As I sat down to write this article to commemorate the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings 81 years ago, I was struck by the news that the US Pentagon is working on a major overhaul of the US’ nuclear strategy. Faced with the possibility of simultaneous, coordinated nuclear confrontations involving multiple nuclear-armed adversaries, namely Russia, China, and North Korea, instead of only one nuclear peer, Washington is exploring options on how to deal with such a prospect. According to reports on the policy the Trump administration is likely to follow, it plans a renewed focus on short-range tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in regional conflicts involving US allies. The country is reportedly in search of “credible nuclear options” that would “expand the president’s option space by providing him with realistic and credible options and therefore strengthen deterrence.”
Can “tactical” nuclear weapons offer credible options of nuclear use? Would one country’s use of tactical nuclear weapons keep the ensuing nuclear war from escalating beyond the tactical level? Is there any way of ensuring that the adversary plays the game as you desire? Can there be a guarantee that both will keep the use of nuclear weapons at the “tactical’ level?
Lastly, what exactly are TNWs, and can there be anything “tactical” about the use of weapons of mass destruction?
The lure of TNWs
There is no universal definition of tactical nuclear weapons. In the European battlefield of the Cold War, short-range (less than 500 km) nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles or bombers carrying gravity bombs of up to 200 kilotons or artillery shells, depth charges or land mines, were described as “tactical.” NATO perceived value in such weapons. The argument, as explained by Thornton Read in his chapter of the book Limited Strategic War, published in 1962, was that “deploying nuclear weapons near the front makes their use virtually automatic and therefore denies the opponent the option of conventional war. He is left with the choice between not attacking or setting off a nuclear war that would be likely to get out of hand.” So, by magnifying the risk of an uncontrollable nuclear war in case of use of TNWs, NATO signaled deterrence against Russia’s conventional superiority.
Such thinking emerged as a counter to the doctrine of massive retaliation announced in 1954 by then-US Secretary of State John F. Dulles. But many nuclear strategists doubted the credibility of massive retaliation, opining that large-scale use of nuclear weapons against any kind of conventional provocation was unrealistic and would never be taken seriously by the adversary. Flexible response emerged as the solution. It envisaged the use of nuclear weapons in conflicts short of all-out thermonuclear war.
While the US has retained elements of the flexible response strategy ever since the 1960s, after the end of the Cold War Washington drastically reduced its tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons inventory by over 90%. It retired nuclear artillery, land-based short-range missiles, and atomic demolition munitions, retaining the option of only air-delivered gravity bombs. The return to TNWs will likely resurface more options across delivery platforms. It may be recalled that the last couple of Nuclear Posture Reviews already mentioned the fielding of limited sea-based low-yield options (such as the W76-2 warhead on Trident submarine missiles) to plug perceived gaps in this domain.
Such an attack would be enabled by counterforce capabilities of high precision and accuracy that can allow for a “discriminate” nuclear war. Technological advancements in miniaturization of nuclear warheads, development of highly accurate delivery systems, and better space-based, AI-enabled remote sensing to identify enemy nuclear forces, the realization of the Golden Dome to ensure defense are all part of the piece of US nuclear strategy to handle a high intensity peer conflict scenario. Improved offensive capabilities for counterforce attacks and active defenses for damage limitation are believed to provide the credible nuclear option. Nuclear counterforce that facilitates avoidance of targeting cities are assumed to provide escalation dominance through a flexible and controlled response. It may be recalled that in the late 1970s, too, such ideas had been put forth by the nuclear use theorists or NUTS.
NUTS advocated nuclear deterrence through the projection of nuclear war fighting, arguing that nuclear operations could be conducted in a logical and controlled manner. The idea of escalation dominance and cool control while using low-yield, small nuclear weapons on a limited number of military targets was rationally put forth. The intent was to signal an ability to undertake a limited, pre-emptive, counterforce attack to deter the adversary from initiating or escalating a conventional conflict.
Can TNWs keep nuclear war limited?
However, the question that had raised its head then and which will be pertinent today too is whether it is possible to execute controlled nuclear operations? Though these are advertised as limited nuclear operations with small nuclear weapons, the challenge stems from the uncertainty about the adversary’s response. In his book, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Lawrence Freedman states, “It takes two to keep a war limited.” It can never be guaranteed by the first user that the adversary would read the signal of limited nuclear use correctly and respond in the same manner. In fact, going by the experience of simulation exercises and war games conducted during the Cold War, no war beginning with the use of tactical nuclear weapons ever ended at that level.
Even more problematic is the risk generated by the suggestion that the use of a few, small nuclear weapons would be a better proposition than large-scale use of nuclear weapons. If accepted as a risk worth taking, the idea of limited nuclear war would increase the temptation of their use. In turn, this would generate a sense of vulnerability in the country likely to face such a limited strike and thus raise its incentive for pre-emption, thereby making a nuclear exchange more likely.
This is where one needs to remember the nature of nuclear weapons as quite distinct from conventional weapons. The instantaneous release of large amounts of energy in the form of blast and thermal heat, ionizing radiation, and long-term radiation from nuclear fallout make nuclear detonations very different from others.
How can the lure of TNWs be limited?
To drive home this appreciation of the basics of nuclear weapons and deterrence, it is recommended that studies, especially the use of visual media such as cinema, be undertaken to graphically illustrate the damage potential of nuclear weapons. Once the full range of physical, economic, social, political, health, environmental, and psychological effects are highlighted, arsenal requirements would be better understood.
It is evident that in the current geopolitical environment nations feel compelled to keep nuclear weapons for deterrence. But expansion plans need to demonstrate understanding that it is not essential that the warheads must keep on growing for deterrence to work. Nuclear deterrence is fairly easy to establish in terms of hardware requirements. Empirical data is already available on the damage caused by 12- and 20-kiloton weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These two incidents scarred human minds enough to not let the use of the weapon to be repeated.
Human memory, unfortunately, is short and, as the intensity of the impact fades, needs refreshing. This is true across the world, where the effects of nuclear weapons have not really been systematically studied or documented in popular media in recent times. To grab popular attention, it is necessary to use a plethora of platforms to conduct and publicize studies involving scientists, military men, disaster management officials, and academics to assess the number of deaths and the extent of destruction that nuclear weapons of varying yields on different targets could cause. These can be disseminated better by transforming them into engaging stories. It is one thing to vaguely know that the effects of nuclear use would be horrific, but quite another to be confronted with the extent of actual damage in real places with real figures.
Exposing leaders and societies to such writings, reports, documentaries and movies would bring real issues to the fore. It may be recalled that during the Cold War, American nuclear literature produced several such works, including Hollywood movies that visualized life the day after. Each region that inhabits nuclear armed states needs to do the same so that policy makers and the public can get an idea of the nature of the weapon. Such studies/creation of media can be undertaken individually or jointly. No country needs to be beholden to a reciprocal gesture or an agreement with another to conduct the exercise. Results would be available for all to see and evaluate for themselves. Empirical information on the impact of the blast, heat, prompt nuclear radiation and radioactive fallout in an easy to assimilate format would also enhance nuclear deterrence as nations realize the futility of nuclear weapons for achieving a political objective in a situation where the adversary has a secure second-strike capability. This could sober nuclear requirements.
The historical experience of nuclear weapons buildup reveals that nations often succumb to the concept of “inevitability” in capability build-up. It almost becomes a compulsion for adversaries to follow each other’s lead. This, however, need not be so. Nations have the option of making choices based on the basics of the nature of nuclear weapons. It is when nations forget the unique attributes of nuclear weapons that an arms race takes shape.
Manpreet Sethi ([email protected]) is Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies and Senior Research Advisor at the Asia Pacific Leadership Network.
Media: Pavel Sarychev/Alamy Stock Photo
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