Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR5 – ROK-US Alliance: Linchpin for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

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Introduction

The US-ROK alliance in 2023 celebrates its 70th anniversary, and in both countries remains broadly popular. Previous doubts that both countries have had about the other’s commitment have largely given way to a sense of shared opportunities, and shared challenges. Not only is there an ever-more belligerent North Korea, with its growing nuclear and missile arsenals, but the People’s Republic of China uses both military and economic means to coerce other countries and Russia has demonstrated a willingness to upend norms, redraw borders, and dare former partners (including Seoul) to risk its ire.

2023년의 한미동맹은 70주년을 맞아 양국에서 널리 사랑받고 있습니다. 양국이 상대방의 약속과 책무에 대해 가졌던 이전의 의구심은 공통의 기회와 도전에 함께 대응하며 사그라 들었습니다. 호전성을 더해가는 북한이 핵과 미사일 무기를 증강시키고 있을 뿐만 아니라 중국은 군사적, 경제적 수단을 모두 사용하여 다른 국가를 압박하고 있으며 러시아는 한국을 포함한 국가들의 반발에도 불구하고 국제 규범을 무시한 채 국경을 다시 그리려는 의지를 보여주었습니다.

This is also an era of the minilateral, as the US seeks to move past its previous hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia and draw its partners into closer cooperation. South Korea, especially under its current administration, demonstrates increased interest in becoming a regional player, with its recent gestures toward old frenemy Japan representing a key test: historical differences between the US’ two closest partners have prevented a “normal” relationship from emerging despite many similarities in political systems, values, and interests, and Korean public opinion remains skeptical of the Seoul-Tokyo rapprochement. Furthermore, there is always a chance that issues complicating US-ROK relations in the past—conduct by US military personnel in Korea, trade disputes, environmental concerns related to US bases—could resurface.

현재 미국은 아시아에서 이전의 대규모 동맹 시스템을 뒤로하고 우방국을 보다 긴밀한 협력으로 끌어들이려는 소다자주의적(minilateral) 입장을 취하고 있습니다. 한국, 특히 현 정부 하의 한국은 지역 내 핵심 국가가 되는 것에 대해 관심을 높이고 있으며 최근 한국이 애증관계에 있는 일본에 취한 제스처는 다음과 같은 의문을 낳습니다. 미국의 가장 가까운 두 동맹국 간의 역사적 갈등은 양국이 가진 정치 체제, 가치관, 이해관계의 많은 유사점에도 불구하고 양국의 정상적 외교 관계를 가로막았으며 한국 여론은 여전히 ​​한일 화해에 회의적입니다. 또한 주한미군의 비위 문제, 무역분쟁, 주한미군기지와 관련된 환경문제 등 과거 한미관계를 복잡하게 만들었던 문제들이 재부상할 가능성 역시 항상 존재합니다.

All of these issues present challenges for the alliance that will require addressing. In that light, the Pacific Forum, with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, has launched the “ROK-US Next Generation Leaders Initiative” program, bringing together young burgeoning scholars and analysts from both countries to discuss pressing issues in the alliance the way forward. This edited volume contains edited papers on pressing topics—extended deterrence, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and much more—by rising scholars we expect to see addressing these issues in the years to come. Their active engagement, we believe, will help the alliance endure another 70 years, will providing for the security and prosperity of both countries.

이러한 모든 문제는 동맹이 앞으로 해결해 나가야 할 과제를 제시합니다. 그런 의미에서 태평양포럼은 한국국제교류재단의 전폭적인 지원을 받아 양국의 젊은 신진 학자와 연구자들을 한 자리에 모아 한미동맹의 시급한 현안을 논의하는 ‘한미차세대지도자 구상’ 프로그램을 출범시켰습니다. 해당 편집된 발행본은 확장 억지력, 북한, 중국, 러시아, 일본 등 시급한 현안에 대해 앞으로 연구해 나갈 신진 학자들의 논문을 담고 있습니다. 우리는 그들의 적극적인 참여가 한미동맹이 향후 70년 더 지속하는데 도움을 줄 것이며 양국의 안보와 번영의 초석을 다질 것이라고 믿습니다.

Rob York

Director for Regional Affairs

Pacific Forum

Click here to download the full report.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Threat and the US-ROK Extended Deterrence | Chanyang Seo
Chapter 2: The Escalation Risks of Conventional Military Operations against North Korea’s Land-Based Ballistic Missile Forces | Kyungwon Suh
Chapter 3: Indo-Pacific-Focused ROK-US Maritime Exercises: Strengthening Operational Readiness to Safeguard the Indo-Pacific | Jaeeun Ha
Chapter 4: Legitimate Containment: How the ROK-US Reciprocal Defense Procurement can legitimately balance China’s military influence in the South China Sea | Yaechan Lee
Chapter 5: The Five Eyes (FVEY) Intelligence Alliance: Should the Republic of Korea (ROK) be Included as a Permanent Member Under President Yoon Suk Yeol’s Term? | Jung Seob Kim
Chapter 6: The Role of Local Governments Alliances: Improving Military Morale & Readiness of the ROK-US Joint Force | Gyeonga Kang
Chapter 7: South Korea’s Second Sight: Risks and Rewards for the ROK-US Alliance with Russia | Julian Gluck
Chapter 8: ROK and a Hard Place: Improving Republic of Korea and Japan Relations in Support of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific | Chloe Clougher
Chapter 9: A Strengthened US-ROK Partnership to Bolster Resilient Development in the Asia-Pacific Region | Lindsay Horikoshi
Chapter 10: Military Alliances, Environmental Degradation, and Status of Armed Forces Agreements | Kyle Wardwell

About the Authors

Chloe Clougher is the officer in charge of intelligence and strategic debriefing at the 320th Special Tactics Squadron, Kadena Air Base, Japan. She recently completed a deployment in support of Special Operations Command Pacific’s Military Liaison Element at US Embassy, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. She received her master’s degree in international relations from the Yenching Academy of Peking University, Beijing, China, and her bachelor’s degree in biology and Mandarin Chinese from The College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA. She is also an alumna of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Ms. Clougher is proficient in Chinese and Arabic, and previously lived and studied in China, Taiwan, and Jordan. Her research interests include Chinese politics and foreign policy, intellectual property law in China, environmental NGOs and legislation, economic development in East and Southeast Asia, infrastructure aid in Asia and Oceania, and rising nationalism.

Julian Gluck is a United States Air Force bomber instructor pilot and staff officer who recently served as Aide-de-Camp to the Commander of U.S. Air Forces Korea (Seventh Air Force). He is a 2012 Distinguished Graduate of the United States Air Force Academy and received the 2019 Secretary of the Air Force Leadership Award as the top graduate of Squadron Officer School. Major Gluck is a member of the Program for Emerging Leaders at National Defense University, a Military Fellow at the Project on International Peace and Security at the College of William & Mary, and a Shawn Brimley Next Generation National Security Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He was named to the Forbes 30 Under 30 class of 2020 as a standout honoree for Law & Policy in North America. Additionally, Major Gluck co-founded Young Professionals in Foreign Policy’s Northeast Asia Security Symposium. His research interests include multilateralism, nuclear deterrence, and the Indo-Pacific.

Jaeeun Ha is a native of Pyeongtaek and attended the Yeungnam University, earning a Bachelors of Arts in Education. She interned at the G9 office of Camp Henry, located in Daegu, Korea, where she developed interest in working in the international community, and later joined the Republic of Korea Navy as an ensign. Ha served as the translator of the training branch of the Republic of Korea Fleet command of Flotilla 5. During this assignment, she was involved with countless multinational exercises, training, and international conferences including Cobra Gold, MCSOF, ADMM-Plus, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Multinational Mine warfare Exercise, Combined/Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, etc. Ha’s awards include the MND Medal, ROKFLT Commander Medal, MC Commandant Medal and other personal commendations. Ha’s last assignment was the Foreign Area Officer/Translator of the International Cooperation Branch for the Republic of Korea Navy Headquarters, and she is a freelance translator.

Lindsay Horikoshi is currently an Engagement Manager at Camber Collective, a social impact strategy consulting firm, where she leads teams of management consultants on complex strategy, customer insights, and project management engagements. She has over eight years of experience supporting private sector, multilateral, and US government clients, including U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Defense Health Agency. She has designed, implemented, and evaluated strategy and transformation programs in global health, as well as military and veteran’s health. Prior to joining Camber, she worked as a global health subject matter expert with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Inspector General. Lindsay earned an MSc. in Global Health and a BS in International Health from Georgetown University and is a Certified Supply Chain Professional (CSCP). In addition to global health, research interests include international security cooperation with US allies and partners, supply chain and economic resilience, and comparative health systems.

Gyeonga Kang is the Operations Lead for Chinook-47 Performance Based Logistics (PBL) at Boeing Korea LLC. Her main responsibility is to support the day-to-day operations of the in-country team by working as a liaison for the customers (ROK Army and Air Force). She previously worked as a government official Lv. 7 at the Gyeonggi Provincial Government, the biggest provincial government in South Korea. She served as a liaison for USFK, 8A, 2ID, and 7AF to improve community-military relations in the Gyeonggi Province. She received her BA in international relations from the University of Puget Sound. In May 2023, she is starting her master’s program and will be majoring in program management. With her experience and degree, she is hoping to become a program manager for the Boeing Company. In January 2023, her research paper on “the Role of Role of Local Governments in ROK-US Alliance: Improving Military Morale and Readiness of the ROK-US Joint Force” was published by Pacific Forum. In the paper, she discussed the causes of the Rodriguez Live Fire Complex in Gyeonggi-do and offered policy recommendations to contribute to establishing an open and free Indo-Pacific.

Jung Seob “Scott” Kim is a cyber threat intelligence practitioner with five years of experience in intelligence and international affairs. He currently holds an MS and BA in criminal justice with a specialization in cybercrime. He focuses on applying threat intelligence and helps organizations managing threats within the financial sectors. He was selected to the Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and participated as a member of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity’s Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Operation Centers. Kim is the co-author of the academic article “Assessing the Practical Cybersecurity Skills Gained Through Criminal Justice Academic Programs to Benefit Security Operations Center” that was published by the Journal of Cybersecurity Education, Research and Practice. He also contributed to the “Increasing Threats of Deepfake Identities” white paper published by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Kim was born in South Korea, speaks fluent Korean, and is a first-generation college graduate.

Yaechan Lee is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Boston University. He has received a BA in economics from Waseda University and an MA in international relations from Peking University. Based on his experiences in the major economies of the region, Yaechan’s work focuses on a wide range of topics involving the Korean peninsula. His papers have been published in top outlets such as the Pacific Review, where he discusses Korea’s hedging strategy in the East Asian region. He has also written many op-eds in the past in outlets such as The Diplomat” that discuss similar topics on Korea.

Chanyang Seo is a researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses where she focuses on North Korean nuclear and missile programs. She completed a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD) from The Fletcher School at Tufts University. In her master’s thesis, Chanyang examined North Korea’s nuclear politics for a maximalist unification goal through the ‘Stick and Carrot’ strategy. Previously, she worked as a research intern at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva. She also worked as a research assistant in the International Security Studies program at The Fletcher School. Her research interests lie in inter-Korean relations, US-DPRK relations, North Korean nuclear program, nuclear security and nonproliferation, and regional security in East Asia.

Kyungwon Suh is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Technology and International Security at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories. Starting September 2023, he will be a Lecturer at the Australian National University’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre. He received his PhD in political science from Syracuse University in 2022. His research interests include nuclear weapons, interstate coercion, alliance politics, and great power politics. Born in the Republic of Korea, he earned his BA in political science from Sungkyunkwan University and MA in political science from Yonsei University.

Kyle E. Wardwell is a recent International Relations MA graduate from Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea. Prior to this position, Kyle received a Chemistry degree from Oklahoma City University and a Biomedical Engineering degree from the University of Oklahoma. After competing for Team USA in the Rio 2016 Paralympics as a guide runner for blind athletes, Kyle worked as a medical research assistant and received a Fulbright Scholarship for two years in South Korea, serving as an instructor, orientation leader, and editor. Kyle’s research interests include cost analysis of trade disruption and the impact of the international military operations and global supply chains on environmental degradation.

PacNet #39 – AUKUS: Enhancing Undersea Deterrence

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Driven by the CCP’s imperative to oversee “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049, US intelligence sources indicate that Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered the PLA to become capable of countering American military power in the Indo-Pacific and ready for a takeover of Taiwan by 2027. This is an alarming prospect lent credence by recent Chinese military exercises around the island nation. According to Adm. John Aquilino, Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), in his March Congressional testimony, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is on track to deliver 440 battle force ships by 2030, including significant increases in aircraft carriers and major surface combatants. As it grows in strength, the PLAN is likely to use its large naval forces to further uphold, even enforce, illegitimate Chinese claims over areas of the East and South China seas, areas through which foreign vessels of all kinds have rights to move under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the PRC ratified in 1996.

In this worsening geopolitical environment Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have created the AUKUS submarine and technology-sharing agreement, which has been called a “trilateral, security partnership based on defense capabilities that support [the three countries’] mutual national defense objectives.” According to Mara Karlin, US Assistant Secretary of Defence for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, the agreement will “lift all three nations’ submarine industrial bases and undersea capabilities, enhancing deterrence and promoting stability in the Indo-Pacific.”

Deterring indirectly

Before explaining how AUKUS facilitates “direct deterrence” from the perspective of capabilities, capacity, and force posture, it is important to identify forms of “indirect deterrence,” namely by promoting deterrence through a constellation of security alignments and the strengthening of the defense industrial base (DIB). In the case of these latter two forms of “indirect deterrence,” AUKUS—as with the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral and the Quad—is a minilateral. These minilaterals are not strictly alliances, but provide their members with a shared pool of military capabilities or what has also been dubbed a “federated model of defense.” Within the United States, these alignments gel with the administration’s organizing principle of “integrated deterrence,” which was laid out in the 2022 National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Nuclear Posture Review. In addition to accelerating efforts to promote planning, coordination, and operations between various US government agencies and US allies, AUKUS also provides integrated deterrence at the level of the defense industrial base for all three cooperating nations. While it would be a stretch to call this “undersea deterrence,” it would also be remiss not to mention the bolstering effect AUKUS will have on naval shipyards, the nuclear enterprise, and undersea sensor and weapons systems industries, which all contribute to national strength.

Directly deterring from beneath the sea

Defining deterrence as the “building of combat credible forces across all domains and across the full spectrum of conflict to deter aggression,” Karlin also noted that AUKUS is about more than just pillars I and II, but also includes a focus on undersea deterrence throughout the Indo-Pacific across a range of areas. At the simplest level, the agreement adds to undersea deterrence by delivering new advanced warfighting capabilities to its members, particularly Australia: it provides two types of nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) platforms—the Virginia class and “AUKUS class”—to replace Australia’s aging Collins class of conventionally powered submarines. While it is a crude measure, more vessels with long-range capabilities, amplified by the advanced weapons capacity and kinetic effects that they can deliver at greater range, more effectively may deter an adversary in the event that it contemplates aggression.

Map: AUKUS

AUKUS thus provides all three countries with a wider distributed force posture closer to likely areas of operations, vis-à-vis the PLAN in the Western Pacific. As shown in Map 1, nuclear-propelled submarines greatly complicate the PRC’s calculus. They can be sent north of Australia to stalking grounds surrounding the South and East China seas, which are critical to Chinese maritime communication lines across the Pacific and to the Middle East and East Africa. By making these routes more vulnerable to interdiction, AUKUS forces the PLAN into a more defensive posture, which may direct resources away from large warships and logistics vessels designed for expeditionary operations.

It does this through the 2-part pathway framework agreed upon in March 2023. The first part of the pathway consists of increased port visits by US and UK SSNs from 2023, which adds to the ability of INDOPACOM and the Royal Navy to regularly  position forces east of the Strait of Malacca and west of the International Date Line (IDL)—a helpful softening of the tyranny of distance confronting US and UK naval forces. The second part of the framework includes a rotational element in Australia under the Submarine Rotational Force West intended to begin by 2027. According to the Australian Department of Defence, this will be composed of “a rotational presence…of one UK and up to four US, nuclear-powered submarines” at Fleet Base West. This is likely to draw In Astute- and Virginia-class submarines. Again, this adds to a joint and combined campaign, allowing the three allies to synchronize joint capabilities through increased exercises and further cementing persistent forces in between the Strait of Malacca and the IDL.

Forms of deterrence provided by AUKUS

AUKUS, therefore, provides deterrence at multiple levels. The first two are forms of “indirect deterrence,” or factors which strengthen general deterrence at the state level.

  1. AUKUS provides a signal of intent—through that of political alignment—potentially muddying the calculations of a potential aggressor. This is AUKUS as a minilateral grouping, and as architecture rather than as a defense industrial deal.
  2. AUKUS provides indirect deterrence by adding to national strength by adding to the DIB of each member by providing opportunities for industrial cooperation and production. It releases national resources towards shipping industries that may have previously been in decline.

AUKUS has several effects in terms of direct deterrence, too. It is helpful to use the four-point “Seize the Initiative” INDOPACOM approach to divide them:

  1. In its simplest and most direct form, AUKUS contributes to undersea deterrence by providing its members, notably Australia, with new advanced warfighting platforms (the SSNs and their systems).
  2. That these are superior systems, with longer ranges provided by their nuclear propulsion, adds to their impact on potential adversaries’ logistics and planning. As submarines can hide underwater, they are an asymmetrical weapons system, designed to threaten sea lanes and surface shipping, both commercial and military.
  3. Then there are the agreements made in March of this year, such as the two-part pathway that allows for a second direct form of undersea deterrence: that of providing those platforms in a distributed posture across the region. Whether through port visits or a more sustained presence through Submarine Rotational Force West, AUKUS brings more allied forces into the Western Pacific.
  4. Then, finally, there is the deterrent effect produced by Submarine Rotational Force West itself: that of an integrated allied operational force that ideally will operate under a combined command structure.

Conclusion

As American, Australian, and British submariners train, exercise, and deploy, so will their operational capability and efficacy increase. They will become an integrated force capable of great strategic effect—deterrence—in the Indo-Pacific, a valuable asset for any war planner. The question as to whether these six forms of deterrence will deter Xi from ordering PLAN forces to lunge across the Taiwan Strait or from undertaking coercive activity across the First Island Chain is unclear. While they might not sufficient—given the time it takes for these systems and structures to come on line—these nascent capabilities will complicate PLAN planning and logistics. In the future, in any actual kinetic contingency, they will also provide a potent instrument to contain Chinese regional ambitions and military coercion.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

PacNet #36 – How Biden can make the most of his Pacific Islands trip

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An earlier version of this article was published in The Pacific Island Times.

Later this month, President Biden is scheduled to make an official visit to Papua New Guinea while en route to the Quad Leaders’ Summit from the G7 Leaders’ Summit. The visit is being hailed as the first time that a sitting American president has ever visited a Pacific island country. It also builds on three prior events attended by senior leadership figures.

In 2018, former Vice President Mike Pence visited Papua New Guinea to attend the APEC CEO Summit. At that event, he highlighted the value of multi-billion dollar investments made in Papua New Guinea by ExxonMobil. He declared that the United States would partner with Australia and Papua New Guinea on Lombrum Naval Base. And he promised that the US government would protect the sovereignty and maritime rights of Pacific island countries.

Last July, incumbent Vice President Kamala Harris addressed the 51st Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting. In her remarks, she acknowledged that the Pacific Island Countries have not received the diplomatic spotlight that they deserve from the US government. She also delivered a commitment to strengthen the partnership between the United States and the Pacific island countries.

Last September, Biden hosted the US-Pacific Island Country Summit, where participants jointly issued a Declaration on the US-Pacific Partnership. Separately, the Biden administration published a formal roadmap for how to implement the commitments made on the American side. This coincided with the release of a Pacific Partnership Strategy as an addendum to the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States.

During the upcoming visit, the Biden administration will seek to further strengthen the partnership between the United States and the Pacific island countries. This will start by putting Papua New Guinea on the list of Presidential Travels Abroad. But, it will not end there. This trip will need to be about much more than a touch and go on a runway in Port Moresby.

The Biden administration will need to make this trip worth the risks. That will require President Biden to deliver on multiple commitments in the space of only a few hours. That will present its own challenges.

There are a lot of upstream dependencies and downstream uncertainties. The Biden administration will therefore need to be prudent in their selection of deliverables.

Here are four options they are likely to consider:

First, Biden should have a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Marape of Papua New Guinea. Assuming the negotiations will be concluded, that meeting would provide an opportunity to sign new defense and surveillance cooperation agreements between the United States and Papua New Guinea. That would mark an important bilateral win.

Second, Biden should have a joint meeting with Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr, Marshall Islands President David Kabua, and Micronesian President David Panuelo. Assuming the negotiations will be concluded, that meeting would provide an opportunity to announce the Compact of Free Association agreements between the United States and the freely associated states. That would enable the next phase in the renewal process to kick-off prior to the debt limit X-date and the summer recess for the United States Congress.

Third, Biden should have a multilateral meeting with the member states of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). That meeting would not only provide an opportunity for all parties to attest to the broadening and deepening of regional cooperation on priority issues such as climate change, economic recovery, maritime security, environmental protection, and international security. It also would present a platform for the PIF member states to independently observe that the US government is making progress against the Roadmap for a 21st-Century US-Pacific Island Partnership.

Of course, not all commitments can be fulfilled through bilateral and multilateral meetings. The American public tends to exhibit limited knowledge about geography, foreign policy, and the world. It also appears to be uncertain about the economy and impatient with the ongoing war in Ukraine. There is a risk that such sentiments could endanger the billions of dollars that the United States government intends to spend on a revised diplomatic and military posture in the Pacific islands region. The Biden administration will need to mitigate that risk.

This presents the fourth option. The Biden administration should try to use the setting to their advantage. The American public may have severe gaps in their knowledge about Papua New Guinea, but many Americans know about the region through war stories about places like Bismarck Sea and Guadalcanal.

Some even have personal memories involving family members. President Biden is one of them. He reportedly had two uncles who were based in Papua New Guinea during World War II. The Biden administration could try to leverage these historic battles and personal memories to persuade a wider audience of the myth that America is a Pacific nation.

Michael Walsh ([email protected]) is a senior adjunct fellow at Pacific Forum. He also is an affiliate of the Center for Australian, New Zealand, and Pacific Islands Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: Flags of countries in the Pacific Islands Forum as featured in an article by The Fiji Times. 

PacNet #32 – Europe’s China confusion does the world a disservice

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An earlier version of this article appeared in The Japan Times.

Talk about mixed messages! Days after European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made one of the toughest speeches ever on China by an EU official, French President Emmanuel Macron visited that country with a delegation of business leaders.

Macron’s visit saw him meeting with supreme leader Xi Jinping, emphasizing points of convergence with Chinese proposals to end the Ukraine war and touting Europe’s “strategic autonomy”—diplomatic speak for creating distance from the United States on important policy matters.

It’s music to Chinese ears. Beijing is eager to exploit those differences to dilute any consensus on China policy within Europe and widen gaps between it and Washington to prevent the emergence of a unified position toward China.

European incoherence is worrying and not for just obvious reasons. Internal differences deprive the world of a credible alternative to the hard line toward China that dominates thinking in the United States. This is especially troubling for Japan, whose logic in many ways mirrors that of Europe.

In a speech the week before Macron’s visit, von der Leyen said that Xi “essentially wants China to become the world’s most powerful nation,” and that had been accompanied by a “deliberate hardening” of China’s strategic stance, with the country becoming “more repressive at home and more assertive abroad.” She pulled no punches, noting that “Just as China has been ramping up its military posture, it has also ramped up its policies of disinformation and economic and trade coercion. This is a deliberate policy targeting other countries to ensure they comply and conform.”

The EU identified China as a “systemic rival” in its 2019 strategic outlook. That label takes on special significance given von der Leyen’s pledge “to ensure that our companies’ capital, expertise and knowledge are not used to enhance the military and intelligence capabilities of those who are also systemic rivals.”

For her, however, and in distinction from US policy, the preferred policy is to de-risk trade with China, not to decouple. “We do not want to cut economic, societal, political or scientific ties. … But our relationship is unbalanced and increasingly affected by distortions created by China’s state capitalist system. So we need to rebalance this relationship on the basis of transparency, predictability and reciprocity.”

That means recognizing Chinese ambitions for what they truly are, rather than what some might want them to be—or as they may be presented—and promoting competitiveness and resilience within EU economies and businesses. That means reducing vulnerabilities created by reliance on single suppliers for critical or essential materials. That means employing defensive measures, like the trade controls mentioned above.

Her tough words contrasted with Macron’s message. He and Xi issued a joint communique in which they agreed to “improve market access” for each other’s businesses and designated 2024 as a “China-France Year of Culture and Tourism,” a move intended to get Chinese tourists to visit France as pandemic travel restrictions are eased. They also closed a deal to open a second production line for Airbus in China, another boost to the company’s ambitions in that market.

Macron emphasized the need to promote Europe’s “strategic autonomy,” or as he explained in an interview during his visit, reducing dependence on the United States and preventing Europe from getting “caught up in crises that are not ours.” Addressing the Taiwan situation, he added that “the worst thing” would be for Europeans to “become followers on this topic and take our cue from the US agenda and a Chinese overreaction.” Those comments generated considerable pushback in Europe; the Biden administration focused instead on cooperation with France.

China welcomed Macron; von der Leyen, a member of Macron’s group, not so much. Politico contrasted the treatment given the two. Macron was met on the airport tarmac by the foreign minister; von der Leyen got the ecology minister at the regular passenger exit. Macron’s schedule was overflowing, von der Leyen’s was bare-bones. Macron had a glittery state banquet with Xi while von der Leyen held a news conference at EU delegation headquarters. As Politico summarized the atmosphere, “While state media trumpeted the Sino-French relationship, Chinese social media demonized von der Leyen as an American puppet.”

If all that was too subtle, Fu Cong, China’s ambassador to the EU, was blunt in remarks to the Financial Times the day of von der Leyen’s speech. “We do hope that the European governments and the European politicians can see where their interests lie and then resist the unwarranted pressure from the US,” adding “it will only be at their own peril.” After all, he noted, “Who in their right mind would abandon such a thriving market as big as China?”

The easy explanation for EU schizophrenia is “good cop, bad cop.” That assumes a level of foresight and coherence in European diplomacy that seems unduly optimistic. Most observers concede that there are, as Mikko Huotari, director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies explained, substantive differences between von der Leyen and the major EU governments on how to handle EU-China relations.

There is also a self-serving element to Macron’s statements: In this and similar formulations, European strategic autonomy would be led by France. In his typically incisive and caustic analysis, Tufts University professor Dan Drezner writes that “Macron is playing his part of the French president and trying to call attention to himself.” According to Drezner, the appropriate “considered response is a polite shrug.”

Still, there is a real cost to Europe’s incoherence but it isn’t the one that typically comes to mind. A European position that is both clear-eyed about China while acknowledging the need for engagement would provide an important counterweight to the narrow-minded consensus that dominates thinking in the United States.

Writing in The National Interest last month, Paul Heer, a former American national intelligence officer for Northeast Asia, worried about the “bipartisan consensus on the nature and scope of the threat from China,” challenging the validity of the premises upon which those judgments are based and warning of groupthink that could lead US policy dangerously astray.

Heer agrees that China is a formidable and ruthless opponent and one that requires a comprehensive, whole-of-government competitive US response. Still, he rejects — citing the Annual Threat Assessment of the US intelligence community — that it is “an ‘existential’ winner-take-all threat to US global power and influence or to the American way of life, requiring a wholly adversarial cold war US response.”

His conclusion matches that of Harry Hannah, another former American intelligence official, who argues in a Stimson Center Red Cell report that a fixation on China risks repeating Cold War mistakes, especially that of ignoring or underplaying other developments that could be equally if not more important to US national security. Hannah is especially keen to empower other actors whose interests and values align with that of the United States, even though they may not be identical. Ignoring them or forcing them to toe the US line, he argues, plays to Beijing’s preference for a great power “Group of Two” that marginalizes other countries—many of which are US allies or partners.

A united Europe, one with a coherent and consistent policy toward China, could, in this conception of global order, balance China without going to the US extreme. While Europe alone can’t check China, its approach approximates that of Japan and together they offer a more inviting alternative to those skeptical of the all-or-nothing US policy. It is a credible option for those in Washington uncomfortable with the prevailing hard line, too.

Europe can’t replace the United States on issues of Indo-Pacific security. Forging a framework for constructively engaging one of the world’s superpowers is just as vital, however. Brussels can’t do that alone. Only by working with Tokyo and other like-minded countries can Europe succeed.

Japan has been reaching out to Europe for some time now, a process that began two decades ago and accelerated under the Trump administration as Tokyo and Brussels sought allies to gird an international order weakened by Beijing, Moscow and, sadly, Washington. Japan and the EU signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement, the Economic Partnership Agreement and the Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure to strengthen their cooperation and counter the forces of revisionism.

The United States needs to adopt a more flexible approach to its allies and partners, giving them the space to maneuver as they see fit—as long as they work toward the same goals. But this demands that those allies step up as well. Recent events show that Brussels understands the challenge; meeting it remains beyond its grasp.

Brad Glosserman ([email protected]) is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University as well as senior adviser (nonresident) at Pacific Forum. He is the author of Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions (Georgetown University Press, 2019). This article is drawn from a forthcoming book on the new national security economy.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: President Xi Jinping and President Emmanuel Macron at an official ceremony at the Great Hall of the People (6 April 2023, CNN) by Gonzalo Fuentes via Reuters. 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, CR1 – South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Emerging US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral

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Executive Summary

The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue conducted in December 2022 confirmed that there is very little difference in threat perceptions regarding the East and South China Seas. The three countries view China’s increasingly assertive claims to the territories and maritime zones in the two bodies of water as antithetical to their shared vision of a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. China’s rapid military expansion, including unprecedented nuclear weapons and missile buildup, reinforces the urgency of the threat. Japanese and Philippine interlocutors worry that as China approaches nuclear parity with the United States, the region’s strategic environment will worsen. American participants emphasized greater and tangible demonstration of alliance commitments and agreed that some risk-taking is required to push back against Chinese coercion. There was a consensus about the challenge of addressing Beijing’s gray zone activities that have so far succeeded in seizing territories and maritime areas in the South China Sea and establishing regular intrusions into Japanese waters in the East China Sea. Participants struggled to find a strategy to blunt China’s salami-slicing tactics while avoiding escalation and armed conflict.

Key Findings & Recommendations

The geographic locations of the Philippines and Japan make them frontline allies in addressing maritime security challenges brought about by an increasingly assertive China. Long term, Chinese coercion is expected to worsen  as  it  commissions  new  vessels,  deploys sophisticated missile systems, and approaches nuclear parity with the United States. The three countries should be willing to take some risks to prevent China’s coercion from succeeding. The alliances need to be reinforced through more explicit demonstration of commitments. Discussion between these countries on the strategic implications of Beijing’s rapid nuclear and missile buildup should commence. The dialogue emphasized these findings, among other takeaways.

Finding: One function of Beijing’s gray zone operations is to test the resolve of other claimants and the United States, hoping they prioritize de-escalation to avoid armed conflict and eventually back down. During a “gray zone” crisis, prioritizing de-escalation when China escalates will likely result in fait accompli, with Beijing gaining more maritime spaces and territories.

  • Recommendation: The United States, Japan, and the Philippines should be willing to take some risks (for example, by conducting operations to get past a blockade instead of abandoning the mission) to prevent China’s coercion from succeeding.

Finding: Chinese gray zone coercion in the South China Sea follows a pattern. Militia vessels first establish a presence in another country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), inside the nine-dash line. Since they pose as fishing vessels, they force other claimants to consider two difficult options: either conduct law enforcement operations against the vessels, risking tension with China or simply monitor and record. CCG vessels and occasionally PLA Navy vessels anchor close by to deter other claimants from taking action.

  • Recommendation: Operationally, the United States and its allies should consider abandoning the concept of gray zone and instead draw a clear line between benign peaceful activities and non-peaceful activities to encompass operations carried out by civilian agents taking orders from military agencies.
  • Recommendation: Instead of identifying China’s actions as being in the gray zone, which leads to confusion about how to respond without risking armed conflict, the United States and its allies should instead match the escalation and turn the tables on China, for instance by reinforcing presence to maintain the status quo, instead of focusing on ways to de-escalate and end the crisis.

Finding: When Washington committed to the Japan- administered Senkaku Islands in 2014 and refused to offer the same to Philippine-administered land features in the South China Sea, the credibility of the U.S.-Philippine alliance significantly decreased, which resulted in more Chinese assertiveness and stronger voices in the Philippines calling for an accommodation of Chinese security preferences.

  • Recommendation: The United States needs to become more willing to commit explicitly to existing defense treaties during crises to increase deterrence while also compelling China to reverse course.

Finding: There are legal constraints to Japan’s response to China’s gray zone challenges. For instance, the JCG is legally mandated to conduct law enforcement operations against fishing vessels, and even against militia vessels, as they are not sovereign immune vessels. The JMSDF is in charge of maritime security operations but is only allowed to act when the JCG cannot manage a specific threat and when the defense minister has given an order. The JCG cannot conduct law enforcement operations against CCG vessels, which are sovereign immune vessels. However, the JMSDF also cannot conduct maritime security operations against CCG vessels because they are not considered warships by the Japanese government. Meanwhile, the U.S. military has made clear since April 2019 that it would make no distinction between Chinese Coast Guard and militia boats and PLA Navy ships.

  • Recommendation: The United States and Japan should discuss the roles of JCG, JMSDF, and U.S. Forces Japan during crises to cope with political constraints and mitigate the operational implications of legal gaps.

Finding: Beijing’s unprecedented nuclear weapons build-up is integral to China’s long-term maritime security goals in Southeast Asia. The trajectory of China’s nuclear weapons build-up predicting a stockpile of about 1,500 warheads by 2035 and reaching nuclear parity with (if not nuclear superiority over) the United States, could shape the cost-benefit calculations of U.S. allies and partners.

  • Recommendation: The United States should make investments and not allow China to achieve nuclear superiority while also commencing discussions with Japan on nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing and with the Philippines on its appetite for a nuclear umbrella in exchange for greater U.S. access to Philippines bases.

Finding: The biggest challenge for Japan and the U.S.- Japan alliance vis-à-vis gray zone coercion in the East China Sea is that CCG vessels are sovereign immune vessels and, therefore, cannot be subjected to ordinary law-enforcement operations. China would see JMSDF conducting maritime security operations against warships as an act of war and could trigger escalation toward armed conflict.

  • Recommendation: Japan should reconsider CCG vessels’ sovereign immunity since intrusion into the Japanese territorial sea to assert territorial jurisdiction is a violation of Japan’s sovereignty. This could mean taking considerable risks by maneuvering to physically challenge the presence of Chinese government vessels inside the Japanese territorial sea or block any resupply mission. Any risk-taking should be fully coordinated with the United States to avoid a mismatch in expectations.

Finding: U.S. and Japanese participants diverged on how they perceived the usual refrain of not taking sides on sovereignty issues that accompany U.S. statements related to territorial disputes in the region. Some Japanese participants view the wording as unnecessary and worry it could give the impression that U.S. commitment is weak.

  • Recommendation: The United States should word statements to highlight the source of tension and Washington’s strong alliance commitments.

Finding: Winning the information war is critical to holding China to account for its assertive behavior.

  • Recommendation: Philippine and Japanese militaries and coast guards should invest in surveillance hardware and facilitate the release of data (including photographs, satellite data, and videos) to the public. Data should be released after an incident in a matter of hours, not days or weeks. Doing so would put Chinese propagandists on the defensive and not dominate the information domain. The United States should assist in providing ISR data and ensuring full maritime domain awareness.

Finding: The United States now has a clear position on maritime claims in the region. In July 2020, Washington explicitly stated that it does not recognize China’s nine- dash line claim, effectively reversing its position on maritime claims. The new U.S. policy on maritime entitlements mirrors the decision of the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal that ruled in favor of the Philippines. This could have implications for the ongoing negotiation for a joint U.S.-Philippine patrol in the South China Sea.

  • Recommendation: The U.S. Coast Guard and Navy should join their Philippine counterparts in patrolling areas identified in the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal as part of Philippine entitlements.

Finding: Funding remains an issue for the modernization of Philippine forces. While the Philippine Navy continues to procure more modern platforms, budget constraints slow the process. Japan has made the PCG the largest in Southeast Asia in terms of the number of surface assets, but PCG vessels lack modern weapon systems necessary for law enforcement. Japan cannot provide weapon systems because of institutional constraints.

  • Recommendation: The United States and Japan should consider a burden sharing-arrangement to help the Philippines safeguard its maritime entitlements in the South China Sea. Japan should continue to provide the platforms, while the United States provides the weapon systems. Also, the United States can focus its foreign military financing on modernizing the Philippine Navy while Japan can focus its resources on helping the civilian maritime agencies in the Philippines, such as the PCG and the Bureau of Marine and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), increasing their presence in the South China Sea, and developing overall capabilities.

About this report

Pacific Forum, with support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) organized the inaugural Track 2 U.S.-Japan- Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue on December 1- 2, 2022. Strategic thinkers from the United States, Japan and the Philippines, including scholars, policy experts, and retired military and government officials, participated in the dialogue. This report contains the general summary of the discussions.

The recommendations contained in this report, unless otherwise specifically noted, were generated by the discussions as interpreted by the Principal Investigators. This is not a consensus document. All participants attended in their private capacity.

The statements made and views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Pacific Forum, the project sponsors, or the dialogue participants’ respective organizations and affiliations. For questions, please email [email protected]

Click here to download the full report.

PacNet #30 – Now is the time for a US-Japan-Taiwan security trilateral

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Japan is determined to uphold the international order in the Indo-Pacific but cannot achieve that goal alone. Therefore Tokyo enhances its partnership with allies through minilateral arrangements like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (with the United States and Australia). Some even advocate Japan’s cooperation with another minilateral, the Australia-US-UK (AUKUS) pact, in high-tech areas like hypersonics or cybersecurity. The rise of such minilateral frameworks among like-minded countries can make the region more stable and resilient.

Yet another potential framework also merits attention: trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and Taiwan.

Pacific Forum recently published “The World After Taiwan’s Fall,” attracting attention throughout the region. In the volume, David Santoro, Ralph Cossa, and other scholars emphasize the significance of Taiwan in maintaining the current rules-based order. The United States is undoubtedly the biggest supporter of Taiwan—especially in military terms. The Taiwan Relations Act has since 1979 allowed for the transfer of defense articles, something the United States has honored across both Republican and Democratic administrations.

However, during a contingency on Taiwan, Washington would struggle to stave off an attack without Japanese help, chiefly because it has no military bases and deployments on the island. For the US military to rescue Taiwan, it needs proximate locations for operations. Guam, the US territory with Andersen Air Force Base and Apra Harbor, could be a starting point for the US military. A more effective missile defense plan is also needed to protect Guam and continuously project power. The Philippines, under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., has also offered the US military four additional bases which could be used in a contingency.

The closest US bases to Taiwan, however, are in Okinawa, part of the Japanese archipelago and the First Island Chain. Kadena Air Base is one of the US bases that would play a crucial role in a Taiwan contingency. It is 400 miles from Taipei and the only significant US base to reach the Taiwan Strait without refueling. Article 6 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan grants the US military use of facilities and areas not only for defending Japan but also “maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” However, US bases are located on Japanese sovereign territory and Japan’s consent is not automatic. Prior consultation, before US military combat operations commence, is therefore critical in responding to a contingency in Taiwan.

Japan has its own reasons for concern over a Taiwan contingency. If Taiwan falls, Okinawa would then be vulnerable to PRC takeover, as the Pacific Forum report warns. Yonaguni, the westernmost island of Okinawa, is only about 70 miles from Taiwan. In 2016 the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) afresh established a camp on the island. The following year, then-Commander of USPACOM Harry Harris and then-Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Kawano Katsutoshi jointly visited the brand-new camp.

In December 2021, the late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo insisted that a Taiwan contingency is the equivalent of a contingency for Japan. This should come as no surprise: in addition to strategic considerations, bilateral ties between Japan and Taiwan are underpinned by deep friendship. Japan is by far the most liked country among the Taiwanese public. Thousands of ordinary people in Taiwan expressed deep condolences for the assassination of Abe Shinzo, due to his deep commitment to Taiwan. When the 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami hit Japan in 2011, the Taiwanese people enthusiastically expressed solidarity with their Japanese friends. Taiwan, an island of just 23 million people, contributed the second-highest amount of donations following this disaster, behind only the United States.

Japan has tried to enshrine the Taiwan issue as the priority of the US-Japan alliance. In February 2005, the US secretaries of state and defense and the Japanese foreign and defense ministers held the ministerial 2+2 meeting. Already at the time, common strategic objectives of the joint statement included the Taiwan Strait. The joint statement of the 2+2 meeting in June 2011, “Toward a Deeper and Broader US-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership,” encouraged “the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues through dialogue.” During then-Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide’s visit to Washington DC in April 2021, the joint statement also underscored the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait at the summit level for the first time since the end of a formal diplomatic ties with Taipei. Following the leaders’ meeting, the G7 shared their concerns over the Strait. At an incoming summit in Hiroshima in May, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio is expected to coordinate the G7 nations to express continued concern.

Notwithstanding, there is no platform to coordinate the efforts of the three sides. As Beijing takes more assertive actions, these three governments should act now. In my view, the three parties should discuss trilateral security cooperation. Thinking about the triangle security-wise, the weakest side is the tie between Japan and Taiwan. The first challenge for trilateral cooperation is strengthening the security linkage between Tokyo and Taipei.

This new minilateral should start with modest steps. The framework should be functional during a contingent scenario, and establishing a communication channel will be critical, especially at the beginning, to plug the lack of contact. Another gap to fill is cooperation in the maritime domain. Unlike in Ukraine, this would be a significant battle theater, but Taiwan’s navy and coast guard are far less—or not at all—integrated with their US and Japanese counterparts.

A big picture is definitely needed. But a small step is suitable for creating momentum, especially to avoid antagonizing Beijing too much and too soon. There could be several measures to take for practical use. In 2022, it was reported that Japan was considering sending active-duty personnel from the JSDF instead of retired personnel. Someone with an active connection with the JSDF will be an essential channel between the two militaries. As China steps up its efforts in the East and South China Seas, cooperation between the two island countries in the maritime domain is also critical. The memorandum of understanding regarding the collaboration between the US Coast Guard and its Taiwanese counterpart could be a good example to follow. Based on the tangible results of security cooperation between Japan and Taiwan, a trilateral partnership could be established. In fact, trilateral collaboration has already been built up in Taipei. President Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly touched on “GCTF”—the Global Cooperation and Training Framework—to advance cooperation in practical areas, including training, public health, and digital economy. Honolulu could be another acceptable location to smooth communication among the three parties. The tropical city is host to US Indo-Pacific Command, and active personnel from the JSDF and other militaries are dispatched there.

As discussed above, Japan should pursue another minilateral framework in the Indo-Pacific to stabilize the region; it is high time to forge trilateral security cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Taiwan. And some minor steps would be fitting for the very beginning.

Masatoshi Murakami ([email protected]) ) is an associate professor at Kogakkan University in Japan and a visiting fellow with the Air Command and Staff College of Japan and Nakasone Pease Institute. He previously worked with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a career diplomat and has conducted research as a visiting fellow at Pacific Forum this spring.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR4 – A History of Shared Values, A Future of Shared Strategic Interests: US-Australia Relations in the Indo-Pacific

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About this Volume

Authors of this volume participated in the inaugural U.S.- Australia Next-Generation Leaders Initiative, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State through the U.S. Embassy in Canberra. With backgrounds from academia, public policy, civil society, and industry, the cohort brings rich insights on the past, present, and future of the U.S.-Australia relations. This program was conducted from February 2021 – September 2021.

Click here to download the full report.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Americans and Australians in the Pacific Century | Craig Kafura
Chapter 2: “Substantial and Fruitful Benefits”: State Governments as Vectors of CCP Influence in Australia | Rick Umback
Chapter 3: Economic Mate-ship: US-Australian Policy Alignment to Counter PRC Economic Coercion | Rose Rodgers
Chapter 4: Evolving the US-Australia Alliance: An Agenda for Cyberbiosecurity Engagement | Thom Dixon

The United States and Australia have been treaty allies for more than 70 years. This bond endured throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror, and it increasingly looks as though they will be close partners throughout the great power competition with the People’s Republic of China. The two partner countries were among the earliest critics of the PRC’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, have shared concerns over Chinese investment and its impact on their national security, and what growing PRC influence means for them the future of democracy in the Indo-Pacific.

The two countries were early and enthusiastic members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which includes fellow Indo-Pacific democracies Japan and India, and which has moved to address pressing regional challenges such as pandemic response and climate change. Plus, with 2021’s announcement of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) pact Canberra proved its willingness to defy not only Beijing, but also other democracies—especially in Europe—to build out its capacity to defend itself and counter the PRC’s growing regional power.

The contributions to this volume each address the nature, not only of the alliance, but the challenges it will face in the years to come. Craig Kafula of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs notes that public polling in both countries reveals overwhelming agreement on most subjects related to the alliance and its forthcoming challenges, but also differences of opinion that will have to be navigated. Rick Umback of Australian National University’s School of Politics and International Relations examines the growth of PRC influence over local governments and Australia, and the ramifications this has for other liberal democracies in the Indo-Pacific.

Rose Rodgers at the Center for Naval Analyses says the AUKUS has not limited, but actually increased the need for scrutiny of PRC investment in critical and emerging technologies, and other means of screening technological investments. Moving away from what the alliance means for relations with the PRC, Thom Dixon examines the field of cyberbiosecurity—the intersection of cybersecurity and biosecurity—and how US-Australian cooperation in this field is essential to meet two of the great challenges of this age: climate change and pandemic response.

Taken together these analyses—brought to you by the next generation of American-Australian analysts—richly detail the nature of the challenges the allies face, and offer recommendations on how to meet them over the next 70 years of their partnership.

About the Authors

Thom Dixon is undertaking a multidisciplinary PhD at Macquarie University in international relations and synthetic biology. He is a member of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in Synthetic Biology. In 2018, he completed a Non-resident WSD-Handa Fellowship with the Pacific Forum on synthetic biology and Australian foreign policy. Thom is an alumni of the 2017 EU-Australia Leadership Forum and the 2021 US-Australia Next-Generation Leadership Initiative. He is the Vice President of the Australian Institute of International Affairs in NSW and the Manager, National Security and Defence at Macquarie University. His research focuses on the convergence of the life sciences with the information sciences and how international relations can better enable the global bioeconomy.

Craig Kafura is the assistant director for public opinion and foreign policy at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a Security Fellow with the Truman National Security Project, and a Pacific Forum Young Leader. At the Council he coordinates research on public and elite opinion on a wide variety of foreign policy and international affairs issues, with a particular focus on Asia. Since joining the Council in 2011, Craig has authored or coauthored dozens of reports and briefs on public opinion and foreign policy. His writing has appeared in a variety of outlets including Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, and The Diplomat, and he is the coauthor of “Foreign Policy Beliefs Among Leaders and the Public” for The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, 7th edition. Craig holds an MA in political science from Columbia University and a BA in political science from Yale University.

Rose Rodgers is a DC-based political-military analyst. Her research focuses on PRC strategic forces, export controls, nuclear nonproliferation, and arms control. Rose has a Masters in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. She studied Mandarin at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China as a Boren Fellow.

Rick Umback holds a Ph.D. from the Australian National University’s School of Politics and International Relations. His research interests cover the intersection of technology, industry, public policy, politics, and strategic affairs. He is currently employed in the public sector and has previously worked in academia and Parliament.

Photo: Aboard the USS Wasp (LHD 1) at the Port of Brisbane, Army Maj. Gen. Roger Noble, deputy chief of Joint Operations (left) and Rear Adm. Fred Kacher, commander, Expeditionary Strike Group 7 (right) begin the closing ceremony for Exercise Talisman Sabre fon July 27, 2019 from U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Nicolas A. Cloward.

PacNet #29 – Toward a resilient supply chain to counter Chinese economic coercion

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On Aug. 3, 2022, following US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Chinese customs suspended natural sand exports while blocking imports of citrus fruits, chilled white scallops, and frozen mackerel. Export bans are usually symbolic in Taiwan, as farming and fishery exports make up just a fraction of Taiwan’s economy. However, some of the suspended products seem to target specific locales—fishermen, for example, traditionally represent an influential voting bloc in the coastal areas of Taiwan. Beijing may have hoped to turn them toward the relatively China-friendly Kuomintang, and against President Tsai Ing-wen’s Democratic Progressive Party in the local election three months later.

Although China justified the bans by claiming Taiwanese exports violated food safety standards, the timing of this episode suggests Beijing had engaged in economic coercion to change another government’s behavior—and not for the first time.

With China’s rapid economic growth since the late 1970s and early 1980s—and especially after Beijing joined the World Trade Organization in 2001—China’s ability to reward and penalize other countries economically has also grown. As China has increased its interdependence with other countries, it has frequently deployed economic coercion to increase its leverage on issues such as territorial and maritime disputes, in retaliation for criticism over its human rights violations, or to protect its security interests.

Countries in Asia have responded differently toward Beijing’s economic coercion, critically affecting their relations with the regional economic behemoth. Perhaps contrary to the PRC’s expectations, such reactions have contributed to these countries’ growing independence from Chinese coercion, and present an opportunity for the United States to build its regional influence.

Japan

In September 2010, a Chinese trawler collided with two Japanese Coast Guard patrol ships near the Senkaku Islands, an uninhabited—yet disputed—archipelago in the East China Sea. After the Japanese government arrested the trawler captain and sought to put him on trial, China protested. Its expressions of disapproval included halting shipment of rare earth elements (REEs) key to producing hi-tech products like hybrid cars, wind turbines, and guided missiles. The 2010 fishing boat incident triggered Japan’s concerns about dependence on China for processed rare earth materials, as Japan was the largest importer of China’s REEs, and had no alternative supply sources at the time.

The crisis forced Japanese public and private economic actors to pursue multiple REE diversification projects. Notable efforts included increased REE recycling; seeking alternative sources of supply from the United States and Australia; intensifying undersea exploration; and increased use of other substitutes. Consequently, from 2008 to 2018, the share of Japanese rare earth imports from China fell from 91.3% to 58%. China’s ban on rare earth elements showed the downside of “weaponization of interdependence,” by disturbing the global value chain and eventually causing China to lose much of the leverage it had as a key trading partner with Japan.

Australia

The relationship between China and Australia has deteriorated in recent years amid a range of events, starting with Australia banning Huawei from its 5G networks in 2018. The relationship soured further in 2020 as Australia called for an inquiry into China’s response to the COVID-19 outbreak. In response, China imposed an 80.5% tariff on Australian barley and barred imports from Australia such as beef and coal, among other measures. Although Australia has found alternative markets for products such as beef, coal, and copper ore, other products such as lobster and timber continue to suffer compared to their 2019 trade levels.

The case of Australia shows another critical consequence of exercising economic coercion: Rational countries will make the choice not to trade with countries they perceive as aggressors based on the negative perceptions left over from economic coercion, even if this means paying a price economically. This once-close relationship, which took decades to build between the Australian sellers and Chinese buyers, was effectively destroyed by China’s penalties.

South Korea

In July 2016, the US Department of Defense and South Korean Ministry of National Defense announced in a joint statement the alliance’s decision to deploy a US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile battery in South Korea to defend against the increasing North Korean missile threat. THAAD is a highly effective, combat-proven defense against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats. Beijing opposed THAAD in Korea based on the fear that the batteries weakened China’s nuclear deterrent and signaled US intent to contain China.

In response, Chinese tourism to South Korea dropped by about 40% and Korea’s consumer goods and cultural products were boycotted inside its giant neighbor. Estimates of the total cost to South Korea range between $7.5 billion and $15.6 billion. To normalize economic relations and remove informal economic sanctions, the South Korean government in 2017 announced its commitment to “three nos”—no additional deployment of THAAD batteries, no South Korean integration into a US-led regional missile defense system, and no trilateral alliance with the United States and Japan. However, ordinary South Koreans’ views of China deteriorated. According to research by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, in the aftermath of the dispute South Koreans viewed China even less favorably than they view Japan, which colonized the Korean Peninsula from 1910-45 and had consistently been Koreans’ least favored country (with the occasional exception of North Korea).

Lessons of Chinese coercion

Chinese economic coercion poses a serious threat to international trade. Clearly, China has been imposing and administering export restrictions, which requires countries to conform to export duties, export quotas, and to meet minimum export price requirements, to achieve Chinese political goals. To halt such coercion, CSIS Senior Vice President for Asia Victor Cha has introduced the concept of “collective resilience” to counter Chinese economic coercion. Specifically, collective resilience is a concept where the United States organizes partners to build economic leverage and discourage Beijing from engaging in coercion in the first place. Members of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and Chip4 Alliance are often regarded as key partners of the United States. US partners should cooperate with the Biden administration to establish an early warning system, map out critical supply chains, and diversify the resources for important goods to construct a resilient supply chain.

The United States and its allies and partners should build a bloc to deter China’s acts of economic coercion. To build a robust supply chain that reduces China’s role in supplying critical technologies, members of the bloc should first come to an agreement on ways to build fair and resilient economic order. However, the two massive bills passed by the US Congress—the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act—pose a severe threat to this mission. Not only does the IRA provide subsidies to vehicles assembled only in North America, the latter bill provides $52 billion for semiconductor companies constructing new high-end manufacturing plants in the United States. This could undermine US credibility, as both can easily be seen as unfairly subsidizing its companies and violating the spirit, if not specific laws of, the World Trade Organization. At the same time, based on the regional proximity and the influence China has on the region, allies will feel pressure to enter a costly and prolonged subsidy war between the United States and China. Export controls on transfer of cutting-edge technologies to China and building a resilient supply chain in the Indo-Pacific won’t work unless key allies and partners cooperate.

The Biden administration should therefore work with its partners to form economic security strategies on advanced technologies where innovations are spurred, while the commercial competitiveness of each country is protected. The US’ Asian allies have already learned from their Chinese counterpart that the only way to avoid weaponizing the economy is to boost the competitiveness of one’s industry, while reducing the economic dependence of the country exercising economic coercion.

Su Hyun Lee ([email protected]) is a researcher focusing on US-China relations and economic security in Korea National Diplomatic Academy. Previously, she was a 2021-22 Resident Korea Foundation Fellow at the Pacific Forum. She holds BA in East Asian International Studies and MA in International Cooperation both from Yonsei University.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR3 – Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

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Introduction

There is a growing acceptance among countries in the Indo-Pacific region that strategic competition between the United States and China is changing perceptions about security and the adequacy of the existing security architecture. While some have characterized the competition between the two as a new Cold War, it is clear that what is happening in the region is far more complex than the competition that characterized the original Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the economic integration that has taken place since the early 1990s makes it much more difficult to draw bright ideological lines between the two sides. Further, the Asian context of the emerging competition is one where the two competitors have grown to share power. As the dominant military power, the United States has been the primary security guarantor in Asia and beyond. China, on the other hand, has emerged over the past decades as the primary economic catalyst in Asia and beyond. Currently, each side seems increasingly unwilling to accept that arrangement.

Download the full volume here.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Carl Baker

Chapter 1 | Southeast Asia Faces Its Boogeyman – Great Power Competition Returns to Southeast Asia in the 21st Century

Drew Thompson

Chapter 2 | Geoeconomics and Geopolitics in Southeast Asia

Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Chapter 3 | Economic Aspects of National Security

Brad Glosserman

Chapter 4 | China as a technological power: Chinese perspectives and the quantum case

Hoo Tiang Boon

Chapter 5 | Minilateral groupings as an alternative to multilateralism in an era of strategic competition

Thomas Wilkins

Chapter 6 | The Role of Indo-Pacific Economic Institutions in Shaping Security Competition

Prashanth Parameswaran

Chapter 7 | Economic Development Cooperation amid Indo-Pacific Strategic Competition

Gong Xue

Chapter 8 | Regional Security Cooperation in the US-China Strategic Competition

Kei Koga

Chapter 9 | Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation

Raymund Jose Quilop

PacNet #19 – Rare earths realism: Breaking the PRC’s global refining monopoly

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“The Middle East has oil, and China has rare earths.” – Deng Xiaoping (1987)

Rare earth elements (REEs) are a class of 17 metals essential to the technology, transportation, energy, defense, and aerospace industries. These are used for high-powered magnets and precision parts in anything ranging from batteries, solar panels, and wind turbines to smartphones, lasers, and jet engines. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) came to dominate global supply chains for these valuable inputs during the Deng-era of foreign policy characterized by the adage, often translated as “hide your strength, bide your time.” Subsidized state-owned enterprises were empowered to drive competitors out of the rare earths mining and processing businesses, giving the PRC a virtual monopoly by the late 1990s.

The wider world only came to appreciate the strategic implications of this concentration in 2010, when a maritime dispute between the PRC and Japan triggered a total halt of rare earths exports from the former to the latter. Though trade resumed after the incident, the episode highlighted both the vulnerabilities that the dependency allowed, and the PRC’s willingness to exploit those for political leverage. Japan was subsequently motivated to begin investing in alternative suppliers abroad, while the United States moved to jumpstart its own shuttered domestic capacity.

State of the market

Thirteen years later, the green shoots of new market entrants display a small but meaningful movement towards diversifying the world’s REEs supply. The United States and Australia have demonstrated political resolve to break the PRC’s hold on the market. Japan and India are also attempting to establish domestic industries but the barriers to entry remain formidable. The industries of mining and ore refinement are notoriously lengthy and capital-intensive—doubly so in countries with complex licensing and ecological surveying requisites. The PRC still dominates the entire vertical industry and can flood global markets with cheap material, as it has done before with steel and with solar panels. In 2022, it mined 58% of all REEs, refined 89% of all raw ore, and manufactured 92% of REE-based components worldwide. There is no other global industry so concentrated in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, nor with such asymmetric downstream impact, as rare earths—so the United States and other should pursue further diversification with unique urgency.

The United States: Reviving heavy industry

Beijing’s 2010 dispute with Tokyo was one of its several assertive foreign policy maneuvers to set off alarm bells in Washington and precipitate the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia.” As the swiftness of the PRC’s rise continued to outpace expectations during the Trump years, American political appetite shifted from defending hegemony in Asia, to addressing its own vulnerabilities at home—including the outsourcing of mining industries for REEs, amongst others such as lithium, nickel, and graphite. The global bottleneck for midstream industry segments like refining is so severe that the few American rare earths miners in operation send their raw ore to China for processing, before it returns to the United States as permanent magnets for use in F-35s, Tesla Model 3s, and the like.

In conjunction with an overarching strategy to address this weakness by revitalizing domestic supply chains for critical minerals, the US government is supporting the buildout of processing facilities in California and Texas for two rare earths juggernauts in-the-making—MP Materials, an American company, and Lynas Rare Earths, an Australian firm. Additionally, the Biden administration’s recent Inflation Reduction Act provided tax incentives for critical mineral businesses, and supercharged two faculties that will allow the executive branch to bolster industrial development on an ad hoc basis: the Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office and the Defense Production Act. The United States should continue focusing grants towards ventures past the proof of concept stage in rare earths refining and magnet manufacturing, so that they can then access the Department of Energy’s lending resources to scale quickly.

People’s Republic of China: Tightening the reins

The media often characterizes the PRC’s rare earths dominance as the “trump card” of wolf warrior diplomacy, but Xi Jinping likely understands that the implicit threat of applying this leverage outweighs the cost-benefit of its actual use. The international environment of today is far less forgiving than that of 2010, and a rare earths embargo applied tomorrow on a nation like Japan or the United States would easily spark a bellicose trade dispute and push a tsunami of funding towards emerging competitors.

However, there exists a dangerous window during the next several years, when the PRC’s influence over the global industry is diminishing but still overwhelming enough to put importing nations in a bind. In this sense, Beijing could still use its “trump card” over a critical political moment—becoming even more tempting once its monopoly’s decline appears inevitable. Beijing’s cognizance of this scenario is reflected in its recent merger of three state-owned mining giants into the China Rare Earth Group. This massive consolidation allows the party to more easily control the market and develop synergies to bring costs even lower, which will hamper foreign upstarts.

Realist conclusions in a global market-based system

In the long run, monopolistic behavior will be solved by the interconnected markets on which modern society is built. The strategic calculus and narratives between great powers may be swiftly changing, but the fundamental rules of the game remain. The more likely the world perceives the weaponization of the rare earths industry by Beijing, the more pressure will be applied on the two competitive market forces already working towards solutions.

The first is the potential for new market entrants. Rising Chinese export tariffs and spiking prices signal opportunity. Canada, India, and the United Kingdom have all recently announced their intent to develop their first domestic refineries for REEs, with national security interests undoubtedly providing propulsion. Relatively small investments now could pay off big by shaking up market dynamics later this decade, so the United States could seed promising ventures abroad, and consider this high-profile sector an opportunity to build up “friendshoring” partnerships with alternate producers.

The second is the threat of substitutes. Necessity is the mother of invention—and if substitutes can replace REEs in end-use products, then supply fears may be sidestepped. The embedded risks of REEs have already been driving manufacturers like Toyota and Volkswagen to redesign their electric motors with less rare earths or alternative (albeit less efficient) magnet metals. The US departments of  Energy, Defense, and Commerce have been pursuing alternatives, but governments should also consider rewarding companies who find innovative ways of designing their products without REEs, in the style of bug bounties. Even without implementing substitutes, establishing backup options builds supply chain resilience and saps the power of a monopoly.

Tetrataenite is one promising breakthrough in magnetic alternatives. Until recently, this nickel-iron alloy was only observed in meteorite samples, but last year was successfully replicated in a University of Cambridge laboratory. Experts say it has an outside chance at upending the entire rare earths industry in the years to come.

Aside from pressing into the two competitive market forces of new entrants and substitution, the United States should continue subsidizing the rapid development of its rare earths supply chains—particularly the midstream layers: ore processing, mineral refining, and alloying. The faster it can do so, the narrower the window will be for Xi Jinping to play hardball during the waning years of China’s monopoly, and the less likely that opportunity is to coincide with an attempted invasion of Taiwan.

The economic downturn, domestic discontent, and international scrutiny resulting from Beijing’s stringent COVID-19 lockdown policies have left Xi Jinping’s political capital temporarily spent as he works to patch up relations and entice businesses back to the PRC. To break the global refining monopoly without sparking a larger geopolitical firestorm, an inflection point in broadening supply diversification needs to be achieved soon.

Brandt Mabuni ([email protected]) is a resident WSD-Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum. 

An earlier version of this article was published on Pacific Forum’s Young Leaders Blog.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.