing belief that Ukraine’s military will successfully regain control of Crimea by August 2023. The United Kingdom has recently supplied Ukraine with multiple “Storm Shadow” cruise missiles, significantly bolstering the nation’s long-range strike capabilities.

Furthermore, French President Emmanuel Macron has committed to providing Kyiv with the SCALP-EG missile, similar to the Storm Shadow, with a range of up to 155 miles. This advanced weaponry holds the potential to target strategic locations, including the Kerch Strait Bridge—a crucial land link between Russia and the Crimean Peninsula, serving as a vital supply route for Russian forces amid the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Despite apprehensions from certain Western leaders regarding Putin’s designation of Crimea as a “red line,” the region remains under relentless assault from Ukrainian forces. The recent introduction of advanced, extended-range munitions from the United States is poised to further escalate the barrage on military targets. As Russia hurriedly constructs defensive trenches in Crimea, it becomes evident that it is profoundly worried about the region’s susceptibility to a potential Ukrainian invasion.

Last September, Putin declared Kherson part of Russia, despite lacking full control. Putin declared that Russia would use “all the forces and means at their disposal” to “protect” this newly acquired territory. However, Ukraine showed little concern and, within 40 days, Russia abandoned Kherson’s capital city. Putin’s annexation justification was based on a staged poll, claiming it represented the will of the people much like the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

In a recent statement, former French President François Hollande highlighted the notion that a triumphant Ukraine, symbolized by the withdrawal of Russian forces from Donbas and potentially even Crimea, would effectively discourage Russia and China from pursuing imperialistic ambitions against their neighbors. The defeat of Putin would not only signify the abandonment of such temptations but also serve as a resolute message that aggressive actions will not yield favorable outcomes.

However, if Ukraine falls short of reclaiming its original borders from 2014 and can only restore its pre-February 2022 borders, China may interpret it as the West’s insufficient commitment to reestablishing the international order. In fact, the recently appointed special envoy of China for the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has emphasized an immediate cease-fire. This proposal entails granting Russia control over the currently occupied regions of Ukraine. Such an outcome would embolden Russia further. Consequently, a Russian triumph would deliver a disheartening message to the world and set an alarming precedent for Beijing, offering them encouragement in their own ambitions.

The provision of essential weaponry to Ukraine in a timely manner, enabling the restoration of its internationally recognized borders, holds significant importance for both the United States and Europe. Failure to expedite this support inadvertently benefits China by diverting attention and resources away from Taiwan. In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the United States would be compelled to prioritize the defense of Taiwan due to its heightened strategic value. Hence, it becomes crucial for the United States to motivate its European allies to assume a more prominent role in protecting against Russian aggression. Encouragingly, recent developments indicate a positive trend, exemplified by Germany’s recent announcement of its largest aid package to Ukraine yet—nearly $3 billion.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated, “This Russian war against Ukraine and against the entire free Europe began with Crimea and must end with Crimea—with its liberation.” But the importance of the war ending in Crimea is for more than just Europe. It will serve as a cautionary tale for future acts of aggression that, in the long term, the democratic world will band together no matter how long it takes to defeat authoritarian aggression. A quicker end to the war with a complete restoration of international order, serves as the best deterrent to China’s Taiwan ambitions.

David Kirichenko ([email protected]) is a freelance journalist and an editor at Euromaidan Press. He tweets @DVKirichenko.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping meeting in February 2022 by Sputnik/Aleksey Druzhinin/Reuters. 

PacNet #41 – ASEAN unity and the Russia-Ukraine crisis

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Dato Lim, ASEAN’s former secretary general, recently admitted that ASEAN’s ability to function effectively depends on the capability of its members to align their national interests with regional imperatives. Given the diversity within and between its member states, preserving unity has been a core objective since the organization’s inception.

For example, the 1967 Bangkok declaration—the organization’s founding document—emphasized regional cooperation and strengthening existing bonds of regional solidarity. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation reiterated these sentiments. In the aftermath of the 2012 Bali Concords II, however, ASEAN set out to create a “cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN community” with a “common regional identity.” This drive toward unity was accentuated through the ASEAN Regional Community Vision of 2025, with its target of “one identity and one community” adhering to “shared values and norms.”

Even so, disunity persists. The crisis of Myanmar, for example: In April 2021, two months after the junta took power in a coup, ASEAN forwarded a five-point consensus on the crisis. Violence continues to escalate, however, generating vocal international criticism toward ASEAN’s slow response. While Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have been largely more critical of the junta’s actions, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos have remained taciturn.

Global issues have similarly failed to engender regional consensus. The Russia-Ukraine war is a notable example. ASEAN responses, in terms of policy documents and statements, to the events since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 have been relatively muted. A 2014 joint EU-ASEAN statement following the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, condemned the act and called on all parties to stop the violence. The organization also addressed the situation in Ukraine at the foreign ministers’ level, but interestingly, only after 2022.

On Feb. 26, 2022, March 3, 2022, and April 8, 2022, ASEAN foreign ministers issued statements on the conflict. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was referred to as “hostilities” taking place in Ukraine. Instead of calling on Russia to withdraw from its occupation of Ukrainian territory in contravention to international law, the statements only called for “an immediate ceasefire or armistice” followed by “political dialogues that would lead to sustainable peace in Ukraine.”

Singapore and Laos represent contrasting perspectives. A 2023 survey conducted by Singapore’s Yusof Ishak Institute shows that only 14% of respondents from Laos are “very concerned” about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, compared to over 50% of respondents from Singapore. A 2020 survey asking “Who would you consider your country’s preferred strategic partner if the United States was unreliable” found that 33% of respondents in Laos considered Russia a suitable partner, while less than 1% felt the same way in Singapore. Differing sentiments toward Russia and, more importantly, how each nation frames the conflict, weakens efforts at unity.

ASEAN unity in praxis—voting in the UNGA

From 2014 to February 2023 there were 11 General Assembly resolutions on the Ukrainian crisis. In each, barring one (A/RES/68/262), all 10 ASEAN nations expressed their vote. The trajectories of voting patterns demonstrates the absence of a united position in the organization.

Source: Author’s data, based on United Nations General Assembly Voting Records.

As this graph makes evident, most of ASEAN abstained on resolutions concerning the Ukraine War. Brunei and Vietnam, for example, have consistently abstained on UNGA resolutions. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, initially in favor, shifted to abstaining in each subsequent resolution. Singapore is the only ASEAN country that has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions on the subject on more than one occasion. Even so, it has not consistently voted in favor of resolutions. Laos, in contrast, has either abstained or voted against resolutions on the Ukrainian crisis.

Laos and Singapore on the Ukrainian Crisis 

To delve deeper, let’s explore the voting patterns of Laos and Singapore, the two countries that show the greatest divergence among ASEAN nations. While Singapore has proven most willing among all ASEAN nations to support UNGA resolutions on the Ukraine war, Laos (except for A/RES/68/262, where it did not vote) has consistently voted against.

A/RES/73/194, a resolution adopted on Dec. 17, 2018, is the point where this divergence begins. The resolution directly addressed hostilities taking place in the region and condemned Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory. It also urged the Russian federation “as the occupying power” to withdraw its forces without delay. Examining the resolution reveals three recurring points of contention between Singapore and Laos. This relates to Article 1, Article 5, and Article 8. Each of these articles are repeated in the resolutions of the next General Assembly session (not the next resolution) and in each case Singapore and Laos adopted starkly differing positions, with one voting in favor and the other voting against. Article 1 focuses on Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty by launching an attack on Ukraine.

Article 5 points out the unjustified nature of Russian action in Ukraine, i.e., that it is in violation of international law. Article 8, meanwhile, classifies Russia as an “occupying power” and directs our attention to the importance of it ending its “occupation of Ukraine’s territory.” As a result of these three clauses, and more specifically, the framing of Russia’s actions in these clauses, we see a significant divergence in the positions of Singapore and Laos.

A/RES/73/263, a UNGA resolution adopted five days later, does not include these three articles. Consequently, Laos and Singapore abstained. In A/RES/74/17 we witness the divergence once more, as it contains the three articles noted in A/RES/73/194. A/RES/74/17 was passed in 2019, a year after A/RES/73/194. By then the two nations had begun disengaging forces in Zolote and Petrovske (in Eastern Ukraine) and conducted Normandy Format Meetings – an informal meeting between French, German, Russian and Ukrainian diplomats.

Even so, the positions of Singapore and Laos remained unchanged as reflected by their voting pattern. Whenever UNGA resolutions discuss Russia’s actions as a violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity, note that Russia’s actions are unjustified (and therefore contravene international law), and classify Russia as an occupying power which should withdraw from Ukrainian territory, Laos votes against it while Singapore votes in favor.

This pattern between Singapore and Laos shows the latter’s disregard for the gravity of Russia’s actions. Moreover, it also explains why ASEAN foreign minister meetings did not classify Russia as an “occupying power” in violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity or even mention Russia in any statements.

Laos’ position may have a direct correlation with its economic crisis. According to its statistics bureau inflation hit a 22-year high in 2022 which eroded the population’s purchasing power. The nation also struggles to acquire sufficient foreign currency for its imports which has caused fuel shortages. In May 2022, the government stated that it would look for cheaper fuel sources instead of relying solely on China, Thailand, Vietnam and other nearby nations. Russian gas, meanwhile, is 70% cheaper than other international suppliers which will most likely draw Laos towards Moscow. Laos’ economic dependence on China might also induce it to welcome stronger ties with Russia; thereby diversifying its foreign relations and enhancing its strategic position through “mutual checks and balances among its partners.” At the outbreak of hostilities between Ukraine and Russia, Laos’ Foreign Ministry only stated that it will follow the “evolving, complex and sensitive” situation in the region and called upon all parties to “exercise utmost restraint.” Vientiane also conducted joint bilateral military drills with Moscow as recently as November 2022.

Accordingly, the fact that ASEAN members cannot agree on who violated international law in the Ukraine conflict casts doubt on the organization’s commitment to a “rules-based” international order. Moreover, if members cannot agree on violations taking place in Eastern Europe, thousands of miles from Southeast Asia, its inability to deal with contentious issues closer to home should be expected.

Conclusion

This is a problem because ASEAN Centrality presupposes unity. If ASEAN hopes to be at the center of the region’s security and economic architecture, the organization must not only adopt a proactive role on regional issues, but also maintain unity and a sense of cohesion on framing regional and global issues. That ASEAN members cannot adopt a common position on a conflict in Eastern Europe casts doubt on its ability to guarantee centrality. The absence of “ASEAN Centrality” could also further enable the establishment of new minilateral initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and AUKUS to exert a greater role in shaping security developments in Southeast Asia and the wider Indian Ocean region.

A first step to greater unity would be enhancing cooperation among ASEAN states. Wealthier ASEAN countries should seek to help those, like Laos, in a more precarious financial position reduce its dependence on external actors such as Russia.. Given Laos’ financial position other ASEAN nations should provide economic assistance to Vientiane and thereby reduce its dependence on external actors such as Russia. Regular bilateral meetings alone are insufficient to promote unity—one nation’s difficulties must be viewed as the entire region’s problem. If the ASEAN nations perceived challenges from this perspective the probability that disunity persists on international issues such as the Ukraine-Russia conflict would decline significantly.

Shakthi De Silva ([email protected]) serves as a Visiting Lecturer in International Relations for tertiary-level institutes in Sri Lanka. His most recent publications include a chapter on the securitization policies adopted by Gulf States and South Asia in the book ‘Regional Security in South Asia and the Gulf’ (2023) published by the Taylor and Francis Group (Routledge).

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: ASEAN Summit 2023 May 10, 2023 in Indonesia by CNN Philippines Staff/Southeast Asia News today/Sekretariat Presiden YouTube.  

PacNet #67 – After Ukraine, the need for a collectively framed new order

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When Russia’s President Vladimir Putin launched his “special military operation” to invade and occupy neighboring Ukraine on Feb. 24, the world shuddered. In a painstakingly premeditated manner, Putin stepped over perhaps the most foundational norm of the prevailing international order. For approximately two decades, many sensed the gradual but relentless erosion of confidence in the principles, conventions, and processes designed to foster stability and peace. The world shuddered because, on Feb. 24, it seemed that the end game had abruptly come into view.

The rules-based order has emerged as a key axis of the intensifying animosity between the West and the China-Russia partnership. Twenty years ago, Beijing and Moscow voiced guarded expressions of support, an acknowledgement that the trade regime, in particular, was central to their aspirations for economic development. Yet they also flagged a possible interest in unspecified amendments to the wider regime at some point in the future. Only in recent times—essentially since 2020—have China and Russia indicated more precisely where and how the rules-based order clashes with their interests and preferences.

The key points of contention emerging thus far concern economic competition, governance, and international security. While disputes in and around the international trade agenda probably attracted the most attention, grasping them is at least straightforward. Regarding governance and international security, the nature and intent of the Chinese and Russian positions is more challenging. China has indicated that, while its system of governance is distinctive in a number of ways, it is unacceptable to question its legitimacy or equivalent status to those in the West. China contends that a perfectly valid re-conceptualization of democracy—and related concepts such as universal human rights—means its approach to governance is legitimate and effective. Regarding international security, the China-Russia joint statement of Feb. 4 spoke of an aspiration to shape “a polycentric world order based on the universally recognized principles of international law, multilateralism and equal, joint, indivisible, comprehensive and sustainable security.” The last of these principles—especially the notion of indivisibility—was the core contention by President Putin in support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Is there space for a constructive conversation on these matters? Finding that space is a challenge we must approach with creativity and humility. The prevailing rules-based order has delivered massively across a broad front for over 70 years, not least in preventing war between the major powers. Presumably, therefore, the rewards for genuine engagement on a workable adaptation of the current order could be immeasurable. No state should claim a monopoly on wisdom. No state should presume to be on the right side of history. Democracies may be prone to slipping toward chaos as priorities and process are lost in a scramble to indulge too many disparate aspirations. However, no authoritarian leadership has ever dared offer a candid account of how to achieve and sustain the order and discipline they covet.

A first step must be to lower the barriers to easier communication. All parties must project a willingness to learn and understand. It would also be helpful to widen the band of participants in these international conversations so we get more spontaneity—as well as confidence that we are hearing the real story.

We already have a modest record of edging closer together on a range of the more sensitive issues on the international economic, political, and social agenda. Furthermore, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has noted that the prevailing order must modernize to address the challenges the framers of the order could not even imagine. Even if we cannot readily identify a path to reconciliation, for both sides to acquire a deeper appreciation for the other’s perspective could prove an important shock-absorber.

The final, and definitive, reality: we must change our ways. All empires have stemmed from a powerful, unfettered leadership that achieved compelling dominance and used that status to frame their “orders”—Persian, Greek, Roman, Mongol, down to the United Kingdom and United States. All these leaders encountered the same dilemma: how to make the order suit the values and interests of the dominant power, while remaining sufficiently attractive to be self-policing, keeping the costs of sustaining order within manageable bounds. Nuclear weapons have overtaken this traditional method of shaping an order. They are powerful beyond purpose—they have destroyed the relationship between outcomes on the battlefield and any combination of numbers, technology, strategy, tactics, planning, judgment, effort, bravery, skill, and honor. Compelling dominance has become much harder to achieve and capitalizing on that dominance in a world with nuclear weapon states harder still. The next iteration of the rules-based order, if there is to be one, must be the first framed in some collective fashion.

The foregoing observations suggest small indications that, alongside the need for an innovative approach to refurbishing the prevailing order, there may well be something of a political appetite to consider novel approaches, even if the likely outcome is somewhat spartan. These straws continued to swirl positively during the cluster of high-level gatherings in Southeast Asia in November 2022, notably ASEAN’s East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Indonesia-chaired G20. The G20, having found a way through the Ukraine question and energized by a long and earnest bilateral between Xi and Biden, produced a lavish 52-paragraph leaders statement, perhaps the first consensus statement from a broad group of leaders since the invasion of Ukraine.

ASEAN must ensure that its familiar and trusted security processes—especially the EAS and the ASEAN Regional Forum—remain alert to opportunities for these processes to assist with creating or sustaining the many protracted conversations between states that surely lie ahead.

Ron Huisken ([email protected]u) adjunct Associate Professor, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, ANU and Editor of the CSCAP Regional Security Outlook.

The following has been adapted from the introduction to the Regional Security Outlook 2023, prepared by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.

PacNet #34 – Why ASEAN should heed the distant tolling of bells

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It is hard to know what deft (or otherwise) diplomacy is going on behind the scenes in ASEAN-led architecture in the lead-up to the season of summitry, most importantly the East Asia Summit (EAS). This includes the range of precursor senior officials meetings which often set the conditions for ministerial and leaders-level meetings later in the year. But diplomacy will need to be deft to find a position that at least balances the concerns of all EAS partners with respect to Russia’s participation.

Based on public-facing statements and commentary, right now it appears there is no balance. ASEAN does not seem to have taken action that has imposed costs on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, acknowledged the concerns of other EAS members, or expressed ASEAN condemnation of Russia’s actions.

ASEAN foreign ministers did issue three statements in relation to Ukraine: one calling for restraint and de-escalation on Feb. 26; one calling for a ceasefire on March 3; and one about the killing of civilians and humanitarian access on April 8.

While this was welcome, these statements did not mention Russia. They thus did not challenge Russia’s reprehensible actions.

ASEAN countries also largely supported the UN General Assembly resolution on March 2, which “deplored in the strongest terms” Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and demanded Russia’s immediate, complete, and unconditional withdraw from Ukraine territory (Laos and Vietnam abstained); and on March 24 in relation to the humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine (Brunei, Laos, and Vietnam abstained). But only the Philippines voted in favour of the UN Human Rights Council’s resolution to suspend Russia on April 7.

ASEAN’s statements and each country’s UN voting record indicates the limits of action for individual ASEAN members and ASEAN as a bloc. Singapore, however, has been the most forward-leaning, applying sanctions against Russia).

Cambodia, as the chair of ASEAN, with Indonesia as chair of the G20, and Thailand as chair of APEC, issued a joint statement on May 4 saying: “we are determined to work with all our partners and stakeholders to ensure a spirit of cooperation.”

Russia no doubt was pleased to see this, stating publicly that the statement represented “an important contribution to strengthening multilateralism, building an atmosphere of cooperation and trust, mutual respect and a reciprocal consideration of interests, not only in the region but also globally.”

While it does not make explicit references to Russia, the trilateral statement indicates that the chairs of these three international groupings will not exclude Russian participation.

Make no mistake, despite the waves of mis- and disinformation and fallacious narratives, Russia’s actions are a breach of international law, both in the principle of its invasion as well as in its ongoing execution—particularly as there are multiple reports detailing violations of the laws of war, and crimes against humanity occurring at the hands of Russian officers and soldiers.

But this is not just a breach of international law. It is also a trampling of the principles that ASEAN purports to hold dear—including sovereignty, non-interference, and the rule of law. These are the principles ASEAN has captured in its own Charter, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia to which, as a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN, Russia is a party.

ASEAN has constantly voiced (almost in desperate, anxious tones) the need to maintain its centrality in the region’s institutional architecture. But centrality requires credibility. ASEAN risks its credibility by not taking stronger action.

ASEAN’s consensus-based and conservative approach means that it proceeds at the pace of the slowest member and lowest level of comfort to take action. ASEAN consensus is also influenced by the longstanding relations that some ASEAN members have with Russia, including on military sales. Through this approach, ASEAN seeks to maintain the status quo, to avoid confrontation with major powers or having to “choose sides.” That approach, however, constrains ASEAN’s ability to respond with agility to the shifting geostrategic reality and overlooks the threats to its longer-term interests.

Many countries in the region want ASEAN to maintain credibility and relevance, and believe it is important for regional stability. If ASEAN is to do so, it must take a stance against breaches of international law and (for the most part) universally accepted principles. Otherwise, those principles are moot.

Failure to take action is to legitimize and normalize Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. It ignores not only Ukraine’s current plight, but also Russia’s threats to other countries in Europe—including Sweden and Finland, who see the writing on the wall and have shifted their long-standing position about NATO membership.

It is important to recognise ASEAN’s rationale for not wanting to take sides. But this is not about taking sides with any one country. This is about taking the side of principle. It is essential to reinforce regional stability, security, and prosperity.

Expelling Russia from international fora where Moscow participate with Southeast Asian countries would be a step too far for ASEAN. But finding a better balance would be in order. A good start would be an explicit acknowledgement that Russia is the aggressor.

It is time ASEAN stepped up to demonstrate why it has become an integral part of the regional political architecture. Doing so will prove its value as a key platform in shaping and reinforcing norms of behavior.

Patrick O’Connor is the pseudonym of a non-American diplomat and former military officer who has worked on and studied Southeast Asia extensively. He has had several diplomatic postings throughout the Indo-Pacific and in Ukraine.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

PacNet #22 – Feminist foreign policy and Ukraine: For now, Japan leads the way

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A gendered war is taking place in Ukraine, powered by patriarchal authoritarianism that thrives on unencumbered violence. Some women bravely serve in Ukraine’s military, the media, and in support roles on the front lines. Yet stereotypical gendered norms have been reinforced as most refugees are women, while Ukrainian men must stay and fight. Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) principles seem ignored by the security sector, as women are absent in peace talks, and reports of sexual- and gender-based violence abound. By applying a feminist foreign policy (FFP) lens—focused on a re-imagination of conflict resolution and human security—we consider how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has influenced Indo-Pacific foreign policies, particularly aid, defense, diplomacy, trade, and immigration. We find that Japan stands out as demonstrating alignment with some FFP principles, and may be ripe for formal FFP adoption. Given other Asian states’ mixed responses, however, the invasion of Ukraine may split the Indo-Pacific on this framework.

Aid, sanctions, and immigration

First, FFP principles recommend consideration of women, children, and minority communities in aid provision, with emphasis on humanitarian aid over military/defensive responses. Tokyo has provided ¥12 billion ($95 million) in emergency humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and promised more. This aid demonstrates consideration of women by including hygiene products alongside tents, winter clothing, and generators.

Japan is an above average official development assistance (ODA) contributor to gender equality as a member nation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee. To build on this achievement, Japan could stipulate requirements similar to its Jordanian Palestinian Refugees ODA program for its aid to countries accepting Ukrainian refugees. This program included Alleviation of Social Gaps, which prioritized the empowerment of women refugees through vocational training and access to reproductive health education.

A second plank of FFP is prioritization and allocation of resources to peace over state security, including “gender equality [and] … the human rights of all.” As such, arms trade with non-democratic countries that abuse human rights and subjugate women, and Indo-Pacific military build-up would signal anti-feminist responses. Japan has generally set a positive example by supporting Ukraine without inflaming conflict. Its commitment to restricting military equipment exports has led to its supply of bulletproof vests and non-lethal equipment, but no weapons (though it recently announced the shipment of drones). Tokyo, while a recipient of US extended nuclear deterrence, has also warned against any use of nuclear weapons, acknowledging the painful history of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Third, emphasizing consultation with and equality of all impacted groups, an FFP perspective opposes neo-colonialism, the forceful control or influence of other states. Meanwhile, sanctions are not the preferred option because they typically hurt those already most vulnerable. Sanctions, however, are less militaristic than lethal support, and therefore more acceptable in FFP terms. Eight years ago, when Russia annexed Crimea, Japan failed to sanction Moscow in a bid to maintain diplomatic talks over islands both Russia and Japan claim as their own. By contrast, Japan has moved more decisively in 2022, following US and EU sanctions early on. To date, Japan has restricted Russian banks, and sanctioned oligarchs, companies, and military entities. While Japan still relies on Russian fuel, seafood, and various goods, it has revoked Russia’s most-favored nation trade status, impacting  ¥1.54 trillion ($12 billion) in imports.

Fourth, a country’s FFP would also need to include a generous immigration policy, in this case focusing on the 4.2 million Ukrainian refugees rather than state security. Japan has considered amending its limited immigration policy and opened its doors to friends and family members of its Ukrainian population. The new policy would allow them to stay longer or work.

It won’t be an easy fix—Japan’s past hesitancy towards refugees will require complete immigration policy transformation to align with FFP principles. In 2020, Japan approved 47 out of 3,936 asylum applications (1.19% of the total). Though an improvement from 2019’s 0.42% acceptance rate, other countries are accepting more Ukrainians in response to the crisis. Still, Tokyo seems determined to lessen restrictions. To demonstrate national support for the consideration of individual refugees, Japanese Foreign Minister Hiyashi Yoshimasa returned to home from Poland personally escorting 20 Ukrainian refugees.

A divided Indo-Pacific?

The provision of military aid is essential for FFP precedent. While Japan is all-but-mandated to follow FFP-aligned guidelines due to Article 9 restrictions, other countries with fewer hurdles can more easily adapt their aid distribution.

What precedent, then, does Japan’s restriction of military aid to Ukraine set for its future responses to a conflict in Asia? Furthermore, in case of a contingency—such as China invading Taiwan—how might the reactions of Indo-Pacific countries to the Ukraine crisis predict alignment with feminist values? There has been debate about whether comparing Taiwan to the invasion of Ukraine makes sense, but in either case we are likely to see both adhesion to and straying from FFP principles.

The Indo-Pacific is split on Ukraine. The only other Indo-Pacific nation to demonstrate a feminist-aligned response to Ukraine is New Zealand, which sanctioned Russia and sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine instead of weapons. Australiadid all that and sent military aid. South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have been moderately aligned in their responses, with offers to support other countries’ refugee intakes financially and cut trade ties with Russia and implement sanctions, but refusing to accept Ukrainian refugees.

Most states, however, have been quiet on Russian sanctions and avoided direct criticism. Vietnam has vaguely condemned Russia, but abstained from voting on the March 2 UN Security Council resolution deploring the invasion. India has worked around Western sanctions, while China has criticized sanctions amid misogynistic remarks about Ukrainian women. Smaller countries like the Federated States of Micronesia have cut diplomatic relations with Russia without imposing sanctions. The Philippines offered military bases to the United States if the war spreads to Asia, but moved ahead with the purchase of Russian defense equipment. Similarly, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Malaysia have chosen to protect Russian arms trade over supporting Ukraine. Given anti-colonialist affinities between Indo-Pacific nations and Ukraine, failing to offer stronger, clearer alignment with the West’s rules-based order and with feminist principles may be a lost opportunity for smaller Indo-Pacific states.

It is unclear if Japan’s response is what Ukrainian feminists want. Japan, however, has taken what might be considered feminist approaches to foreign policy, offering humanitarian aid, resisting calls to provide military support, sanctioning Russia, and even increasing its intake of refugees. In so doing, Japan has modeled a foreign policy that other nations should emulate, especially smaller states, which could face similar threats in the future. Feminist foreign policy advocates hope that it continues to do so, while also addressing domestic gender equality challenges faced by Japanese women and its LGBTQ community. Any attempt at formal adoption of a Japanese FFP should include self-reflection on where Japan stands internationally on domestic gender policies, especially if Tokyo wants to set an example for other Indo-Pacific countries.

Hannah Cole ([email protected]) is Program & Publications Manager and Non-resident James A. Kelly Korea Fellow at Pacific Forum. Maryruth Belsey-Priebe ([email protected]) is a Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Fellow at Pacific Forum and Harvard International Relations graduate student. Tevvi Bullock ([email protected]) is a WPS Fellow at Pacific Forum and PhD candidate in Gender, Climate & Humanitarian Action at Monash University.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

PacNet #20 – After Ukraine – Enacting a realistic Japanese diplomatic security policy

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An earlier version of this article appeared in the Mainichi Shimbun. It has been edited and translated from Japanese.

With Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the world now stands at a crossroads. Will we revert to a pre-World War II order where the weak suffer what they must, and the strong do what they will? Or will we maintain the existing global order under international law? At this crucial moment, Japan must unite with the G7 and continue to impose tough sanctions on Russia to prevent further military challenges and uphold a free and open international order.

Those who suffer most in wars are always civilians. Japan should make every effort to engage with concerned countries to begin ceasefire talks and avoid further casualties. As of April 2, over 4.1 million Ukrainian citizens—nearly a 10th of Ukraine’s population—have been forced to flee to other countries. Although Japan has historically been reluctant to accept refugees, it has announced its intent to accept Ukrainians. Yet, the conditions under which they are accepted should be further relaxed. Meanwhile, the momentum for providing humanitarian assistance to Ukraine is growing among Japanese citizens. Rational assessment of the turbulent international situation is essential to achieving balanced diplomacy.

Declining US influence

Because Washington failed to prevent Russia’s invasion, US influence in the world will weaken and we are heading towards a more multipolar world. Certainly, the United States has no obligation to defend a non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and on certain conditions, Ukraine was promised territorial integrity and security by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia via the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. Not standing by this commitment may lead to certain countries in East Asia to take actions similar to Russia’s, while setting a precedent that countries with nuclear weapons cannot be controlled. In particular, the danger of crises emerging in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula are increasing. Given US cautiousness in dealing with nuclear-armed states, Japan will have to engage in diplomacy and dialogue to reassure concerned countries.

Japan should reconsider its reliance on the United States, which has not fulfilled its role as the global policeman. At the same time, without the United States, East Asia will also likely become unstable. So, deepening the Japan-US alliance to keep the United States in Asia is critical. In that sense, Japan has a major role to play. Japan must take drastic measures to strengthen its diplomatic and defense capabilities and build a new international cooperative system centered on peace and stability in Asia. As situations in foreign countries are becoming increasingly tense, Japan is under pressure to rebuild its security strategy from scratch. The time is ripe to promote Japan’s readiness and actions to protect itself.

The role of political parties

A think tank focused on diplomacy and security policy should be established by my party, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) of Japan, to renew and deepen policies, reduce over-reliance on the bureaucratic nerve center of Kasumigaseki, and amplify Japan’s global reach. There is an urgent need to stabilize relations with the United States and to establish an independent intelligence gathering and dissemination system. The CDP should therefore establish offices in Washington, DC.

While the opposition party should always offer alternatives to the ruling party, there is no need to highlight differences when it comes to diplomacy and security policy. We should leave party interests behind when it comes to issues directly linked to the survival of the nation, and instead unite to protect peace in Japan.

Promoting realistic policies

In the face of the current crisis, Japan must seek comprehensive foreign and security policies based on a realistic view of the international order. According to various polls, over 80% of people worry about Japan’s security in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Protecting the lives of the people and the sovereignty of the nation should be the highest priority for Japan. National defense approaches should be further discussed and deepened and no topic should be taboo.

Gaining trust and reassuring the public are difficult tasks. Politicians should avoid making unrealistic and reckless assertions while also avoiding being overly sanguine about countries that are expanding their military. What Japan’s national defense policy requires today is to thoroughly reconsider Japan’s conventional capabilities while also ensuring the smooth operation of extended deterrence. The will and leadership of our politicians, and our realistic understanding of the geopolitical situation, will be further tested if we are to protect Japan and lead the liberal international order in Asia.

Hideshi Futori ([email protected]) is a member of the Japanese House of Representatives in the Constitutional Democratic Party.

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PacNet #18 – Ukraine and the decoupling of space cooperation with Russia

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The imposition of wide-reaching sanctions against Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine will have long-lasting effects on the space industry, academia, and government cooperation.

International cooperation with Russia, principally from Western countries, will likely take a similar path to the ongoing bifurcation in supply chains and academic cooperation between China and the United States and its allies and partner countries. This ongoing competition for both market and academic dominance in high-technology is the most poignant manifestation of a new geopolitical era marked by growing economic fragmentation and the retreat of globalization.

Australia’s Director General of the Office of National Intelligence Andrew Shearer told the Australian Financial Review’s Business Summit this month: “Technology is the center of gravity in this new geopolitical contest, and we are going to see increasing maneuvering between the great powers in particular for pre-eminence in critical technology.” Space falls squarely into this technological contest with far-reaching implications for cooperation between Russia and the West.

In February, five days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a Northrop Grumman Antares rocket launched a Cygnus cargo spacecraft to the International Space Station (ISS). The rocket’s first stage was built in Ukraine, but other parts came from the United States and featured components from many European nations, plus it was powered by a Russian engine. This exemplified how space cooperation has until now transcended geopolitical tensions. The continuation of such cooperation now looks unlikely.

Speaking to the Chinese media, Dmitry Rogzin, the head of Roscosmos, stated that the “European Space Agency and the whole European Union have taken a frenzied position on the conduct of Russia,” making cooperation “impossible.” Russia had already begun turning to China for greater space ties after the West imposed sanctions in response to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The latest spate of sanctions will further limit space cooperation with Russia and further push Moscow into Beijing’s orbit. Agreements on a number of missions have already been struck, including on the Chang’e-6, which seeks to return lunar samples from the far side of the moon, and the Chang’e 7, which looks for water at the lunar south pole. Last year, Moscow and Beijing also released an ambitious roadmap to construct a joint lunar base, the International Lunar Research Station.

Roscosmos’ future does not appear rosy, however. Russia’s space program has already come up against severe cash shortages and the Russian economy, barely bigger than Australia’s, faces significant contractions due to sanctions. Its ambitions and forecasted projects, including the development of its own space station, will likely face significant delays. “Roscomos is in for some very tough years,” David Burbach of the US Naval War College recently told media.

The hiatuses on joint projects, including the Venera-D mission with NASA and the ExoMars mission with the European Space Agency, represent some of the most immediately recognizable casualties for the space industry. But OneWeb’s pivot to Elon Musk’s SpaceX to provide launch services, after the tearing up of its contract with Russia, most clearly indicates Russia’s accelerating decline. While a major space player that has developed, and is developing, some world-leading space technology, Russia amounts to less than a central player today and will face considerable financial constraints going forward.

The dilution of dependence on Russian space services continues. NASA, for instance, no longer relies on purchasing seats on the Russian Soyuz spacecraft, at around $80 million a seat; SpaceX now launches astronauts via the Commercial Crew Program. As a result, the United States and other space powers have less need to maintain strong ties with Roscosmos, as seen in SpaceX’s offer to boost the altitude of the ISS. Besides, Russia’s bluff and bluster around deorbiting the space station already indicate an empire in decline.

By future-proofing access to facilities in orbit, NASA supports a number of private companies in funding the development of private stations that will replace the ISS. As Phil McAlister, director of commercial space at NASA said, “The private sector is technically and financially capable of developing and operating commercial low-Earth orbit destinations, with NASA’s assistance.”

Even if joint projects, academic or commercial, included Russian expertise, the current geopolitical climate will likely place hard limits on such projects. A significant collapse in scientific collaboration has already occurred and, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Congress banned US companies from using Russian rocket engineers for national security launches after 2022. “We need to completely reconceptualize and recognize that security and economics are completely integrated and interdependent,” Shearer pointed out in his speech to the business elite gathered in Sydney.

Some argue that cooperation with Russia can continue, noting that Moscow remains committed to supporting the ISS and just launched three cosmonauts to the station. However, Roscosmos continues to express doubt over its future involvement with the ISS beyond 2024 as it continues to advance plans to build its own private space station. Roscosmos head Dmitry Rogozin states that the plan is to be ready by 2025, but the difficulty in meeting this timing would likely result in Russia requesting access to the Tiangong space station that China hopes to complete this year.

Just as COVID-19 accelerated pre-existing trends around the bifurcation of the West and China, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fast-tracked divisions already underway. Geopolitics extend beyond Earth and the blurring between civil and military spheres of space will only intensify competition. The deepening cracks and heightening geopolitical tensions negatively impact the critical work on establishing rules, norms, and principles for responsible behaviors in space necessary to ensure that the space domain remains free, open, and safe for everyone.

Philip Citowicki ([email protected]) is a Non-resident Vasey Fellow at Pacific Forum and an Australian foreign policy commentator.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

PacNet #17 – Ukraine: After invasion, what?

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a pressure campaign unprecedented in both speed and severity. Many governments are trying to further pressure Moscow. A few others are discussing off-ramps to deescalate the conflict.

It isn’t clear, however, what this pressure or those off-ramps are meant to achieve because there has been little discussion of goals. This is a problem because without clear and realistic goals, any endeavor risks crumbling under its own weight or having unwanted consequences.

There can be five different goals after an invasion has begun. The first is to limit damage. In its most sweeping form, it means not getting involved, accepting that the invasion will proceed largely unimpeded and that the targeted country’s sovereignty will be sacrificed. The second goal is to stop the aggressor’s advance and reach an agreement that hands over some, but not all, of its anticipated gains. The third goal is to restore the status quo ante. The fourth is to go beyond the status quo and punish the aggressor. Finally, the fifth goal is to destroy–literally or de facto–the aggressor because its very existence has become unacceptable.

Thus far, many governments have suggested that the goal of the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is restoration of the status quo. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, for instance, declared that the United States will “support Ukraine in its talks with Russia to reach a ceasefire and the unconditional withdrawal of Russian forces.”

For several governments, however, restoring the status quo will likely not suffice. Frontline nations believe that Russia must pay a price to make clear to Putin and all would-be aggressors that such actions will not be tolerated. Some go further. No one serious has recommended Russia’s physical destruction, but French Minister of the Economy and Finance Bruno Le Maire stated (then walked back) that the goal of the pressure campaign is to “wage all-out economic and financial war on Russia” to “cause the collapse of the Russian economy.”

Others have echoed these themes, suggesting that relations with Moscow cannot return to normal until Russian President Vladimir Putin leaves office and a new regime is in place in the Kremlin. For instance, Ivo Daalder, a former US permanent representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) now president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, has argued for a “robust policy of containment” to “counter Russian expansionism, inflict real costs on the Russian regime, and encourage internal change that leads to the ultimate collapse of Putin and Putinism.”

There is a yawning gap, however, between these desired goals and what can be achieved given the limits that the responding powers have set for themselves. Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion, US President Joe Biden has insisted that the United States will help Ukraine in every way possible, including by providing military assistance, but that “[US] forces are not and will not be engaged in a conflict with Russia in Ukraine.” The United States has resisted establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine because such an arrangement would put NATO into a direct fight with Russia. Support for Ukraine, then, is unconditional only until there is a risk of escalation and military confrontation with Russia.

In these circumstances, it isn’t clear that restoration of the status quo–seemingly the bare minimum acceptable for most governments–is within reach. Michael McFaul, a former US ambassador to Russia now professor at Stanford University, confessed as much, calling such an outcome “the most desirable but also the least likely.”

The Russian military operation isn’t proceeding smoothly, and Ukrainian forces are resisting, partly thanks to international assistance, but the power balance is unquestionably in Moscow’s favor and Putin appears determined to continue the invasion, indifferent to the consequences, both human and material. Putin seems willing to destroy Ukraine to possess it, using methods not dissimilar to the ones used by Moscow in Chechnya in the 1990s or, under his leadership, Syria this past decade.

For Putin, withdrawal from Ukraine and recognition of its status as an independent state would mean failure, the denial of his conception of Russian identity and the accompanying dream of rebuilding a modern Russian empire. The humiliation would be greater if the outcome entailed acceptance of Ukraine’s complete territorial integrity, i.e., the return of the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in the Donbass, which Moscow recognized as independent before the invasion, and of Crimea, which it annexed in 2014. Make no mistake: many governments demand no less.

More ambitious goals, such as regime change in Russia, are even more elusive, and a new government in Moscow would also not necessarily be an improvement. Besides, pursuing such a goal would likely lead to military escalation–a development the United States, European powers, and others are trying to avoid. Putin, who has long believed that many are out to get him, could feel vindicated and lash out, either by widening the conflict beyond Ukraine or resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.

Avril Haines, the US director of national intelligence, recently said that while Putin likely did not anticipate the pushback he is getting in Ukraine and internationally, he “is unlikely to be deterred by such setbacks and instead may escalate–essentially doubling down.” Assume she’s right: now imagine what Putin could do if eliminating him became the policy of many governments (and if that policy galvanized Russians to support him).

Given the power asymmetry between Russia and Ukraine and the redlines that the governments responding to the invasion have drawn for themselves, the outcome of the conflict is likely to disappoint many. At best, Ukraine’s resistance and the pressure campaign will force Russia into a settlement, with to-be-determined terms, possibly short of restoring the status quo. At worst, Russia might succeed in destroying and/or vassalizing Ukraine.

Analysts will soon begin identifying lessons about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. One is already emerging: there are hard limits to how much developments and outcomes can be shaped after a determined major nuclear-armed power has begun invading a weaker nation, especially when the responding powers rule out military engagement.

Admittedly, different situations will present different challenges and opportunities. In response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, building a coalition to pressure Beijing would likely be more difficult because many countries are much more dependent on the Chinese economy than on the Russian economy. Stopping or rolling back such an invasion, however, might be less challenging because the maritime environment in Asia presents Beijing with a natural barrier that would complicate its operations.

More importantly, whereas the United States refuses to go to war with Russia over Ukraine because it never committed to its defense, it has remained “strategically ambiguous” as to whether it would do so over Taiwan. In that case, then, Washington would not rule out military action, regardless of the escalation risks. Meanwhile, a military response would definitely be on the table in the event of an invasion of a NATO or another US treaty ally; Biden has stressed that “We will defend every single inch of NATO territory with the full might of a united and galvanized NATO.”

The key takeaway from the current conflict in Ukraine is that it is best to prevent an invasion from ever taking place. Practically, and especially for the United States, that means adapting its military posture and that of nations most exposed to, or worried about, potential invasion in ways that deny would-be aggressors the ability to proceed. It also means reducing and, if possible, eliminating dependencies and vulnerabilities they have with potential aggressors. Doing so will enhance deterrence and, should invasion happen regardless, allow for more effective resistance and, therefore, more flexibility in shaping developments and outcomes.

Had Ukraine worked harder (and been helped more) to adopt such a “denial strategy” after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Putin might have refrained from invading. If he had chosen to do so anyway, his forces would have encountered more resistance, increasing the prospects of a settlement favorable to Ukraine.

Looking to Asia where the power balance is shifting fast in China’s favor, this line of thinking should drive actions about Taiwan. No one wants to look back in a few years thinking that more should have been done to prevent or complicate a Chinese invasion. The time to act–and act fast–is now.

David Santoro ([email protected]) is President and CEO of the Pacific Forum. He is the editor of US-China Nuclear Relations: The Impact of Strategic Triangles (Lynne Rienner, May 2021). Follow him on Twitter @DavidSantoro1.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

Photo: Sergei Supinsky/AFP