Having contributed to monitoring India-Southeast Asia relations via a descriptive analytical approach for Pacific Forum’s journal Comparative Connections, I welcome the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) 2026 State of Southeast Asia Survey and the Lowy Institute’s 2025 Southeast Asia Influence Index. Both present relevant metrics using different methodologies on Southeast Asia’s relations with select external countries, including India. Another worthy tool is the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy’s Anatomy of Choice Alignment Index (AOCAI) but it only addresses Southeast Asian countries interactions with the US and China—not other external partners of ASEAN member countries.

However, a shared shortcoming, alas inherent in the design of such tools, is that neither provides sufficient consideration of India’s own stakes and priorities in the region. By adding India’s outlook and goals, a fuller, complementary assessment of India-Southeast Asia relations may be reached.

ISEAS 2026 State of Southeast Asia key findings about India

A key finding of the 2026 ISEAS survey is that while India ranks last or fifth of the five countries measured for “trust” (Japan, EU, US, China, and India), for the first time trust exceeds distrust of India. And India’s trust ranking is just below China’s (with Beijing too moving into positive trust territory for the first time) and the United States. India’s inclusion among the five countries polled about trust is itself notable given that the overall survey measures the influence (but not trust) of up to 11 external countries—depending upon the specific variable measured. For example, India ranks sixth among eight external countries for both economic and politico-strategic influence in ASEAN. However, the survey measures ASEAN’s 11 Dialogue Partners’ strategic influence separately—where India stands seventh. Trust versus influence is not easily separable or distinguishable partly given the shifting number of countries included in polling specific variables and because the measures flowing into trust and influence are not the same.

A more challenging issue is that “trust” appears delinked from perceptions (not empirical measurements) of material economic and politico-strategic influence. For example, trust of India and other countries is measured by perceptions of whether India/they will “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance; however, neither what is “right” or a country’s interest and capability of doing “right” is clear). The two key components of trust in India are its role as a “responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law” and its “vast economic resources and the political will to provide global leadership.” Here again, the line between trust and influence is fuzzy—and perceptually not empirically measured. Distrust of India is primarily explained by two components; India’s focus on “internal and subcontinental affairs and hence cannot focus on global concerns and issues” and India’s lack of “capacity or political will for global leadership.”

The complexity of the ISEAS survey’s views of India is not mitigated by other highlights. India ranks last among all of ASEAN’s dialogue partners for leadership in maintaining a rules-based order and upholding international law. Over 60% of ASEAN has “no confidence,” “little confidence,” or “no comment” that India will “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance. And yet India ranks third of six choices as a “preferred and trusted strategic partner” to hedge against the uncertainties of US-China rivalry.

ASEAN elites seem conflicted about India’s actual and potential role. Changing international conditions as much as assessments of India’s actions appear to shape these perceptions. Depending upon one’s half empty or half full approach to assessment, India is a poor option for ASEAN’s stated priorities and requirements or ASEAN has a range of poor options among which India is a middle power option that cannot afford to be ignored.

Lowy Southeast Asia Influence Index (SEAII)

According to the findings of the Lowy index , India ranks sixth in overall economic, defense, diplomatic, and cultural influence among ten extra-regional powers; behind China, the US, Japan, Australia, South Korea and ahead of UK, France, Russia, and Canada. Notably, India’s overall “score” is proximate to other middle powers Japan, Australia, and Korea. India is surprisingly weak on cultural and people-to-people influence despite a long civilizational history with the region. The reasons for India’s relative status among external partners, according to the index is that India’s “practical follow-through with Southeast Asian countries often lags behind the pace of announced initiatives and cooperative frameworks.”

On the table: India-Southeast Asia relations compared in the ISEAS Survey & Lowy Influence Index

ISEAS and Lowy are aligned in seeing India’s role as mostly commensurate with other middle powers—and on one or two specific variables (say “trust” in the ISEAS survey or defense networks in the Lowy index) close to either the US or China. A distinction with a difference is that Southeast Asian opinions in the ISEAS survey appear lower than the measured empirical variables in the Lowy influence index.

A summary of India in the survey and index can be juxtaposed as follows:

Meaning from measurements

What is the meaning of the ISEAS and Lowy measures of India-Southeast Asia relations? First, neither valuable initiative includes India’s (or other external partners) desired weight and priorities in Southeast Asia. India reasonably could both perceive and measure its influence and role in Southeast Asia as commensurate and aligned with its interests—closer to its ranking and position in the Lowy Institute’s Southeast Asia Influence Index than the perceptions of India in the ISEAS’ Survey of the State of Southeast Asia.

For India, Southeast Asia is an important but not core priority compared to its immediate neighborhood, much of west Asia, and the major global powers and even Europe as measured by a range of variables including but not limited to domestic drivers of foreign policy, energy imports, exports of petroleum products, trade, foreign direct investment, maritime and land borders, chokepoints and sea-lanes, foreign assistance, security threats, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), and Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) activities and many other empirically measurable factors. Southeast Asia is not unimportant to India but should not be over-weighted either. India’s advances in Southeast Asia such as being a member of regional arrangements (including opting out of ones such as RCEP not perceived to be in India’s interests) reflect diplomatic progress compared to its earlier isolation in the region. India also continues to act in Southeast Asia via the Quad; which bridges numerous interests. While still a middle-level economic and defense partner, the net slope of India’s role in Southeast Asia has been steadily upward—albeit from a low base.

India now needs to update its assessment of Southeast Asia to determine whether the region should be accorded higher priority amidst great global disruptions. Southeast Asia needs to adjust its “demand-side” perceptions of India with less grand expectations and a deeper appreciation of what drives India and what it can, and cannot, deliver in Southeast Asia.

Satu Limaye, PhD ([email protected]) is President & CEO of The America + Asia Project, Senior Fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses, and Visiting Scholar at George Washington University’s Sigur Center.

Media: Philippine Navy

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