Based on USCENTCOM Congressional Testimony
The following is the second in a two-part series on the evolving security architecture in the Indian Ocean and how I2U2 countries (India, Israel, UAE, US) can further security cooperation in the broader Indian Ocean region. It follows a day-long November 2024 workshop conducted by the India and Indian Ocean program at Pacific Forum in partnership with the Hindu American Foundation and StandWithUs. For part one click here.
Strategic competition is a contest of visions. The United States and its allies and partners promote a vision in which the rules-based international order respects the sovereignty of nations and shared interests are advanced through the strength of partnership. The People’s Republic of China, Russia, and Iran have deepened their partnership and collaboration as: 1) Iran seeks to strengthen its regional position in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) through a “good neighbor policy,” 2) Russia leverages Iranian military support in Ukraine, and 3) the PRC aims to exploit tensions in the region to afford them a position of advantage while diminishing US interests. According to public reporting, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said in November 2023 that “death to America” is not just a slogan, it is a policy. The PRC and Russia increasingly contribute to Iran’s goals through direct assistance or refusing to apply their own instruments of national power to discourage Iran’s malign behaviors. Strengthening the I2U2 grouping (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States) can provide a counterweight to PRC-Russia-Iran malign influence in the IOR. Right now, the IOR experiences both conflict and strategic competition. I believe that we need to get the “Indo” right in our “Indo-Pacific” strategies.
For nearly 80 years, since President Truman recognized India in 1946 and Israel in 1948, and President Nixon recognized the United Arab Emirates in 1971, the United States has formed a network of hard-earned security partnerships throughout the IOR. These partnerships are more than just objects to be guarded from competitors like the PRC and Russia, they must be nurtured and reinforced. The United States’ partnerships are strategic high ground and represent a core strength. This is evidenced by the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and its rapid response to recent trade disruptions caused by Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. The US Fifth Fleet leveraged its decades-long relationships under the Combined Maritime Forces to bring together more than 20 nations under Operation Prosperity Guardian, which protects shipping through the critical Bab al Mandeb Strait in response to the Houthis’ indiscriminate attacks. Only the US could generate an international response so quickly, and it would not have been possible without the trust and interoperability the US has fostered among allies and partners. India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States are crucial partners who can strengthen Operation Prosperity Guardian and make the Bab al Mandeb a free and open chokepoint. Each of our countries depends on the free flow of energy, goods, and other communications to maintain stability throughout the IOR and eastward into the Pacific.
US partnerships in the IOR will become even more valuable as the transformation toward modernization and prosperity continues. The United States wants to be part of this transformation, and its competitors know this. India, through its 14-nation Information Fusion Center—Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram, successfully monitored and tracked the MV Ruen, a Malta-flagged vessel which had been hijacked by Somali pirates. Through multinational information-sharing and cooperation, INS Kolkata intercepted the vessel and forced the surrender of 35 Somali pirates onboard. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) catapulted itself to global prominence in space, sending an astronaut to the International Space Station for six months and providing the world with a new map of Mars from its Hope Spacecraft, the second probe ever to successfully enter Mars orbit on its first try. And Israel successfully defended its own territory and the territories of KSA, Jordan, Bahrain, and the UAE from two separate Iranian missile attacks in 2024, with the support of the US, UK, and France. These are all examples of I2U2 and the Abraham Accords in action. American engagement has contributed to this transformation, and the IOR of the future will remain open to those who continue to help it.
Strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China
With telecommunications and physical infrastructure, diplomacy, and security cooperation, the PRC is rapidly penetrating the IOR and feeds misperceptions of American disengagement to try to supplant the United States as the security partner of choice. In late October 2023, the PRC’s outgoing Naval Escort Task Force (NETF), which ostensibly counters piracy in the Gulf of Aden on rotational deployments since 2008, visited Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Pakistan before departing the theater. This unprecedented series of port calls was a milestone in the PRC’s nascent campaign to gain security influence and access.
The term “security partner” means something very different to the PRC than it does to the United States, and this is important for India, Israel, and the UAE to know. The PRC offers discounted sales and rapid delivery of military equipment, and the region is learning the hidden cost associated with these quick sales. When Chinese equipment performs poorly, there is no maintenance, logistics, or training architecture in place. Furthermore, the PRC shows no desire to support the region’s security or stability with its military forces. For example, the PRC’s NETF in the Gulf of Aden has done nothing in the defense of international shipping under Houthi attack, nor has it responded to the recent series of piracy events in the Somali Basin, instead solely focusing on the protection of Chinese assets and interests. Considering the PRC’s failure, I believe India can rise as the net security provider for the IOR, and strengthening the Indian Navy in power projection, anti-submarine warfare, and Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness will help. I was thrilled to see I2U2 in action when INS Shardul visited Dubai in October of this year for the exercise Zayed Talwar.
Meanwhile, the PRC has also done little to rein in Iran’s destabilizing behavior since the much-touted rapprochement it brokered between Tehran and Riyadh in March 2023. Unfortunately, perhaps as evidence of the lack of depth of the arrangement and tepid commitment towards actual stability, Iran has continued its illicit activities, including continued arming of the Houthis. It is noteworthy that the PRC buys 90% of exported Iranian oil, which they could use to influence Iranian lethal aid to the Houthis if they chose to. Instead, Beijing only helps Tehran evade sanctions and accelerate its destabilization of the region. The PRC’s unwillingness, or inability, to leverage its influence has contributed to Iran’s disruption of the free flow of international commerce. I2U2 countries must work together to ensure the free flow of international commerce for all the nations of the IOR.
The IOR is vital to the PRC achieving its goal of refashioning the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences and become the world’s leading power. Increased cooperation between the PRC and the IOR advances its Belt and Road projects, strengthens bilateral relations, and helps regional countries diversify their economies.
A key element of the Belt and Road seeks to create overland shipping routes between the PRC and Europe through Central and South Asia, which could bolster regional economies but also carries risk. For example, Pakistan is the world’s third-largest recipient of Chinese loans (behind Russia and Venezuela), receiving over $67 billion to fund the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Now, amid its ongoing economic crisis, Pakistan is vulnerable to PRC influence.
The PRC relies on the IOR for its energy, importing 80% of its crude oil through the Indian Ocean. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) announced last year by the US, along with six other countries and the European Union, offers a promising counterbalance to the PRC’s Belt and Road. IMEC supports the vision of a Free and Open Indian Ocean Region, which strengthens free trade, economic development free of coercion, and support for each state’s sovereignty.
The US must improve its processes to outperform competitors like the PRC, who has increased arms sales to the region in the last decade. The US is also monitoring the potential expansion of PLA basing in the IOR, beyond their current naval base in Djibouti and influence at the Port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar Port in Pakistan, and Kyaukphu Port in Myanmar. If the PRC were to secure additional PLA naval bases, it could give them the ability to hold I2U2 strategic lines of communication at risk. Even in ports where they have no intention of establishing a naval base, Chinese state-owned enterprises that own or operate terminals could give them considerable political influence that present I2U2 countries with logistical challenges in a future conflict.
The PRC’s heavy dependence on energy imports from the IOR and I2U2 navies’ ability to control vital sea lines of communication and chokepoints, such as the Suez Canal, Bab al Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, and Strait of Malacca, means that deterrence of further regional instability is within our reach. In closing, I2U2 should work together to compete throughout the IOR to the benefit of each of our countries’ Indo-Pacific strategies.
Dr. Jason Olson ([email protected]) is a scholar specializing in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean region. He has received research grants to study the Abraham Accords, focusing particularly on how they align with U.S. interests. He collaborates with various ambassadors to expand the successful peacebuilding model of the Abraham Accords to other Muslim-majority countries. Jason earned his Ph.D. in Near Eastern and Judaic Studies from Brandeis University in 2016. This paper is not written on behalf of the US DoD, US Navy, or PACFLT and these views are solely the author’s in his personal/academic capacity.
PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.
Photo: Chinese naval troops wave off a replenishment ship bound for the waters near Somalia | Credit: Reuters
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